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FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

P E R S I A

PART XXVII

JULY TO DECEMBER 1929

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Further Correspondence respecting Persia.

PART XXVII.

[E 3303/3303/34]

No. 1.

Colonial Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 1.)

Sir, *Colonial Office, June 28, 1929.*
I AM directed by Lord Passfield to transmit to you, to be laid before Mr. Secretary Henderson, a copy of a despatch addressed by the High Commissioner for Iraq to His Majesty's Minister, Tehran, regarding questions outstanding between the Iraq and Persian Governments.

2. I am to state that Lord Passfield's observations on Sir Gilbert Clayton's despatch will follow at a later date.

I am, &c.
J. H. HALL.

Enclosure 1 in No. 1.

Sir G. Clayton to Sir R. Clive.

(Secret.)

Sir, *Bagdad, May 27, 1929.*
IN connexion with the proposal of the Persian Government to send a representative to Bagdad to negotiate a treaty, I have the honour to enclose herewith a series of notes by my counsellor on the subject of the various questions outstanding between the Iraq and Persian Governments. While I see no *prima facie* reason to differ from any of the views expressed in these notes, I have not had time to study in detail the considerable number of questions involved. I do not, therefore, wish at present to commit myself to complete concurrence with the views expressed by Mr. Bourdillon. I think, however, that the notes may be of use to you and may facilitate correspondence between us when negotiations have commenced. I should be grateful for any interim comments that you may feel inclined to make, or for any suggestions as to further subjects which might be discussed.

2. A copy of this despatch is being sent to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.

I have, &c.
GILBERT CLAYTON,
Acting High Commissioner for Iraq.

Enclosure 2 in No 1.

Note on Questions Outstanding between the Iraq and Persian Governments.

SIR ROBERT CLIVE has intimated to us that the Persian Government are sending a representative to Bagdad to negotiate a treaty with Iraq. It appears that the treaty in question is to be "a treaty of friendship or provisional agreement." Beyond this somewhat vague description, we do not know exactly what the Persian Government contemplate, and we are expecting a further communication from Tehran in this regard. Unless all that the Persian Government are contemplating is a mere one- or two-clause treaty laying down perpetual friendship between the two countries, it would appear that the Perso-Egyptian Treaty would be an excellent model for a general agreement between Persia and Iraq.

There remain three major subjects for negotiation:—

(1.) *Customs Tariff.*

A "most-favoured-nation" treatment clause may be included in the general treaty, but it would probably be preferable to have a separate customs agreement, and in that event it may be necessary to conclude an *accord provisoire* of, say, one year's duration in order to allow time for the conclusion of a detailed formal agreement.

(2.) *A Frontier Agreement.*

This should specifically recognise the 1913 Protocol frontier, and it might well be modelled, as regards the remainder of its provisions, on the Treaty of Angora.

(3.) *A Tripartite Agreement in regard to the Shatt-el-Arab Conservancy Board.*

In regard to this we still await the views of the Iraq Government.

Besides these major questions, there is a considerable number of minor matters to be dealt with, and I append a series of notes prepared by myself and consular secretary in regard to such matters. My own view is that as many of these matters as possible should be dealt with by inter-departmental agreements, for which we have a good many precedents, rather than by full dress agreements requiring parliamentary ratification.

B. H. B(OURDILLON).

May 25, 1929.

Extradition Agreement between Persia and Iraq.

Procedure is at present based on an informal agreement, accepted as a temporary measure by both Governments.

The agreement, though sparingly used, has worked quite well in practice. It is simple in form, and has given rise to one difficulty only. It makes no mention of any right, on the part of the extraditing nation, to refuse extradition of its own nationals. There are three practices current in this matter:—

1. No exclusion, as between Great Britain and the United States of America.
2. Absolute exclusion, as between Great Britain and most European States.
3. Permissive exclusion, as in the British treaty with Persia.

Under the provisional agreement no right to refuse extradition of nationals of the extraditing State is secured, but the Persian Government have taken the line that under international custom no State ever extradites its own nationals. They are not correct, but as it was obviously convenient to be able to refuse to extradite Iraqis, we have not challenged their point of view, but have simply, on a basis of reciprocity, refused to extradite Iraqis.

The formal extradition treaty which will now presumably be concluded will have to mention this point. My own view is in favour of permissive exclusion, as there may conceivably be cases where we should actually prefer to extradite an Iraqi. This would follow the line of the agreement with Syria.

B. H. B.

May 7, 1929.

Customs Co-operation between Persia and Iraq in the Shatt-el-Arab.

The need for close co-operation is obvious, and the fact that, owing to the greater efficiency of our organisation, and the fact that the Shatt belongs to Iraq, Persia needs Iraq help more than *vice versa*, should help in the conclusion of an agreement. A working arrangement was arrived at between Mr. Monk and M. Cordonnier in June 1924. This arrangement was subject to the approval of both Governments. The Iraq Government approved it, but the Persian Government, although it was very much in their favour, refused to do so, on the ground that they had not recognised the Iraq Government. In actual practice the arrangement is to all intents and purposes in force.

The only question of importance that arises is whether the tri-national conservancy board will have anything to do with any agreement as to customs procedure that may be arrived at. My own view is that they need not and should not.

B. H. B.

May 7, 1929.

Direct Telegraphic and Telephonic Communication between Iraq and Persia.

There is actually in existence an inter-departmental agreement, negotiated at Tehran by Mr. Gumbley in September 1925. Not having recognised Iraq, the Persian Government would not agree to through connexion, but the agreement allowed for two frontier telegraph offices with hand transfer between them.

Even this agreement has not, owing to the failure of the Persian Government to do their share, become operative. Apart, however, from the ridiculous hand transfer at the frontier, it seems a suitable basis for a permanent agreement. Such an agreement should, in my opinion, be purely inter-departmental, and not subject to ratification.

One serious difficulty has arisen in the shape of the attitude of the Indo-European Telegraph Department, who have objected to the agreement as infringing certain of their rights. It looks as if it may be necessary, in order to satisfy the Indo-European Telegraph Department, to increase the rates laid down in the provisional agreement. It is, however, the duty of the Persian, and not of the Iraq, authorities to deal with the Indo-European Telegraph Department.

As regards telephonic communication, we have a long-distance system to Khanaqin, and Persia has one to Khasrovi, 6 or 7 miles away. We have asked the Persian Department to join up, and they, as was expected, refused. But it should now be possible to arrange a connexion.

B. H. B.

May 8, 1929.

Combined Customs Post at Persian Frontier.

At the present moment Persia has a customs and passport post at Khasrovi, about a quarter of a mile over the frontier. Iraq has a passport post at Katchal-Katchal, on the frontier, most of the building, which was put up during the war, being actually in Persian territory. The Iraq customs post is at railhead at Khanaqin, 7 miles away.

The advantages of pushing railhead up to the frontier and having a combined customs post there has long been recognised, and plans have been discussed by the Customs Departments of the two countries. A scheme, which is understood to be likely to satisfy the Persian Government, was forwarded officially by the Council of Ministers to the High Commissioner on the 8th November, 1927, with the request that it should be laid before the Persian Government. It was sent demi-officially to Sir Robert Clive, who has not yet considered the time suitable to press it.

There is no reason why the scheme should not be discussed as soon as the Persian representative arrives, but there is no money in the budget either for the railway extension or the building of the post.

B. H. B.

May 8, 1929.

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Persian and Iraq Nationality Problems.

The chief difficulty has arisen over article 8 (b) of the Iraq Nationality Law, which lays down the reasonable and ordinary provision that any person born in Iraq who attains his majority and whose father was born in Iraq and resident in Iraq at the time of the person's birth is an Iraqi. Nationality thus acquired may be renounced within one year of the attainment of majority. To cover the cases of persons who had attained majority more than one year before the passing of the law, they were allowed up till the 6th August, 1926, within which to renounce Iraq nationality. This period was extended for a year, and again, at the express request of the Persian Government, until the 31st December, 1927. A further extension was asked for, but refused. The result is that any resident of Iraq who comes under this definition and who has attained his majority is irrevocably an Iraqi national, even though he may, under the Persian law, also be a Persian national.

This brings us to the Persian law. That law is silent upon the subject of children born abroad of Persian parents, but they are, in fact, regarded as Persians up to the *n*th generation (*vide* Mr. Nicolson's despatch to the Foreign Office of the 4th November, 1926). This obviously gives rise to a great many cases of dual nationality, which would not matter much if Persia would recognise dual nationality, and would also recognise the universal principle that in cases of dual nationality the nationality of domicile prevails; in other words, that a Perso-Iraqi is a Persian while in Persia and an Iraqi while in Iraq, and cannot in either country claim consular protection by the consuls of his alternative motherland. But this principle the Persian Government have so far refused, tacitly at any rate, to recognise. *Hinc illæ lachrymæ.* Once they recognise the principle—and they must be made to do so—it does not matter to Iraq how many of her inhabitants have Persian as well as Iraq nationality; but it is intolerable to have Persian consuls claiming to protect a number of individuals who are, by a law based on well-recognised principles, Iraq subjects. It is possible that, in order to settle this question and induce Persia to recognise the dual nationality principle, it may be necessary to revive the period for renunciation which expired at the end of 1927, but I should strongly deprecate this.

This is the main problem. A subsidiary problem of considerable importance springs from it, namely, that of the tribal cultivators (mostly Muhaisin) on the Iraq riverain tracts bordering on the Shatt-el-Arab. The question is very fully dealt with in our secret despatch of the 30th June, 1928.

The last sentence of article 8 of the Treaty of Erzerum of 1847 runs:—

“And they have agreed that the tribes concerning whom there is a dispute and whose suzerain is not known shall, once for all, have the choice and election of the place wherein they shall henceforth reside; and the tribes whose subjection is known shall be forcibly returned to the territory of the State to which they belong.”

No actual mention is made of nationality, but it is pretty clearly intended that “subjection” should follow “residence,” and we proposed that Persia should be invited to agree that under the Treaty of Erzerum all tribes permanently domiciled in Iraq or Persia follow, as regards nationality, their place of domicile, the same principle holding good in the case of a frontier tribe domiciled partly in Persia and partly in Iraq. This solution would probably involve an amendment of both nationality laws, but I am sure that it is the only satisfactory one. As far as we know, this suggestion has not yet been mentioned to the Persian Government.

B. H. B.

May 9, 1929.

Right of Iraqis in Persia, and Persians in Iraq, to own Immovable Property.

The present position is that in Persia no foreigner may own immovable property, except such as may be necessary as a residence or place of business. Agricultural estates are thus excluded. There is no discrimination against Iraqis as compared with other foreigners.

In Iraq all foreigners may own immovable property of any description, but the consent of the Council of Ministers must be obtained in every case before the property can be registered in their name, and it has been the practice, while strained relations with Persia prevailed, to refuse this consent in the case of Persians. There is, therefore, a discrimination in practice, but not in law, against Persians.

The question might be discussed, but I doubt whether any agreement is practicable, and we shall probably end by being compelled to recognise the existing legal position, namely, that Persians can own agricultural estates in Iraq, while Iraqis cannot do so in Persia.

B. H. B.

May 9, 1929.

Consular Protection of Iraqis in Persia.

In negotiating any agreement with Persia, which mentions consular representations, it will have to be borne in mind that, at the present moment, Persia refuses to allow British consular officers to “protect” Iraqis. They may only “use their good offices on their behalf.” Once proper relations are established it must be made clear that British consuls in Persia have, until Iraqi consuls are appointed, the same rights and duties in respect of Iraqis that they have elsewhere.

B. H. B.

May 9, 1929.

Execution in Iraq of Judgments of Persian Courts and vice versa.

A law for the execution of foreign judgments was passed in June 1928, the countries to which it is applicable being left for settlement by regulation. The law has so far been applied to Great Britain and Syria and the Lebanon, and the Iraq Government wish also to apply it to France, Italy, Germany, Egypt, Turkey and India. The question arises as to whether it should apply to Persia. My own view is that it should not, at any rate, until there has been a considerable improvement in the Persian Courts; but it may be difficult to resist a demand by Persia that the law should be extended to cover her. At any rate we should avoid raising the issue from this side.

B. H. B.

May 23, 1929.

Administration of Estates of Deceased Persians in Iraq and vice versa.

We have in the past been frequently troubled by demands from Persian consular officers to be allowed to administer the estates of Persians dying in Iraq. The question is a difficult one, and special legislation will be required. Such legislation will not affect the jurisdiction of the Iraq courts, but provision might be made—

- (a) For consuls to be informed in cases where heirs cannot be found, so that enquiries may be made in Persia.
- (b) For consuls to assist in the distribution of small estates, when able and willing to do so.
- (c) For consuls to be consulted in regard to personal law.

How the question of the administration of Iraqi estates in Persia stands, as regards Persian law, I do not know, as I do not think we have ever had a case referred to us. But obviously any agreement arrived at would have to be reciprocal.

B. H. B.

May 23, 1929.

Mutual Service of Judicial Documents between Iraq and Persia.

The present arrangement is confined to mutual service of summons. There is no reason why this should not extend to mutual service of all documents emanating from the courts (the term “service,” of course, not including “execution” of warrants of arrest, or of judgments), as in the case of our agreement with Syria. There seems no reason, however, to repeat the rather peculiar safeguards which exist under the arrangement with Syria, to prevent a person who responds to a summons from being proceeded against on a criminal charge without being first given a chance to flee across the frontier. After all, if he has reason to fear being arrested he need not respond to the summons. Nor need the power existing in the

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Syrian arrangement to refuse to serve summons in contravention cases be retained. The person served can always refuse to answer the summons.

As regards the channel of service, the consular authorities would probably be best; e.g., a court in Kermanshah would send a document to the Persian consul-general, who would send it to the Ministry of Justice.

As regards the method of service, each country would accept the practice observed in the other. A certificate, signed by the local authorities and authenticated by the consul, would be sufficient proof of service for the court issuing the document.

B. H. B.

May 23, 1929.

Special Passport Arrangements for the Shatt-el-Arab.

In Turkish times no passport control was in operation between Mohammerah and Basra.

2. On introduction of the passport system in Iraq and for four years after the war, the Iraq Administration maintained their own passport officer in Persian territory at Mohammerah, who concerned himself only with Indians and foreigners and did not interfere with the local inhabitants, for whom there was free travel along the Shatt-el-Arab.

3. In March 1922, in view of a Persian Government protest, this officer was withdrawn, and the Iraq police issued regulations compelling all travellers between Basra and Mohammerah to carry some form of passport, visaed either by the police in Basra or by the British vice-consul at Mohammerah, as being good for all journeys between Mohammerah, Abadan and Basra for a period of twelve months. Five rupees was charged for this visa. Simultaneously, for the first time in history, passport checking of all arrivals and departures was initiated at Basra.

4. A storm of protest arose from Basra merchants, and especially from the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. The Persian Government (not the Sheikh of Mohammerah) authorities, on the other hand, were pleased, since they made money issuing passports to Persians as required by the new Iraq rule.

5. In April 1923 revised regulations were issued by the Iraq police. These totally exempted permanent residents on either bank of the Shatt-el-Arab (Gurmat Ali to Fao) from having to carry passports or get visas for crossing the river, and under them Basrawis could visit Mohammerah and Mohammerawis could visit Basra at will so far as the Iraq control was concerned. The new rules also instituted what is known as the "Shatt-el-Arab visa," permitting persons other than such permanent residents to travel for one year between Basra and Mohammerah. The fee for this visa was 2 rupees. Here the Persian authorities took a hand in the game; they had no intention of giving up their new passport takings. They refused to accept the Iraq exemption of permanent residents from Gurmat Ali to Fao, and would exempt only residents on the stretch of the river from Abul Khasib to Fao, i.e., in practice, only adherents of the Sheikh of Mohammerah who live on either bank of the river below Basra. Even the latter had to carry Mukhtar's identity certificates. This meant that Basrawis had to have passports to enter Mohammerah, although Mohammerawis need not have them to enter Basra. Further, the Persian authorities now began to insist on such passports bearing the visa of the Persian consul at Basra for entry to Mohammerah. The latter's fees varied with his own whims and the rate of exchange. There was no attempt on the part of the Persians to reciprocate by introducing a 2 rupees Persian "Shatt-el-Arab visa," corresponding to the Iraq one.

6. A further storm of protest arose, and there was much agitation in favour of retaliation against Persians. Sir Henry Dobbs opposed this, on the grounds that it would have no effect whatever on the rapacity of Persian officials, and would rather encourage them. However, eventually he withdrew his opposition under protest.

7. In March 1925 the Iraq police issued further revised regulations requiring permanent residents on either bank of the Shatt (Abul Khasib to Fao this time) to carry passports certifying them as such, but exempting them from visas for entry or departure from Iraq. The previous "Shatt-el-Arab" visa, with its fee of 2 rupees, was retained for other than such permanent residents, but for Persians the fee was raised to the equivalent of the Persian fee. This did not have any effect on the Persian authorities, who continued to insist on all travellers from Basra to

Mohammerah obtaining visas from the Persian consul at full visa rates. Persian visas, good for all journeys during one year, cost anything up to 8½ rupees.

8. Finally, in May 1928 (about the time of the anti-census troubles), the Persian authorities ruled that Iraqis must obtain a separate Persian visa at the full fee for each entry to Mohammerah, and must also pay 5 rupees for an exist visa for each departure from Mohammerah. This was the last straw, and in November 1928 the Iraq police issued regulations deleting all privileges for Persians travelling on the Shatt-el-Arab. This meant that Persians from Mohammerah visiting Basra had to obtain not only the usual consular visa good for one year from the British vice-consul at Mohammerah, but also the 5 rupees exit visa from the Iraq police on each departure. Even then, Persian travellers were much better off than Iraqis.

9. The matter was reported to the British Legation in Tehran in October 1928, but without any satisfactory result.

10. The following is the position at the moment:—

(a.) With the abolition of the Iraq departure visa fee, Persians from Mohammerah visiting Basra only have to pay the British vice-consul at Mohammerah 5 rupees 6 annas, the usual fee for a consular visa good for all journeys during one year, and they pay nothing on return from Basra. On the other hand, Iraqis from Basra visiting Mohammerah have to pay the Persian consul a full visa fee of 5 rupees 6 annas (and a little more) for each journey, and also a departure visa fee of 5 rupees for each return journey from Mohammerah. This is most unfair and has actually forced out of business Iraqi taxi-drivers on the Tanoomah-Mohammerah run. The Persian consul-general in Bagdad is understood to have written to Tehran suggesting that the Persian departure visa be abolished now that the Iraq one has gone.

(b.) As to the permanent residents on either side of the Shatt-el-Arab below Abul Khasib, for whom, as explained above, special rules have been made from time to time, these are the Muhaisin cultivators who live in the date groves along the river banks and must be expected in the nature of things to cross and recross the river in order to see their relations, to sell their produce, to do their shopping, to work on the Karun at harvest time, to work in Basrah during the date season. The regulations as they now stand require these people to take out passports in order to cross the river. It is true that the cost of such passports is only 5 rupees per year, but, in addition, photographs must be obtained and application must be made—so in practice the temptation to cross the river without a passport proves too much for most of them, in spite of occasional prosecutions and fines. Some better arrangement for the passport control of these people should be practicable.

C. E(MPSON).

Since the above note was compiled, the Persian Government have, in view of the abolition of the Iraq departure visa fee, abolished the retaliatory departure visa fee charged to Iraqis.

B. H. B.

May 27, 1929.

Passport Control on the Rawanduz Route.

When in 1927 attention was directed to the possibility of developing the "Rawanduz Trade Route" between Arbil and Tabriz, the Persian authorities at the frontier did not insist on travellers from Iraq having Persian consular visas on their passports. They visaed passports at the frontier (taking a fee) and allowed travellers to proceed. A similar practice obtained at other Persian frontier posts such as that on the Khanaqin-Tehran road.

But in the spring of 1928, the Persian Government issued a general ruling abolishing such emergency frontier visas, with the effect that, theoretically, no one might enter Persia by the Rawanduz-Rayat road without a Persian consular visa. The nearest Persian consul is at Mosul. The result, in practice, is thus a very considerable handicap on all traffic to Persia by this route.

In April 1928 the British Legation were addressed on the subject emphasising that, as the Persian Government professed to be themselves anxious to develop this route, a return to the former practice should be acceptable to them.

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The Persian Government refused, however, to allow any modification of their new general rule on this route. They suggested, instead, appointment of a Persian consul at Sulaimani. The Iraq Government decided that such an appointment was unacceptable for political reasons; it would, in any case, be useless for the purposes of the Rawanduz route.

An attempt should be made to induce the Persian Government to alter their attitude.

C. E.

May 24, 1929.

Motor Taxation Agreement.

For nearly five years attempts have been made to bring about an agreement between Iraq and Syria in regard to the taxation of motor vehicles, viz., customs, registration, road taxes, &c. So far, nothing has come of it; as a result, Iraqi transport companies are at a disadvantage in Syria. A recent change in the basis of motor taxation in Syria to a petrol tax will make it more difficult still to co-ordinate with the road-tax basis obtaining in Iraq. However, we have suggested this as a suitable subject for discussion at the Iraq-Syrian Overland Route Conference which we have recommended.

It has been considered useless so far to bring Persia into the discussion, but through motor traffic in transit Syria, Iraq and Persia is daily increasing, and it is obvious that a mutual understanding on the subject between all three States is very desirable and likely to be most beneficial to trade. The matter might be mentioned to the Persian delegate for consideration by his Government.

C. E.

May 14, 1929.

[E 3312/95/34]

No. 2.

Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received July 1.)

(No. 259.)

Tehran, July 1, 1929.

(Telegraphic.) R.

VICE-CONSUL, Shiraz, reports that "there is possibility that Kashgai resistance may collapse in the near future. Military have proclaimed amnesty, and some khans have come in."

[E 3339/104/34]

No. 3.

Sir R. Clive to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received July 2.)

(No. 313.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of Intelligence Summary No. 11 from the acting military attaché respecting events in Persia.

Tehran, June 4, 1929.

Enclosure in No. 3.

Intelligence Summary No. 11 for the Period ending June 1, 1929.

Tehran.

1. *Railway.*—The latest estimate of cost of construction for the portion Zemanabad to Tehran (Zemanabad being the village south of Hamadan near which the railway will probably take a westerly course to Tehran via Nubaran) is 44,000 tomans per kilometre. The total cost of construction of the railway is now estimated at about 120 million tomans (about £24 million).

2. The Persian Government has finally approved the plan, previously announced, for the construction of the Trans-Persian Railway from Kilometre 10 to Kilometre 165.

3. *Perso-Swedish Treaty.*—A Perso-Swedish treaty of friendship was signed at Tehran on the 27th May.

4. *Communications.*—The Ministry of Public Works is considering the construction of roads between Pahlevi and Astara, and from Resht to Meshed-i-Sar and Barfurush.

5. *Foreign Instructors.*—The Ministry of Public Works has submitted proposals for the engagement of four European instructors for the Agricultural School, either from France or Belgium.

6. *Motor Transport.*—There is a glut of motor transport on the main roads of Persia; excessive importation of lorries has lowered transport rates to an unremunerative level.

7. *Afghan Affairs.*—The Persian Government have decided to cease to recognise the Afghan Ambassador to Tehran as the representative of his Sovereign.

Khorasan.

8. *Afghan Affairs.*—Afghan refugees have been pouring into Meshed throughout May. Shuja-ed-Dowleh, recently appointed Governor of Herat with special powers, arrived in Meshed on the 14th May.

9. *Earthquake.*—The places which have suffered most are Kuchan, Bajgiran, Robat, Bujnurd, Gifan and Shirvan. Subscriptions already collected are said to have reached 150,000 tomans. In Tehran money was practically extorted from merchants, and some dissatisfaction was thereby caused.

10. *Locusts.*—Locusts have appeared in large numbers in the area Birjand-Turbat-i-Haidari, and have considerably harmed the crops.

Fars.

11. The situation in Shiraz has caused much anxiety. The Qashqais have not crossed the Bushire-Shiraz Road on their northern migration, and appear determined to force the Government's hand. They demand the return of Soulet-ed-Dowleh, exemption from conscription and permission to retain their arms.

12. The Baharlu Arabs have joined in and taken Darab; they have besieged Fasa. Government retook Dasht Arzin on the 23rd May from a Qashqai force.

13. The situation is rendered serious by the fact that the Qashqais are very well armed.

14. Sartip Abu'l Hassan Khan appears to have gained a victory over the Baharlu near Fasa about the 25th May.

15. Large numbers of troops have been concentrated in the Shiraz district throughout the last ten days (the 20th to 30th May), including three aeroplanes, several armoured cars, machine guns, cavalry and infantry; the total force now in Shiraz numbers probably at least 8,000. Troops have been transported from Kerman as well as from Tehran.

16. The Persian Government appears to be inclined to accede to the Qashqais' demands: Soulet-ed-Dowleh and his eldest son, Nasir Khan, have been liberated from prison (though they are still under surveillance in Tehran), and the second son of Soulet, named Malik Mansur Khan, has been sent hurriedly to Shiraz, presumably to act as ilkhani.

17. Mirza Ibrahim Khan Qawam left Tehran for Europe on the 16th May, 1929.

Persian Baluchistan.

18. Dost Mohamed is retained in Tehran, and it is most improbable that he will be allowed by the Shah to leave. Reports from Duzdap indicate that some of his adherents are collecting lashkars at Sarbaz and Charbar. Persian troops are being sent from Dizak to Charbar, and a Persian officer is being sent to the latter place via Karachi in order to negotiate with Din Mohamed.

19. *Communications.*—The Ministry of Public Works has been instructed to build a high road connecting Bampur, Rigan, Shurab, Khwash, Dávar-Paná, Duzdap and Gouharkuh.

Azerbaijan and Kurdistan.

20. Trouble is reported near Sauj Bulagh and between Maragha and Senneh.

21. *Anti-Locust Campaign.*—The Persian press on the 19th May report the commencement of locust extermination operations on the Russo-Persian frontier by a Soviet mission employing 300 men. Operations started on the 16th May and are expected to last about eight months.

Persian Gulf.

22. There seems no doubt that arms and ammunition were landed by the two recent Russian steamers which visited the Gulf.

23. The Communist disturbances at Abadan have been suppressed for the present. It appears that, fortunately, the outbreak was premature, as it had originally been staged to commence in the month of Muharram (beginning on the 9th June).

Turkey.

24. *Communications.*—Persian papers announce on the 19th May, 1929, that the Ford Motor Company is in negotiation with the Turkish Government for the construction of a railway from Trebizond to near Bayazid. Persian merchants are to be offered £500,000 worth of shares.

A. C. TROTT, *Acting Military Attaché.*

Tehran, June 1, 1929.

[E 3343/150/93]

No. 4.

Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received July 2.)

(No. 324.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a note from Taimourtache on the recognition of Iraq by Persia.

Tehran, June 14, 1929.

Enclosure 1 in No. 4.

Taimourtache to Sir R. Clive.

Téhéran, le 10 juin 1929.

Mon cher Ministre,

La question d'Irak étant à plusieurs reprises soulevée au sein de la Société des Nations, le Gouvernement persan trouve nécessaire, sinon utile, de notifier cette reconnaissance au secrétariat de la Société des Nations.

Le Ministère des Affaires étrangères a préparé une note au nom de l'honorable Sir Eric Drummond, Secrétaire général de la Société, dont j'envoie ci-jointe la copie pour l'information de votre Excellence.

Veuillez agréer, &c.

TEYMOURTACHE.

Enclosure 2 in No. 4.

Persian Note to Secretary-General, League of Nations.

Ministère des Affaires étrangères, Téhéran
[non datée].

M. le Secrétaire général,

J'AI l'honneur de porter ce qui suit à votre connaissance, afin que communication en soit donnée au Conseil, à la Commission permanente des Mandats et aux États membres de la Société des Nations.

Vous savez que soit le Conseil, soit la Commission permanente des Mandats ont été plusieurs fois saisis des raisons pour lesquelles la Perse, à son grand regret, n'avait pu jusqu'ici reconnaître le Gouvernement d'Irak. La plus essentielle d'entre elles était,

comme on sait, la différence qui avait été établie, par l'accord judiciaire complémentaire au Traité d'Alliance entre la Grande-Bretagne et l'Irak, entre les ressortissants étrangers, quant à la juridiction qui leur serait applicable. Le Conseil, dans la séance même où il reconnaissait le Traité d'Alliance en question comme constituant la forme que revêtirait le mandat sur l'Irak, saisi d'une protestation du délégué persan, avait, sur la proposition de M. Branting, pris acte des réserves de la Perse et exprimé le vœu que la question fût résolue par des négociations directes entre les parties intéressées. Le délégué de la Perse et celui de la Grande-Bretagne avaient, chacun pour leur part, souscrit à cette manière de procéder.

A partir de cette époque, le Gouvernement impérial de Perse n'a pas cessé de réclamer l'égalité du traitement avec les autres membres de la Société des Nations, à titre de membre de la Société et en vertu du Pacte. En même temps, le Gouvernement impérial de Perse, qui savait par sa propre expérience, jusqu'à quel point l'existence d'une institution judiciaire étrangère est lourde à supporter pour l'amour-propre national et, par conséquent, souhaitait voir la démonstration de la confiance à l'égard de la nation irakienne, en soumettant à sa juridiction tous les étrangers séjournant sur son territoire, a eu l'occasion de proposer l'abolition du régime spécial judiciaire en Irak et l'introduction d'un régime général.

Le Gouvernement impérial de Perse, qui a été informé au cours de ses négociations par le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique de l'intention de ce dernier de proposer au Conseil de la Société des Nations le remplacement du régime judiciaire actuel en Irak par un régime applicable à tout le monde, a été très heureux de constater que les deux Gouvernements étaient animés des mêmes sentiments.

Le Conseil, qui en a été saisi, a donné son consentement de principe et, prenant acte de ce consentement, le Gouvernement impérial de Perse, convaincu que très prochainement un nouveau régime judiciaire applicable à tout le monde remplacera celui existant actuellement, a décidé de reconnaître le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Roi Fevçal et cette reconnaissance a eu lieu à la date du 25 avril 1929. Les relations directes ainsi instaurées entre les deux Gouvernements permettent d'augurer un règlement prochain de toutes les questions qui demandent à être réglées entre les deux pays.

C'est cette situation que j'avais l'agréable mission de vous faire connaître.

Je vous prie, &c.

[E 3344/2383/34]

No. 5.

Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received July 2.)

(No. 332.)

Sir,

Tehran, June 15, 1929.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith an interesting report on the recent earthquake in Khorasan, sent me by His Majesty's consul-general at Meshed.

2. Mr. Law's information as to the number of deaths (3,257) indicates that the magnitude of the disaster was even greater than the first reports indicated. In view of the complete absence of registrations of births and deaths in the villages of Persia, however, it is permissible to doubt whether the figures are accurate.

3. I have already drawn your attention to the surprisingly generous contributions made by the public to appeals for donations. It is much to be regretted that the efficiency with which the money was collected under the aegis of the Minister of Court is to be set against the inefficiency and lack of co-ordination of the medical arrangements. Unfortunately, there exists in the Public Health Department an atmosphere of complete self-satisfaction combined with profound ignorance.

I have, &c.

R. H. CLIVE.

Enclosure in No. 5.

Consul-General Law to Sir R. Clive(No. 26.)
Sir,*Meshed, June 7, 1929.*

I HAVE the honour to send you the following report on the local arrangements made to deal with the situation arising from the recent earthquake in the neighbourhood of Shirvan. I regret that this report has been somewhat delayed owing to my difficulty in getting hold of the information and checking it:—

2. *Casualties*.—The latest figures reported are: Killed, 3,257; seriously injured, 1,121; animals killed (sheep and cattle), 6,546.

3. *Funds*.—The sums remitted to the local committee of the Red Lion and Sun from Tehran up to a few days ago are believed to amount to 150,000 tomans; collected in Meshed, 10 to 11,000 tomans; received separately by the committee through the Meshed Shrine (remitted from Tehran), 23,000 tomans; total, 183,000 tomans.

These funds are banked with the Bank-i-Pahlavi in the name of the Committee of the Red Lion and Sun, which has power to spend any sums voted by a majority of the committee.

4. *Relief Arrangements*.—These are in the hands of—

- (a.) The main committee of the Red Lion and Sun, of which, for the purpose of dealing with the earthquake relief measures, the Governor-General is the chairman. On this committee, besides the Governor-General, are the Amir-i-Lashkar, the Rais-i-Amnieh, the Rais-i-Nazmieh, the Rais-i-Malieh (military), and fifteen other members, including merchants, notables, three doctors, and the editor of the local newspaper "Bahar." The cashier is Mirza Ali Kazeruni, a leading merchant, and the member responsible for stores, such as petrol, grain, sugar, flour, tea, &c., purchased by the committee, is Yunus Agha Vahaboff, another leading merchant.
- (b.) A sub-committee in Kuchan. The chairman of this sub-committee is Sarhang Jawad Khan, of the artillery; and the members include Mirza Muhammad Khan Hadi, the "Rais-i-Cabinet" of the Governor-General, Sultan Evaz Khan, Muffatish-i-Nazmieh, Haji Hussain Agha, the Governor of Chinaram, who is their cashier, two Persian "engineers," four accountants from Government offices in Meshed, and four inspectors (mubashirs), also from Meshed.
- (c.) Four sub-committees in Kuchan, Robat, Bujnurd and Fahruj, that is to say, in the heart of the earthquake area, whose duty it is to carry out the instructions of the sub-committee in Kuchan.

The lion's share of the work is done by the sub-committee in Kuchan, which sends its suggestions for expenditure on relief or medical comforts, &c., to the main committee, and which is responsible for disbursements. It is also supposed to send a daily report of progress to the main committee. The main committee meets twice a week, and after approving the proposals of the Kuchan Sub-Committee, remits to that committee the necessary funds.

5. *Actual Measures*.—Up to date 30,000 tomans are believed to have been sent from headquarters to the Kuchan Sub-Committee. It is also understood that something like 25,000 tomans have already been spent on the following objects:—

- (1.) Purchase of cows and sheep.
- (2.) Medicines, medical comforts, and expenses of attending to the wounded generally.
- (3.) Provision of food to the destitute, sugar, flour, &c.
- (4.) Purchase of motor transport and expenses connected therewith. One Ford car and one lorry have been purchased for the transport of men, food, tents, digging implements and so on to the earthquake area. Four lorries have been also hired for the same purpose. Flour is distributed to those who need it, under the authority of the Kuchan Sub-Committee, from the Government ambars in Kuchan, Fahruj, Shirvan and Bujnurd.
- (5.) Miscellaneous, such as travelling expenses of the Governor-General, &c.

6. *Medical Relief*.—Shortly after the disaster occurred, the Governor-General went to the spot with five doctors from Meshed and six dressers. This advance guard

was followed by eight doctors from Tehran, including Dr. Amir Alam, and twelve dressers from Tehran. Medical relief is entirely under the charge of Dr. Amir Alam. His centre of operations is Shirvan, and he has established three field hospitals (tents) in Gifan, Robat and Shirvan. Very little information is available as to what these doctors have actually accomplished, though the Governor-General tells me he is satisfied that they have done "splendid work." It is understood that they collect the wounded from the outlying villages into these three hospitals and attend to them there. Dr. Amir Alam, who has just returned to Meshed, has sent periodical reports to the main committee under whom he worked in Meshed.

7. *General Remarks*.—Now that the first shock of horror at the calamity has worn off, the feeling which finds the most general expression about the whole affair is satisfaction that they, the Persians, have been able to meet this disaster and tackle it themselves without any outside help. Have they not subscribed unprecedentedly large sums of money? Have they not got committees and sub-committees on up-to-date lines to deal with the business? Did the Government not demonstrate its practical efficiency in sending from Tehran to the scene of the disaster with the utmost despatch a special aeroplane which reached Meshed filled with doctors and drugs a few hours after it left headquarters? The Persians claim in effect to be dealing with this tragic situation on efficient and modern lines. They must then be judged by modern standards—altogether apart from the fact that interest other than Persian have largely contributed to the relief fund and have a right to know how that fund is being managed. I propose, therefore, to offer one or two comments on this claim.

8. It is true that large sums of money have been collected. The public has been surprisingly generous. Almost as surprising is the fact that the public in Meshed is now largely indifferent to the fate of the sums they have subscribed. So far as they are concerned the money has gone, and they are not interested now in what happens to it. There are, however, one or two people, business men for example, who made large contributions, who are asking themselves whether the same thing is going to happen now that happened in connexion with the Turbat Relief Fund five years ago. No one as yet asks this question openly, and the press is inevitably silent. It is also true that representative committees have been formed and are apparently functioning. But, again, nobody knows quite what they are doing or how they are spending the money. Everyone, I think, has confidence in the Governor-General and in Haji Hussain Agha, the cashier of the Kuchan Sub-Committee; but to what extent these two can control the expenditure of such large sums of money is doubtful. What I am convinced admits of no doubt is that the Governor-General is doing all that one man in his position can do by personal interest and supervision to secure that the money is spent properly. It is a pity, however, that he has not so far taken the public more into his confidence. I imagine there are very few countries in which it would be possible for such huge sums to be raised for purposes of "relief," and for relief "operations" to continue so long without the public demanding to know what was being done and insisting on having regular balance sheets. The "Amir-i-Lashkar" has more than once said that regular communiqués were going to be issued to the press. So far none has appeared. It has also been said that after everything has been done that can be done, a comprehensive report and balance sheet will be published by the Governor-General.

9. Finally, it is true that a large number of doctors, more or less qualified, were hurried to the scene of the earthquake. Perhaps Dr. Amir Alam, when he returns to Tehran, will submit a detailed report on what they found and what they did. In Meshed nobody has any precise information. Without any wish whatever to be cynical, I cannot refrain from adding the following footnotes. M. Hackin, who was staying at the so-called "Grand" Hotel when the medical mission arrived in hot haste from Tehran by aeroplane, told me that the doctors remained in that hotel kicking their heels for three or four days. While there, they carried out their ablutions in and drank water from the general service tank in the courtyard of the hotel, which is used equally, it seems, for washing the feet and the cooking utensils of the hotel guests. Meanwhile, their drugs and dressings lay scattered about the courtyard of the hotel, among the debris of the place, collecting dust and dirt. Apparently, there was no reason why this mission should not have come to Meshed by lorry instead of by aeroplane. It would have been less of an advertisement, but it would have been cheaper and just as expeditious. And finally, when I went myself to Kuchan and saw one of the villages which had been hit by the earthquake, a village on the outer ring of the earthquake area, where there had only been half a dozen

people killed and about the same number injured, no one knew anything about any doctors having passed that way. The wounded were quite uncared for at this and the neighbouring villages.

10. A copy of this despatch is being sent to the Government of India.

I have, &c.

H. D. G. LAW.

[E 3346/95/34]

No. 6.

Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received July 2.)

(No. 334.)

Sir,

Tehran, June 15, 1929.

IN continuation of recent telegraphic correspondence and of my despatch No. 308 of the 1st June, 1929, I have the honour to submit, with the same reservations as to accuracy as I made in that despatch, a narrative of the course of events in Fars during the last fortnight.

2. On the 4th June telegraphic communication between Shiraz and Kazerun on the Bushire main line was finally interrupted, and it was discovered a few days later that seven miles of telegraph line between Kazerun and Shiraz had been completely carried away, nothing remaining except the poles. The road-guards and military forces came into contact with the Qashqais in the region of Chinar Rahdar on the 3rd and 4th June and some fighting took place. Ali Khan at that time was encamped close to Deh Sheikh, not far from Chinar Rahdar, and from the 4th June onwards no further traffic of any kind was allowed to pass between Kazerun and Shiraz.

3. On the 5th June a report was received from the Isfahan telegraph office to the effect that eight hundred Qashqais were on the way to Shah Riza near Qumisheh; this would mean that the dissident tribes had approached uncomfortably near to Isfahan. Although confirmation of this report did not arrive, it appeared on the 6th June that the telegraph wires between Shiraz and Sivand, on the Isfahan-Shiraz road, were cut, so that direct telegraphic communication with Shiraz was interrupted on all sides. The interruption of the line to Sivand was not however of long duration; the lines were no doubt cut by a force of Qashqais about a thousand strong who appeared at Pul-i-Khan, near Persepolis on the Sivand road, on the 6th June. They captured a few troops but soon retired, on the advance of the new Amir-i-Lashkar Habibullah Khan Shaibani, who left Sivand on the evening of the 6th June for Shiraz, where he arrived after some fighting.

4. The military forces evacuated the Fasa area about this date, the troops previously engaged there being concentrated in Shiraz. Their number was about one thousand. Thereafter the military were localised at Shiraz and Kazerun, the garrison at the latter place being in grave danger. Mr. Davis reported on the 11th June that the Shiraz-Isfahan road was not being held at all, and that the main fighting was localised at Chinar Rahdar.

5. At 2 A.M. on the 6th June the tribes attacked the Shiraz aerodrome, but were repulsed; among the empty cartridges picked up were some from French carbine Mauser rifles and shot guns. Two military planes were damaged and the Junkers plane was hit in several places, fortunately not in the petrol tank.

6. On the 8th June a telegraph ghulam brought in the following story: He had been captured by a Qashqai force and taken to Ali Khan, the half-brother of Soulat-ed-Dowleh. Ali Khan during the interview remarked that it was his intention to occupy Shiraz, but that his quarrel was only with the Persian Government and the military. He was personally prepared to accept the last offer of the Government, which, in fact, complied with all the Qashqais' demands except the surrender of Soulat in person; but now that the tribal confederation against the Government had become so general he was powerless to take individual action.

7. Pul-i-Khan was again deserted on the 8th June, but a band of rebels occupied it on the 9th or 10th, and are reported to have blown up one of the archways of the bridge over the Band-i-Amir, thus cutting off road communication from Isfahan to Shiraz. They are also credited with having burnt the road-guard fort at Pul-i-Khan.

8. The situation at Kazerun on the 11th June was very serious; the inhabitants were panic-stricken and were all hiding their property; an attack was expected

hourly. The motor road from Kazerun to Mian-Kotal was destroyed in places, and was difficult to negotiate even on foot.

9. So far the inhabitants of Shiraz appear to be behaving very well; most of them probably sympathise with the rebels. The military are in difficulty over the supply of ready money for current needs.

10. From my telegram No. 237 of the 10th June you will have remarked the attitude of the Persian press (particularly the semi-official papers "Shafagh-i-Surkh" and "Iran") in hinting that the revolt of the Qashqai tribes has been engineered and supported by British agents, and that the rifles and ammunition now being used against the Persian Government have been supplied by us.

11. From my letter to Taimourtache of the 14th June, of which a copy is being sent in another despatch, you will see that in consequence of the attack on the aerodrome at Shiraz members of the British community consulted with His Majesty's acting consul concerning the advisability of evacuation; and that when Mr. Davis communicated this to the Governor-General the latter sent a distorted version of the message to the Minister of Court, who thereupon addressed to me a letter, saying that he considered Mr. Davis's request for evacuation "*peu amicale*."

12. The acting consul at Shiraz estimates the number of Persian troops in the Shiraz area at about seven or eight thousand. I have heard estimates as high as twelve thousand, but think Mr. Davis's opinion more correct.

13. It is not surprising that the Persian Government are extremely anxious as to the result of the operations now proceeding. In one of the articles in the "Iran" newspaper a significant announcement was made that certain military officers, guilty of irregularities, had been punished; a fact which shows that the Persian Government is alive to a very real feeling of dissatisfaction and exasperation at the oppressive conduct of military officers throughout the country.

14. It may be that a time limit will be set upon the present guerilla warfare by geographical considerations; the Qashqai tribe should have gone to their summer quarters in the mountains west of a line joining Abadeh to Dehbid some five weeks ago. I understand that they will be hard put to it to get adequate fodder and accommodation for their large flocks and herds for the next two months; at the end of that time, if necessary, they can send back their flocks to the southern Garmsir regions, where they are usually stationed for the winter. The Government troops are no doubt hoping to deal them a decisive blow while they are, as at present, half-way between their winter and their summer quarters, in the vicinity of Shiraz.

15. I enclose herewith a rough sketch-map of the Shiraz district which shows the situation of the places mentioned above, as well as the Qashqai tribal areas.*

16. My latest news is that the road-guard post at Sivand deserted on the night of the 13-14th June.

17. I have good reason to believe that His Majesty is not pleased with the Governor-General, his Highness Akbar Mirza, who had been instructed to come to Tehran, and arrived here this morning by aeroplane.

Copies of this despatch have been sent to the Government of India, His Majesty's High Commissioner for Iraq, Bagdad, and to His Majesty's acting consul-general at Bushire.

I have, &c.

R. H. CLIVE.

[E 3347/1070/34]

No. 7.

Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received July 2.)

(No. 336.)

Sir,

Tehran, June 15, 1929.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 312 of the 1st June and in accordance with the authorisation contained in Mr. Oliphant's private telegram of the 10th June, I have the honour to report that I handed yesterday to the Minister of Court a letter in French, of which a copy is enclosed, embodying the substance of Sir Hugh Barnes's letter of protest to the Prime Minister enclosed in your despatch No. 219 of the 7th May.

* Not reproduced.

2. I had arranged for Mr. Wilkinson, the chief manager of the Imperial Bank, to be present during my interview with the Minister of Court. His Highness read through the letter twice. He then said:—

"I understand this letter to contain three distinct points:—

- "(1.) A protest that the bank's concession had been infringed;
- "(2.) A protest on the subject of bank-notes; and
- "(3.) A claim for indemnity for losses suffered by the bank during the war.

"As regards the second point, that is on the way to being satisfactorily settled. As regards the third point, I have already made it abundantly clear to Mr. Wilkinson that the Persian Government will never entertain this claim for indemnification."

I pointed out to his Highness that the claim in question was for money looted from the bank mainly by Swedish gendarmic officers in the service of the Persian Government, and the Persian Government were responsible for the action of their own employees. His Highness declined to admit this, but said that Persia was overrun with foreign troops; that these Swedish officers, though nominally in the service of the Persian Government, had ceased to be under their control; they had become the paid agents of the Germans, and the bank should more properly have addressed their claim to His Majesty's Government, who themselves might have obtained a refund from the Germans in the form of reparations. Mr. Wilkinson here interposed that the money stolen was Persian money and that the bank had repaid the Persian claims at the head office in Tehran. Taimourtache replied that this did not alter the view of the Persian Government; the bank had three alternatives—either to pay, or to refuse payment, or to bring an action against the Swedish officers. They had chosen the first alternative, and their claim was more properly against His Majesty's Government. In any case he repeated with great emphasis that the Persian Government would never entertain the bank's claim.

3. As regards the first point, that the Persian Government had infringed the concession of the bank, he declined to admit this. He fetched a copy of the bank concession and read out article 6, which he maintained was rather an obligation of the bank than of the Persian Government. The Government were not bound to give their business to the bank; it was rather the bank who were bound to assist the Government if the latter required assistance. Legally, therefore, he maintained the Government had done nothing wrong. I replied whatever might be the strict legal interpretation of the relevant articles of the concession the present attitude of the National Bank, as directed by Dr. Lindenblatt under the instructions of the Ministry of Finance, appeared to be definitely hostile to the Imperial Bank. Not only had the Government transferred to the National Bank all the Government business which had for the past forty years been done with the Imperial Bank, but the National Bank, instead of embarking on business which under its concession the Imperial Bank was precluded from undertaking, came into the field as a direct competitor of the Imperial Bank and as nothing else. Under their charter they were established to facilitate commerce, agriculture and industry. They had done nothing, and appeared to have no intention of doing anything, for the two latter, and they had in no sense assisted the commerce of the country because they were merely attempting to take away the established business of the Imperial Bank without entering on any new field of activity. Mr. Wilkinson here elaborated various activities which were open to the National Bank but impossible for the Imperial Bank, such as mortgages on real property, the silk cocoon business from Gilan, which passed through Russia and which, owing to the absence of relations with the Soviet Government, was too risky for the Imperial Bank to undertake; the opium business, which should obviously be a Government undertaking now that the Persian Government had established an opium monopoly. His Highness argued that these undertakings were all speculative and that the new bank could not afford to squander its resources in unnecessary risks. I replied that as a national bank with the resources of the Government behind it it should more naturally have attempted to assist Persian trade in any direction, especially in those directions which were not open to the existing banks. Finally, His Highness said that the bank's protest appeared rather to be for moral infringement than for legal infringement. I replied that whatever word he might choose to define the nature of the protest, the result was that there was a complete lack of cordiality between the National Bank and the Imperial Bank through no fault of the latter. His Highness admitted the lack of cordiality and said it was

certainly most unfortunate, and he would be only too ready to do what he could to assist matters. He regretted that Mr. Wilkinson was going away, as he would otherwise have got Mr. Wilkinson and Dr. Lindenblatt together in his presence in the hope of clarifying the position. I said that Mr. Wilkinson was going on leave at once and that he needed his leave and that I imagined there could be no question of his putting it off again; he would be back in the early autumn. His Highness said that as soon as ever he came back he would take the matter up, as he considered it essential that the two banks should be on friendly terms. Meanwhile, he would discuss the matter with Prince Firuz and with Dr. Lindenblatt. He drew attention to the fact which Mr. Wilkinson readily acknowledged that he had in the past always done his best to settle differences between the Imperial Bank and the Ministry of Finance.

4. Finally, he expressed the hope that I would not insist on leaving this letter of protest with him as, in that case, the letter would have to be submitted to the Council of Ministers, and I now knew in advance what the answer would be. In the circumstances I realised that it would serve no purpose to leave the letter and to be sent in due course an entirely unsatisfactory reply.

5. I have no reason to believe that his Highness is himself hostile to the Imperial Bank and I am convinced that he realises the necessity, in the interest of Persia, for good relations between the two banks. I trust, therefore, that the board of the Imperial Bank will agree that it is preferable to rely on the goodwill of the Minister of Court and his promise to clear up the relations between the two banks rather than to send in the protest and merely to receive an uncompromising answer.

6. I should add that in the course of this conversation his Highness spoke somewhat bitterly of the fall in the kran exchange, some 12 per cent., as he put it, in the last three or four months, i.e., from 48 to 54 to the £ sterling. I asked him if he accused the Imperial Bank of being responsible for this fall in the exchange. He said no, and Mr. Wilkinson then tried to explain the reason for the fall. If the Persian Government had not insisted in keeping all their sterling reserve intact and had been willing to use it for maintaining the exchange, it would have been possible to keep the latter round 50 to the £ sterling. His Highness replied it was the policy of the Government to maintain this reserve in a gold currency—part, he said, was banked in Germany and part in Switzerland at 6 per cent. He then enquired whether, if the Government did buy krans with a part of this reserve, Mr. Wilkinson would guarantee the exchange remaining fixed for a certain period round 50. Mr. Wilkinson said this was quite impossible. The rate of exchange must depend on the balance of trade, and while the Railway Syndicate was buying abroad the supplies for the railway, Persian export trade was not sufficient to balance these imports. His Highness admitted that he was not an expert in exchange questions and merely said the position was very unsatisfactory and something must be done.

7. The Persian Government are, I understand, again seriously thinking of establishing a gold standard on the advice of Dr. Schniewind, the German Financial Adviser, and are anxious to discuss the matter in the autumn. It is obvious that the conversion of the Persian currency from a silver to a gold basis could not possibly be effected without the help and support of the Imperial Bank. In any case, to sell their present stock of silver of some 50 million to 60 million tomans and replace it by gold would, Mr. Wilkinson tells me, involve a loss of 25 per cent., say £2 million to £3 million sterling. It seems to me, therefore, that a favourable opportunity may present itself in the autumn for the Imperial Bank to regularise their relations with the Persian Government and the National Bank on a more satisfactory basis in return for their assistance in the matter of the gold standard.

8. Mr. Wilkinson, to whom I have shown this despatch, will doubtless discuss the question with his board on his return to London. He leaves Tehran on the 16th June.

I have, &c.

R. H. CLIVE.

(Confidential.)

P.S.—June 16.—Since writing the above, Mr. Wilkinson has been to see me. He was requested by Taimourtache to call on him this morning. His Highness said that he had given to the Shah a full account of our conversation of the 14th. His Majesty had said: "We need the Imperial Bank. I consider that both the Anglo-Persian Oil Company and the Imperial Bank of Persia are Persian concerns. You may tell Mr. Wilkinson that, also that I intend to reopen an account with the bank," or words to that effect.

[20533]

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Taimourache went on to say that if there was any trouble between the bank and the Minister of Finance during his (Wilkinson's) absence, the acting manager was immediately to write him. As soon as Mr. Wilkinson returned, he intended to get him and Dr. Lindenblatt together and to go into the question of how the business could be divided between the two banks. Mr. Wilkinson told me, in fact, that Taimourache showed himself most friendly and anxious to get matters between the two banks placed on a satisfactory footing. I said I considered the Shah's message very encouraging, and I sincerely hoped the board of the bank would carefully go into the whole question this summer. If means could be found of associating the Persian Government with the Imperial Bank, so that the Government had a direct interest in the fortunes of the bank, I felt sure that that would not only appeal to the Persian Government but would in the end be beneficial to the bank. After all, the goodwill of the Imperial Bank in Persia to-day was worth a great deal.

I told him for his private information that it was on the lines of direct association that Sir John Cadman had been discussing the future of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company with the Persian Government. I hoped that his board would very seriously consider the question in this light.

R. H. C.

Enclosure in No. 7.

Sir R. Clive to Taimourache.

Téhéran, le 10 juin 1929.

Mon cher Ministre,

J'AI l'honneur de porter à l'attention sérieuse de votre Altesse la protestation suivante que la Banque impériale de Perse désire adresser au Gouvernement persan, citant plusieurs exemples qui démontrent qu'à certains égards le Gouvernement persan n'a pas respecté avec son exactitude habituelle les termes de la concession accordée à la banque :

1. Concernant les articles 1^{er} et 6 de la concession :

La Banque impériale de Perse ayant été nommée Banque de l'État, c'est-à-dire la banque du Gouvernement, et sa situation exceptionnelle en Perse ayant été soulignée en article 5 par l'expression "Institution nationale," la banque estime que la création par le Gouvernement persan d'une Banque nationale, *comme elle est opérée actuellement*, est contraire à l'intention de la concession et se heurte aux droits et aux privilèges accordés à la Banque impériale par cette concession.

Dans les clauses 1 et 5 de la loi de 1927 établissant la Banque nationale, il est dit que le premier but de la nouvelle banque sera de faciliter le commerce, la cultivation, l'agriculture et l'industrie par le moyen de prêts à bonne sécurité. Cette catégorie d'affaires n'étant pas permise à la Banque impériale en vertu de sa concession, elle ne peut avoir d'objection à ce qu'elle soit confiée à une autre banque. Bien que la clause 12 de la loi précitée prévoit dans le cours du temps une expansion des opérations de la nouvelle banque, la Banque impériale a naturellement supposé qu'on ne permettrait pas que cette expansion empiète sur les affaires confiées à la Banque impériale tant que sa concession soit en vigueur. Néanmoins, il paraît maintenant qu'en moins de deux ans après son établissement les opérations de la Banque nationale sont conduites de manière à envahir directement celles de la Banque impériale en sa capacité de banque d'État ou de banque du Gouvernement. Or, on a récemment transféré les comptes du Gouvernement à la Banque nationale et les paiements gouvernementaux et en Perse et à l'étranger ont été faits par une entremise autre que celle de la Banque impériale, malgré la stipulation en article 6 de la concession. C'est là un développement auquel la Banque impériale désire tout spécialement attirer l'attention du Gouvernement impérial.

2. Concernant l'article 3 de la concession :

Une circulation fiduciaire ne peut être maintenue d'une manière efficace que par une surveillance continue de la circulation. Cette surveillance nécessite de temps à autre l'expansion de la circulation pour pourvoir aux demandes du commerce, et aussi la cancellation des billets vieux et usés et la substitution d'autres. Malgré que la Banque impériale ait demandé depuis plusieurs mois et à maintes reprises la mise en circulation de nouveaux billets, le Ministère responsable a, de propos délibéré, refusé son consentement à ce que le sceau du Haut-Commissaire soit apposé à ces nouveaux billets, qui sont, comme déjà expliqué, nécessaires à la circulation. Il en résulte que la

Banque impériale, qui n'est aucunement susceptible de blâme dans cette affaire, est considérée par la presse et par le public comme responsable des inconvénients qui s'en suivent.

3. Concernant l'article 10 de la concession :

La Banque impériale se plaît à reconnaître que, sous l'administration sage et clairvoyante de Sa Majesté impériale le Schah, le bon ordre et la sécurité ont été si bien établis en Perse qu'aucune plainte ne puisse être formulée en ce qui concerne cet article de la concession. Néanmoins, cela n'a pas toujours été le cas. Il est bien connu que pendant les règnes des prédécesseurs de Sa Majesté impériale et au moment où la protection que le Gouvernement est tenu par la concession d'accorder à la banque était vraiment indispensable, cette protection ne se faisait pas sentir et par conséquent plusieurs de ses succursales furent saccagées et ses fonctionnaires emprisonnés.

La Banque impériale désire donc avec le plus grand respect soutenir que le Gouvernement actuel est tenu de reconnaître que ses prédécesseurs n'ont pas rempli leurs obligations sous ce chef et que la banque devrait être indemniée pour les pertes ainsi subies.

J'ai maintenant cité à votre Altesse trois exemples de la manière dans laquelle le Gouvernement persan a, dans l'opinion de la Banque impériale, manqué de remplir les obligations que lui impose la concession de la banque. De ces trois exemples les deux derniers ont déjà été portés à la connaissance du Gouvernement persan par une correspondance écrite entre la banque et les Ministres d'État intéressés.

En général, la Banque impériale est d'avis qu'à certains égards la situation actuelle dont elle se plaint provient de l'esprit de patriotisme et de nationalisme engendré dans le pays pendant les dernières années, et aussi d'un vrai désir de la part du parti nationaliste d'éliminer toute l'influence étrangère. Néanmoins, et tout en tenant compte de la réaction de ces sentiments sur le Gouvernement persan, on ne peut contester l'obligation de respecter les termes de la concession tant qu'elle existe. La banque se permet la réflexion que depuis quarante ans elle est l'invitée honorable de la nation persane. En qualité de banque d'État elle a été chargée d'une grande partie des affaires financières du Gouvernement. En qualité de banque nationale elle a aussi fait son mieux pour activer l'industrie et le commerce du pays.

Animée de ces considérations, la banque se croit en ordre de faire cette protestation et de prier, respectueusement, que les mesures nécessaires soient prises pour écarter les bases de ses plaintes. Elle se permet en outre de suggérer les mesures à prendre, c'est-à-dire :

- (1) Que les opérations de la Banque nationale soient limitées de telle façon qu'elles ne soient plus en opposition ni aux droits ni aux privilèges accordés par la concession à la Banque impériale ;
- (2) Que la demande de la Banque impériale soit exaucée sans délai en ce qui concerne la mise en circulation de nouveaux billets de banque et que le sceau du Haut-Commissaire y soit apposé ;
- (3) Que le Gouvernement persan reconnaisse l'obligation qui lui incombe de compenser les pertes subies sous la dernière dynastie et de régler les justes revendications de la banque.

Finalement, la banque désirerait appeler l'attention du Gouvernement aux attaques nombreuses dirigées contre elle dans la presse publique en Perse. Les Ministres d'État ont été ouvertement et à plusieurs reprises invités à enfreindre les termes de la concession. Jusqu'à présent, ces expressions d'opinion n'ont, tant que la banque le sache, subi aucune contrainte de la part du Gouvernement. La Banque impériale se permet de suggérer une certaine action officielle pour corriger les impressions erronées, en ce qui concerne les termes de la concession et les obligations du Gouvernement, qui semblent être nourries et propagées par certains organes de la presse à Téhéran.

Avant de terminer cette lettre, je dois expliquer que j'ai considéré préférable de me faire l'interprète auprès de votre Altesse du point de vue de la banque plutôt que d'adresser une note officielle au Gouvernement persan. Il est inutile d'ajouter que j'ai l'autorisation de mon Gouvernement.

Je serai heureux de recevoir de votre Altesse des assurances sur les points soulevés ci-dessus.

Veuillez, &c.

R. H. CLIVE.

[E 3348/172/34]

No. 8.

Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received July 2.)

(No. 337. Confidential.)

Sir,

Gulhek, June 15, 1929.

I HAD a conversation yesterday with the Minister of Court on the subject of the railway which it may be of interest to record.

2. The conversation arose out of a remark of his Highness that he was going to spend the Muharrem vacation, *i.e.*, from the 16th to 21st June, in Mazanderan to see what progress was being made with the railway from the port of Bander-i-Gez. I said that, as his Highness might know, I was a convinced sceptic about this railway, and had always been. He said he was aware of this. I felt, I said, that it seemed to me that Persia was spending a mass of money which she could ill afford for a railway that would never pay—at least, not in our lifetime. Mr. Poland had first estimated the cost at 75 million tomans. A year later Mr. Thomas Brown of the German Syndicate had admitted to me that it could hardly be built for less than 90 million. When I returned from leave last November the estimate had risen to 100 million, and only last month Mr. Brown had again been to see me and when I pressed him on the subject he had said that the railway could not be built for less than 120 million. He further admitted that in his opinion the section from Bander-i-Gez on the Caspian to Tehran with its 25 miles of solid tunnelling could never pay.

3. There seemed to me, moreover, as I told his Highness, to be a certain cynical indifference on the part of the railway syndicate, who took—and quite rightly from their point of view—no risk at all. They only worked on a cash basis, *i.e.*, cash in advance of the work done. The moment the money was not forthcoming they were prepared to clear out without loss.

4. I was quite prepared to admit, however, that the section in the south from the new port of Khormusa across the plains to Dizful might be of great benefit to the province of Khuzistan and might even in time prove remunerative. But how about the next section from Dizful to Burujird, some 200 miles through uninhabited limestone mountains, which could only be built at an enormous cost? How was Persia going to find the vast sums of money required which last month were estimated at 120 million tomans (say £24 million) and which would probably in the end be more nearly 150 million tomans (£30 million)?

5. At present she was paying the bill out of the proceeds of the sugar and tea monopoly, which was estimated to bring in about 6 million tomans a year. But Persia was paying a heavy price for this monopoly which necessitated the taxation at an exorbitant rate of two articles of prime necessity to every Persian. Moreover as the direct result of this monopoly an organised contraband trade had developed in the Persian Gulf, and it was estimated that Persia was losing over 1 million tomans a year in smuggled tea and sugar. In order to check this contraband trade the Persian Government were now embarking on the luxury of a navy, and had ordered six gunboats in Italy. What was this navy going to cost Persia in capital expenditure and annual upkeep? Finally as the direct result of the large purchases abroad of railway material the kran exchange had fallen in the last few months from 48 to 54 krans to the pound sterling, about 12 per cent., and there appeared to be little prospect under present conditions of the kran appreciating.

6. His Highness patiently listened to my remarks, the truth of which he did not deny, nor attempt to controvert. He merely said the railway was necessary for Persia. It was essential to find another outlet than Russia for the agricultural products of Gilan and Mazanderan, rice, tea and tobacco. He went on to say that the wealth of Persia was twofold, agricultural and mineral. If the former was scientifically developed Persia could in time become a large exporter of agricultural produce. The presence of mineral wealth (apart from oil) had now been proved: copper, iron, coal had all been found in different parts of Persia, but without railway communication the mineral wealth could not be developed. I enquired where had copper recently been discovered. He said in the neighbourhood of Yezd. Unfortunately, however, Yezd is some 500 miles from the nearest point on the prospective railway.

7. I had in fact the impression which I have always had, that the Shah just said there must be a railway and Taimourache against his better judgment replied, "Yes, your Majesty, there shall be a railway." He then threw himself into the

project with that energy and enthusiasm with which he has happily—or in the present case perhaps unhappily—been blessed. I cannot help feeling that in this railway lie the seeds of a financial tragedy, if not worse, although I sincerely hope that I may be proved to have been a pessimist.

8. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India and to His Majesty's High Commissioner for Iraq.

I have, &c.

R. H. CLIVE.

[E 3350/95/34]

No. 9.

Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received July 2.)

(No. 339.)

Sir,

Gulhek, June 16, 1929.

SINCE writing my despatch No. 334 of the 15th June, I have this morning received a further report from Mr. Acting Consul Davis, copy of which I have the honour to enclose. It gives the text of the petition sent to him by some of the Kashgai leaders, which is not without interest.

2. I am sending copies of this despatch, with its enclosures, to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, His Majesty's High Commissioner for Iraq, and to His Majesty's consul-general at Bushire.

I have, &c.

R. H. CLIVE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 9.

Acting Consul Davis to Sir R. Clive.

(No. 34.)

Sir,

Shiraz, June 10, 1929.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 8 of the 8th June, 1929, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a copy, with translation, of the petition which I received from the chiefs of the Kashgai tribes now in revolt against the Persian Government.

The petition was brought into Shiraz by an unknown runner (Persian "qasid") on the night of Friday, the 7th June, and handed by him to a well-known merchant of Shiraz, who is a British-protected person. The signatories are, as you will observe, chiefs of the three leading branches of the Kashgai—the Darashuri, Kashkuli and Farsimadan tribes.

I have, of course, given no answer to this unusual petition. Indeed, I have no means of communicating with the senders even if I wished to do so, though in the present state of opinion at Shiraz it would be impossible to convince the Persian authorities of the truth of this statement, so firmly do they believe that "the hand of the British Government is behind these disturbances." I cannot understand what they suppose we might hope to gain from disorders whose immediate and visible effects are so entirely detrimental to all British interests in Persia.

I have, &c.

A. W. DAVIS.

Enclosure 2 in No. 9.

Petition from Certain Kashgai Chiefs to His Majesty's Consulate, Shiraz.

(Translation.)

[Undated.]

YOU have of course acquired full information concerning the state of affairs in the Kashgai tribe, which has at all times been obedient to the orders of its national Government, especially in recent years, notwithstanding the fact that for the last four years without intermission Military Governors have been set over us poor people and we have refused them nothing, either our persons or our goods. We have patiently borne every sort of oppression which they have inflicted upon us, and we have always been ready to help the army in its battles, and have lost many men fighting for them. We did not refuse or turn aside from any kind of obedience.

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Although the Kashgai tribe submitted and became prepared to serve the Government before any other tribe, yet it has suffered more oppression than any others. The more it complained to the authorities, the more the oppressions were increased. For three months now we have been asking for justice, but they have not thought our complaints worthy of attention, and have done nothing to make our lot more bearable. There is no refuge for us. We, therefore, beg you to communicate our humble petitions to the League of Nations and find some means of settlement for us, in order that we may live with our minds at rest and our future secure.

At present the whole south (of Persia) is in trouble and difficulty owing to the unsettlement of mind prevailing, and it is possible that disorders may occur upon the roads and that merchandise may be lost in consequence. If this should happen, it should not be attributed to the Kashgai tribe. Your petitioners except order and security. We take you, a representative of the British Government, to witness that our just complaints have been disregarded, and we have no one to do us justice.

(Signed and sealed) HUSSEIN DARASHURI.
NASRULLAH DARASHURI.
ILYAS KASHKULI.
'ABBAS 'ALI KASHKULI.
MASIH KHAN FARSI-MADAN.
ISFANDIAR KASHKULI.
(Kalantars (chiefs) of the Kashgai tribes.)

[E 3351/95/34]

No. 10.

Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received July 2.)

(No. 340.)

Sir,

Gulhek, June 16, 1929.

I HAVE the honour to refer to my despatch No. 156 of the 16th March on the subject of the Kurdish situation round Sauj Bulagh, and to transmit to you herewith a further report from His Majesty's consul at Tabriz.

2. It will be seen that, as usual, the Kurdish situation is giving trouble, while the position in Fars is such as to prevent the Persian Government adopting a firm attitude.

3. It is interesting to notice that the demands put forward by the Kurds are almost identical with those made by the Kashgais. They are, however, of so obvious a character that it would be rash to assume collusion.

4. I have sent a copy of this despatch, with its enclosure, to His Majesty's High Commissioner for Iraq.

I have, &c.

R. H. CLIVE.

Enclosure in No. 10.

Consul Gilliat-Smith to Sir R. Clive.

(No. 36.)

Sir,

Tabriz, June 6, 1929.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 25 of the 15th April last relative to the Kurdish situation, as also to recent consulate diaries on the same subject, I have the honour to report as follows:—

According to information received, the Persian Government have made no progress whatever towards a settlement of the Kurdish question. The authorities are said to have abandoned, or to be prepared to abandon, their original intention, and are credited with a willingness to come to terms with the Kurds on the following conditions: (1) The Kurds are not to be disarmed; (2) they are to furnish no recruits; (3) they are not to be compelled to wear other than their national dress. This does not, however, satisfy the Kurdish demands. They further insist that no troops should be stationed at Sauj Bulagh, and that no Persian Civil Governor should be sent to them. It being impossible for the Persian authorities to accept such terms, there is a deadlock.

2. Meanwhile, the authorities are causing unofficial reports to be published in the local press, and otherwise circulated, announcing various victories over the Kurdish forces, the capture of the standard-bearer of Sheikh Khalil, and, subsequently, the killing of the sheikh, while attempting to cross a river, pursued by the Persian troops. Native public opinion refuses to believe these reports. It is argued that, if they were true, the authorities would be only too eager to issue an official report on the subject. Supplies, usual at this time of the year, of butter, sheep and cheese, are not arriving from the Sauj Bulagh area; letters from Sauj Bulagh are still censored; goods from Tabriz to Sauj Bulagh are not being despatched to any extent. Consequently, the Government-inspired reports are untrue and are being broadcast with the intention of keeping the populace quiet during the forthcoming Moharram. It is even said that the Kurds have attacked the Persian positions and defeated the Persian troops.

3. Of these reports, the most likely one appears to me to be that there is at present a deadlock at Sauj Bulagh. The reasons given for the willingness of the Persians to come to terms with the Kurds are disturbances in Khuzistan and on the Afghan frontier.

4. Sixty Shahsavans in the Gara Dagh have revolted and are said to be attacking travellers and amieh posts on the Tabriz-Ahar (capital of the Gara Dagh) road.

5. Disorders are reported from the Maku District, where the Kurds are, as usual, sending provisions to their brethren of the Kiralar stronghold near Mount Ararat, and it is feared that this circumstance may cause unpleasantness between the Persian authorities and the Turks, and lead to the latter crossing into Persian territory in order to carry out punitive measures. On the 31st May the Turks are said to have attacked Kiralar, but to have been repulsed with losses amounting to 100 men.

I have, &c.

B. GILLIAT-SMITH.

[E 3352/95/34]

No. 11.

Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received July 2.)

(No. 341.)

Sir,

Tehran, June 15, 1929.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 236 of the 6th June, I have the honour to transmit herewith correspondence which has passed between the Minister of Court and myself arising out of the Qashgai revolt.

2. The first letter from Taimourtache refers to two separate questions and contains (a) a complaint against His Majesty's acting consul at Shiraz, which, as will be seen from my letter to his Highness of the 14th June (Enclosure 4), was entirely unjustified, and (b) what amounts to a complaint against His Majesty's Government on the ground that a huge contraband trade, mainly in British arms, was being carried on unchecked across the Persian Gulf into Persia in spite of the presence of His Majesty's ships. "Comment osent-ils traverser le golfe, où les bateaux de guerre britanniques sont présents et se croient en devoir d'empêcher la contrebande?" In his second letter, however (Enclosure 3), the Minister of Court almost contradicts this remark when he writes "je suis loin de l'idée de vouloir mettre à la charge des bateaux de guerre de Sa Majesté britannique un devoir qui sort, peut-être, des cadres de leurs fonctions." Again, in reply to my question why, if the Persian Government had good reason to suspect the smuggling of arms into Persia from a British-controlled area, had they never drawn the attention of this Legation to the traffic, his Highness sends the quite illogical reply (illogical in view of his original charges) that as the duty devolves on Persia of guarding and policing her own territorial waters she has never had any call to draw the attention of the British Government to the contraband trade in arms on the high seas.

3. The impression I have both from Taimourtache's two letters and from conversations I have had with him on the subject is that (1) the Persian Government vaguely know that there is a big contraband traffic across the Gulf in sugar and tea; (2) that they have now jumped to the conclusion that, because the Qashgai tribes are well armed, they are armed with smuggled British rifles; (3) they are anxious, as always, to find a scapegoat on whom to throw the blame. What more natural than to blame His Majesty's Government for anything that goes wrong in South Persia?

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4. His Highness has not, in fact, adduced the slightest proof that arms, British or otherwise, are being regularly smuggled into the country. The Persian Government have never yet attempted to disarm the Qashgai and the Khamseh tribes, who, so far as I know, have always been well armed.

5. The position regarding the right of His Majesty's ships to search vessels suspected of smuggling arms in the Gulf is not clear to me. I was under the impression that, in view of the articles relating to special zones, which include the Persian Gulf in the International Arms Traffic Convention of 1925, His Majesty's ships had certain police rights in the matter in so far as concerns native vessels of less than 500 tons, although it is true the convention has never been ratified by the Persian Government. I should be glad to learn therefore to what extent His Majesty's ships in the Gulf are authorised to detain and search suspect vessels.

6. In view of the negotiations which I am at present conducting with the Persian Government for a general settlement of outstanding questions, and more especially those connected with the Persian Gulf, I venture to submit that it might be of mutual advantage clearly to establish with the Persian Government the future attitude of His Majesty's ships in this matter. Taimourache has more than once admitted to me the value of the presence in the Gulf of His Majesty's ships. Obviously, if it is the case that a contraband trade in arms is carried on from the Arab coast of the Gulf, Persia is intimately concerned to see this trade stopped. Without the assistance of His Majesty's Government she is powerless to do this herself.

Copies of this despatch and of its enclosures have been sent to the Government of India, His Majesty's High Commissioner for Iraq, Bagdad, and to His Majesty's acting consul-general at Bushire.

I have, &c.
R. H. CLIVE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 11.

Taimourache to Sir R. Clive.

Mon cher Ministre,

Téhéran, le 8 juin 1929.

NOUS venons d'apprendre que Mr. Davis, le gérant au consulat général britannique à Shiraz, est allé voir le Gouverneur général pour lui proposer de faire partir par avion les femmes en état de grossesse, c'est-à-dire donner un signal d'évacuation partielle de Shiraz.

Or, la ville de Shiraz n'étant aucunement menacée et cette évacuation n'étant nullement justifiée, il est surprenant de voir Mr. Davis vouloir donner le signal d'alarme. Surtout qu'il y a tant de fausses nouvelles répandues dans le monde sur la Perse et sur les événements qui s'y passent qu'un tel fait, insignifiant par lui-même, aurait pu être interprété par les milieux mal informés ou malveillants à notre préjudice. Votre Excellence sait très bien qu'il serait très nuisible aux intérêts persans de produire en ce moment l'impression que le Gouvernement persan n'est pas en état de maintenir l'ordre dans les régions du sud et du golfe Persique.

Je suis convaincu que votre Excellence est d'accord avec moi de considérer cette démarche du gérant du consulat général peu amicale.

La seconde question sur laquelle je veux également attirer l'attention de votre Excellence, c'est la progression inouïe de la contrebande des armes.

Selon les rapports de nos autorités, il y a une contrebande régulièrement organisée dans les pays côtiers du golfe Persique. Les contrebandiers de ces territoires, de connivence avec leurs complices sur les côtes persanes, s'occupent très énergiquement de la contrebande des armes—la plupart de la fabrication britannique—du sucre et du thé.

Si les contrebandiers bravent les fonctionnaires du Gouvernement persan, qui n'a pas de forces navales, ceci me paraît compréhensible; mais comment osent-ils traverser le golfe, où les bateaux de guerre britanniques sont présents et se croient en devoir d'empêcher la contrebande des armes?

Dans les conditions susmentionnées, les difficultés du Gouvernement persan dans la lutte contre les insurgés du sud deviennent presque insurmontables.

Je signale ces faits à votre Excellence pour qu'elle puisse agir en conséquence.

Veuillez agréer, &c.
TEYMOURACHE.

Enclosure 2 in No. 11.

Sir R. Clive to Taimourache.

Mon cher Ministre,

Téhéran, le 10 juin 1929.

ME référant à cette partie de votre lettre du 8 courant qui concerne la contrebande des armes, je me permets de vous faire les observations suivantes :

1. Par suite de la convention d'après-guerre pour régler le trafic en armes, il est devenu impossible d'exporter sans contrôle au golfe Persique des armes britanniques.

2. A part des armes que possédaient les Arabes après la guerre dont une partie aurait pu arriver en Perse, je ne peux admettre sans preuve que des armes britanniques en grande quantité se sont infiltrées dans la Perse.

3. Si le Gouvernement persan a eu bonne raison de soupçonner qu'on passât des armes en Perse en contrebande d'une zone contrôlée par le Gouvernement britannique, il n'y a jamais attiré l'attention de cette Légation.

4. A ce que je sache, les vaisseaux de guerre de Sa Majesté britannique n'ont aucune autorité à détenir pour chercher la contrebande des bateaux à destination de la côte persane dans les eaux territoriales persanes.

En vu de ce qui précède je me permets d'attirer l'attention de votre Altesse à l'article dans le "Shafagh-Sorkh" de ce matin qui contient des insinuations infondées et qui ne peut que soulever des malentendus malheureux.

Veuillez agréer, &c.
R. H. CLIVE.

Enclosure 3 in No. 11.

Taimourache to Sir R. Clive.

Mon cher Ministre,

Téhéran, le 12 juin 1929.

EN réponse à vos lettres des 10 et 11 courant, où vous répondez à la seconde partie de ma lettre du 8 courant relative à la contrebande des armes, je me permets de vous signaler un fait incontestable : la progression excessive de la contrebande des armes. Nos autorités douanières et autres le confirment dans tous leurs rapports. On confirme également que les centres de cette contrebande se trouvent dans certains endroits du golfe Persique, tels que Koucit, Dobby et d'autres. La contrebande se fait (la grosse part) par les voiliers qui transportent le sucre, le thé et les armes et doivent traverser la haute mer du golfe pour arriver dans les eaux territoriales et sur le territoire persan.

Je suis absolument incapable de vous dire comment les contrebandiers se procurent les fusils et les cartouches. Mais la présence des armes neuves en grande quantité est la preuve irréfutable de l'existence de cette contrebande.

Vous me demandez, dans votre lettre du 10, pourquoi le Gouvernement persan n'a pas attiré l'attention de votre Légation sur le fait que les armes en contrebande passent par la zone contrôlée par le Gouvernement britannique.

Sans parler de nombreuses difficultés du Gouvernement persan à préciser l'itinéraire exact de la contrebande, celui-ci, ayant le devoir de surveiller et de faire la police de ses eaux territoriales, n'a jamais eu besoin d'attirer l'attention du Gouvernement britannique sur la situation de la contrebande des armes dans la haute mer.

Quant à ce que les vaisseaux de guerre de Sa Majesté britannique n'ont pas d'autorité à détenir les bateaux dans les eaux territoriales persanes, pour chercher la contrebande, je partage tout à fait la façon de voir de votre Excellence. Il ne s'agit pas, évidemment, des eaux territoriales persanes, où il n'y a que l'autorité persane qui peut être reconnue. Mais je me permets d'attirer votre attention sur ce que je viens de dire, que pour arriver à ces eaux il faut traverser la haute mer. En faisant cette remarque, je suis très loin de l'idée de vouloir mettre à la charge des bateaux de guerre de Sa Majesté britannique un devoir qui sort, peut-être, des cadres de leurs fonctions.

Relativement à l'article du "Shafagh-Sorkh," étant tout à fait de votre avis d'éviter, autant que possible, tout malentendu fâcheux et malheureux, je dois vous mettre au courant de ce qui suit : le Gouvernement persan, considérant peu importants les événements du sud et jugeant inutile d'alarmer l'opinion publique, avait décidé de prier les journaux de ne pas en parler. Mais on a constaté pratiquement que ce silence engendre les versions et les hypothèses invraisemblables, que le développement

des événements au sud exigeait, au contraire, que l'opinion publique persane en soit informée. Par conséquent, le Gouvernement s'est vu obligé de retirer sa demande préalable auprès de la presse. Depuis, les journaux peuvent écrire et émettre leurs propres opinions et "Shafagh-Sorkh" ne représente que l'opinion de sa rédaction.

Veuillez agréer, &c.

TEYMOURTACHE.

Enclosure 4 in No. 11.

Sir R. Clive to Taimourache.

Mon cher Ministre,

Téhéran, le 14 juin 1929.

J'ai maintenant reçu de notre consul à Shiraz les précisions qui me permettent de répondre à la première partie de la lettre que votre Altesse m'a adressée le 8 courant.

Mr. Davis m'informe que l'affaire s'est passée comme suit :

Après l'attaque sur l'aérodrome de Shiraz, où des avions ont été avariés et des balles sont parvenues jusque dans la ville, certaines dames britanniques sont devenues un peu nerveuses et leurs maris ont demandé au consul s'il n'y avait pas moyen d'évacuer les femmes et les enfants (non pas des femmes en état de grossesse). Mr. Davis a de suite répondu que cela pourrait créer une impression malheureuse, et ne pourrait en tout cas se faire que si le Gouverneur général n'y voyait pas d'inconvénient.

Le même jour Mr. Davis a demandé son avis à son Excellence, qui a de suite répondu que des troupes seraient envoyées pour protéger les résidents étrangers, ce qui rendrait l'évacuation inutile. Quand Mr. Davis leur a raconté cette conversation toutes les dames se sont dites prêtes à rester.

Je ne vois vraiment pas en quoi Mr. Davis aurait pu agir différemment, ni même plus correctement.

Veuillez agréer, &c.

R. H. CLIVE.

[E 3354/104/34]

No. 12.

Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson. (Received July 2)

(No. 343.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of Intelligence Summary No. 12 from the military attaché on the subject of events in Persia.

Tehran, June 16, 1929.

Enclosure in No. 12.

Intelligence Summary No. 12 for the Period ending June 15, 1929.

Tehran.

1. *Persian Officials.*—Dr. Sadiq-i-A'lam, of the Ministry of Education, has been appointed as the Persian representative in the forthcoming International Conference on Adult Education in London.

2. The Persian Minister in London has been called upon to resign.

3. *Wireless Station.*—The Persian papers announce that a wireless station of short wave-length, of material bought in France and sent via the Persian Gulf, will shortly be opened in Tehran.

4. *Communications.*—The Tehran Post Office announces that postal services between the following towns will shortly be opened: Bushire to Borasjun, and Aoroman to Marivan in Kurdistan.

5. *Railway.*—A reliable report from Sultanabad states that the railway survey in the Burujird district is expected to be completed by the end of June 1929.

6. The section Bandar-Shah (near Bandar Gez) to Ashraf is practically finished; rails are laid down from Kilometre 12 to Kilometre 50.

7. At the southern end of the railway 18 kilom. of rails have been laid. Work is progressing daily.

8. The question of a direct line from Zamanabad, near Hamadan, to Tehran, avoiding Kazvin, is still under discussion.

9. Pahlavi authorities have asked for an extension of the railway from Kazvin as soon as it has reached this latter place (or its neighbourhood).

10. *Military Appointments.*—Amir Lashkar Ahmad Agha Khan, General Officer Commanding Western Division, has been relieved of his command. Sartip Fazlullah Khan has been appointed head of the amnieh. Sartip Mehdi Quli Khan has been appointed to command the Western Division.

11. *Perso-Greek Customs Agreement.*—A provisional customs agreement between the Persian Government and the Greek Government, was signed in London on the 24th May. The agreement is valid for six months, and the goods of each country receive most-favoured-nation treatment.

12. *Persian Legation at Bagdad, &c.*—The Persian press announces on the 10th June that, in order to allow for the extra expenses which will be incurred by the Persian Government in founding a Legation at Bagdad and creating consulates in Mosul, Kirkuk, and Kut-el-Amara, a sum of 15,000 tomans is to be appropriated.

Khuzistan.

13. *Staff College.*—A Staff College for the training of military officers was opened at Ahwaz on the 15th April, 1929.

14. *Conscription.*—Unrest in Behbahan, Tangistan, and Burujird is stated to have caused the Persian Government to postpone for one year the enforcement of the compulsory recruitment law in Mohammerah and Abadan.

15. *Kuhgilu Tribe.*—The Governor-General of Khuzistan has taken eleven youths from the tribe as security for its good behaviour. One of them, the son of Imam Quli Khan, has been sent to Tehran.

Fars.

16. *Revolt of Tribes.*—The Persian Government troops have continued their campaign against the Qashqai and Arab tribes in the Shiraz area.

The operations were placed in charge of Sartip (now Amir Lashkar) Habibullah Khan Shaibani on the 3rd June. The tribes are carrying on a guerilla warfare with considerable success.

The Persian army detachment at Fasa has been withdrawn. Most of the Government forces are now concentrated on Shiraz, with posts at Kazerun and Chinar Rahdar. Kazerun is practically isolated and its garrison in grave danger. The insurgents have cut the telegraph wires between Shiraz and Kazerun, removing the line completely for a length of 7 miles. The telegraph wire to Isfahan has also been cut, and rebel bands have been in intermittent occupation of Pul-i-Khan, some 30 miles from Shiraz on the Isfahan road. They are reported to have blown up one arch of the bridge over the Band-i-Amir there.

The rebels attacked Shiraz aerodrome on the night of the 6th June and damaged two army aeroplanes.

The number of Persian troops in the Shiraz area is probably eight to nine thousand. This should be enough to protect Shiraz, with adequate leadership. The strength of the tribes is difficult to estimate; they are embarrassed by their flocks and herds, which have not been sent to their summer grazing grounds north of Shiraz.

A good deal of fighting has taken place round Chinar Rahdar. The leadership of the tribes appears to be with Ali Khan, aided by various Qashqai kalantars, including the Qashqulis.

The troops are in difficulties over a supply of ready cash.

The Persian Government evidently views the situation as grave, and fears that the movement may spread. Inspired articles have appeared in the press suggesting that the tribes are being supported and helped with ammunition, &c., by British agents.

Persian Gulf.

17. *Preventive Service.*—The Persian Government have ordered six gunboats to be made in Italy, for police work in the Persian Gulf, especially to check the smuggling of sugar and tea.

18. *Bushire.*—The Ministry of the Interior announces the receipt of a detailed report from the Governor of Bushire, for a supply of drinking water for the town, by means of iron pipes; the estimated cost to be 300,000 tomans.

Khorasan.

19. *Communications.*—The metalling of the Meshed-Karez road is in progress, but very little work has yet been done.

20. *Earthquake in Shirvan and Kuchan District.*—The latest figures announced of casualties in this disaster are as follows: Killed, 3,257; seriously injured, 1,121; sheep and cattle killed, 6,546. Relief measures are in the hands of a main committee in Meshed and several sub-committees.

21. *Russian Activities.*—The notorious Soviet propagandist Vaxoff, who was head of the Russtransit firm in Meshed before it closed down, has lately been extremely active in Meshed, and is working for the intelligence department of Askhabad.

22. Refugees from Russia have lately caused much embarrassment not only to the Persian authorities in Meshed, but to the Soviet also. The latter are reported to be establishing new military posts at different points on the Perso-Russian frontier to intercept these refugees.

23. Many Afghan subjects residing in Russia have been arriving recently in Kushk and Takhta Bazar from the direction of Merv. Besides genuine Afghans a large number of Tartars, Caucasians and Turkomans are said to have come in under the head of "Afghan recruits." These men are being trained under Russian instructors in Takhta Bazar with a view to taking part in anti-Habibullah operations from the north.

24. *Afghan Affairs.*—Shuja-ud-Dowleh, the ex-Governor of Herat, arrived in Meshed on the 13th May and left again on the 27th May. He attempted to recruit Hazaras, with the hope of sending them to Herat in time to help the cause of Amanullah. He brought with him from Herat a lorry-load of arms, including revolvers and rifles, all stamped with the Soviet Government mark. These arms were confiscated at Karez, but some were subsequently returned to Shuja-ud-Dowleh.

25. The acting Afghan consul-general was still functioning at Meshed at the end of May. It is reported that about the middle of May a message came from Abdur-Rahim in Herat to inform him that if he did not throw in his lot with Habibullah he would be replaced by another official sent by Abdur-Rahim.

26. Reports from Meshed say that the situation in Herat is obscure; the town appears to be administered by a committee of six persons under the chairmanship of the kotwal, one Mohammed Ibrahim Khan. Mohamed Ghaus is reported to be still (the 31st May) in Kushk, and to have collected a force of some 2,000 "Afghans" with a view to marching against Herat.

27. The Governor of Herat, Abdur-Rahim, has attempted to communicate with the British consul-general at Meshed, asking whether he would send a representative to Herat to confer with Abdur-Rahim, and whether transit visas through Duzdab, Quetta and Chaman could be given to a party of mullahs whom Abdur-Rahim wished to send as a deputation to Habibullah in Kabul. No visas were given.

Azerbaijan.

28. Reports from Arbil foreshadow the resumption of hostilities at an early date between the Mangur tribes and the Persian Government troops. The leading spirit in keeping alive the desire to revolt is Mullah Khalil.

29. The Persian Government have released the prominent chiefs, Hasan Agha and Hamzeh Agha, presumably with the object of placating the tribes; but this move has been interpreted as a sign of weakness. The Government has also spread abroad notices announcing the abolition of feudal tribute, which sop may or may not placate the tribes; but the notice goes on to state in unequivocal terms the Government's intention to bring the whole district under a regular administration.

30. Operations against the Kurds are proceeding in a half-hearted fashion in the Sauj Bulagh area. The Shahsevan irregulars who are helping the Persian troops have proved very unreliable. It seems that the Persian Government would like to drop the campaign, and with it the disarmament and "Pahlavi hat" policies.

Kermanshah.

31. *Communications.*—The Persian press, on the 14th June, announce that a credit of 43,000 tomans has been appropriated for the construction of a road from Kermanshah to Pusht-i-Kuh, via Shahabad (formerly known as Harunabad, on the road from Kermanshah to Khanakin). Engineers and workmen have been sent to begin operations. It is not clear to what part of Pusht-i-Kuh the road will lead.

Turkish Frontier.

32. The name of the Turkish delegate to the commission is announced as Fazil Bey.

33. Persian newspapers announced on the 10th June that Nasrullah Khan I'tela-ul-Mulk, the Persian representative on the Perso-Turkish Frontier Commission, was ready to start with his staff for the frontier, there to decide certain outstanding questions in consultation with the Turks. He served on the previous frontier commission of 1913-14.

Baluchistan.

34. Reference Baluchistan Agency Confidential Diary No. 8, 1929, paragraph 9. No confirmation of the contemplation to migrate can yet be obtained. Reliable reports state that feeling against the detention of Dost Mohamed is rising, but it is improbable that the Shah will allow him to leave Tehran.

35. Military barracks are being built at Iranshahr (otherwise Fabreh).

36. Reports state that orders have been issued to enlist 500 Baluchis from Bampur and Kwash areas in the Persian forces.

Bakhtiari.

37. Bakhtiari robbers have been active near Borujen, Shah Reza, and generally in the Semiran district.

Yezd.

38. *Conscription.*—Conscription has not yet been started in the Yezd area.

Russia.

39. The Persian press announces that a bridge has been erected by the Russians over the Astara River, forming the frontier bridge at Astara on the Caspian Sea. The bridge has thirteen arches and is 97 metres long; its cost is to be borne equally by the Persian and the Soviet Governments.

H. J. COOPER, *Captain, R.A.S.C.,*
Assistant Military Attaché.

Tehran, June 15, 1929.

[E 3381/19/34]

No. 13.

Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received July 3.)

(No. 260.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, July 3, 1929.

YOUR telegram No. 206: Anglo-Persian negotiations.

Since the arrest of Prince Firuz, the Finance Minister, wild rumours have been circulating in Tehran. Even the position of the Minister of Court is involved, and although I personally do not believe that his position is likely to be challenged, in spite of the intrigues which are undoubtedly taking place against him, I propose to wait until the general atmosphere is clearer.

I propose to raise question of telegraphs with the Minister of Court at the first opportunity, when his position has been absolutely secured.

As regards claims, the Persian Government have now twice definitely repudiated those arising during the period of the war. In my opinion, all these war claims are compromised by the recent action of the Imperial Bank of Persia in handing over about £85,000 to the Persian Government before getting any assurance from them regarding claims.

[E 3378/99/34]

No. 14.

Acting Vice-Consul Fletcher to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received July 4.)

(No. 7/42. Secret.)

Sir,

Mohammerah, June 10, 1929.

IN continuation of my despatch No. 6/34, dated the 8th instant, I forward herewith, for your information, a copy of my despatch No. 16/41 addressed to His Majesty's Minister, Tehran.

I have, &c.

E. W. FLETCHER, *Captain.*

Enclosure in No. 14.

Acting Vice-Consul Fletcher to Sir R. Clive.

(No. 16/41. Secret.)

Sir,

Mohammerah, June 10, 1929.

WITH reference to my telegrams Nos. 23 and 25 dated the 9th June, 1929, I have the honour to submit the following report:—

In addition to the information which had steadily been reaching me of the intention of the Busheri element in Abadan and Mohammerah to cause trouble during the Moharram, it was vaguely reported that nationalist and religious propaganda against the British was being disseminated. The purport of this propaganda was that the Persian Government was really backing the movement, that Tehran's real wish was to see the British out of Khuzistan, and that the Russians, who are the Persians' real friends, would lend all possible aid.

I had also had information of meetings held in the house of Mirza Ismail and Mirza Jelal, sons-in-law of Muvaqqar, at which Mirza Jelal assured those present of the eventual release of the deportees by means of the influence wielded by Muvaqqar at Tehran. These two men were warned both by the Governor of Mohammerah and by the Governor-General, and I was assured that they would be kept under observation.

On the 8th June the Persian police, on information received from the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, seized some letters belonging to a barber named Reza Ghuli Ardabili, which, I believe, contained instructions from the Communist party of South Persia. Five arrests were made forthwith and the Anglo-Persian Oil Company informed me that the Governor of Abadan was asking for 100 more troops from Ahwaz. The Governor of Abadan then departed for Ahwaz.

About 8 p.m. on the 8th June I received a telephone message from Mr. Elkington, general manager of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company at Abadan, to say that information was coming through of impending trouble. He said that he could not state definitely when the trouble would occur, but that it might be that same night; but he told me that he would let me know later when fuller information had been collected and verified.

I asked the Governor of Mohammerah by telephone to have the troops in Mohammerah ready to move off, and I telephoned to Lieutenant Willoughby, the consul at Ahwaz, to ask if the 100 reinforcements which, I then understood, were to be despatched could be sent down earlier and could stand by for an immediate move. At about 10 p.m. after an interview with the Governor of Mohammerah I went to Abadan to study the situation.

It appeared that most reliable information (which my subsequent enquiries give me no reason to disbelieve) had been received that a party headed by Mirza Ismail and Mirza Jelal, the sons-in-law of Muvaqqar, had been planning in Mohammerah to make an attack on the refinery with 150 armed Persian followers, mostly Busheris, who would incite and intimidate the rest of the Persian population to rise, by raising the cries of "Down with the foreigners and unbelievers!" and of "Khuzistan for the Persians!" To this end further propaganda was to be spread, pointing out the smallness of the military force protecting the refinery, and stressing the fact that the Persian Government was really in sympathy with the movement.

All plans had been laid in Mohammerah and, on the first night of Moharram, i.e., the night of the 8th June, emissaries of the leaders were to commence meetings

in Abadan to rouse the Persians. By this means they hope to make a successful attack within the next fourteen days.

This information fits in so well with various activities and reports noted both by me and the Anglo-Persian Oil Company and comes from such a reliable source that I do not feel justified in disregarding it as a scare.

How far this movement, definitely nationalist and anti-foreign in character, is connected with the paper discovered on the 8th June is not known, but I believe that it is being given every encouragement by the Communist party.

The Governor-General was interviewed by the consul, Ahwaz, on the night of the 8th and was given the names of the ringleaders. He said, however, that it would be fatal to touch them until after Moharram; he guaranteed the safety of the refinery and stated that the troops there were adequate. This he repeated to Mr. Elkington over the telephone, and when the latter replied that in the event of no more troops being sent the Governor-General would have to be prepared to face a riot, the Governor-General replied that he was so prepared.

On the 9th June after an interview with the senior naval officer, Persian Gulf, at Basra I had a further interview with Mr. Elkington, and separate interviews with the Governors of Mohammerah and Abadan and with the officer commanding troops.

The Persian authorities were all sceptical of the information we had received, and although I stated that I was uneasy and would feel easier in my mind if reinforcements were to be sent, they replied that it was unnecessary, alleging that the arrival of reinforcements would disturb the people. As I had some two weeks ago urged that reinforcements should arrive during the first few days of Moharram, and as the situation is one in which the population is perfectly peaceable but is liable to be intimidated and excited by a mob of gunmen with whom the troops are not in sufficient numbers to deal adequately, I felt that these reasons are not at all justifiable.

Acting obviously under orders from Tehran, they all denied that Muvaqqar had any hand in the Busheri movement, and they all grossly exaggerated the number of troops now available, which is in my opinion not more than 250, although the officer commanding troops gives it at 400.

I consider the whole position most unsatisfactory. It seems plain to me that the local authorities are acting under orders from Tehran, and that the whole situation has been brought about by a failure on the part of the Central Government to deal firmly with Muvaqqar. It is incredible to my mind that the facts of the existence of this movement and of the meetings held in the houses of Mirzas Ismail and Jelal should be unknown to the Persian authorities.

To my mind the local authorities are genuinely doing their best, and the military have made the best possible use of the forces at their disposal here. I feel that they have been told not to take strong action with regard to any matter in which Muvaqqar is concerned. The Governor of Mohammerah, after having repeatedly told me that he knew Muvaqqar to be capable of anything, is now trying to persuade me that Muvaqqar is entirely guiltless of any complicity in the troubles here. The Governor-General of Khuzistan, after giving me to understand that we had only to ask for more troops and they would be sent, now refuses to send them. The promise of the strengthening of the Abadan police has not been fulfilled, nor has adequate effect been given to the assurance of proper passport and customs precautions. In short, the Persian Government are not carrying out the promises made to the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, and to me, nor are they taking the strong action necessary to prevent not only a crisis now, but the occurrence of a long series of such crises, the ultimate end of which I am utterly unable to foresee.

The situation is, I repeat, most unsatisfactory, and the time has come when the Persian authorities should show that they are definitely protecting the company, and are definitely determined to suppress any attempts at destroying the refinery.

I regard as essential:—

- The prompt despatch of strong reinforcements, preferably with one armoured car.
- The complete change of all customs and passport personnel on the Shatt-el-Arab, except M. Rabi of Mohammerah.
- The arrest and removal of all ringleaders, after the first ten days of Moharram are over.
- Strong action by the Central Government, firstly in regard to Muvaqqar and his relations, and secondly in regard to Russian traders and propagandists now here.

In addition I think that the chief of police, Mohammerah, is not above suspicion, and I would like to see him replaced.

In conclusion, I would again repeat that I do not wish to appear alarmist, but I am convinced that strong action now is the only means of preventing further and possibly more serious troubles.

A copy of this despatch is being forwarded to the Hon. the Political Resident, His Majesty's consul, Ahwaz, the Foreign Office, London, the High Commissioner, Bagdad, and the Air Officer Commanding, Bagdad.

I have, &c.

E. W. FLETCHER, *Captain.*

[E 3390/19/34]

No. 15.

Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received July 4.)

(No. 264.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Tehran, July 4, 1929.

YOUR telegram No. 205.

In reply to my letter conveying your message, Minister of Court has written requesting me to express his warmest thanks for your telegram, "which shows that His Majesty's Government desire to see finally and successfully settled questions which have for some time been under discussion between His Majesty's Minister and myself." After referring to pacific policy of Persian Government and desire for most friendly relations with all her neighbours, Minister hoped that the most cordial relations based on respect for their mutual rights and common interests would be maintained between Persia and British Empire, and that with your valuable assistance my task and that of the new Persian Minister, who will interpret the view of his Government, will be crowned with success and a new page opened in the relations of the two countries.

"Whilst hoping that bonds of friendship and mutual confidence may be drawn still tighter, I present my respects to Secretary of State, and can only regret that I am not personally acquainted with him."

[E 3591/95/34]

No. 16.

Mr. A. Henderson to Sir R. Clive (Tehran).

(No. 350.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, July 9, 1929.

THE Persian Minister in Paris came to see me to-day and was accompanied by Sir John Cadman.

2. Hussein Khan Ala began by referring to the great difficulties which were being encountered by the Persian Government in connexion with arms smuggling in the Persian Gulf, and said that, rightly or wrongly, there was an impression in Persia that His Majesty's Government were not developing the necessary energy to suppress the traffic, and that more might be done by His Majesty's ships in the Gulf.

3. I pointed out to the Minister that the question was engaging my attention, but that I could not admit that His Majesty's Government could be held responsible for the smuggling that was going on. It must be remembered that the coast line to be watched over was over 1,000 miles in length, and that the naval forces at the disposal of His Majesty's Government in the Gulf were not such as to make it possible to ensure that no arms were smuggled.

4. The Minister then proceeded to refer to the attitude of certain British elements in Persia, who, he suggested, were impeding the friendly development of Anglo-Persian relations. He hoped very much that I would send the necessary instructions to see that this obstructionist attitude was abandoned, and that I would also do what was in my power to accelerate the negotiations between the two Governments.

5. I told Hussein Khan Ala that his allegations as regards the attitude of British elements in Persia came to me as a great surprise. It was the first time that I had heard any hint to this effect, and he must understand that before I could act as he desired he must be good enough to supply me with more specific material than the rather vague charges which he was now bringing. I pressed him several

times on these lines, without, however, obtaining anything more than a reiteration of his general statement. At one moment he had mentioned the personnel of the Indo-European Telegraph Department as a possible source of the obstruction to which he had pointed, but as he did not elaborate the point I let the matter drop.

6. In conclusion the Minister asked me whether he might assure his Government of the friendly dispositions of the new Government in England towards Persia. I told him that he might certainly give this assurance, and that he might rely upon me to do what was possible to bring the present negotiations to a satisfactory conclusion.

7. The Minister thanked me and then withdrew.

I am, &c.

ARTHUR HENDERSON.

[E 3515/95/34]

No. 17.

Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received July 12.)

(No. 273.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, July 12, 1929.

MY telegram No. 259.

1. Shiraz situation is still obscure. Negotiations are still proceeding. Tribal demands believed to be selection of ilkhani from Kashgai tribes, taxes to be collected by ilkhani, no disarmament, refund of certain fines, no conscription throughout Fars and no Government monopolies of sugar, tea, tobacco or, above all, opium. Most Kashgai leaders have recently been in Shiraz. Soulat-ed-Dowleh was released and sent to Shiraz by aeroplane on 10th July. He was received by six Kashgai khans and a military officer and conferred with military authorities. This surprising change of policy is naturally interpreted as a sign of weakness. South-east of Shiraz Khamseh Arabs are reported to have 3,600 fighting men with ample supplies of money; they are collecting Government taxes and rent of Qavam's properties. Shiraz-Kazerun road still closed.

2. Bakhtiari situation: Minister of War arrived at Isfahan 5th July in connexion with unrest in Bakhtiari country. He is still there, and on his recommendation a concentration of some 2,000 troops has been made in Isfahan. Dissatisfied elements in Bakhtiari tribes are making similar demands to Kashgais and appear to be rebelling against their own khans.

Position is of special interest for Anglo-Persian Oil Company, both from the point of view of security of fields and from that of their labour supply.

(Repeated to India, No. 133; Bagdad, No. 137; and Bushire, No. 102.)

[E 3552/172/34]

No. 18.

Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received July 16.)

(No. 349. Confidential.)

Sir,

Tehran, June 27, 1929.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 337 of the 15th June on the subject of the prospective trunk railway from the Caspian to the Persian Gulf, I have the honour to report that I paid a short visit last week during the Moharram holiday to Mazanderan, travelling by the new motor road which was completed last year to Barfarush and Meshed-i-Sar, on the Caspian.

2. This road branches at Aliabad, 15 miles east of Barfarush, to Sari, the political capital of the province, whence it is in course of being prolonged to Bander-i-Gez, the prospective terminus of the railway in the south-east corner of the Caspian.

3. Two things especially struck me. Firstly, the almost complete absence of traffic along this road. I only passed six motors on the 180 miles from Tehran to Barfarush (the commercial capital of the province), while camel, mule and cart traffic was almost equally lacking.

4. Secondly, no one could help being struck by the very great engineering difficulties with which the railway syndicate will be faced. Mr. Thomas Brown had

told me that 25 miles of solid tunnelling would be necessary, and I can well believe it.

5. Taimourtache had also spent a few days last week in Mazanderan and had visited Bander-i-Gez and travelled over the 22 miles of rail which had so far been laid. In the course of a friendly conversation two days ago, when we were discussing our experiences and impressions, he said that the railway syndicate had only a contract at present to construct the line from Bander-i-Gez to Aliabad in the north and from Khormusa to Dizful in the south. Both are perfectly straightforward sections over flat country. The Government had as yet come to no decision about any further construction. I said I hoped they would not do so without very carefully weighing the financial side of the problem. He made no further comment except to ask me what I thought of monopolies in general and the sugar and tea monopoly in particular. I said that, as an Englishman, I had been brought up to believe that monopolies were economically unsound. They were opposed not only to the principles of free trade, but also to freedom of trade. As regards the sugar and tea monopoly in particular, I had given him my views last time we had discussed the railway. He said he agreed in theory with the objections to monopolies, but argued that the monopoly tax as opposed to the import duty and road tax on tea and sugar was not so high as seriously to affect the consumer. The existence of this monopoly, moreover, provided a fund, apart from the general budget, which could be used for special purposes and, if necessary, provide the security for a foreign loan. Persia might, for instance, wish to raise a loan for road construction and contract to have roads built in the same way as she had arranged for provisional railway construction. I expressed no opinion about this beyond saying that road development certainly appeared to me to be not only a less expensive but a far more generally useful way of dealing with the question of transport in a large, under-populated country like Persia than the trunk line as at present proposed.

6. I only report this conversation as appearing to indicate that the Minister of Court may even be wavering in his ideas about the railway. The prospective cost of the latter is worrying him. He wishes to explore other possibilities before the Shah and the country are finally committed to the trunk line. Moreover, he knows that there is no enthusiasm in the country itself for the railway.

Copies of this despatch have been sent to the Government of India and His Majesty's High Commissioner for Iraq, Bagdad.

I have, &c.
R. H. CLIVE.

[E 3553/95/34]

No. 19.

Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received July 16.)

(No. 350.)

Sir,

Tehran, June 28, 1929.

I HAVE the honour to submit for your information a short summary of the events in Shiraz district and neighbourhood during the past fortnight, so far as I have been able to ascertain them. As previously reported, my sources of information are neither very numerous nor very reliable. The strict secrecy observed by the Ministry of War has been maintained; and I doubt whether anybody except His Majesty the Shah and one or two of his subordinates is in a position to form a correct appreciation of even the military aspects of the situation.

2. At the beginning of the fortnight, the situation from the Government point of view appeared very dangerous. Communications by road and telegraph between Isfahan and Shiraz were cut. The amnieh (road-guard) post at Sivand had deserted. Numbers of petty marauders were robbing villages on the Isfahan-Shiraz road, the robbers belonging to the Boir Ahmedi and Bakhtiari tribes, as well as to some divisions of the Qashqais. Some road-guard posts had been evacuated and the personnel concentrated on Abadeh. On the 15th June a force of about 1,000 soldiers with machine guns, field wireless, explosives and iron girders for repairing bridges arrived at Abadeh from Isfahan, evidently with the object of repairing the damaged arch of the Pul-i-Khan bridge a few miles north of Shiraz, but this force did not proceed further south for some days. Reliable reports indicated that raiders were collecting in the Duzdab district; and the Kerman-Bunder Abbas road via Baft, in

addition to the motor road between those places via Tang-i-Zagh, was declared unsafe, and it was recommended that no goods should be sent over those routes for the present. The road from Shiraz to Bushire was absolutely closed, and in many places destroyed; and the telegraph line from Shiraz to Kazerun was so badly damaged that it cannot be repaired for some time.

3. Fortunately for the Government the Muharram celebrations intervened. The principal day of mourning, the 10th day of the Persian month, fell on the 18th June, and both sides seem to have taken a rest. However, bands of Qashqais were by this time circulating in the northern part of their tribal area, that is, in the districts west of Abadeh and Dehbid; on the 17th June, for instance, a well known Qashqai leader named Hussein Khan, son of Ayaz Khan Darashuri, with 800 sowars, arrived at the village of Hassanabad, 50 miles west of Abadeh, and collected men and provisions. General Shaibani's efforts to re-establish communication with Shiraz were, however, to some extent successful, and on the 18th June telegraph communication between that town and Isfahan was reopened.

4. Shortly afterwards two columns of Persian troops, of a total strength of 3,000, left Shiraz, proceeding northwards, with the object of gaining possession of the town of Baizah. One report states that this force was in charge of the previous commander of the Shiraz garrison, Prince Mohammed Hussein Mirza; and as his brother, Prince Firuz Mirza, was arrested in Tehran on the 18th June, reports were not wanting that Mohammed Hussein Mirza had deserted to join the tribes, together with a number of Persian troops. However this may be, the idea of the expedition appeared to be to capture Baizah, a place some 30 miles north of Shiraz through which the main body of the Qashqai tribe used, in previous years, to pass on its way to the tribe's summer quarters. Reinforcements of rebels were reported to be rapidly proceeding in the direction of Baizah on the 19th, and the success or failure of this expedition appeared to be a matter of much importance. Hitherto, I have received no reports of the result of these operations. I imagine that any victory for the troops would have been triumphantly announced; the fact that no such victory has been declared leads me to suppose that no decisive engagement took place. It was in any case improbable that a force of troops would succeed in surprising the Qashqais at any particular point in their own vast area.

5. On the 22nd June a column from Behbahan was sent to co-operate with the Persian troops in the Baizah area. The road between Kazerun and Bushire was at this time reported to be badly damaged, and a special aeroplane has been making two or three trips daily between Shiraz and Bushire transporting accumulated stores of opium to the coast for shipment. Temporary repairs were effected about this time to the Pul-i-Khan bridge. The insecurity in the vicinity of the Bunder Abbas-Kerman road was shown by the fact that Major Noel, the newly-appointed consul for Kerman, attempted to travel thither by the Bunder Abbas, but was obliged to return in spite of the fact that he was accompanied by an escort; he finally took the Karachi-Quetta-Duzdab route.

6. The defences of Shiraz were arranged by General Shaibani by means of pickets of troops on the principal strategic points on the hills which encircle the town and the plain which surrounds it. On the 25th June it was reported that the townspeople were expecting the tribes to attack the town, and that the majority of the Shiraz forces were engaged with the enemy. Ali Khan was in a position 8 miles south of the town, where fighting occurred on the night of the 24th June. The Qashqai leader had the support of the Dashtistan Arabs, numbers of whom returned south from their summer quarters near Dehbid.

7. On the 26th June renewed fighting was reported. A notice had been posted in the town, and circulated to the tribes, offering a fourteen days' truce, in which the rebels were invited to surrender; in which case they would be pardoned.

8. The news on the 27th June was more satisfactory. The road from Shiraz to Isfahan was declared safe, and lorries were allowed to leave and enter Shiraz. However, reports received at the same time to the effect that road-guard posts at other places on the Isfahan road had been withdrawn in order to strengthen the section from Dehbid to Sivand did not encourage feelings of optimism. Moreover, it is now reported that the bridge over the Daliki River, some 40 miles on the Bushire side of Kazerun, has been destroyed. This may mean that pessimistic reports as to a coming rising of tribes in the vicinity of Bushire may be justified.

9. I am reporting in a separate despatch both the recent arrests of prominent Persian officials in Tehran, for reasons possibly connected with the Qashqai revolt, and the campaign of rumours, expressed in press articles and circulated broadcast by

word of mouth, to the effect that the revolt was engineered by British agents, and the insurgents supplied by us with British arms.

Copies of this despatch have been sent to the Government of India, His Majesty's High Commissioner for Iraq, and His Majesty's acting consul-general at Bushire.

I have, &c.
R. H. CLIVE.

[E 3554/96/34]

No. 20.

Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received July 16.)

(No. 351.)

Tehran, June 29, 1929.

Sir,

I HAVE already reported by telegraph the arrest of Prince Firuz Mirza, Nusrat-ed-Dowleh, G.C.M.G., the Acting Minister of Finance of the present Government. I now have the honour to submit some details of the event, and recent developments connected with it.

2. On the 18th June, 1929, the 10th day of the month of Muharram, and the day on which the principal national mourning ceremonies of the Shiah world take place, His Majesty the Shah, with those of his Ministers who were in Tehran, attended a *rozah-khwan* ceremony of public mourning in the Government "Tekieh," in accordance with usual practice. His Highness the Minister of Court had left for Mazanderan the day before, with the Shah's permission, to make an inspection of the progress of the railway and the roads in that province; he was due to return, and did return, on the following Friday, the 21st June. Prince Firuz and Daver, the Minister of Justice, had arranged to accompany Taimourtache, but at the last moment the Shah had refused them permission to go.

3. When leaving the "Tekieh" hall, His Majesty suddenly said to the Prime Minister that Firuz Mirza was to be under arrest. The chief of police, who was present, was given charge of the Minister of Finance, who made an unsuccessful attempt to make a personal appeal to His Majesty.

4. The Prince was taken by car to the police headquarters, where he was subjected to a long examination. He spent that night in a room at the police station, and the following day was escorted to his private house, outside Tehran, named Farmaniyeh, where he was made to produce certain documents, and various boxes and papers were examined. He is still under arrest, though at his house and not in the police headquarters; and in spite of enquiries from all possible sources I have to report that I, like almost everyone else in Tehran, am completely ignorant of the real charge which has been made against him. The Prime Minister, under instructions from the Shah, has taken over charge of the Ministry of Finance, pending the appointment of a new Minister.

5. The wildest rumours have been current to explain the reasons for the arrest of Prince Firuz. It has been said, for instance, that a letter from Russia, showing that the Prince was in league with the Russians against the present régime, had been intercepted in the post; again it has been asserted that letters had been intercepted showing that the Qashqai revolution was aided and abetted by Prince Firuz and his cousin, Akbar Mirza, the Governor-General of Fars. Finally it has been suggested that wholesale corruption in the Ministry of Finance had been brought to the knowledge of the Shah.

6. None of these rumours have as yet been confirmed, and the general public are still in complete ignorance as to the reasons of the arrest. It is, in fact, probable that only one man in the country besides the Shah himself is aware why the Prince has been arrested. This is General Muhammed Khan Dargahi, the chief of police, who remains in the absolute confidence of the Shah, and has long been the enemy not only of Prince Firuz but also of the Minister of Court.

7. In the course of a conversation which I had with the latter a few days ago, I took occasion to ask him why Prince Firuz had been arrested. He replied "I know no more about it than you do"; I asked the Shah the same question and His Majesty replied "I have very strong evidence against Prince Firuz, and when I have all the proofs in my hand I will tell you. Meanwhile I wish you to enquire

and recommend to me a suitable successor as Minister of Finance." Taimourtache went on to say that the documents on which the Shah relied must either be genuine or forgeries; in case they were genuine he could only deeply regret that Prince Firuz, with whom he had been always on terms of friendship, should have been guilty of improper conduct. In case they were forgeries it was most unfortunate that His Majesty should have been led to take such drastic action on the basis of information which was not true. In any case there could be no question of Prince Firuz returning to public life in this country for a considerable time. He was however much embarrassed at having to find a successor to the Prince, who was intelligent, very hard-working, and thoroughly at home in his department. Whom could he find to succeed him? He dismissed Djam, the Minister of Public Works, and Farzin, the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, as useless. Someone however would have to be found at an early date; it was quite impossible to leave the Prime Minister as Acting Minister of Finance for more than a week or two.

8. I was careful to express no gratification at the dismissal of Prince Firuz, as in countries like Persia my experience is that no Minister is irretrievably compromised. They all have a habit of turning up again. Prince Firuz has certainly acted as an avowed enemy of this Legation and everything British since he came into office nearly two and a half years ago. The Anglo-Persian Oil Company and the Imperial Bank of Persia, have suffered much from his unfriendly attitude, and I cannot recall one single instance in which he has ever been instrumental in settling the smallest question affecting this Legation.

9. It is commonly said that Prince Firuz, who was in debt to the tune of about £20,000 when he came into office, is now in very prosperous circumstances. He could hardly in fact have been Minister of Finance so long without profit to his bank account. If in the end nothing definite can be proved against him he will probably be given leave to go to Europe.

10. On the same day on which Prince Firuz was arrested, Akbar Mirza, the Governor-General of Fars, who had been recalled by aeroplane from Shiraz, and Sartip Fazlullah Khan Zahidi, the chief of the *amnieh* (gendarmerie) were also arrested, and are still in prison. No reason is known for the arrest of Akbar Mirza, except that the position has gone from bad to worse in Fars since he became Governor-General; but for this he would appear hardly to be responsible, as he had no authority over the military.

11. Sartip Zahidi, who has always been a *bon viveur*, had recently been in Shiraz. He is reported to have spent his evenings in riotous living, and not to have been unduly depressed by the successes of the Qashqai over the Government forces. The Shah sent for him and is reported to have slapped him in the face, and to have condemned him to a period of hard labour as a private soldier. Among his present duties is said to be that of cleaning out the latrines.

12. Amir Mujahid Bakhtiari, who has always been a notorious intriguer, was also arrested, but he has now been released, as the evidence against him was a document which has now been proved to have been fabricated by one of his own employees.

13. The Persian press did not appear during the period the 18th to 21st June, owing to the Muharram holidays. But on the 22nd June an article appeared in the newspaper "Ittila'at," reporting the arrests of Prince Firuz, Prince Akbar Mirza and Sartip Zahidi, and connecting them with the revolt of the Qashqais in the south. It is reasonably certain that this report either emanated from Government sources or was permitted by them to be published. On the 23rd June the newspaper "Shafagh-i-Surkh," which is often officially inspired, alluded to these arrests in an article, a translation of two paragraphs of which I enclose herein.* It is suggested, firstly, that all three arrests are in connexion with a plot to support the Qashqais and, secondly, that Prince Firuz is accused of treason or embezzlement in connexion with the negotiations for the Anglo-Persian Agreement in 1919.

14. In the same number of the "Shafagh-i-Surkh" there appeared a long extra from the "Izvestiya," dated, I believe, the 16th June, concerning the causes of the Qashqai revolt; and although the arrests had not then taken place, I enclose a copy of a translation of a portion of this article,* accompanied by comments thereon by the Persian paper. The story of British responsibility for the Qashqai revolt is repeated; though it is interesting to observe that the "Shafagh" acknowledges that some Persian officials have been to blame. Firuz, Akbar and Zahidi are the scapegoats.

* Not printed.

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Copies of this despatch and enclosures have been sent to the Government of India, His Majesty's High Commissioner for Iraq, Bagdad, and His Majesty's acting consul-general at Bushire.

I have, &c.
R. H. CLIVE.

[E 3555/100/34]

No. 21.

Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received July 16.)

(No. 353.)
Sir,

Tehran, June 29, 1929.

IN accordance with the instructions contained in your despatch No. 86 of the 27th February last, I have lost no opportunity of pressing the Minister of Court to fulfil his promise that the affairs of the Sheikh of Mohammerah shall be satisfactorily and equitably settled as soon as possible.

2. The basis on which I hoped for a settlement was the series of proposals set forth in paragraph 195 of the annual report for 1927. His Highness drew my attention in March last to the practical difficulties in the way of expressing any such settlement in a way which would have a permanent validity. He was apprehensive that, if the Government made any such settlement and submitted it to the Majlis, the latter would either alter it or refuse to ratify it; at any rate, the delay would be great and the difficulties considerable.

3. Taimourtache then made the following proposal: The sheikh's affairs should be submitted to arbitration. The arbitration was, however, to be such in name only, and merely in order to get round Majlis difficulties and take advantage of the recently-passed Arbitration Law. If this were done, the settlement embodied in the arbitration would have complete validity without having to be ratified by the Majlis. The form of the arbitration award would be settled by mutual agreement. Nominal arbitrators would be appointed who would append their signatures to the agreed solution.

4. I told His Highness that the precise form of the settlement was a matter more for him than for me. I was interested in seeing that this long-outstanding matter should be settled equitably and in justice to the sheikh. If he could assure me that the arbitration method would lead to a just and speedy decision of permanent validity I would welcome it.

5. The sheikh, after a long argument, eventually agreed in principle to some such arrangement. He wished to establish the 1927 proposals as the utmost he could do in the way of coming to terms, and eventually agreed to send his son, Abdul Hamid, to see Taimourtache and obtain from him the Government's offer in order that he might prepare his answer thereto.

6. The Minister of Court gave Abdul Hamid a letter to the then Minister of Finance, Firuz Mirza, asking him to hand to the sheikh's son a statement of the views of his Ministry about the sheikh's properties. After some annoying delays, Firuz produced a long document, which was, I regret to say, and as I feared it would be coming from Prince Firuz, extremely disappointing. It was composed on the lines of the first report made by Colonel MacCormack, in which the farmans held by the sheikh were regarded as invalid, and almost the only things left for the sheikh were the palm plantations which "had been planted with the capital and personal initiative" of the sheikh. Even these, however, were not to be necessarily his; if anyone else had a claim to them (as no doubt, after nearly five years of absence of the sheikh, would certainly be the case) the resulting disputes would be tried in the local courts. The report made no mention of the farman by which the sheikh was given a salary as Director-General of the Customs, although even the MacCormack report had recognised that as valid. And at the end of the report the sum of 400,000 tomans arrears of taxes, as assessed in 1924, was mentioned as an outstanding claim, although no mention was made of the fact that the sheikh has been forcibly removed from his lands and from receiving anything whatever from them for more than four years.

7. It was also disquieting that Firuz, in an interview with Abdul Hamid on this matter, said that he must recognise that his father's affairs were no ordinary matter and "would not be settled as the sheikh wishes." He even hinted that he had received special instructions to that effect from a higher authority.

8. I was relieved to hear, on about the 18th May, that Taimourtache had rejected the proposals made by Firuz, and had returned them to him saying that he must revise his views and prepare a new statement.

9. The sheikh then produced a new proposal. He suddenly remembered that he possessed a letter, written by Dr. Millspaugh in October 1926 and signed both by him and by the then Minister of Finance, Muhtashim-es-Sultaneh, in which the views of the Finance Ministry were expressed in a fashion very much more favourable to the sheikh than in any other document. One of the principal points in it was the recognition that the sheikh's lands were regularly held as "transferred property," so that the validity of the farmans was acknowledged. Other less acceptable proposals were made, notably the assessment of the "maliyat" or land tax on the sheikh's transferred property at 20 per cent. The sheikh informed the acting oriental secretary that he agreed with the letter as a basis of settlement; in fact, that if it had not been for the 20 per cent. he would agree to it almost entirely.

10. At my advice, he then wrote a letter to Taimourtache, in which he referred to Dr. Millspaugh's letter, enclosing a copy, and saying that he would be prepared to negotiate on the basis of this letter, although there were certain things in it which he could not accept.

11. The sheikh's letter was handed to the Minister of Court some three weeks ago. No reply to it has yet been received by the sheikh. I learn, however, from a private conversation with His Highness that he is in principle agreeable to the proposal that Dr. Millspaugh's letter should form a basis for the artificial arbitration. He told me that he knew that Dr. Millspaugh was not a generous man and would not be likely to have given away anything to which he thought the Government had a right. As for the rate of taxation, he was willing to listen to the sheikh's views on this point. It seemed reasonable that the rate of taxation should not be higher than that allowed by the law.

12. Although I know that Taimourtache, owing to recent crises, has not been able to study Dr. Millspaugh's letter thoroughly, I have some hope that the sheikh's affairs have moved a step forward on their way to a settlement, and I shall not fail to press the Minister of Court to hasten a solution.

13. I should add that there has recently been one very encouraging sign of the good faith of the Minister of Court, in whose desire to settle this matter I still believe. The leases of certain of the sheikh's property in Mohammerah rented to the Anglo-Persian Oil Company fell in this spring. The company desired to renew them. Before taking any action, Mr. Jacks approached Taimourtache. His Highness raised no objection, and the sheikh was paid the sum of £8,000 in cash as a composite sum for the renewal of the leases for a period of ninety-nine years.

14. Meanwhile the sheikh is becoming older, blinder and more afflicted with diabetes. The sight of one eye has almost completely gone. He still has hopes that when his affairs are settled he may be allowed to go abroad and have proper surgical attention for it. He attends the Court periodically and His Majesty is gracious to him. But he is in actual fact a prisoner in Tehran; all his movements are watched, and he is even worried when he goes to the hills for a rest. He is exasperated every now and then to hear that his son Abdullah, an officer in the Persian army in Khuzistan, has sold some of his properties and made away with his date harvest. It is increasingly difficult to talk to him about his affairs; he prefers to say: "I leave it to you; I wish to have nothing to do with Persians." All correspondence addressed to him is censored by the military authorities, though he occasionally has letters delivered to him through this Legation. And he continues to hope that we shall hold the Persian Government to their promise of justice.

I have, &c.
R. H. CLIVE.

[E 3556/95/34]

No. 22.

Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received July 16.)

(No. 357.)
Sir,

Tehran, June 29, 1929.

I HAVE the honour to forward to you herewith an interesting despatch from His Majesty's consul at Tabriz on the subject of the manner of celebrating the annual mourning festival of the Shias, known as "Ashura," during the month of Muharram in Azerbaijan.

[20533]

2. The attitude of the Pahlavi régime was at first to discountenance and discourage too violent manifestations of passion during these ceremonies. It may be that they were regarded as having a Qajar flavour. The Government's initial policy of fostering national sentiments was accompanied by that of suppressing the power of the priests in various ways. As the mullahs are the prime movers in the quite elaborate preparations for these mourning ceremonies, it was not surprising that last Muharram (in 1928) they were carried out with less elaboration than has been known ever before. The reciting ("rozeh-khwani") by the priests of the harrowing narrative of the martyrs on the plains of Kerbala in the 7th century was allowed to continue; but only small processions in limited areas went about the streets on the 10th day of Muharram, and the passion plays ("ta'ziyeh") performed by wandering bands of players going from village to village for a consideration were forbidden.

3. This year, however, the Government has adopted a different attitude. The only definite restriction enforced by the police was the prohibition of the following things in all processions: flags ("alam"), coffins ("kutal") and decorated standards ("nakhl"). Mullahs, who up to this period of the year have (except in the case of a few eminent divines) been obliged to wear the Pahlavi hat, have been allowed to wear their turbans for the two mourning months of Muharram and Safar, and the rozeh-khwani have been very well attended. His Majesty the Shah attended more than one sitting of the rozeh-khwani in the Government "tekiah" or audience hall, and on two occasions is reported to have given the sum of 500 tomans to the eloquent narrator. Ta'ziyehs, however, were still forbidden.

4. I imagine this change of policy has two causes. In the first place, the recent events in Afghanistan have undoubtedly shown the Persian Government that it is unwise to go too fast. In the second place, the Qashqai rebellion has given rise to every kind of wild rumour, and it is natural to suppose that the Government allowed more latitude over these celebrations in order that men's minds should be occupied with something other than politics and rumours of wars.

Copies of this despatch and enclosure have been sent to the Government of India and His Majesty's High Commissioner for Iraq, Bagdad.

I have, &c.
R. H. CLIVE.

Enclosure in No. 22.

Consul Gilliat-Smith to Sir R. Clive.

(No. 41.)

Sir,

Tabriz, June 19, 1929.

I HAVE the honour to report that the "Ashura" festivities of the 10th Moharram (the 18th June, 1929) at Tabriz passed off without any disturbance of the peace, but not without incidents which are of interest, in view of the original plan of the authorities to prohibit not only the head-chopping, but also all the harmless and picturesque street theatricals commemorating the death of Hussein.

2. As already reported, all swords, trumpets, banners, drums and other paraphernalia used in connexion with the celebrations were collected and confiscated by the Government authorities last autumn, and the former nightly din caused by the practice, which lasted some three to four weeks previous to the 10th Moharram, of the dastas was entirely absent this year. Quite recently, however, anonymous posters were placarded on the walls of the houses stating that the people intended to carry out the usual head-chopping in spite of the prohibition, and that, if molested by the authorities, they would resist interference, shedding, if necessary, their own blood and that of others.

3. On the 10th Moharram the police distributed swords to the dastas in strictly limited numbers, two swords per dasta being deemed sufficient for requirements. Between 6.30 and 7 A.M. all those who so desired, in all parts of the town, had their heads gashed by the persons usually appointed to carry out this operation, after which local processions were formed, each dasta, however, keeping to its own town quarter and not meeting others and proceeding to the aialat as formerly. Swords not being to hand, those who wished to let more blood and who, on former occasions, were in the habit of inflicting additional wounds on their heads, now produced kitchen knives, pocket knives, and even flint-stones, and the amount of blood which flowed does not seem to have been appreciably less than in former years. Motor ambulances and first aid were also, as heretofore, provided by the authorities.

4. In the afternoon and evening the usual gatherings were held in the principal quarters of the town, the praying and wailing took place, and the Amir Lashgar, the Governor-General, the chief of police and other authorities were prominent and apparently sympathetic members of the gathering in one of the largest and most frequented Timchas in the Bazaar. Especially the Amir Lashgar, Khazai, appeared as a zealous upholder of the Shia practice, beating his breast in public, ordering that tea should be served to everyone, and publicly stating that he approved of these holy customs, and that, were he to possess 500,000 tomans, he would spend it all in ensuring that these traditional customs were carried out in a way worthy of the tragedy which they commemorate. In spite of this apparent goodwill on the part of the authorities, the celebrations were unorganised and all the spectacular episodes of the tragedy were left unenacted, and great is the displeasure among a certain section of the population.

5. Reports, authentic or otherwise, have not as yet been received from the outlying districts. In Saujbulaq, where the population is Kurdish and Sunni, no such celebrations are held, while in Urmia, where the Moslem and Christian population lives side by side and fanaticism is less pronounced, the Moharram celebrations have not been much to the fore for many years past.

I have, &c.
B. GILLIAT-SMITH.

[E 3557/95/34]

No. 23.

Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received July 16.)

(No. 358.)

Sir,

Tehran, June 29, 1929.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 256 of the 26th June, and in continuation of my despatch No. 341 of the 15th June, I have the honour to enclose herewith copy of the memorandum which I handed on the previous day to the Minister of Court rebutting the allegations which have been made that His Majesty's Government were in sympathy with the Qashqai rebels, and had even furnished them with arms, and that His Majesty's ships in the Gulf had not stopped the contraband trade in arms.

2. Although a document communicated to the Minister of Court is not official in the sense that it would have been if handed to the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, it is, as you are aware, the usual practice now in the case of any urgent or important matter to deal directly with the Minister of Court over the head of the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. Moreover, in the present case, as I was anxious that His Majesty should read this memorandum, I communicated it to Taimourtache in English with a Persian translation attached instead of in French, which is the language usually employed in our communications.

3. The Minister, after reading through the memorandum, again repeated in the most emphatic language that neither His Majesty nor himself doubted the good faith of His Majesty's Government. The fact remained, however, that there was a big illicit traffic in arms, and he had just received news from the Customs indicating that Koweit was probably the centre of the traffic. It was believed that a certain Sheikh Maskur Khan (Tangestani) was one of the principal receiving agents on the Persian side, and that arms were landed, among other places, at two small creeks to the west of Bushire, called Skiiv and Bostaru. I told his Highness that His Majesty's consul-general at Bushire was at present on a visit to Koweit, and was enquiring into the question of the arms traffic. His Majesty's Government were only too ready to assist in stopping this traffic, if it was shown to exist, and His Majesty's consul-general and the senior naval officer would readily co-operate with the Persian authorities in the Gulf if the Persian Government so desired.

4. His Highness made no comment on this, and will presumably first submit my memorandum to His Majesty.

5. In the course of our conversation, however, he elaborated at length the necessity for Persia to maintain the best and most friendly relations with His Majesty's Government and the Government of India. Only two countries really counted in Persia's foreign policy, Russia and Great Britain. He dismissed Afghanistan as a land of chaos, and Turkey as a poor country like Persia, who could

be of no help to the latter. Iraq he described as a satellite of Great Britain, who would always direct her foreign policy. From this he passed to the question of our negotiations, and he expressed the hope that His Majesty's present Government would display the same anxiety to settle outstanding questions as the late Government. I replied that I had no doubt whatever on this point, and that I felt sure he could count on your sympathy and goodwill.

I have sent copies of this despatch and enclosure to the Government of India, His Majesty's High Commissioner for Iraq, Bagdad, and His Majesty's acting consul-general at Bushire.

I have, &c.
R. H. CLIVE.

Enclosure in No. 23.

Memorandum.

FROM the information at the disposal of His Britannic Majesty's Legation, and from the hardly veiled accusations published lately in the Persian press, it would seem that there is a tendency to regard His Majesty's Government as in some measure responsible for the present troubles in Fars, and to believe that they have supplied the rebels with arms.

2. The reproaches levelled at His Majesty's Government are apparently three, namely:—

- (1.) That they are in sympathy with the rebels, and are actively helping them.
- (2.) That they have furnished British rifles to the Qashqais.
- (3.) That the British war vessels in the Gulf have not stopped the traffic in arms.

3. These allegations will be taken in their order.

The supposition that His Majesty's Government are helping the rebels, or are even in favour of them, is to any student of British policy so patently absurd, and so sharply in contradiction with that policy, as to merit little notice. It is, indeed, obvious that, while His Britannic Majesty's Government and the Government of India have every interest in the peaceful and orderly development of States with which they have a common frontier, they have everything to lose by the existence of disorder in these States. The information at the disposal of His Majesty's Legation goes to show that these reports have nevertheless gained wide credence in Shiraz, where both the civil and especially the military authorities go so far as to assert publicly that His Majesty's Government are in sympathy with the rebels. His Majesty's Legation are convinced that the Imperial Government attach no credence to such reports, which are no doubt assiduously spread by certain elements whose habit it is to do all in their power to weaken the friendly ties uniting the British and Persian Governments. His Majesty's Government feel, however, that to allow the present suspicions to continue can only do harm to Anglo-Persian relations, and it is suggested that the Imperial Government might take an opportunity of letting it be publicly known that these suspicions are entirely unfounded.

4. His Majesty's Legation understands that the local authorities in Shiraz have drawn further justification for their opinion from what they consider the unhelpful attitude of the Imperial Bank of Persia and Indo-European Telegraph Department in that town. It seems that, owing to the impossibility of procuring a further supply of cash, the former was compelled to refuse to provide the military authorities with sufficient funds for payment of the troops—a matter involving several hundred thousand krans a month. This could only have been done by depleting the statutory silver reserve which each branch of the bank is bound to hold against its notes issued.

The troubles in Fars have, of course, resulted in widespread destruction of telegraph lines. It was necessary to send out Gholams to effect repairs, but, owing to the activity of the rebels, useless and dangerous to send them unescorted. The local manager of the Indo-European Telegraph Department accordingly asked the military authority for permission to send them with the troops. This permission not being granted, Mr. Bartlett was compelled to inform the authorities that he could no longer keep the lines open. Exception cannot in the circumstances be taken to the

attitude either of the Imperial Bank or of the Indo-European Telegraph Department.

5. For the reasons given in paragraph 3 above, any suspicion that His Britannic Majesty's Government have in any way been privy to the supply of British rifles to the Qashqais falls to the ground. It may nevertheless be true that a certain number of British arms are in the possession of the rebels, although the reports received by His Britannic Majesty's Legation are to the effect that among the arms so far captured and the cartridge cases picked up are those of both German and French make. However that may be, admittedly during the war the Arab tribes on the south side of the Gulf and in the Euphrates Valley came into possession of considerable numbers of arms, some of which may have found their way into South Persia. That they have done so lately is, although not out of the question, highly unlikely in view of the troubled situation in Arabia, which renders it, to say the least, improbable that the local rulers—or, indeed, private individuals—have been willing to sell their arms. At the same time, His Majesty's Legation understand that a certain number of Qashqai tribesmen were armed by the Persian military authorities last autumn, but they are at a loss to know whence arms have of late reached the rebels, if—as they find it difficult to believe—they have arrived only recently in South Persia. The arms traffic had, it was believed, at length been reduced to very inconsiderable proportions, and any positive evidence would accordingly be welcomed, as opposed to unsupported rumours, which the Imperial Government can supply, as to the provenance and point of entry into Persia of such arms and the routes used by the smugglers. At the same time, further enquiries are being made by the British authorities.

6. As regards the failure of His Majesty's ships in the Gulf to prevent this alleged recrudescence of the arms traffic, His Majesty's Legation take the opportunity of reminding the Imperial Government that it is entirely due to the efforts displayed in the past by His Majesty's Government that this trade in the Persian Gulf has been reduced to its present small dimensions. They have spared neither effort nor expense with this object in view; indeed, the existing agreements with the independent rulers of the Arab coast were largely concluded for this purpose.

7. While, as the Imperial Government are aware, His Majesty's ships in the Gulf are alert to prevent any smuggling of this nature, it is manifestly impossible for three or four ships to exert complete control over nearly 1,000 miles of coastline. A much larger number of vessels could, indeed, hardly hope to prevent smuggling altogether. His Majesty's Legation would further point out that the task of His Majesty's ships would be materially lightened could they count upon the whole-hearted co-operation of the Persian Customs and other authorities, which, unfortunately, they have not been able to do in the past. His Majesty's Government are, it is unnecessary to state, as ready as ever to assist the Persian Government to the best of their power to stamp out this traffic, and they accordingly suggest that the Imperial Government should instruct the local authorities in the south to discuss with His Majesty's consul-general at Bushire and with the senior naval officer the appropriate measures to be taken.

*British Legation, Gulhek,
June 25, 1929.*

[E 3558/104/34]

No. 24.

Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received July 16.)
(No. 359.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of Intelligence Summary No. 13 for the period ending the 29th June compiled by the assistant military attaché to this Legation.

Tehran, June 30, 1929.

(Secret.)

*Intelligence Summary No. 13 for the Period ending June 29, 1929.**Tehran.*

1. *Qashqai Revolt.*—Instigation and encouragement of the Qashqai revolt on the part of the British officials in the south of Persia is alleged by the Minister of Court. References to this instigation appear in the censored press and His Majesty's Minister has protested.

2. *Persian Officials.*—The Persian Minister in London has resigned and Taqizadeh, Governor of Khorasan (see "Persian Personalities," No. 25), has been appointed; the Persian Minister in Paris has been instructed to proceed to London to pursue pending negotiations, but has explained to the Minister of Court that "he knows by experience that no result will be obtained."

3. The Minister of Finance, Prince Firuz; the late Governor-General of Fars, Sarem-ed-Dowleh; and the commandant of the gendarmerie, General Fazlullah Khan Zahedi, have all been arrested, and are now either in prison or under surveillance. The exact reason for their incarceration is obscure.

4. *Military Command.*—At a meeting of all Amir-i-Lashkars at the Ministry of War on the 22nd June the Shah was present. It is stated that Amir-i-Lashkar Ahmed Agha Airom is to be sent to take command in Shiraz (see "Personalities," No. 33).

5. *Veterinary Laboratory.*—A veterinary laboratory has been installed in Tehran by the Ministry of War.

6. *Ex-Amir Inayatullah.*—Ex-Amir Inayatullah has expressed a desire to spend the summer in Hamadan; there is no report of the Persian Government having yet acceded to his request.

Tabriz.

7. *Communications.*—No new high roads have been constructed during the year 1307. Work on the Tabriz-Tehran road proceeds desultorily. The Kaflan Kuh and Shaffi passes are kept in good condition. The increased motor traffic increases the long-felt want for bridges on this road.

8. Work on the Tabriz-Haidarabad-Iraq frontier road, which was abandoned last year for political reasons, has not been recommenced.

Abadan.

9. See "Special Appreciation," No. 1, dated the 26th June, paragraph 1.

Khorasan.

10. *Communications.*—The Meshed-Khaf-Kariz telegraph line is now working.

11. The Meshed-Kariz road is in process of being repaired, but little work has been done.

12. *Recruiting of Hazaras.*—Amir-i-Lashkar has stated that attempts to recruit Hazaras from Persia for despatch into Afghanistan would not be tolerated by the Persian Government.

13. *Afghan Affairs.*—The main points in the statements of two Hazaras who served in Ghulam Nadir's force to the south of the Oxus were:—

That the above force crossed into Afghanistan at the beginning of April, occupying Mazar-i-Sharif, Tashkurghan and Haibak, while Akcha, Shibarghan and Sarapul were brought under the authority of Ghulam Nadir. The force consisted of 800 Hazara infantry, 400 mixed cavalry, of which 200 were Russians, dressed as Uzbeks, and three field guns with Russian personnel. The Hazaras had had no previous military training, with the exception of about 100. The equipment and rations were supplied by the Russian Government, and, further, the force was supported by two Soviet bombing machines at Dehbadi. About the 30th May the Russian cavalry and artillery (strength unknown) then in Tashkurghan were withdrawn via Mazar-i-Sharif to Termez, following which all the Hazaras recruited in the Soviet Union were also withdrawn, with the exception of about 200, who were then in Haibak, and whose fate is unknown. On their return to Soviet territory the Hazaras were disarmed and the G.P.U. gave them railway warrants to their homes.

Yezd.

14. *Crops.*—Favourable prospects of grain crops have not been realised. "Sen" has done considerable damage in the Isfahan district, and locusts are reported to have practically destroyed Yezd and Kerman crops. Pasturage is good.

Persian Baluchistan.

15. *Communications.*—The Kerman-Bam-Iranshahr road is being remade. Repairs to the Kerman-Bam section have been put in hand; beyond Rigan the work will be commenced in the autumn. The road Kerman-Mahun is being reconstructed to avoid the sands.

Fars.

16. See "Special Appreciation," No. 1, dated the 26th June, paragraph 2.

17. It is interesting to note, on p. 19 of the Administration Report on the Persian Gulf, 1928, that between the 23rd October and the 16th November, 1928, the general commanding the brigade operating against Imam Quli Khan engaged and armed several hundred Qashqai.

Persian Gulf.

18. *Conscription.*—Conscription ceased at the ports on the Gulf during the end of March and the first part of April.

Sarhad.

19. See "Special Appreciation," No. 1, dated the 26th June, paragraph 3.

H. J. COOPER, Captain, R.A.S.C.,
Assistant Military Attaché.

Tehran, June 29, 1929.

[E 3589/95/34]

No. 25.

Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received July 17.)

(No. 276. Confidential.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Tehran, July 16, 1929.

MY telegram No. 273.

Minister of Court expressed great concern about Bakhtiari situation. He said that Shah was in a very nervous state and unfortunately ready to believe every rumour he heard, chiefly to the effect that British were behind all the tribal trouble now going on in Persia.

He readily accepted what I had written to him on 14th July in reply to a letter detailing these rumours (copy sent by bag), but something must be done, he said, to stop these rumours and clear up the situation.

All business was at a standstill, as the Shah could not take his mind off the subject of these tribal revolts. Yesterday His Majesty's consul-general at Isfahan reported heavy fighting around Safmotiasht and defeat of Government troops with many casualties. Deserters and wounded were coming into Isfahan. I asked his Highness what exactly were the grievances of the Bakhtiari. He said they had none. They still maintained their ancient system of tribal government. They had demanded exemption from conscription for five years and various minor matters which could all be easily settled.

But revolt of the tribes was daily getting more serious. Brigands from Kehamsch tribes had seized town of Sinjan, half-way between Shiraz and Kerman, and might even threaten Kerman.

The Vali of Pusht-i-Kuh and his sons were making trouble in the west. He believed that, if it could be made known that not only were British not behind revolting tribes but that they definitely deprecated movement, things would calm down. He appealed for our good offices to help Persian Government in their present

difficulties. He said British influence in Central and Southern Persia was still enormous, and that we alone could produce necessary calming effect. I asked how. Had he in mind that consul-general at Isfahan, for instance, should go and talk to recalcitrant khans? He said he thought that was too official.

Possibly something could be done through Anglo-Persian Oil Company. I promised to discuss the matter with Mr. Greenhouse.

(Repeated to India, No. 135, and Bagdad, No. 138.)

[E 3593/95/34]

No. 26.

Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received July 17.)

(No. 277.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, July 16, 1929.

MY immediately preceding telegram.

The information of Mr. Greenhouse, which tallies with my own, is that the Bakhtiari trouble is mainly an internal one as between conflicting elements in the tribes. The younger khans are dissatisfied with the older khans, many of whom live comfortably in Tehran, like absentee landlords. At the same time, nervousness of the Shah is natural. Bakhtiaris occupy a central position, and if the revolt against the Government becomes serious, no one can say what may be the effect in Luristan and Kurdistan, where unrest is always simmering. I submit British attitude should remain entirely neutral in present conflict between the Persian Government and the tribes, although, when this can be done unostentatiously, the tribes' tribal chiefs might be advised to come to terms with the Government.

The Soviet press is very active in ascribing the present troubles of the Persian Government to British machinations, while hinting that Pahlavi régime is partly responsible in that nothing has been done to improve the lot of the poorer classes.

(Repeated to India, No. 136.)

[E 3592/95/34]

No. 27.

Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received July 16.)

(No. 279.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, July 16, 1929.

MY telegrams of 16th July regarding tribal situation.

United States Legation inform me that an English engineer named Morrison, a member of a railway survey party in the employ of Ulen and Co., was captured when the party was attacked by brigands in Luristan on the 12th July. Another Englishman, named Waddell, was wounded. The company have informed the Persian Government.

I do not consider that this is necessarily connected with the general tribal movement. It is, however, ominous; and yesterday the Shah held an all-night sitting with his Council of Ministers to consider the situation.

[E 3646/95/34]

No. 28.

Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received July 21.)

(No. 283.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Tehran, July 20, 1929.

MY telegram No. 276.

Prime Minister gave a farewell dinner yesterday for Taqizaddeh, who leaves to-morrow for London. I found Minister of Court more cheerful about tribal situation. He said he had spoken to the Shah on the basis of my recent letter, and professed to have convinced His Majesty that it was not in our interests to stir up trouble and that therefore we had not done so. Undoubtedly Bakhtiari disturbance was due to internal dissensions in the tribe, and he quite realised it was necessary to

nominate an ilkhani more generally acceptable to Amir Jang. He did not anticipate trouble in Luristan as it was now clear that incident mentioned in my telegram No. 279 was an isolated act of brigandage. In Shiraz General Shaibani was gradually getting the situation in hand, although it seems likely that Persian Government may have to make considerable concessions. Raids by Khamseh tribe north and west of Kerman continued, but he did not consider this very serious. Incursion a few days ago of Simko had aroused great anxiety, but after killing a few frontier guards he had retired again into Turkish territory.

(Repeated to India, No. 139.)

[E 3647/95/34]

No. 29.

Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received July 20.)

(No. 284.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, July 20, 1929.

MY immediately preceding telegram.

Teymourache proceeded to speak about the attitude of the Russians towards the present unrest among the tribes, and the measures taken by the Persian Government in this connexion. The Russian consuls at Ahwaz, Isfahan and Shiraz were being closely watched. The Russian steamship "Loos" had recently called at Mohammerah, and not even the captain had at first been allowed to land. As a result of representations from the Russian Ambassador, however, he had eventually telegraphed permission.

The Shah was well aware that the Soviet Government had no sympathy for the Pahlavi régime, and that they wished for nothing better than a state of disorder in Persia, but he had no direct evidence of Soviet instigation of tribesmen.

I enquired if he considered that the Persian Communist party had any influence or were in relations with Moscow.

He said that Suleiman Mirza was living in Tehran, but was fairly harmless, although, no doubt, he still had communication with Moscow. He considered that communism as a whole had made no advance in Persia, although workmen, especially in foreign employ, now magnified their smallest grievance and looked for sympathy outside.

The most discontented elements in the country were the mullahs, tribal chiefs, big landed proprietors, and the old administrative class. He included Taqizaddeh among the latter. An attempt must be made to humour these discontented elements. The Shah was, however, also considering how he could best improve the lot of the peasants and small proprietors, which he, Teymourache, for his part, considered a matter of equal importance.

(Repeated to India.)

[E 3593/95/34]

No. 30.

Mr. A. Henderson to Sir R. Clive (Tehran).

(No. 217.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, July 20, 1929.

YOUR telegrams Nos. 276 and 277 of the 16th July: Unrest in Bakhtiari country, Fars, &c.

You are authorised to give unostentatious advice to the tribal chiefs to come to terms with the Government, whenever the moment seems to you opportune to do so and in such manner as you consider best.

I agree with you, however, that British attitude must remain entirely neutral in the present conflict between the Persian Government and the tribes, in spite of the Minister of Court's appeal to you for assistance.

(Repeated to India.)

[E 3662/19/34]

No. 31.

Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received July 23.)

(No. 368.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a note from Taimourtache, dated the 2nd July, on the subject of Anglo-Persian relations.

Tehran, July 10, 1929.

Enclosure in No. 31.

Taimourtache to Sir R. Clive.

Mon cher Ministre,

Téhéran, le 2 juillet 1929.

C'EST avec un grand plaisir que j'ai reçu la lettre du 1^{er} juillet de votre Excellence ainsi que le texte du télégramme de Mr. Arthur Henderson, Secrétaire d'État pour les Affaires étrangères.

Je vous prie de vouloir bien communiquer à M. le Secrétaire d'État mes remerciements les plus cordiaux pour son télégramme, qui montre l'intérêt du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique à faire aboutir à bonne fin les questions soulevées depuis longtemps entre son Excellence Sir Robert Clive et moi.

Je suis persuadé que M. le Secrétaire d'État aux Affaires étrangères sait bien que le Gouvernement impérial de Perse, dont le but unique dans sa politique pacifique est le relèvement moral et matériel du pays, a le désir et la volonté fermes d'établir ses relations avec les Puissances voisines sur les bases d'amitié, de sincérité et de l'estime mutuel et d'avoir une nouvelle ère dans ses relations politiques, est sincèrement désireux de voir exister entre la Perse et l'Empire britannique les rapports d'une parfaite cordialité résultant du respect des droits mutuels et de la communauté d'intérêts légitimes des deux parties. Ce désir du Gouvernement impérial de Perse a été signalé à plusieurs reprises et je me fais un agréable devoir de le confirmer encore une fois.

J'aime à espérer qu'avec l'appréciable concours de Mr. Arthur Henderson la tâche de Sir Robert Clive et du nouveau Ministre de Perse, qui arrivera sous peu à Londres et qui aura à charge d'être l'interprète des sentiments de son Gouvernement de voir les questions en négociation terminées à l'avantage des deux parties et une nouvelle page ouverte dans les relations des deux pays, sera couronnée d'un parfait succès.

Dans l'espoir de voir les liens d'amitié et de confiance mutuelle encore plus resserrés entre les deux pays, je présente à M. le Secrétaire d'État mes hommages et je regrette vivement d'être privé du plaisir de le connaître personnellement.

Veuillez, &c.

TEYMOURTACHE.

[E 3666/279/34]

No. 32.

Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received July 23.)

(No. 374.)

Sir,

Tehran, July 13, 1929.

I HAVE the honour to report that the Persian Government have recently appointed the following persons as members of the Turco-Persian Frontier Commission:—

- (1.) Head of the Persian delegation: Mirza Nasrullah Khan Khal'at-Bari, formerly named I'tila-ul-Mulk. This official was the head of the Persian delegation to the Turco-Persian Frontier Commission of 1913, which was dealing with questions of delimitation of the frontier up to the beginning of the European War. Since then he has served the Persian Government in various capacities; he was once head of the Turkish section of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs; he acted for a short time as Minister for Foreign Affairs; he was Minister of Finance in March 1920, under Vussugh-ud-Douleh; and he was appointed Governor of Kurdistan in May 1926. He has not had much to do with this Legation recently; but in 1913 I read that he "gave satisfaction."

- (2.) General Abdul-Reza Khan Afkhami, a soldier who has served on various staff appointments, in Kurdistan and Khorasan as well as in Tehran. He seems an efficient and energetic officer.
- (3.) Mirza Abbas Quli Khan Gharib, formerly Mutarjim-ul-Mamalik, who is presumably the secretary to the delegation; he has served both in the Ministry of Justice and in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.
- (4.) Mirza Mohsin Khan Ansari, a minor official of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, as are the remaining two—
- (5.) Rafi'-ul-Mulk, and
- (6.) Sultan Salim.

2. The Persian press announces that the Persian delegation left Tehran on the 29th June for Azerbaijan, where it was arranged that they should meet the Turkish delegation, presided over by Fazil Bey. The work of delimitation was to have started on the 1st July.

3. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople.

I have, &c.

R. H. CLIVE.

[E 3668/95/34]

No. 33.

Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received July 23.)

(No. 377.)

Sir,

Tehran, July 12, 1929.

I HAVE to-day telegraphed my appreciation of the obscure and somewhat disquieting situation in the south of Persia and in the Bakhtiari country; it is therefore unnecessary and would be a waste of time for me to recount in detail all the various rumours which have reached me concerning the constantly changing events. One of the peculiarities of the situation is that the Government's policy is, unfortunately, to censor all news and to neglect even to issue communiqués of the progress of the Persian troops.

2. As an exception to this rule, General Shaibani, commanding the Persian troops in Shiraz, made a proclamation on the 25th June, published in the Tehran papers on the 5th July, the contents of which are sufficiently interesting to bear quoting in full. I therefore have the honour to enclose herewith a translation of the proclamation, and of the principal part of a leading article on the subject which appeared in the "Iran," the semi-official Tehran paper, on the latter date.

3. The reference in the proclamation to "other people" is understood by the average person to mean "the British"; this was doubtless the meaning of its composer. And the "Iran's" remarks appear to mean that the Fars rebellion was started by the British in order to counter the Persian Government's claims to sovereignty in the Persian Gulf.

4. In spite of all I have said to the Minister of Court, and in spite of the assurances he has given to me that he does not for a moment believe in any British complicity in the Qashqai revolt, it is typical of the Persian side of his somewhat complex mentality that he continues to allow the press to publish these insinuations. I am convinced that he does not believe them, but they serve in his eyes the double purpose of helping to save the face of the military, while giving some satisfaction to the Russians.

Copies of this despatch, with enclosures, have been sent to the Government of India, His Majesty's High Commissioner for Iraq, Bagdad, and His Majesty's acting consul-general at Bushire.

I have, &c.

R. H. CLIVE.

July 14, 1929.

P.S.—*July 14.* I enclose a copy of Isfahan despatch No. 40 of the 11th July, received to-day.

R. H. C.

Enclosure 1 in No. 33.

Copy in translation of General Shaibani's Proclamation.

ALL tribesmen of Qashqais are hereby notified that, in consequence of the complaints and grievances of the kalantars (chiefs) of Qashqai against Abbas Khan, the ex-Governor of Qashqai, and other Government agents, and as soon as the appeal of justice of the said kalantars reached His Majesty, in accordance with the command of His Majesty, a committee was sent to Shiraz to investigate the matter. I, particularly, was commissioned to put into effect the sacred designs of the Shah regarding the tranquillity and peace of the individuals of the tribe, and to take all measures with this object in view.

Unluckily, simultaneously to my arrival in Shiraz, the troops were attacked and fired at suddenly and at night time by certain gangs, as a result of which a number of the troops were either killed or wounded. The gangs also began brigandage and villainy in different roads, and converted their complaint and appeal for justice into insurrection and disturbances. They disturbed the public security, which is the foundation of the progress and grandeur of the country, and as a result compelled me to punish the robbers and the rebels by using force. In view of the fact that His Imperial Majesty the Shah cannot acquiesce to the injury of any of the individuals of the country, and whereas those personages who caused the disturbances and disorder to be broken out may have now realised their ignorance and mistake that they have been cheated and provoked by other people (some certain elements), and perhaps they are now sorry for their deed, I notify all khans, kalantars, kadhodas, and individuals of the tribe, by this proclamation, that any of the clans or individuals who may be sorry for his past deeds can apply until two weeks from now to the nearest military post and ask for an amnesty. Undoubtedly those who surrender will enjoy security of life and property completely, and even those who may have perpetrated villainy will be pardoned by His Majesty and their past actions will be overlooked. All soldiers (military agents) are informed accordingly.

No doubt those who continue their irregular actions will be prosecuted and severely dealt with.

No. 230. The 17th Moharram (June 25)

GENERAL SHAIBANI,
G.O.C. Southern Forces.

Enclosure 2 in No. 33.

Extract from the Tehran Newspaper "Iran" of July 5, 1929.

THE outbreak of the rebellion coincided with a time when the Persian Government have legally established the right of their sovereignty on the waters of the Persian Gulf, and the insurrection seemed more like some obstacle which was set on foot against this right of nationality and community of ours. It is, therefore, completely clear how far this incident was detrimental to the interests of the country and how much the ignorance of a number of simple and illiterate persons was possible to prejudice the interests of our country.

Enclosure 3 in No. 33.

Consul-General Bristow to Sir R. Clive.

(No. 40.)

Sir,

Isfahan, July 11, 1929.

WITH reference to my previous reports on the subject of the unrest among the Bakhtiari tribes, I have the honour to report that I had an interview on the morning of the 8th instant with Sardar Assad, the Minister of War, who had been sent here

by the Shah in the hope that his influence would have the effect of calming the tribesmen. Sardar Assad, whom I found in a very nervous and excited frame of mind, stated that the situation was very grave and that he had not had a moment's rest since his arrival, and a large part of his time had been taken up in telegraphic conversation with His Majesty.

2. His Excellency gave me an account of the past history of the Bakhtiari and the present trials and troubles of the khans and the tribesmen, all of which has been carefully explained by Mr. Consul Monypenny in his admirable report to you written in September last, of which he sent me a copy. Sardar Assad said that his brother, Amir Jang, Acting Ilkhani, was apparently besieged in Dehkurd, as he had had no news from him for several days and the telephone lines had been cut. However, just as I was leaving, Amir Jang and Naib Sarhang Sadiq Khan, Military Governor of Chahar Mahal, arrived, having escaped the previous night, but having left Sardar Fatch behind (as they could only obtain two horses) to face the music alone.

3. The following morning Amir Jang sent his confidential munshi to give me certain very secret information, which was to the following effect: The three principal instigators of the trouble are Sarram-ul-Mulk (son of Sardar Zaffar), Ali Askar Khan (nephew of Sardar Mohtashem), and Munazem-ul-Mulk (son of the late Isfandiari Khan); the first of these three went some two or three weeks ago to see the Russian consul-general here, and told him that the Bakhtiari tribesmen were ready to rise in revolt against the Government, and asked him to assist them. The latter replied that he doubted if the tribesmen were serious, but if once they really began to show fight, he was quite prepared to assist them in any way he could, and especially with money (I have not at present been able to verify this latter statement, but, judging from the details given on p. 6 of Mr. Monypenny's report, it would seem to be not impossible). These three then proceeded to Binn, the village of Sardar Mohtashem, who also promised to assist them with all his power and give them horses, grain, &c. Later, Morteza Guli Khan appeared on the scene and he, too, promised his help.

4. The contingency foreseen by Mr. Monypenny in the last paragraph of p. 5 of his above-mentioned report seems to have materialised, and, encouraged by the news of the rising in the south, the tribesmen seem determined to show fight.

5. Sardar Assad told me that he had informed the Shah that, in his opinion, the only thing to be done was to send troops and give these recalcitrant khans and tribesmen a lesson, and Amir Jang, who came to see me just after his munshi had left, seemed of the same opinion.

6. It is very difficult to estimate the number of rifles the tribesmen can produce. They, I am told, say they can put into the field at least 3,000 well-armed men—Amir Jang estimated them at not more than 1,000. He said that the tribesmen who were first discussing with and then threatening and besieging him and the Military Government in Dehkurd had only seven or eight rifles among them!

7. The latest news is that the Government troops (estimated to be between 1,000 and 1,200 men, who arrived here on the 7th) moved out towards Safiddasht on the 9th July. They came into contact with the tribesmen in the Bidehgan Pass, about 7 miles east of that village, and apparently were successful in routing the tribesmen and entering the village. Other troops are said to be holding the western suburbs of Isfahan, while a third contingent is reported to be marching into Chahar Mahal from the direction of Urujin.

8. There will probably be some developments in the next few days which I will not fail to report, if necessary by telegraph.

9. I enclose an extra copy of this despatch, which I would request you to be good enough to forward to His Majesty's consul at Ahwaz should a safe opportunity occur.

I have, &c.

ERNEST BRISTOW.

P.S.—Since writing the above I have seen Mr. Hawker, acting principal of the Stuart Memorial College, who went with a party of boys from his school, about a fortnight ago, to camp in the village of Chadugan, in the Feridun district. There they were welcomed by the inhabitants and received hospitality from the neighbouring Bakhtiari and the military. Everybody, he said, was very excited, and he divided those with whom he had come in contact into "hotheads" and "moderates"; the former, he said, were determined on a trial of strength with the Government troops, and—which is interesting—had prepared a large red banner

bearing words to the effect: "We are loyal subjects of the Shah, but we will not have conscription." In addition to the above, Mr. Hawker said there was a band of mounted and armed robbers hovering on the outskirts, who were taking the opportunity of robbing and looting whenever they could do so without risk to themselves. Mr. Hawker was requested by his host to leave Chadugan with his party two days earlier than he intended (viz., last Sunday), as, it was said, that fighting was about to begin.

E. B.

[E 3669/637/34]

No. 34.

Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received July 23.)

(No. 378.)

Sir,

Gulhek, July 12, 1929.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 172 of the 28th March last, enclosing the Persian National Budget for the year 1308, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a copy of the total revenue and expenditure of the Sugar and Tea Monopoly Funds for the years 1304-7 inclusive (March 1925-29), as published in the newspaper "Iran." I have been privately informed by the head of the Budget and Statistical Service that these figures are official and were correctly reproduced.

2. It will be observed that, during the ten months which elapsed between the signing of the original contract with the Railway Syndicate and the end of the year 1307, no less than 116,381,970 krans were paid out by the Government to the syndicate. This sum represents more than half the total accumulated during four years in the Monopoly Fund. It seems probable, therefore, should railway construction continue for another eight months, that by the end of 1308 the remaining surplus of 97,122,152 krans, as well as the revenues from the monopolies for the current year, will have been swallowed up, and that the Treasury will be faced with the alternatives of either borrowing abroad or of diverting other funds to the railway project, if this is to be continued at the present rate of expenditure.

3. Article B (5) shows the interest derived from £100,000 which was transferred from the Reserve Fund, composed of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company royalties to the Monopoly Fund. This sum has, I am informed, not yet been expended.

4. Should the calculations of the late Minister of Finance, as outlined in paragraph 1 of my despatch No. 66 of the 2nd February last, prove correct, the total sum in the Reserve Fund at the end of the current year will amount to 131,880,000 krans, at the present rate of exchange. Of this, 108,300,000 krans have already been allotted to cover expenditure on armaments and the deficit on the budget, while the heavy expenditure incurred through the expedition to Fars is likely to set off the small remaining surplus. While, therefore, the purchasing power of the country is on the decrease and markets are suffering from stagnation and inactivity, it appears that the national reserves are likely in a few months' time to have been completely absorbed.

5. A copy of this despatch is being sent to the Government of India and to His Majesty's High Commissioner for Iraq.

I have, &c.

R. H. CLIVE.

Enclosure in No. 34.

Complete List of Revenue and Expenditure of Sugar and Tea Monopoly, showing the Expenses of the Persian Railway.

Prepared by Budget and Statistical Service—Statistical Section.

A brief list of the total Sugar and Tea Monopoly Funds from the beginning (1304) to the end of Esfand (1307) (from March 21, 1925, to March 21, 1929) and a summary of total expenditure paid out from the Monopoly Funds in accordance with special laws up to the end of 1307 (March 21, 1929).

Statement.	Accounts in Detail.	Total of Sections.	Total to the end of 1307 (March 21, 1929).
Part I.—REVENUE.			
<i>A.—The Revenue.</i>			
(1.) Revenue collected in 1304 (1925-26)	36,513,460.80		
(2.) " " 1305 (1926-27)	60,642,815.45		
(3.) " " 1306 (1927-28)	62,890,988.45		
(4.) " " 1307 (1928-29)	66,125,350.75	226,172,615.45	
<i>B.—Interest on Revenue.</i>			
(1.) Amount received from the bank in 1304	162,861.10		
(2.) " " " 1305	1,156,672.60		
(3.) " " " 1306	3,147,094.65		
(4.) " " " 1307	3,637,493.35		
(5.) Interest on £100,000 borrowed from National A.P.O.C. reserve for Monopoly Funds and deposited in the Imperial Bank of Persia, London. (Approximate conversion rate, 50 krans to the £ sterling .. £8,433 10s.	421,662.50	8,525,784.20	234,698,399.65
Part II.—EXPENDITURE.			
<i>A.—Collection Expenses.</i>			
(1.) Expenses paid in 1304 for collection of 1304 revenue out of the 8 per cent. on revenue	832,195.35		
(2.) Expenses paid in 1305 for collection of 1304 revenue out of the 8 per cent. on revenue	64,826.95		
(3.) Expenses paid in 1305 for collection of 1305 revenue out of the 8 per cent. on revenue	3,395,720.85		
(4.) Expenses paid in 1306 for collection of 1305 revenue out of the 8 per cent. on revenue	311,027.25		
(5.) Expenses paid in 1306 for collection of 1306 revenue in the first 3 months out of the 5 per cent. and during the last 9 months out of the 3 per cent. credit ..	2,107,914.60		
(6.) Amount transferred to the Government revenue on account of 3 per cent. expenses for collection of 1307 revenue, according to a special law ..	1,800,000.00	8,520,185.00	
<i>B.—Railway Administration.</i>			
(1.) Expenses of R.W. administration in 1305	872,155.45		
(2.) " " " 1306	2,850,640.15		
(3.) " " " 1307	284,474.30	4,107,219.90	
<i>C.—Railway Construction Expenses.</i>			
(1.) Construction expenses before turning over to the syndicate ..	175,000.00		
" " " 1306	4,137,962.60		
" " " 1307	942,091.20	5,255,053.80	
(2.) Price of land and houses situated along the railway line ..	248,319.20	248,319.20	
(3.) Sums paid to the syndicate to the end of 1307	116,381,970.00	116,381,970.00	
<i>D.—Administration of Blast Furnace.</i>			
(1.) Expenses paid in 1305 (1926-27) ..	41,909.15		
(2.) " " " 1306 ..	204,920.10		
(3.) " " " 1307 on account of obligations incurred up to the date the Blast Furnace Administration was closed ..	71,183.00	318,622.25	

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Statement.	Accounts in Detail.	Total of Sections.	Total to the end of 1907 (March 21, 1929).
Part II.—EXPENDITURE—continued.	Krans.	Krans.	Krans.
E.—Shemshak Coal Mine.			
Payment for road construction and exploitation of the mines and refunded sums	945,836.00	945,836.00	
(1.) Refunded sums in 1305 (1926-27)	149,876.00		
(2.) " " 1306	309.00	150,185.00	
F.—Administration of Discovery of Mines and Geology.			
(1.) Payments made on account of 1306 expenses for discovery of mines	974,937.25		
(2.) Payments made on account of 1307 expenses for discovery of mines and on account of obligations and expenditure incurred up to the end of the period when the Administration of Discovery of Mines and Geology was closed	326,785.95	1,301,722.30	
G.—Expenses for sending Students to Europe.			
Payments made in 1307 for expenses of students sent to Europe, 37,000 krans (68,602.00 paper francs at .50 kran)	77,000.00		
H.—Administration of Railway Inspection and Supervision	34,301.00	111,301.00	
On account of 1307 expenses of the Administration of Railway Inspection and Supervision ..	236,392.30	236,392.30	137,576,246.75
Total available fund at the beginning of 1308 (March 21, 1929)	..	..	97,122,152.90

[E 3672/3384/34]

No. 35.

Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received July 23.)

(No. 383.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a memorandum from the Persian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, dated the 10th July, on the subject of the ownership of property in Persia by British subjects.

Tehran, July 13, 1929.

Enclosure in No. 35.

From the Persian Ministry for Foreign Affairs to His Majesty's Legation.—Dated Tir Mah 19, 1308 (July 10, 1929).

(Translation.)

Circular Memorandum.

IN view of the fact that by virtue of treaties foreign subjects have no right to own immovable property in Persian territory, except within the limits required for their residence, trade or craft; and also, owing to the fact that some foreign subjects have, contrary to the treaties, acquired certain immovable property, and it is evident that official quarters cannot legally consider them (the foreign subjects) as the owners of such properties; and seeing that the Office for Registration of Documents and Properties, in spite of the Law for the Universal Registration of Land in virtue of which the registration of immovable property within Persian territory is obligatory, is at present refusing to accept applications made for registration of immovable properties which have been acquired by foreign subjects in contravention of the stipulations of treaties; and seeing that should any claim relating to such properties be put forth in the Adlieh (Justice) courts direct, the latter courts cannot legally

recognise the foreign subjects as the owners (of the said properties) or give in any way judgments recognising their ownership; notwithstanding the fact that foreign subjects who have, contrary to the stipulations of the treaties in force, acquired certain immovable properties have themselves acted against their own interests; yet, as the Persian Government have always been and are still desirous that as far as possible foreign subjects residing in Persia should not sustain losses, therefore, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs finds it necessary to notify to all British subjects, through the honourable Legation, the fact that a period of one year is given to them, from the date of the present circular memorandum, in order that any of them who, contrary to the provisions of the treaties, may be in possession of immovable properties should, within the said period, transfer the said properties to Persian subjects in any way which they deem advisable and in accordance with interest and expediency. Otherwise, at the expiry of the said period, the Government itself will take necessary action with a view to selling the properties in question by auction for the account of the persons concerned.

Minister for Foreign Affairs.

[E 3675/104/34]

No. 36.

Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received July 23.)

(No. 387. Secret.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of Intelligence Summary No. 14 for the period ending the 13th July, 1929, compiled by the assistant military attaché to this Legation.

Tehran, July 13, 1929.

Enclosure in No. 36.

Intelligence Summary No. 14 for the Period ending July 13, 1929.

(Secret.)

Perso-Turkish Frontier Commission (reference Intelligence Summary No. 12 paragraph 33).

1. The members of the Perso-Turkish Frontier Commission are:—

Mirza Nasrullah Khan Khal'at Bari, U'tila-ul-Mulk.—He was once head of the Turkish section of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and also once Minister of Finance. He was head of the Boundary Commission sitting in August 1914. A year ago he was Governor of Kurdistan for a short time. No further dates with regard to him are available.

Sartip Abdul Reza Khan.—One of the new régime of army officers. Has spent almost all his time at army headquarters; was some time acting chief of the General Staff and was until lately employed on some headquarter duty. For a short time he was in Kermanshah and Khorasan. Is pleasant and agreeable and a polo player.

Mutarjim-ul-Mamalik.—A translator and clerk of the Ministry of Finance, now with the Ministry of Justice.

Mushir Khan Ansari.—A relation of the Persian Ambassador in Moscow. Also Rafi-ul-Mulk and Sultan Salim, about whom nothing is known.

The commission had by the 7th July arrived at Maku.

2. The Majlis passed a Bill ratifying adherence to the Geneva Protocol of the 17th June, 1925, re poisonous gases.

Fars.

3. During the past fortnight the acting chief of the General Staff has replied evasively to all remarks about the situation in the south, stating that the Government

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has complete confidence, that rumours of unrest in Khuzistan are without foundation and that the rumours with regard to Isfahan are but rumours only. There seems to be but little liaison between the Ministries of War and Foreign Affairs. Should Sartip Nakhjevan know all that follows in this summary then he is indeed a superb actor. He seemed rather ungrateful for the trouble taken with regard to the four mountain guns.

4. The acting chief of the General Staff said on the 29th June that he expected the rebels to collapse "soon." An amnesty was reported to have been proclaimed by General Shaibani (Persian Biographies, No. 34), and that several Qashqai Khans had come in. It is now established that these latter were minor chiefs of the Kashkulis; the Kalantar Hussein Khan is still at large and is fighting.

5. The column mentioned in my Special Appreciation No. 1, paragraph 2 (d), dated the 26th June, is reported to be under the command of Mohamed Hussein Mirza, and to have been one of two columns despatched with the intention of occupying Baizeh and of pushing the Qashqai west of the Shiraz-Isfahan road. The road Shiraz-Isfahan was declared safe on the 27th June, but it was not until the 1st July that the first three motor vehicles were able to get through. Indiscriminate commandeering of motor vehicles is still resorted to.

6. The Minister of War, Asad, left for Bakhtiari on the 6th July. This may be regarded in some measure as confirmation of rumours of trouble among the Bakhtiaris and may result in the incarceration of Murteza Quli Khan and Sardar Motashim. Reports state that there have been tribal conferences between the Bakhtiaris and the Qashqais, but the results are unknown with the exception of a reiteration of demands *re* the Pahlavi hat, conscription, monopolies and "sabt-i-asmad." Several hundred troops have left Tehran during the past few days in commandeered lorries.

7. The strength of the Khorremabad garrison has been reduced by about 2,000 men, rifle strength unknown. It is not without interest to note that the Qashqais, who in addition to the fighting capacity and ability of the tribes on the north-western frontier number the accomplishments of first-class mounted infantry, have achieved successes in a manner similar to the north-western frontier tribes. The column of Mohamed Hussein Mirza was caught in a tangi by Qashqais and is reported to have suffered several hundred casualties; the heights were not picqueted. General Shaibani and his motor convoy on approaching a defile were ambushed. There were many casualties, but owing to the fact that the drivers were not hit the party escaped. Shaibani was not hit.

8. The Military Governor at Deh Kurd retired to Urujin to collect fifty sowars as his personal escort; with these he returned to Deh Kurd on the 4th July.

9. Sartip Shaibani has told the local telegraph superintendent that the prevailing conditions do not allow even an escorted attempt to be made to restore communications with Kazerun. The water supply of this place was cut off on the 30th June; its restoration has not yet been reported.

10. Borasjun is reported to be occupied by the rebels and the military garrison surrounded; this has not yet been confirmed.

11. The Khamseh Arabs have again taken the field and took Niriz and Istahbanat about the 30th June and occupied Fasa on the 25th June. The Baharlu tribe is reported to be advancing by two roads on Shiraz with 3,500 rifles. At the beginning of last week a force, strength unknown, was despatched to deal with them. There is no report of an action. The Baharlus are reliably reported to have taken over the Dorab and Fasa districts, to be administering them well, collecting Government taxes and making their own laws.

12. A column of 1,500 men from Arkedan is reliably reported to be moving on Niriz to restore the situation. Unless exceptional leadership is displayed this column may meet with disaster.

13. Reliable reports, dated the 12th July, state that the Qashqai tribe as a whole are moving to their summer quarters and that Soulat-ed-Dowleh left by aeroplane for Shiraz on the 9th July. Thus it seems that the Qashqais are to have Soulat-ed-Dowleh as Ilkhani again, but there is no news of the settlement, but the Qashqais must be retaining their arms.

14. The Baizeh force has returned to Shiraz and may be despatched towards Niriz to deal with the Baharlus.

15. Troops in Isfahan are increasing and there are rumours of a nightly exodus from Tehran of raw recruits. Rumours of wholesale discarding of the Pahlavi hat in Isfahan are current and a heap has been reported to have been burnt.

Comments.

The situation is uncertain. The Qashqais not having been disarmed and having proceeded to their summer grazing grounds close to the Bakhtiari country may make common cause with them. The disaffected elements of both tribes may act in concert and trouble may ensue. Many Bakhtiaris are employed by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, whose affairs will not be immune from interferences, and the efforts of the revolutionaries will be redoubled.

The course of events indicates weakness on the part of the Persian Government, which will be exploited to its limit by Soulat, who is notoriously crooked.

Railway.

16. In the north the line is reported to be progressing satisfactorily; 44.5 kilom. of rail and telegraph line have been laid. In the south 36.5 kilom. of rail have been laid. This information purports to state the case on the 7th July, but may be an underestimate (*cf.* Intelligence Summary No. 12, paragraphs 6 and 7).

Communications.

17. *Telegraph.*—Permission has been asked by the Indo-European Telegraph Company to erect a line from Tabriz to Marand.

A new telegraph line is under construction between Kasvin and Tabriz; it will eventually be extended to connect with the Turkish frontier.

The construction of the Turbat-i-Haidari-Turshiz-Gunabad and of the Shirvan-Shahrud lines has been started.

The Shiraz-Bushire line at Pir-i-Zan, 42 miles south of Shiraz, is interrupted and it is reported that the line has suffered wholesale destruction between Mian Kotal and Kazerun. This latter place is still isolated.

Although no British message can be sent from Shiraz by the Persian wireless, Russians are reliably reported to be using it constantly.

18. *Roads.*—The rumour that a road from Tabriz to Pahlavi is under construction is discredited, but a coastal road from Bander Shah to Pahlavi is being made.

On the evening of the 9th July the Tabriz-Kasvin road was destroyed by a spate at Khiaban, and it is expected that it will take some weeks to repair. Until that time it was possible for light lorries to proceed from Batum to Tehran via Tiflis and Tabriz.

A road to the coal mines at Shemshak is being made from Tehran. The completion of this road will materially assist in reducing the price of coal. The new road from Tehran to the Sa'adabad Palace is not yet completed.

With reference to Special Appreciation No. 1, paragraph 2 (b). The bridging detachment were not of the standard that was first supposed; the Pul-i-Khan has been repaired with bullies and chittai, and forced labour has made sun-dried bricks for the repair of the parapet about the river-bed. The passage of the bridge for a partially loaded 3-ton lorry is precarious. When the bridge was captured on the 10th June the Persian forces lost two officers and fifty men killed and missing.

Kerman: Roads.

19. The Kerman-Duzdap road is still passable for motor-car and light lorry traffic only; no work was done on it during the year March 1928-March 1929.

The Bunder Abbas road is not yet fit for 1-ton lorries, as the bridges, causeways and Irish bridges which are necessary to make the road spate and flood proof have not yet been constructed owing to lack of funds. The road, however, is passable for motor-cars (the 12th June).

The Kerman-Yezd-Isfahan road is in very fair order.

The military road Bam-Iranshahr (Fahraj) is not fit for motor traffic.

A project to make the Kerman-Khabis road fit for motor traffic is under consideration. Should this road be converted into a motor road fit for 3-ton lorries, and a bridge built over the salt marsh near Khabis, then the extension of the road from Khabis to the Duzdap-Meshed road in the neighbourhood of Birjand is a reasonable supposition.

The security of the roads in the Kerman area was not affected by the expedition to the Sarhad and dacoity was negligible.

Military Organisation.

20. The forces of Khuzistan have been combined with the western command under Amir Lashkar Ahmad Khan Sipahbod.

All military personnel in Shustar have been transferred to Ahwaz, only Nazmieh and Amnieh guards remain.

H. J. COOPER, *Captain, R.A.S.C.,*
Assistant Military Attaché.

Tehran, July 13, 1929.

[E 3659/95/34]

No. 37.

Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received July 22.)

(No. 388.)

Sir,

Tehran, July 14, 1929.

SHORTLY before the bag was due to leave, I received from the Minister of Court a letter, of which copy is enclosed, repeating various absurd rumours of English machinations. It is discouraging that his Highness should send me such a letter.

2. I have the honour to enclose copy of my reply.

3. Copies of this despatch have been sent to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, His Majesty's High Commissioner for Iraq, Bagdad, and to His Majesty's consular officers at Isfahan and Mohammerah.

I have, &c.

R. H. CL E.

Enclosure 1 in No. 37.

Taimourtache to Sir R. Clive.

(Confidentielle.)

Mon cher Ministre,

Téhéran, le 13 juillet 1929

UN certain bruit court que le fameux Colonel Lawrence, déguisé en mollah, se rendrait à Souleimanieh dans le but de se diriger vers les régions kurdes.

Je préfère vous signaler la nouvelle parvenue et de vous prier de vouloir bien prendre vos informations pour savoir si elle est fondée. Je ne cacherai pas à votre Excellence que la présence de la personne en question produirait l'effet le plus indésirable.

2. Un autre bruit court à Isfahan qu'il y a une vingtaine de jours, Dr. Schaffter serait allé voir Ali Mardan Khan, un des chefs de la rébellion actuelle de Bakhtiari, et que ce dernier raconte aux siens qu'il a reçu par cette voie l'assurance d'être soutenu dans ses desseins par les autorités anglaises.

3. Les insurgés de Tang-Gazis (Bakhtiari), en présentant par écrit les conditions de leur soumission, qui consistaient en abrogation pour cinq ans du service militaire et quelques autres conditions d'ordre local, ont demandé que l'accord entre eux et le Gouvernement soit garanti par l'A.P.O.C. et qu'en suite, dans leurs pourparlers avec Emir Djang, ils ont demandé la garantie du Gouvernement britannique.

4. Les fils du Vali de Pouchti Koh qui se trouvent en Irak font beaucoup d'intrigues pour provoquer un soulèvement à Pouchti Koh. On y mêle également le nom du fils de Salar-ed-Douleh, Mohamed Reza Mirza.

5. Un rapport parvenu de Mohammerah nous informe qu'au commencement du courant, le consul de Mohammerah avait chez lui un certain nombre des marchands, et qu'au cours de cette réunion les événements d'Afghanistan, la fuite d'Amanullah et le soulèvement des Qachqais ont été sujets de conversation.

J'informe votre Excellence de tout cela dans le but et par désir qu'elle puisse faire l'enquête nécessaire, une insinuation étant toujours possible et à craindre.

Veillez, &c.

TEYMOURTACHE.

Enclosure 2 in No. 37.

Sir R. Clive to Taimourtache.

Mon cher Ami,

Téhéran, le 14 juillet 1929.

AYANT lu très soigneusement votre lettre confidentielle du 13 juillet, je me permets de répondre comme suit :

Où les Anglais désirent voir des troubles en Perse, ou ils ne désirent pas.

On peut partager en quatre catégories les Anglais en ce qui concerne la Perse :

1. Le Gouvernement britannique.
2. La Légation de Grande-Bretagne.
3. Les employés du Gouvernement dans les provinces—y compris les consuls et les employés de l'I.E.T.D.
4. Les employés de l'A.P.O.C., de la Banque impériale de Perse, les missionnaires et les quelques marchands.

Or, si nous considérons ces quatre catégories :

1. Mr. Henderson, Secrétaire d'État pour les Affaires étrangères, vient de vous envoyer une communication très amicale. Il faut croire alors que le Gouvernement britannique est animé des sentiments sincères et amicaux envers la Perse.

2. J'espère que votre Altesse me connaît suffisamment bien après deux années et demie de ne pas croire que j'ai de la sympathie pour les mouvements contre le Gouvernement persan ou que je me sers des agents pour encourager de tels mouvements.

3. En admettant cela, vous n'aurez pas difficulté à croire que, s'il vient à être connu qu'un agent quelconque du Gouvernement tel qu'un consul ou un employé de l'I.E.T.D. encourage en quoi que ce soit des agissements contre le Gouvernement, il ne restera pas longtemps en Perse.

4. Votre Altesse connaît Sir John Cadman et la loyauté de l'Anglo-Persian envers la Perse aussi bien que moi. Toute idée d'une action déloyale de la part des employés de la compagnie est exclue. Je peux dire la même chose pour la Banque impériale. Quel intérêt possible pourrait avoir la banque à encourager des agissements ? Tout au contraire, la banque comme les marchands anglais en Perse ont le même intérêt de voir régner la tranquillité. Finalement, les missionnaires. Je n'ai jamais entendu le moindre bruit que les missionnaires s'immiscent dans la politique, et je suis absolument certain qu'ils ne le font pas. Du reste, il est tout à fait contraire aux règles de leurs sociétés.

En ce qui concerne les détails de votre lettre, j'ai lu dans les journaux que le Colonel Lawrence a été transféré cet hiver des Indes en Angleterre, où, autant que je sache, il reste sous-officier dans la R.A.F. Il est vrai que les Russes ont répandu des histoires que, déguisé en je ne sais quoi, il a agi comme agent du Gouvernement des Indes pour encourager les tribus contre l'ex-Roi Amanullah, mais les Russes disent beaucoup de choses qui ne sont pas vraies. La fameuse légende de Chick déguisé en derviche est de ce genre. En tout cas, je m'informerais où se trouve maintenant le Colonel Lawrence.

Il n'est pas du tout impossible que certains gens des Bakhtiari aient répandu des bruits sur le Dr. Schaffter et sur l'attitude supposée de l'A.P.O.C., mais je me permets de les considérer tout simplement comme des inventions et des mensonges.

Je demanderai au Haut-Commissaire s'il a des renseignements sur le Vali de Pouchti Koh et sa famille et sur les fils de Salar-ed-Douleh.

Le cinquième paragraphe de votre lettre je ne puis guère prendre au sérieux. Si le consul à Mohammerah a invité quelques marchands chez lui, pour quelle raison ne devrait-il pas discuter les événements du jour tels que la fuite d'Amanullah et le soulèvement des Qachqais ? Si un membre de la Légation de Perse à Londres discute avec des Anglais le résultat des élections récentes en Angleterre, cela ne veut pas dire que ses sympathies sont d'un côté ou de l'autre ou qu'il s'immisce dans nos affaires intérieures.

Je prie votre Altesse de ne pas prêter attention à ces bruits, mais de croire aux paroles de Mr. Henderson et aux assurances que je vous ai données maintes fois que la Grande-Bretagne ne désire pas mieux que de voir la Perse forte et tranquille.

R. H. CLIVE.

[E 3704/3704/91]

No. 38.

Mr. Bond to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received July 24.)

(No. 158.)

Jeddah, June 26, 1929.

Sir, I HAVE the honour to report that Ainal Mulk Habibulla Khan Howeida, Persian consul-general for Syria, passed through Jeddah recently on a mission to the King, undertaken at the instance of His Majesty the Shah with the object, I am informed, of smoothing over difficulties that have occurred in the past in connexion with the pilgrimage over differences in religious practice and belief, and of paving the way for mutual recognition by the two Governments.

2. Habibulla Khan, who has had previous experience of a mission of this nature, called on me on his return from Mecca and expressed himself quite satisfied with the result of his conversations with the King. He also informed a member of my staff that the King had stated to him that he had no objection to any section of Islam acting in accordance with its belief, even where such was at variance with Wahabi ideas, provided that it did not do so openly. He would not interfere with anything that was done in private.

3. Habibulla Khan on his part expressed the opinion that the Persian Government might be able to exert pressure upon the Shia Ulema with a view to abolishing certain existing religious beliefs with which the Persian Government was not in sympathy.

4. He hoped to be able to secure a settlement of outstanding questions on his return to Persia. This, he states, will probably be followed by a deputation from the Hejaz to Tehran, and some other political or commercial agreement between the two countries may ensue.

5. The semi-official organ of the Hejaz Government, the "Um-el-Qura," publishes very friendly references to this visit, and states that the negotiations have been successful, and that the results will be published in due course.

6. I have sent a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran, and to His Majesty's High Commissioner for Egypt.

I have, &c.

W. L. BOND.

[E 3753/95/34]

No. 39.

Mr. A. Henderson to Sir R. Clive (Tehran).

(No. 223.)

Foreign Office, July 25, 1929.

(Telegraphic.) P.

IF you consider it desirable, I shall be glad if you will communicate to the Minister of Court the text, given in my immediately following telegram, of a question and answer in the House of Commons to-day.

You may express my hope that he will welcome this emphatic public statement

[E 3753/95/34]

No. 40.

Mr. A. Henderson to Sir R. Clive (Tehran).

(No. 224.)

Foreign Office, July 25, 1929.

(Telegraphic.) R.

Question.

"To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he can make any statement to the House concerning the situation in Southern Persia?"

Answer.

"His Majesty's Government have received reports concerning tribal disturbances in Southern Persia. They have also been informed of certain rumours current in Persia to the effect that these risings are being instigated by British agents; and in this connexion I am glad to have an opportunity of stating that these rumours are devoid of any foundation whatsoever, and that the policy of His Majesty's

Government remains one of strict non-intervention in Persian internal affairs. The Secretary of State is confident that the Persian Government, who have had ample evidence during the past few years of the friendly attitude of Great Britain, realise that in their present difficulties with their disaffected tribes they may count on the sympathies of His Majesty's Government, whose one desire is to see Persia prosperous and peaceful under a strong and independent Government."

[E 3774/95/34]

No. 41.

Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received July 28.)

(No. 290.)

Tehran, July 27, 1929.

(Telegraphic.)

SHIRAZ-BUSHIRE road is now open and district outwardly quiet; mails are being sent by road, though one section is still impassable for wheeled traffic owing to broken bridges.

Dissident tribesmen and outlaws are, however, in the vicinity of the road, and as no permanent settlement with Kashgais has been reached, it is doubtful how long the present situation will continue.

(Repeated to India, No. 144.)

[A 5031/35/45]

No. 42.

General Dawes to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received July 29.)

(No. 83.)

London, July 27, 1929.

Sir,

BY telegraphic direction of my Government, I have the honour, for and in the name of the Government of the United States, to notify through you, His Majesty's Government in Great Britain and Northern Ireland and all parts of the British Empire which are not separate members of the League of Nations, in conformity with the third paragraph of article 3 of the Treaty for the Renunciation of War, signed at Paris on the 27th August, 1928, that the instrument of definitive adherence by Persia was deposited with the Government of the United States on the 25th July, 1929, on which day the treaty became effective with respect to Persia.

May I request you to be so good as to cause this notification to be communicated through the appropriate channels to His Majesty's Governments in the Commonwealth of Australia, the Dominion of New Zealand and the Union of South Africa, and the Government of India?

I have, &c.

(For the Ambassador),

RAY ATHERTON,

Counsellor of Embassy.

[E 3377/19/34]

No. 43.

Mr. A. Henderson to Sir R. Clive (Tehran).

(No. 226.)

Foreign Office, July 29, 1929.

(Telegraphic.) R.

MY telegram No. 206 of 29th June: Anglo-Persian negotiations.

When you consider situation favourable, you may resume negotiations on lines previously authorised, using as a basis of discussion draft articles sent to you on 6th June, subject to following amendments and comments:—

Article 1.—Both paragraphs should be put forward to the Persian Government. It is desirable that general settlement shall contain definite recognition by Persian Government of the fact that the rulers of the Arabian littoral are not under Persian sovereignty, and if Persian Government accept paragraph 2, the question of providing elsewhere for their recognition of the position of these rulers will not arise. It is intended that a schedule shall be added to the treaty enumerating the rulers whose treaty engagements preclude them from ceding territory, viz., Muscat, the Jowasimi Sheikhs of Oman, El Katr, Bahrein, Koweit and Iraq. You should make this clear to Persian Government.

Article 3.—Please substitute version in my despatch No. 329 of the 4th July. The term "British warships" in paragraph 1 should be replaced by "the ships of His Britannic Majesty and of the Royal Indian Marine," as in article 4, paragraphs E and G. The same phrase should be used in Article 4, paragraphs C and J, and paragraph H should be amended on similar lines.

Articles 4, 5 and 6.—Governmental form should be replaced by reference to Heads of States in order that the form of these articles may correspond to that of the other articles of the draft.

Article 5 (c) should be redrafted as follows: "His Majesty the Shah of Persia shall cause to be respected ('fera respecter') the tombs in the British cemetery at Basidu, and undertakes to give to the authorities of His Britannic Majesty all reasonable facilities to ensure its maintenance."

Article 7 (b) and (c).—The words "in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of India" should be added after "His Britannic Majesty's Government."

When discussing with the Persian Government this draft, you should bear in mind the other questions, such as debt, claims, telegraphs, Duzdap Railway, slavery, &c., which will also have to be included in the treaty, or at all events as part of the general settlement. If such a settlement is to be reached at a reasonably early date, rapid progress in some of these questions, and particularly in the question of claims, is essential.

(Repeated to India, No. 35.)

[E 3649/95/34]

No. 44.

Mr. A. Henderson to Sir R. Clive (Tehran).

(No. 228.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, July 30, 1929.

ON 19th July Persian Minister in Paris left with me a telegram dated 15th July from Minister of Court, terms of which are substantially the same as those of his letter enclosed in your despatch No. 388 of 14th July. I am forwarding to Persian Minister in Paris copies of that letter and of your reply.

After informing him of substance of your covering despatch, I proceed as follows:—

"I must confess that I sympathise to the full with Sir R. Clive's disappointment. It must indeed be discouraging for him and for the other British officials in Persia and in this country, who have steadily made it their endeavour for many years to strengthen the friendly relations between Persia and this country, to find that the Persian Government have taken no steps whatever to contradict these malicious and obviously ridiculous items of local gossip, and have even apparently contemplated the possibility that there could be some foundation in fact for the rumours of encouragement by British agents of Persia's disaffected tribes. It should be evident to the Persian Government from the history of the past few years that the one wish of His Majesty's Government is to see a strong and independent Government at Tehran, and that it is far from their wishes that the peace and prosperity of Persia should be jeopardised by internal disturbances. How can it really be supposed that it is in the interest of His Majesty's Government to create or encourage such disturbances in Persia? The fact is rather that it is the primary object of certain other interested parties in Persia and elsewhere to endeavour to break down the good relations now existing between our two countries, and consequently to spread and magnify bazaar rumours of this nature, in the hope that by playing upon the credulity and the fears of ill-informed persons they will be able to create suspicions and dissensions between Persia and Great Britain, and thus weaken the present Persian Government for their own ends."

Letter adds that Colonel Lawrence has not been out of this country since January, and requests Minister to urge upon his Government desirability of taking immediate steps to put a stop to this distressing campaign of calumny, which should never be allowed to obscure the good relations between the two Governments.

[E 3912/3704/34]

No. 45.

Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received August 6.)

(No. 397.)

Sir,

Gulhek, July 24, 1929.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that a report was recently published in the semi-official "Iran" to the effect that the King of the Hejaz was sending a delegation to Tehran to obtain recognition by the Persian Government. On my enquiring of the Minister of Court whether there was any truth in this report his Highness confirmed it, adding that in old days Persia had had a consul at Jeddah, and wished to have one again in view of the many pilgrims who went each year to Mecca.

2. I imagine that any rapprochement between the two countries is unlikely to lead to close co-operation in other questions, although its possible effect on Gulf politics generally should not be lost sight of.

3. Copies of this despatch have been sent to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, and to His Majesty's Government for Iraq.

I have, &c.

R. H. CLIVE.

[E 3915/95/34]

No. 46.

Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received August 6.)

(No. 402.)

Sir,

Gulhek, July 27, 1929.

IN my telegram No. 283 of the 20th July I mentioned that Simko had recently made a raid into Azerbaijan, and after killing one or two frontier guards had retired again into Turkish territory.

2. In this connexion, I have the honour to enclose copy of a despatch from His Majesty's consul at Tabriz, in which he refers to the conditions on which Simko wishes to obtain the permission of the Persian Government in order to return to and settle down in Persia.

3. The Minister of Court, when he informed me of Simko's raid across the frontier, told me that these conditions were entirely unacceptable. The only condition on which Simko would be allowed to return would be that he should agree to settle in that part of the country which the Persian Government might designate; should he agree to this, the Shah was prepared to give him a full pardon.

4. I asked the Turkish Ambassador two days ago if Simko was as inconvenient to the Turkish as he was to the Persian authorities. He gave me to understand that Simko had now only a following of about twelve adherents, and was not considered by the Turkish Government as capable of provoking a serious insurrectionary movement, although he might continue to commit isolated acts of brigandage.

5. A copy of this despatch has been sent to His Majesty's High Commissioner for Iraq and to His Majesty's consul at Tabriz.

I have, &c.

R. H. CLIVE.

Enclosure in No. 46.

Consul Gilliat-Smith to Sir R. Clive.

(No. 52.)

Sir,

Tabriz, July 19, 1929.

I HAVE the honour to report that, according to information received, Ismail Agha Simko has lately been endeavouring to obtain the permission of the Persian authorities to return to Persia on conditions laid down by himself. These are said to be that Simko should be lord of all the townships and villages to the west of Lake Urumia, and responsible to the Persian Government for the maintenance of law and order in the district stretching from Urumia north to Khoi, Lake Urumia forming the eastern boundary and the Turco-Persian frontier the western boundary

of these domains. Naturally, such conditions have been rejected, and the persons sent to negotiate with Simko have returned. The position is therefore unaltered.

2. Meanwhile a Turco-Persian Frontier Commission is said to have begun work.

I have, &c.
B. GILLIAT-SMITH.

[E 3916/637/34]

No. 47.

Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received August 6.)

(No. 403. Confidential)

Sir,

Tehran, July 26, 1929.

THE Persian Ministry of Finance has never had a good reputation. Intrigue and corruption have always been rife, chaos has usually reigned. To the credit of Dr. Millspaugh it may be said that he did his best to instil a semblance of order into the Ministry and to check corruption. Since Dr. Millspaugh's departure two years ago, and until the middle of June this year, Prince Firuz reigned supreme as Minister of Finance. It is true that a Treasurer-General, in the person of Dr. Walder, a Swiss, was installed last autumn, but I fear that Dr. Walder, honest as he may be, is hardly of the calibre to make his influence effectively felt.

2. It is now six weeks since Prince Firuz was placed under arrest, and from all accounts the confusion in the Ministry of Finance has tended to become worse confounded. The heads of several of the departments have been summarily dismissed, while many of the Prince's protégés in the provinces have been recalled.

3. A few days ago a Council of Ministers, at which Dr. Walder was present, was held to discuss the financial situation. The sitting lasted for many hours, and the Minister of Court told me two days later that he had been left under the impression, from what Dr. Walder had said, that there were no funds in the Treasury. He hesitated, however, to believe this. Accordingly he spent next day in the Ministry of Finance and was satisfied that, although there was great confusion in the accounts, the Government was amply provided with funds.

4. Since then two official announcements have been made. On the 20th July it was stated in the press that "in order to improve the smooth running of the different branches of the Ministry of Finance, the President of the Council had appointed Dr. Schniewind, Adviser to the Ministry, to be Director-General of this important department in addition to his present functions."

5. The following day it was announced that Farzin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs since last February, had been appointed Acting Minister of Finance. Regarding the latter appointment I had been aware, and yesterday Farzin confirmed to me what I had been told, namely, that it was only under the greatest pressure that he had accepted the appointment. On the one hand, having previously served in a subordinate capacity in the Ministry of Finance, he knew what he must be prepared for. On the other, he was very loath to give up the pleasant post of Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs without responsibility under the system which has been in force for the past two years whereby all responsibility has come to be vested in the Minister of Court and all decisions are taken by his Highness.

6. It seems quite likely either that Ghaffari, the Political Director of the Ministry, will be appointed Acting Minister or that no new appointment will be made at all, Ghaffari remaining as the senior official in the Ministry.

7. There seems at present to be no foundation for the report that Faruki, now in Tehran on leave from Angora, will be appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs. I know that Taimourtache wishes him to return to Angora if only because he does not wish to see an ex-President of the Council installed at the Ministry, which he likes to consider his special preserve.

8. With regard to Dr. Schniewind's appointment as Director-General of the Ministry of Finance, I am told that there is no question of his being given the powers which Dr. Millspaugh formerly had. Taimourtache has, I know, a very low opinion of the capability of Dr. Walder—in fact, his first words to me when I asked about the recent discussion at the Council of Ministers were: "Ah, ce crétin de Walder." His Highness accordingly advised the Shah to put in Dr. Schniewind as Director-General, although I am at present unaware what is to be exactly the extent of his authority.

9. Meanwhile, it is generally expected that Prince Firuz will shortly be released from arrest and given permission to go abroad. In return for the Imperial clemency, it is said that the late Minister of Finance may be asked to contribute the sum of 200,000 tomans to the funds of the Imperial Household.

Copies of this despatch have been sent to the Government of India and His Majesty's High Commissioner for Iraq.

I have, &c.
R. H. CLIVE.

[E 3917/1070/34]

No. 48.

Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received August 6.)

(No. 408.)

Sir,

Gulhek, July 27, 1929.

IN the course of a visit he paid me this morning my German colleague referred to the relations between the Imperial Bank and the National Bank. He had learnt with much regret on his return from leave a fortnight ago that the relations between the two banks were very unsatisfactory.

2. I said that I feared that this was to a certain extent true. I then told him that I had recently, with Mr. Wilkinson, discussed the matter with Taimourtache, and I gave him a brief outline of what I had said on that occasion to the Minister of Court, as recorded in my despatch No. 336 of the 15th June. I said that it was impossible to avoid the impression that the National Bank had deliberately set itself to cut into the business of the Imperial Bank and had made no effort to embark on those other lines of business which were open to it but closed, under the terms of its concession, to the Imperial Bank. Was this the policy of Dr. Lindenblatt or of the Minister of Finance working through Dr. Lindenblatt? Count Schulenburg preferred to believe it was the latter. In any case he considered it essential that the rivalry between the two banks should be put an end to and a working agreement arrived at whereby more friendly relations would be established.

3. Happily Prince Firuz has been relieved of his office as Minister of Finance and the prospect of better relations thereby enhanced, although personally I have little confidence in the good faith of Dr. Lindenblatt. I have, however, to record that Taimourtache asked me two days ago to inform Mr. D'Alton, the acting manager of the Imperial Bank, that the Government had decided to keep a part of their funds in the Imperial Bank.

4. In the postscript to my despatch No. 336 I referred to what the Shah had said in regard to the Imperial Bank, and it may be that this decision of the Government to place a part of their funds again in the Imperial Bank has been directly inspired by His Majesty.

I have, &c.
R. H. CLIVE.

[E 3918/95/34]

No. 49.

Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received August 6.)

(No. 409.)

Sir,

Gulhek, July 27, 1929.

THE centre of gravity of the tribal situation has during the past fortnight shifted from Shiraz to Isfahan. It will be convenient to deal separately with each of these places, and in conclusion to add some remarks concerning the reports received of disturbances in other areas.

2. In Shiraz an outward calm prevails. The Tehran newspapers, while abstaining from news of the negotiations which are constantly going on between the Qashqai chiefs, whose accepted head is now Soulat-ed-Dowleh, and the Government troops, occasionally quote letters from Shiraz showing that peace reigns and the whole trouble is at an end. I have no doubt, however, that such optimism is misplaced. It is true that road guards have been replaced on the Shiraz-Bushire road, and are guarding it as previously with the exception of the portion between Konar Takhteh and Daliki. This section contains some broken bridges, and until they are repaired passage will be impossible for wheeled traffic; the work of repair is estimated to require at least a fortnight. It is also true that mails are being sent by this road once more, under military guard. But the chief movers in the Qashqai

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rebellion, Ali Khan, the half-brother of Soulat-ed-Dowleh, Hussein Khan Darashuri and Ilyas Khan Kashkuli, have not yet come in to Shiraz, and the whole tribe remains under arms in a state of suspended hostility. I have heard no talk of the surrender of their arms; in fact, the only suggestions concerning the terms which are being offered to the tribe which have reached me have seemed more like a complete climb-down on the part of the Government than the conditions which the Government is imposing on rebellious subjects. It is, indeed, difficult to see what else can happen unless the troops can defeat the Qashqais in the field. This would be a difficult operation for any force of troops fighting against the tribe in their own country; it is especially difficult for the available Persian troops, composed largely of little-trained conscripts and fighting in the heat of the summer.

3. Troops have, however, been sent from Shiraz to the Isfahan area, where a considerable concentration of troops has now been made. The number is estimated as about 6,000, though I have no means of checking this. The Bakhtiari tribe at the moment seems to be in a state of rebellion against its own hereditary leaders, as well as against the Government; they have the Qashqais' grievances (conscription, military governorship, taxes, the Pahlavi hat, &c.), as well as some of their own. Two of the prominent Bakhtiari chiefs, who, from all accounts, are the most influential with the tribe, are at present in their villages in the Bakhtiari area, more or less prisoners, namely, Murteza Quli Khan and Sardar Muhtasham. Many of the younger khans have associated themselves with the growing tribal feeling of revolt against oppressive restrictions, while various bands of marauders have seized the opportunity to plunder indiscriminately wherever opportunity offers. A notorious brigand named Khaybar was reported at the village of Taghun, 11 miles west of Shah Riza (Qumisheh) on the Isfahan-Shiraz road on the 25th July; he captured the place with 200 Bakhtiari, broke open the Government opium store, took out the Government percentage and returned the remainder to the peasants, taking a receipt for the same. Sanguinary engagements have already taken place between the Bakhtiaris and the Government troops at Safid Dasht, Urujin and Kavehrukh, all within about 50 miles of Isfahan; the first-named place was besieged for some days, and, according to my latest information, the whole of its garrison either was captured or surrendered. I also hear reports from Isfahan that columns of troops which have been sent out from Isfahan to the Bakhtiari country are out of touch with their headquarters, and cannot even be found by aeroplane reconnaissance.

4. The Government is, of course, very anxious. His Majesty has summoned several meetings of the Bakhtiari khans at present in Tehran. The final result of their deliberations has been that on the 25th July the aged Bakhtiari chief Samsam-es-Sultaneh, one time Prime Minister, now an old gentleman of 83, and Amir Mufakham, another patriarch who must be well over 70, went off to the Bakhtiari country charged with a special mission from the Government to the tribe. It is no doubt hoped that their influence may be sufficient to induce the tribe to come to terms.

5. I have already reported news of disturbances in the area of the Khamseh tribes, south of Shiraz. My latest information is that they are still in a position of more or less open rebellion. A small branch of them, known as the Farsi tribe, attacked the town of Saidabad, centre of the district of Sirjan, about the 13th July, and captured several Government offices; troops sent from Kerman, however, soon dispersed them. Not long afterwards a prominent Baharlu sheikh named Abu'l Hassan, with a large following, were operating on the Shiraz-Niriz road; and it seems to be this party who captured the towns of Marwas and Herat (between Niriz and Yazd) about the 20th instant, and were reported to be threatening Anar and Rafsinjan (Bahramabad) on the Yazd-Kerman road. His Majesty's acting consul at Kerman is apprehensive at the number of Government troops which have been taken from the garrison at that town, leaving only a small force to defend it.

6. I shall not fail to report any further developments. Meanwhile it is at any rate satisfactory to record my opinion that the Persian authorities, including His Majesty the Shah, do not now believe, as much as they formerly did, in the widespread allegations that these revolts were caused or supported by British intrigues.

7. Copies of this despatch have been sent to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, His Majesty's High Commissioner for Iraq and to His Majesty's consul-general at Bushire.

I have, &c.

R. H. CLIVE.

[E 3919/104/34]

Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received August 6.)

(No. 410.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of Intelligence Summary No. 15 for the period ending the 27th July, compiled by His Majesty's military attaché to this Legation.

Tehran, July 27, 1929.

Enclosure in No. 50.

(Secret.)

Intelligence Summary No. 15 for the Period ending July 27, 1929.

Tehran.

1. *British Legation.*—Major P. C. R. Dodd arrived in Tehran on the 12th July on appointment as military attaché.

2. *Persian Officials.*—General Fazlullah Khan Zahedi, who was arrested some time ago on his return from Shiraz, has now been released.

Sayyed Mehdi Khan Farrak has been appointed as Under-Secretary in the Ministry of Education.

Taghi Zadeh, Persian Minister designate in London, left Tehran to take up his appointment on the 20th July.

Mirza Mohammed Ali Khan Farzin has been appointed as Acting Minister of Finance.

It is believed that Mohammed Ali Khan Faruki, on arrival from Angora, will be appointed as Minister in charge of Foreign Affairs.

It is understood that Sarim-ed-Dowleh (Akbar Mirza), formerly Governor-General of Fars, and Firuz, ex-Minister of Finance, were released on the 24th July on payment of heavy fines. They were both arbitrarily arrested and released without any form of trial.

3. *Europeans.*—Dr. Schniewind (German) has been appointed as Director-General of the Ministry of Finance. He has asked that he may be granted the same powers and facilities as were formerly granted to Dr. Millsbaugh.

One head engineer and five French mechanics have arrived in Tehran in connexion with the installation of a short-wave radio plant which has recently been purchased from France.

4. *Police.*—Twenty Persian students are proceeding to France in the autumn to undergo a course of instruction in police duties.

5. *Foreign Affairs (Hejaz).*—The Persian Government recently sent a representative to the Hejaz. As a result a deputation has left the Hejaz for Persia with the object of establishing diplomatic relations between the two countries.

6. *Posts.*—A bi-weekly mail has now been established between Tehran and Europe, via the Caspian and Russia.

7. *Afghan News.*—Sirdar Inayatullah arrived in Tehran on the 24th July from India, via Bagdad. He is accompanied by Abdul Ahad (formerly A.D.C. to ex-King Amanullah), Mohamed Yakub Khan (formerly Minister at Court), &c. Sirdar Inayatullah is also accompanied by his wife, thirteen children, and one sister.

8. *Wireless.*—It is understood that on the reassembling of the Majlis a Bill will be brought forward for the establishment of central W/T stations in the larger Persian towns.

Gilan.

9. *Pahlavi.*—A report was recently received that the wharves and jetties at the port of Pahlavi were falling into a state of bad repair. The Persian Government have granted a loan to the municipality of Pahlavi of 19,000 toman for the purpose of constructing a new dam or breakwater at that port, and for general repairs.

10. *Caspian Sea.*—A submarine earthquake is reported from the Caspian which has raised the level of the sea one foot.

Khorasan.

11. The well-known outlaw, Hulfu, has been captured and hanged in Meshed. It is estimated that during the last few months he was responsible for the death of thirty persons, including seventeen soldiers and Government officials.

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12. *Earthquake*.—Another serious earthquake occurred in the Meshed area on the 14th July. The villages of Kontehan and Farondj, which had been previously damaged, were completely destroyed, and much damage occurred elsewhere.

Persian Gulf.

13. *Bander Shah Port*.—It is reported in the local press that the new port of Bander Shah was used for the first time on the 13th July, when a ship anchored there and discharged cargo by means of a crane which had been erected on the pier.

Khuzistan.

14. *Railway*.—Construction work is continuing satisfactorily, and labour is employed by day and night on the bridge over the Karun River.

Luristan.

15. On the 16th July a road construction party were attacked on the Dizful-Burujird road.

South Persia.

16. *Russian Activities*.—The markets of South Persia are being flooded with Russian goods landed from Russian steamers at Persian Gulf ports. These goods are being under-sold on the market, with the result that Hindoo and other shopkeepers are suffering severe losses. To show the extent to which Russian goods are entering Persia, the steamship "Loos," on the 22nd-25th June, landed at Bushire—

9,900 bags of sugar.
1,176 cases of matches.
565 bales of piece-goods.

Persian Baluchistan.

17. *Military Barracks*.—It is reported that 32,000 toman has been sanctioned for construction of military barracks in Persian Baluchistan.

18. *Post Offices*.—Persian post offices have been opened at Khwash and Iranshahr.

19. *Telegraphs*.—The telegraph line has been completed from Mirjawa to Khwash.

20. *Wireless*.—The W/T is to be transferred from Duzdap to Khwash.

Fars.

21. The present situation in this province will be more easily understood if it is dealt with under three headings, namely: (a) Kerman, (b) Shiraz, and (c) Isfahan. It is very difficult to estimate actual numbers on either side, the troops are being continually moved from place to place, and the rebels do not consist of entire tribes, but of disaffected elements and robber gangs. The authorities at the Persian War Office, when asked for information, are very reticent, principally because the present acting Chief of Staff, Sartip Nakhejevan, belongs to the old school of suspicious and unprofessional soldiers.

The situation in the oil-fields at Abadan and Mohammerah has not, so far, been affected by the present revolt.

Kerman.—This district is disturbed on account of the unrest in the neighbouring areas of Shiraz and Isfahan, and the trouble here is being caused more by marauding gangs than by tribes in open revolt. The area affected lies between Shiraz-Niriz-Kerman and Yezd. On the 13th July a concentration of some 600 Farsi Arabs, a sub-section of the Khamseh tribe, occupied Sirjan, an area of which Saidabad is the capital, some 100 miles south-west of Kerman. Two days later the military turned them out of Saidabad and neighbourhood without much difficulty. It was later reported that the Tutaki and Chararrahi tribes had occupied Mervas, 100 miles west of Kerman, and Herat, with the further probable intention of moving towards Anar, on the Yezd-Kerman road. The Tutaki are a sub-section of the Kafraki, a Lasharri tribe, and the Chararrahi are an independent tribe of some 1,000 families. Government troops, who are said to be mostly in Saidabad, are not sufficient for the defence of Kerman against a serious attack. Reinforcements are, however, reaching Kerman from Persian Baluchistan.

Shiraz.—Here the situation has greatly improved, and is at present outwardly calm, all fighting having ceased. The Qashqai are allowing the Shiraz-Bushire road to be used, and peace negotiations are proceeding. The original trouble appears to have occurred by the tribes objecting to the increased interference by the Persian Government into their private affairs, and, as will be seen, the terms put forward by the Qashqai bear this out. The Qashqai demands are as follows:—

- (1) The right to appoint their own khans.
- (2) Orders for disarmament of the population of this province to be cancelled.
- (3) No conscription in the Province of Fars.
- (4) No Government monopolies, such as recently imposed on sugar, tea, tobacco and opium.
- (5) Rule by Military Governors to be discontinued.

The Qashqai leaders are—

Ali Khan, a half-brother of Soulet-ed-Dowleh,
Hussein Khan Darashuri,
Ilyas Khan Qashquli,

with whom are negotiating, on behalf of the Persian Government—

Amir-i-Lashkar Shaibani,
Soulet-ed-Dowleh.

It appears likely that the Government will agree to most, if not all, of the above Qashqai terms.

It is believed that 12,000 troops were concentrated in Shiraz, of whom 4,000 or 5,000 have probably been transferred towards Isfahan.

Isfahan.—On account of the seriousness of the Bakhtiari revolt, chief interest is now centred in this area.

The Bakhtiari, in common with the Qashqai, are dissatisfied with the present Government's interference with the liberty of the subject, a policy which must always be resented by the independent-minded tribesmen.

At the same time, the source of the Bakhtiari revolt can also be traced to the more or less legitimate grievances of the younger generation against their own leaders, many of whom live the lives of absent landlords, and take no interest whatsoever in tribal affairs. The chief tribes in revolt are the Zarrasfand and Chahar Lungs, under one Ali Mardan Khan, and these are assisted by bands of robbers, such as that led by the notorious Khaybar. On the 25th July Samsam-us-Sultaneh and Amir Mufakham were sent from Tehran to negotiate with the Bakhtiari. Unfortunately, Murteza Quli Khan and Sirdar Muktasim, who would have been helpful in settling this trouble, were in Bakhtiari country at the beginning of the revolution, and remain there, presumably more or less prisoners, though they are also suspected of complicity by the authorities in Tehran. It is understood that the Isfahan authorities consider that sufficient troops are available to deal with the present situation, so long as the Bakhtiari are not joined by the Kuhgilu, in which case the situation might become very serious. There are approximately 6,000 troops in the vicinity of Isfahan at present, of whom 4,000 are reinforcements recently arrived from Shiraz. Sartip Shahbakhti is in chief command. On the 15th July heavy fighting took place at Safid Dasht, 42 miles south-west of Isfahan, when the Government forces suffered a severe reverse, with reported casualties of 500. A garrison of 300 is also said to have been isolated in Safid Dasht. The Bakhtiari later advanced and captured Urujun, 40 miles south by west of Isfahan. A few days later the well-known robber chief, Khaybar, with 200 men, raided Taghun, 11 miles west of Shah Reza (Qumisheh), 40 miles south of Isfahan. The situation is undoubtedly serious, and a menace to Isfahan exists, as it is doubtful whether the troops will stand another severe handling as they received on the 15th. Two Englishmen belonging to the Ulen Company have suffered from the above disturbances. Mr. Waddell was slightly wounded on the 12th July, and on the same date Mr. Morrison was wounded and captured. Within a week, however, the latter had not only been released, but was fit for duty again.

P. C. R. DODD, Major,
Military Attaché.

Tehran, July 27, 1929.

[E 3920/95/34]

No. 51.

Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received August 6.)

(No. 411.)

Sir,

Tehran, July 28, 1929.

I HAD the honour to forward to you in my despatch No. 358 of the 29th June, copy of a memorandum which I had given to the Minister of Court on the subject of the arms traffic and the allegations that His Majesty's Government had been abetting the insurrectionary movement of the Qashqais.

2. In my covering despatch I stated that His Majesty's consul-general at Bushire was then on a visit to Koweit and was enquiring into the question of the arms traffic.

3. Last week I received from Colonel Barrett an express message recording the result of his enquiries. I have the honour to enclose a copy. Yesterday I communicated to the Minister of Court a translation in Persian of the greater part of this message, omitting only paragraph 2 and the last sentence beginning "S.N.O. points out that . . ."

4. His Highness expressed his thanks for this communication which he said he was very glad to have. His information now was that the arms traffic was not on a large scale. For instance, while it was true that the Qashqai were very well armed, the Bakhtiari were not. Out of a force of 3,000 men who had recently assembled only 700 had rifles.

5. His Highness then thanked me for your reply to the recent question in the House of Commons (I had sent him a copy of your telegram No. 224 of the 25th July). He asked if this had been published by Reuter. I said it had been but not *in extenso*. What I had given him was the actual text of the question and answer in the House of Commons. He gave me to understand that he would have this published in the Persian press.

Copies of this despatch and of its enclosure have been sent to the Government of India and His Majesty's acting consul-general at Bushire.

I have, &c.

R. H. CLIVE.

Enclosure in No. 51.

*Express Message from Colonel Barrett to Sir R. Clive.**July 10, 1929.*

(No. 95.)

YOUR telegram No. 88.

Rumour undoubtedly connects Koweit with arms traffic, but Nuban provincial director of customs in the course of conversation informed me that he had heard reports of smuggling of sugar from Arab coast, but none of arms.

At the same time Belgian customs official at Mohammerah declared to vice-consul that he knew British had been encouraging arms running until two months ago.

Sheikh of Koweit informed me he had long ago issued stringent regulations against arms traffic, and had confiscated 500 rifles from dhows in past eight years. Political agent states though there may be small traffic of arms from Koweit to Persia there is no organised traffic.

Owing to recent troubles in Arabia chiefs have imposed strictest embargo on export of rifles, and it is reported secretly that Akhwan messengers sent to Koweit to purchase rifles had to go to Amara in Iraq owing to high cost.

Tangistani dhows which are largely engaged in sugar smuggling all carry two or three rifles for self-protection, and it is suggested that men if offered sufficient inducement may part with these rifles hoping to rearm themselves on Arab coast. This would account for importation of small numbers of rifles into Persia but not large numbers. Sheikh of Qatr is reported to sell to Sheikh of Madkhor and others on Persian coast the rifles which he purchased from British Government under treaty. He has received 950 in past eleven years, last consignment being 500 in April 1927, so even if report is trustworthy this source is not bountiful. If Qashqai possess large quantities of British arms they must be looted from Syrian, and especially Mesopotamian battlefields and purchases from King Hussein of the Hejaz in the

past. As neither senior naval officer nor I am able to trace any large traffic, much of this must have gone into Persia by land. An informant who is insistent about traffic from Koweit has offered to procure me a rifle from Tangistanis. He says they are of German make known locally as Wassmussi, and they are supposed to have been brought overland from Europe. Mohammerah tells me that arms said to have been landed from "Kommunist" were Browning pistols only. Senior naval officer points out that if Persian Customs did their duty fearlessly smuggling might be suppressed, but until this happens naval co-operation will be useless, and Persian Government must understand that British assistance will mean searching 100 Persian to one Arab vessel.

Post copy by post to India.

C. C. J. BARRETT, *Lieutenant-Colonel.*

[E 3998/95/34]

No. 52.

Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received August 11.)

(No. 293.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Tehran, August 11, 1929.

MY despatch No. 425.

Amir Mufakham has been appointed the Ilkhani and Murteza Quli Khan the Ilbegi of Bakhtiari.

Minister of Court told me to-day that Bakhtiari question was settled, and, in general, tribal situation had greatly improved.

He admitted that at one moment position was extremely serious.

(Repeated to India, No. 152.)

[E 3999/19/34]

No. 53.

Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received August 11.)

(No. 294.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Tehran, August 11, 1929.

YOUR telegram No. 226 of 29th July.

Yesterday I left with Minister of Court outline of general treaty, including all articles so far authorised. Despatch by bag 11th August. Next interview arranged for 20th August.

(Repeated to India, No. 153.)

[E 4000/245/93]

No. 54.

Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received August 11.)

(No. 295.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Tehran, August 11, 1929.

IRAQ.

Minister of Court has written to enquire when definite proposals for abolition of judicial agreement are likely to be submitted to Council of the League.

I have replied that I cannot say, but that question is now under discussion with Iraq Government, and that he can rest assured that His Majesty's Government will hasten matter as much as possible.

Persian Ambassador in Angora, who is now here, and leaves on 20th August for Geneva, will probably be instructed to raise matter with you.

My reply to your despatch No. 348 goes by bag 11th August.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 145.)

[20533]

F 4

[E 4083/95/34]

No. 55.

Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received August 19.)

(No. 422.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith copies of despatches Nos. 44 and 45 from His Majesty's acting-consul, Shiraz, dated the 31st July and the 3rd August, on the subject of the situation in the Province of Fars.

Tehran, August 10, 1929.

Enclosure 1 in No. 55.

Acting-Consul Davis to Sir R. Clive.

(No. 44.)

Sir,

Shiraz, July 31, 1929.

WITH reference to your telegram No. 15 of the 20th July, I have the honour to inform you that externally at least there has been a considerable improvement in the situation in Fars. On Friday last when I visited the ruins of Pasargadae in company with Mr. Whishaw of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, Isfahan, conditions on the Isfahan road as far as Mashhad-i-Murghab appeared to be quite normal. Posts of road guards were in being at all the usual spots, only their increased numbers and unusual vigilance betraying that there had been any trouble recently. The black tents of the nomad tribes were very much in evidence, their animals showing no signs of privation or lack of fodder. Large bands of tribesmen and even a few women were travelling into Shiraz with accumulations of produce to sell, and equally large bands coming out of town with purchases of sugar, tea, piece-goods, pottery, &c., which they had been prevented from buying while the trouble was raging. The bridge at Pul-i-Khan, about 28 miles north of Shiraz, had been repaired; it appeared to have been damaged less seriously than accounts received had led me to expect. The road-guard post guarding it had been gutted by fire when a band of Qashqais led by Malik Mansur Khan, Soulet-ed-Dowleh's second son, attacked and captured it on the 6th June after the Amir Lashkar Habibullah Khan Shaibani had passed through on his way to Shiraz, and slaughtered its garrison of forty soldiers to a man. A new watch tower has been built on the hill above the post to protect it against repetition of such an attack. The Amnieh even allowed us to travel at night through the Sa'adatabad Pass, a fact which may be taken as an index of their confidence in the security of the road.

2. As for the Bushire road, Soulet-ed-Dowleh promised the merchants of Shiraz on his arrival here that he would open the road as far as Kazerun, and his promise has been kept. Since the 14th July stocks of goods, especially sugar, held up at Kazerun have been arriving at Shiraz by animal transport. As a result commodities which had soared to famine prices are now being retailed at reasonable rates. Loaf sugar, for instance, has fallen from 24 krans to 12 krans per man. More recently cars have also been proceeding as far as Kazerun. On the 28th July a report from Kazerun stated that the road from Shiraz to Bushire was in order except for the section from Konar-Takhteh to Dalaki, where three bridges had been damaged. Repair of these was begun on the 27th July. Amnieh posts are established along the road from Shiraz to Kazerun, and it is believed that they are being established also between Bushire and Kazerun; but there is reason to believe that the Borazjun district is far from settled, though I have no detailed information from that side. A column of troops over 1,000 strong with mountain guns and machine guns left Shiraz on the 13th July, proceeded to Kazerun, repairing the road as it went, relieved the Kazerun garrison, and returned to Shiraz on the 28th July. If the present lull continues, there is no reason why the Bushire road should not be open for all kinds of transport in a week or ten days' time. Its security or otherwise must depend on the ability of the Government to disperse the bands of robbers and outlaws who have started operating on their own account under the ægis of the Qashqai insurrection. The Qashqais themselves, of course, have the power to close the road at any moment should they feel inclined to do so.

3. The intentions of the Qashqais in allowing this restoration of security along the main roads are obscure, to say the least of it. They have not been defeated, that is certain. It is still more certain that the Government forces now in Shiraz, greatly diminished in strength now that large numbers have been sent northward to Isfahan and eastward to Niriz, could not possibly resist the Qashqais if they chose to recommence hostilities. Yet it is just as certain that terms of peace have not been arranged. Personally I am inclined to believe that the Government may have decided to follow a policy of wait-and-see. Without giving the insurgents any definite promises whatsoever, they have probably assured the Soulet that the Qashqais will not be further molested this season. I regard it as certain that the Qashqais will not surrender their arms, submit to conscription, or accept the dress reforms, until they are compelled to do so. Nor are they likely to pay any taxes this year. As for the detested opium monopoly, that is already a dead letter so far as Fars is concerned. Ali Khan, the leader of the Qashqai insurgents, came into Shiraz on the 26th July and had short interviews with the Amir Lashkar Shaibani and with his half-brother, Soulet-ed-Dowleh. He returned to the tribes the following day with Malik Mansur Khan, the Soulet's second son, who had been with his father since the 22nd July. What transpired at these interviews has not been disclosed; but it is generally believed that the Qashqais want to get the Soulet's eldest son, Nasir Khan, released from Tehran and appointed Ilkhani, with Ali Khan as Ilbeg. They do not feel free in their negotiations with the Government as long as such an important hostage as Nasir Khan remains in Tehran. Whether they might be tempted to desert their pacific attitude once they had him safely among themselves is an interesting speculation.

4. Ali Khan, who is behind the hills south of Shiraz, in the region of Siyakh, is reported to have dismissed all the Qashqai foot-men and to have kept only the mounted men with himself. The majority of the tribes are now in their "sarhad" (summer grazing grounds) with their flocks and herds in the region stretching from Ardakan to Qumisheh. These dispositions also indicate that they expect no more serious fighting this summer.

5. Of course, much may now depend on the course of events in the Bakhtiari rising. If the Government troops succeeded in inflicting a severe defeat on the Bakhtiari insurgents, the Qashqais would undoubtedly become more amenable to Government pressure. If on the other hand the Bakhtiaris gained any signal success, it would probably be the signal for renewed aggressiveness on the part of the Qashqais. But it seems that in Bakhtiari also a stalemate is a more likely probability than victory or defeat for either party; and while the stalemate lasts the Qashqais will probably remain aloof, independent, and unmolested.

6. In the meantime there is no fresh news of the Khamseh Arab tribes and their doings. They have hitherto scarcely met the Persian Government forces in the field, and they have refrained from interfering with the main roads or aiming a blow at Shiraz itself. But they hold all the territory east and south-east of Shiraz, where not one civil or military representative of the Persian Government has been allowed to remain. In addition to their own territories, they hold Darab, Fasa, Sarvistan, Niriz and Istahbanat. The column about 1,000 strong whose return to Shiraz from Kazerun is mentioned in paragraph 2 above left in the direction of Niriz on the 29th July, presumably to retake that town for the Persian Government and reopen the road from Shiraz to Kerman. But the Baharlu Arabs are reputed to be stout fighters—the Persians fear them more than either Bakhtiaris or Qashqais—and will probably not relinquish their gains without a struggle. It is said that their objects are in the main similar to the Qashqais: the return of the Qawam to administer them and collect their taxes as in the past, no conscription, no disarmament; and in addition no opium monopoly. The opium monopoly affects the Arabs more than the Qashqais since many of them are settled cultivators, not pastoral nomads, and their districts are the biggest opium-producing areas in Fars.

A copy of this despatch has been sent to His Majesty's consul-general, Isfahan, and His Majesty's consul, Ahwaz, for information.

I have, &c.

A. W. DAVIS.

Enclosure 2 in No. 55.

Acting-Consul Davis to Sir R. Clive.

(No. 45.)

Sir,

Shiraz, August 3, 1929.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 44 of the 31st July, I have the honour to report that I have since learnt that the Qashqai leader Ali Khan has dismissed his sowars as well as his unmounted men and has left Siyakh, behind the hills just south of Shiraz. He is now at the Qashqai headquarters, Firuzabad. All the Qashqais are with him in their "germair" (winter grazing-grounds), except the three most important and most warlike tribes, the Darashuris, Kashkulis and Shishbulukis, who are in their "sarhad" (summer grazing-grounds) in the Semirun district, west of Qumisheh, on the Isfahan-Shiraz road. Malik Mansur Khan, the Soulet's second son, has gone north with them. The Soulet himself is still in Shiraz.

The fact that the Qashqais are now so widely separated and that their fighting men have been dismissed goes to support my suggestion that they do not mean to fight any more this summer. I learn indeed that they cannot fight on a large scale for some time to come as their supplies of ammunition are very low. They are replenishing them little by little by means of secret purchases in Shiraz and elsewhere. But when Malik Mansur Khan and the Darashuris, Kashkulis and Shishbulukis come down to their winter quarters and join up with the rest of the tribe, things may begin to happen.

As had been anticipated, the release of Soulet-ed-Dowleh and his reappearance in Shiraz have not been regarded with unmixed pleasure by the whole Qashqai tribe. They feel that his four years' enforced sojourn in Tehran has made him unduly timorous, and too ready to respond to the pressure of the Persian Government. They themselves, on the other hand, regard the Persian Government as a poor thing. They say that they asked for a son of Soulet to be given to them, and immediately Malik Mansur Khan was sent. They then asked for the Soulet himself, and the Soulet was also sent. The Government cannot disarm them, cannot make them give conscripts, and this year at least cannot collect taxes from them. In face of such admissions of weakness on the part of the Government, the Qashqais will neglect the peaceful advice of Soulet-ed-Dowleh to follow the warlike counsels of his half-brother Ali Khan. It is reported that Ali Khan had a disagreement with the Soulet at their interview on the 26th July. This is only to be expected. Ali Khan was useful to his half-brother so long as the latter was kept under surveillance in Tehran, but now he is at liberty he has no further use for his ancient enemy, who has in the meantime acquired an influence over the tribe which the Soulet finds inconvenient.

It is reported that a band of Boir Ahmadi outlaws under Mir Mansur, son of Mir Mazkur, who was hanged in Shiraz as a robber four years ago, and grandson of Mir Abbas, has appeared in the Baiza district, where it is collecting supplies and money.

From the Khamzeh Arab tribes there is no further news. Yavar Muhammad Taqi Khan Arab, formerly Military Governor of Behbahan, an ex-officer of South Persian Rifles, who was appointed Governor of Laristan on the 12th June, but was never able to proceed to his post, left with 1,000 troops on the 30th July to go to Fasa. Other troops from Kharameh were ordered to join him. His force is insufficient to drive the Baharlu Arabs out of Fasa, but he is himself an Arab and has considerable influence and reputation with them, and it is doubtless the hope of the Government that he will be able to establish himself by peaceful means and save face by assuring a nominal submission of the Khamseh tribes, however remote a real settlement may be.

I have, &c.

A. W. DAVIS.

[F 4305/163/87]

No. 56.

Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received August 21.)

(No. 424. Confidential.)

Sir,

Tehran, August 10, 1929.

I HAVE the honour to report that the Persian Government are now considering the grant to a group of Persian merchants of a concession giving this group control of the Persian opium market and sole right of export. The two principal firms in this combine are Behbehani and Sons and Kazeruni.

2. While I am informed that strong protests against this proposal have reached the Persian Government from the Persian merchants' community of Isfahan and Shiraz, I have myself been approached by both Messrs. Ziegler and Co. and Messrs. Hadji Ali Akbar and Sons (Limited), who state that their trade will be hard hit should it go through.

3. I have been unable to ascertain the actual terms of the proposed concession. From an article which recently appeared in the newspaper "Iran," and from information which has reached me from other sources, it would, however, appear that the group undertake to export not less than 4,000 chests of opium a year, and to increase that quantity after the first year. The reported price at which they will buy from the cultivator is 16 tomans per batman, which, if correct, cannot possibly prove remunerative to the latter.

4. It is somewhat difficult to approach the Persian Government on this question, since they are, under the terms of the Opium Monopoly Law, at liberty to grant a concession of this kind, and the grounds of protest would seem to arise only if the concession were contrary to the letter or the spirit of the Opium Convention and the policy adopted by the League of Nations.

5. A further point is that the two firms in Behbehani and Kazeruni are well known in the opium world for their smuggling activities. While the grant of such a concession to firms of this reputation can only be surprising, I am advised that the terms of the concession are such that the group can only make profits if they deal largely in the illicit trade. It is interesting to note in this connexion that, as has, I understand, already been reported to you by His Majesty's consul-general at Bushire, a consignment of some 1,900 chests of unlicensed opium was despatched by these two firms in a Chinese steamer from that port on the 27th July; nominal destination, Vladivostok.

6. The usual rumours are afloat as to large sums to be paid to both Taimourtache and to the Shah himself if the concession goes through, and there is no doubt that both His Majesty and the Minister of Court are using strong pressure to bring about this result at an early date. While the possibility of bribery is, of course, by no means to be discarded, I am informed privately that the question has been handled by the group with considerable cleverness, and that they have had no need to bribe. The downfall of Prince Firuz is largely attributed to the discontent caused among the tribes and cultivators of Fars by the actions of the representatives of the Finance Department. Knowing this the group pointed out to His Majesty that, should they receive the concession, all direct touch with the cultivators would be maintained by their own employees, so that the representatives of the Ministry of Finance could remain in the background, and their cause of dissatisfaction would be excluded. His Majesty has, it is said, been much impressed with this idea.

7. At the moment of writing the concession, which has not yet been signed, is being discussed by a committee of the Majlis, who have, it is said, been told pretty plainly by the Minister of Court what decision they are expected to give. I shall not fail to report further on this question, but, as I think it not improbable that you may have been approached by the representatives of the English firms interested in the Persian opium trade, I have thought it advisable to let you have such information as is at my disposal.

Copies of this despatch have been sent to the Government of India, His Majesty's High Commissioner for Iraq, the Governor of the Straits Settlements, Singapore, and His Majesty's consular officers at Bushire, Isfahan and Shiraz.

I have, &c.

R. H. CLIVE.

[E 4084/95/34]

No. 57.

Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received August 19.)

(No. 425.)

Sir,

Tehran, August 10, 1929.

THE tribal situation during the past fortnight has continued to cause anxiety to the Persian Government, though actual military operations have not been extensive.

2. The position in the Shiraz area has been fully dealt with in Mr. Davis's two despatches, Nos. 44 and 45, which are being sent to you under a separate cover. It occurs to me that His Majesty's surprising decision to send Soulet-ed-Dowleh down to his tribe may not have been such an unwise step as was at first imagined; it may be that Reza Shah's knowledge of the Persian character led him to hope that the result of his presence might breed dissension rather than union; if so, the dispute between Ali Khan and Soulet indicates that His Majesty was probably right. However, the Qashqais have certainly not been defeated, nor their arms taken from them. A settlement has yet to be effected.

3. The situation in the Bakhtiari area is not dissimilar. The Persian papers on the 1st August joyfully published a highly-coloured account of a great victory, stating that the tribe had been scattered, the besieged garrison of Safid Dasht fort had been relieved, and that Government troops had penetrated as far as Dehkurd and Chahar Mahall. I have received, however, a very different account of the affair from Mr. Bristow at Isfahan: it is as follows:—

4. A force of Government troops, about 200 in number, were cut off and surrounded in Safid Dasht fort about the 10th July; the commanding officer being Colonel Mohammed Khan, formerly officer commanding troops in Isfahan. On the 17th July the Government troops suffered a further reverse; and measures were even taken to protect the city of Isfahan by machine-gun detachments. The beleaguered garrison of Safid Dasht were for some days rationed from the air. On the 23rd July the German pilots in charge of the aeroplanes reported the fort deserted and its gates open. However, on the 30th July, the colonel appeared in Isfahan to visit his family. He told a good story of having fought his way out of Safid Dasht. It is, however, more probable that the siege on him and his small force was raised owing to the intervention of Samsam-us-Saltaneh and the Amir Mufakham on his behalf. On being questioned as to how it came about that the fort was reported by the aeroplanes to be unoccupied, he replied that the rationing arrangements were not altogether a success; on at least one occasion bombs destined for the Bakhtiaris fell in the fort, and the food fell among the besiegers. He therefore instructed his men to make no sign to the air, and the little force lived on barley soup for a week. Mr. Bristow adds that it is obvious that the Government troops are not conducting operations with energy. Chahar Lang rebels have, however, occupied various villages in the Fereidan district, where they have been collecting taxes and giving receipts, while frequent robberies of cattle and sheep are reported from the Semirum area, including Yazdikhast, Aminabad, and Shahr-Reza (Qumisheh). His Majesty's consul-general also notes the significant fact that since the "Arba'in" celebrations on the 27th July Pahlavi hats have been discarded by the poorer classes with impunity.

5. It appears that the mission of Samsam-us-Saltaneh and Amir Mufakham had some effect. The latter has now been appointed Ilkhani, and Murteza Quli Khan, son of Samsam-us-Saltaneh, Ilbegi. Though the new Ilkhani is too old to be likely to accomplish much, the new Ilbegi is a clever man, and may succeed in bringing the tribe to heel. The previous Ilkhani, Amir Jang, and his brother, the present Minister of War, Sardar As'ad (Ja'far Quli Bakhtiari), are neither of them on good terms with Murteza Quli Khan, but both appointments are generally acceptable to the tribesmen, and Sardar As'ad and his brother are prepared to accept this as being His Majesty's decision.

6. The rebels of the Farsi tribe (one of the sub-divisions of the Khamseh Arabs), under one Sheikh Abu'l Hassan Khan, are still reported to be on the war path in the Kerman district. On the 31st July reports were received that 400 of these rebels were operating near Pur and Dowletabad on the Kerman-Bunder Abbas road. Robberies are also reported from near Baft; a village named Isfandaghi in this neighbourhood being looted on the 1st August.

7. In Tehran a great deal of anti-British propaganda has been manufactured out of the tribal unrest. Two main stories are being circulated: first, that the British caused the tribal rebellions because we were displeased with the Pahlavi régime, which we ourselves had put in power, but which had failed to deliver the goods; and second, that we were backing the rebels in order to force the Persian Government to grant us certain concessions, and the extension of the concessions of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company and the Imperial Bank of Persia. But as the situation improves belief in this propaganda tends to wane.

8. The position of the Government has, however, been considerably shaken and there is a great deal of discontent among the peasants and small proprietors in the Tehran district at present owing to the situation created by the huge surplus of wheat now in the Government "ambar," or store. The Government, anxious to keep the price up, is preventing the sale of the new crop at market rates; in fact, it has for the time being prohibited all sales of wheat. Hence the poor peasant, always in debt, is unable to turn his new crop into cash.

9. Two more officers of high rank have recently been arrested in Tehran: Amir Lashkar Mahmoud Agha Airum, and Sartip Muhammad Hussein Mirza, a brother of Firuz Mirza and son of Farman Farma. Both are accused of embezzlement and peculation, and they are being examined by a military court.

10. In the midst of all these events it is not surprising that a great number of intrigues are on foot; and the position of the Minister of Court, Taimourtache, may not be quite so secure as it was. He naturally has many enemies, who would rejoice at his downfall, and who are certainly waiting on events to see whether an opportunity may not present itself to unseat him. However, I believe he still has the complete confidence of the Shah, and so long as this remains unshaken, his enemies will have great difficulty in removing him, and may themselves suffer if they attempt it.

Copies of this despatch have been sent to the Government of India, His Majesty's High Commissioner for Iraq at Bagdad, and His Majesty's acting consul-general at Bushire.

I have, &c.

R. H. CLIVE.

[E 4085/19/34]

No. 58.

Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received August 19.)

(No. 426.)

Sir,

Gulhek, August 10, 1929.

AS authorised in your telegram No. 226 of the 29th July, I arranged to see the Minister of Court this morning, when I left with him an outline of the proposed general treaty. I have the honour to enclose a copy.

2. I told his Highness that I did not propose to-day to discuss the treaty in detail, but I suggested that we should read through together the articles at present drafted, when I would give such explanations as I could, and he could make such comments as occurred to him.

3. As regards Article 1. I explained that as a concession to the views he had expressed to me last winter, His Majesty's Government had been prepared to include a non-aggression clause. At the same time the clause had been amplified in a reciprocal sense so as to cover the various sheikdoms and rulers on the south side of the Gulf, together with the Kingdom of Iraq. He made no comment except to ask whether this included Bahrein. I said, yes, but we would come to the article on Bahrein later.

4. Article 2. His Highness suggested the addition of a phrase at the end "not less favourable than that accorded to any other Power." I said I imagined this was unnecessary but that I would submit the point to you.

5. Article 3. After reading through this article, his Highness at once objected to the second paragraph. I said the second paragraph merely consecrated in treaty form the arrangements existing to-day. Taimourtache replied that to-day's arrangements were admittedly only temporary, and to include this clause in the treaty would be very wounding to Persian *amour-propre*. I then cited the precedent referred to in the third paragraph of Admiralty letter to Lord Monteagle of the 1st May, in which it is stated that British, French, Belgian and German vessels of

the North Sea Fishery Patrol being regularly employed in that area could call at any port without previous notice. His Highness argued that this evidently was an international arrangement in the mutual interest of four countries and he did not consider this as a precedent for the Persian Gulf. I replied that I did not agree with his contention, and it seemed to me impracticable and cumbersome that every time one of the vessels stationed in the Persian Gulf wished to call at a Persian port a formal request had to be made through this Legation. If this was so, I said, it would be necessary to count at least a week on each occasion before the necessary authority was obtained. I then cited two instances when this would be most inconvenient: (a) in the case of a vessel wishing to oil at Abadan; (b) in case His Majesty's consul-general at Bushire had suddenly, at short notice, to cross the Gulf to somewhere on the Arab side. His Highness replied that as regards oiling at Abadan, he was quite prepared to meet us and to arrange that notification to the local Governor should be sufficient. The latter would be given authority to allow the vessel to oil at Abadan without reference to Tehran. As regards the second case, he pointed out that I had on occasion pressed for urgent permission for an aeroplane to cross Persian territory, and he recalled one occasion on which this permission had been granted and settled within two hours. He was quite prepared to guarantee to me that in urgent cases permission could be as quickly obtained for the visit of warships. It was not, he went on to say, that the Persian Government wished to prevent British warships calling at Persian ports, but it was simply a question of *amour-propre* for the Persian Government not to put into the treaty an arrangement such as that proposed in the second paragraph of article 3 whereby British warships could go in and out of Persian ports whenever they liked and without previous notice. While not accepting his Highness's point of view I said we had better go on with the next article.

5. *Article 4 (Henjam)*. His Highness was inclined to think that to put this long article in its present form into the treaty was too cumbersome and that, at any rate, the greater part of the article could be attached as an annex to the treaty. We then read through the article, and he said that while there were certain things to which he objected as contrary to Persian sovereign rights, he was agreeable in principle to our having reasonable facilities at Henjam. What he particularly objected to were two points in paragraph (e), one, that the British naval authorities should have the right to send and receive sealed bags of postal matter. This, he said, was contrary to international postal conventions and would be criticised in the Majlis, when the treaty came to be submitted, as a definite infringement of Persian sovereign rights. The other point referred to freedom of customs for the goods imported by His Majesty's ships into Henjam. The same objections, he said, applied. On the other hand, he was quite prepared that goods and stores might be kept in bond at Henjam for the use of the navy, and that some means might be found of allowing the small quantity which would actually be required ashore not to pay customs duty. But he was not prepared to state in the treaty the right to customs exemption for these stores. His Highness raised no other specific objections, but I have the impression that he will submit a counter-draft of the article.

6. *Article 5*. With regard to this article, his Highness only remarked that the second paragraph of section (b) seemed rather absurd to include in the treaty and might be omitted.

7. *Article 6*. He made no observations.

8. *Article 7 (Bahrein)*. He at once objected to this as begging the whole question of Bahrein. I said we would not discuss the point now, for in the end we should have to consider the treaty as a whole.

9. *Article 8*. The same would apply to this article.

10. *Article 9*. His Highness said he would like to have something much more definite with regard to lighting and buoying. I said this was all I had been authorised to submit to him, but, as he would see, it left a way open to a discussion of the whole question.

11. *Article 10 (Slavery)*. I told his Highness that His Majesty's Government were not prepared to accept this counter-draft, but, as a concession, if he would accept our original proposal, would be prepared to limit its duration until the year 1936. I said we hoped that before that date arrived the Persian Government might be able to play their part in helping to suppress slavery in the Gulf, and, in the circumstances, I saw nothing wounding to Persian *amour-propre* in our proposal. His Highness hotly contested this, and said that when he had proposed the reciprocal right of search this was merely to save the Persian face, because, as I knew, the Persians had no war vessels of any kind which were in a position to carry out a search. He could not see, therefore, why we should not accept his proposal, which

gave us all we wanted while saving the Persian face. He then went on to say that, under recent legislation, any slave who set foot on Persian soil was automatically a free man. Persia was as much opposed to slavery as His Majesty's Government, and was only too ready to collaborate in its suppression within the limit of her sovereign rights. She could, therefore, never accept any one-sided agreement and would agree to no form of slavery convention except on a basis of absolute reciprocity.

12. We did not discuss any of the other articles, and I am to have another interview with his Highness on the 20th August, when he will have had time to study the present proposals in detail and will, no doubt, submit his own counter-proposals.

13. I told his Highness that I was leaving the draft in its present skeleton form in order that he might see roughly what sort of treaty we had in mind, and that it appeared to His Majesty's Government more convenient to include all these various subjects in one treaty. He did not demur to this, and I said that there might possibly be other articles to be put in later.

14. I am sending a copy of this despatch, with its enclosure, to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India.

I have, &c.
R. H. CLIVE

Enclosure in No. 58.

Projet de Traité.

Sa Majesté le Roi de la Grande-Bretagne, de l'Irlande et des Dominions britanniques au delà des Mers, Empereur des Indes, et Sa Majesté impériale le Shah de Perse,

Désireux de renforcer les relations amicales existant entre eux,

Ont résolu de conclure un traité à cet effet et ont nommé comme leurs plénipotentiaires:

Sa Majesté le Roi de la Grande-Bretagne, de l'Irlande et des Dominions britanniques au delà des Mers, Empereur des Indes:

Pour les Indes:

Sa Majesté impériale le Shah de Perse:

Lesquels, ayant communiqué leurs pleins pouvoirs, trouvés en bonne et due forme, ont convenu comme suit:

ARTICLE 1^{er}.

Il y aura paix perpétuelle et amitié sincère entre les hautes parties contractantes et entre leurs successeurs respectifs.

Chacune des hautes parties contractantes, d'accord avec les obligations lui incombant par suite du Pacte de la Société des Nations et du Traité multilatéral pour la Renonciation de la Guerre, signé à Paris le 27 août 1928, s'engage à respecter l'intégrité territoriale et l'indépendance politique de l'autre haute partie contractante, y compris des territoires pour la défense desquels celle-ci est responsable, et de tout autre Chef d'Etat dont les relations conventionnelles avec cette haute partie contractante à la date de la signature du présent traité ne permettent pas la cession d'un tel territoire à une autre Puissance quelconque.

ARTICLE 2.

Les hautes parties contractantes sont d'accord pour maintenir leurs relations diplomatiques sur un pied de parfaite égalité. Elles conviennent que les représentants diplomatiques de chacune d'elles recevront, sur le territoire de l'autre, le traitement consacré par l'usage et la pratique du droit commun international.

ARTICLE 3.

Sa Majesté impériale le Shah de Perse accordera aux navires de Sa Majesté britannique de la marine royale des Indes, et de la flotte auxiliaire dans les ports et les eaux territoriales persanes, et Sa Majesté britannique accordera aux vaisseaux de guerre persans dans les ports et les eaux territoriales du Royaume-Uni, des Indes et de toutes les colonies britanniques les facilités et les privilèges consacrés par l'usage international habituel, et qui ne doivent être d'aucune façon moins favorables que ceux accordés aux navires de guerre d'une autre Puissance quelconque.

Les hautes parties contractantes conviennent de ne pas insister sur le préavis habituel pour chaque visite rendue aux ports de l'un quelconque des territoires mentionnés au paragraphe précédent par un vaisseau de guerre de l'autre haute partie contractante stationné dans les eaux avoisinantes à ce territoire, pourvu que les noms des vaisseaux de guerre stationnés dans le voisinage aient été récemment communiqués au Gouvernement du territoire intéressé, et que les autorités locales soient prévenues de la visite au plus tôt et autant que possible d'avance.

ARTICLE 4.

(Henjam.)

(A.)

Sa Majesté impériale le Shah de Perse consent à la continuation des facilités spéciales dont Sa Majesté britannique a joui jusqu'à présent dans l'enceinte actuellement marquée sur l'île de Henjam et à cet effet s'accorde à céder à bail ce terrain à Sa Majesté britannique dans les conditions suivantes.

(B.)

La période du bail sera de cinquante ans et les facilités continueront jusqu'à ce qu'elles soient terminées par commun accord entre les deux Souverains.

(C.)

Le but dans lequel Sa Majesté britannique désire la prolongation des facilités spéciales à Henjam étant l'approvisionnement en vivres et en combustible des navires de guerre de Sa Majesté britannique, de la marine royale des Indes, et de la flotte auxiliaire de service dans le golfe Persique et le maintien d'une station télégraphique et radiotélégraphique, Sa Majesté impériale le Shah de Perse est d'accord à ce que, dans l'enceinte spécifiée, Sa Majesté britannique aura le droit de maintenir un dépôt de charbon et de conserver ses facilités actuelles en ce qui concerne les réservoirs de pétrole et la station télégraphique. Sa Majesté impériale le Shah de Perse s'accorde à ce que les autorités britanniques aient le droit de construire les bâtiments nécessaires.

(D.)

Sa Majesté impériale le Shah de Perse s'accorde à ce que les facilités actuelles pour la récréation des marins, dans l'enceinte spécifiée, y compris le terrain de sport et la cantine navale, soient retenues par Sa Majesté britannique.

(E.)

Sa Majesté impériale le Shah de Perse est d'accord à ce que, dans l'enceinte spécifiée, Sa Majesté britannique se charge des arrangements nécessaires pour la protection des biens de Sa Majesté britannique et pour la sanitation dans l'enceinte. Les autorités navales auront le droit de recevoir et d'envoyer des sacs scellés de matière postale. Les importations et les exportations pour les navires de Sa Majesté britannique de la marine royale des Indes et de la flotte auxiliaire, pour la cantine navale et pour les stations télégraphiques et radiotélégraphiques seront à la fois libres de tout contrôle et exemptes de droits de douane et de taxes analogues; mais Sa Majesté britannique s'engage, pour sa part, à ce que toutes autres marchandises importées ou exportées continueront à être assujetties aux droits de douane habituels. Sa Majesté impériale le Shah de Perse acceptera comme témoignage du contenu d'un envoi quelconque un certificat délivré par l'officier responsable et dûment autorisé.

(F.)

Dans l'enceinte spécifiée, aucune taxe, y compris taxe de route, ne sera prélevée.

(G.)

Conformément à l'article 34 de la Convention sanitaire internationale de 1912, les navires de Sa Majesté britannique et de la marine royale des Indes et de la flotte auxiliaire, ayant à bord des médecins, seront dispensés de pratique, pourvu que les autorités compétentes soient informées par radio, pas moins que six heures auparavant, que le navire doit arriver et qu'il est en saine condition dans le sens des conventions sanitaires.

(H.)

Conformément à l'usage international, il sera permis aux équipes des navires de Sa Majesté britannique et de la marine royale indienne et de la flotte auxiliaire de débarquer, de rester dans l'enceinte précitée, et d'embarquer sans être soumis aux formalités de passeport ou d'autres formalités, qu'ils portent ou non l'uniforme.

(I.)

La station à Henjam sera louée à Sa Majesté britannique (représentée par l'Indo-European Telegraph Department), qui pourra s'en servir à condition que tous les frais de maintien soient à la charge de Sa Majesté britannique et que les messages envoyés de temps en temps par Sa Majesté le Shah de Perse soient transmis gratis.

(J.)

Sa Majesté impériale le Shah de Perse donne son assentiment à l'usage libre et sans restriction de la rade entre les îles de Henjam et de Kishm pour le mouillage des navires de Sa Majesté britannique, de la marine royale des Indes et de la flotte auxiliaire.

ARTICLE 5.

(A.)

Sa Majesté britannique s'engage à céder à Sa Majesté impériale le Shah de Perse les droits dont il a joui à Basidu depuis 1820. L'enceinte dans laquelle Sa Majesté britannique a exercé un contrôle pendant cette période a une grandeur d'à peu près un mille anglais carré.

(B.)

Sa Majesté britannique cédera à Sa Majesté impériale le Shah de Perse tous les bâtiments et les ouvrages qui lui appartiennent et qui ont une valeur de 20,000 à 25,000 roupies.

Il est à noter que les villages d'alentour et les dhows persans dépendent pour leur eau des puits situés dans l'enceinte.

(C.)

Sa Majesté impériale le Shah de Perse fera respecter les tombeaux dans les cimetières britanniques à Basidu et entreprend à accorder aux autorités de Sa Majesté britannique toute facilité raisonnable pour en assurer le maintien.

ARTICLE 6.

Sa Majesté britannique cédera définitivement à Sa Majesté impériale le Shah de Perse la poste T.S.F. à Henjam et tous les appareils de radiotélégraphie aux stations de Bouchir et de Lingah à partir de la date de la ratification du présent traité.

ARTICLE 7.

Sa Majesté impériale le Shah de Perse reconnaît l'indépendance des Sheikhs Gouverneurs de Bahreïn et les relations spéciales qui les unient au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique dans le Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et de l'Irlande du Nord et au Gouvernement des Indes.

ARTICLE 8.

Les hautes parties contractantes, dans l'intérêt des relations amicales actuellement si heureusement existant entre elles, sont d'accord pour regarder comme réglées par ces présentes sur la base du *statu quo* actuel toutes questions pendantes quant à la souveraineté sur certaines îles dans le golfe Persique autres que celles mentionnées dans les articles (Henjam, Basidu, Bahreïn) du présent traité. Sont reconnues notamment la souveraineté de Sa Majesté impériale le Shah de Perse sur l'île de Sirri, et la souveraineté des Sheikhs Jowazimi d'Oman sur les îles de Tamb (avec Nabiqu Tamb) et d'Abu Musa.

ARTICLE 9.

Les hautes parties contractantes, convaincues que le maintien de l'unité de contrôle administratif qui existe actuellement en ce qui concerne le service des fanaux et des bouées dans le golfe Persique est désirable dans l'intérêt de la navigation générale, s'accordent pour examiner plus à fond la possibilité de coopérer à cet égard.

ARTICLE 10.

(*Question de l'Esclavage.*)

ARTICLE 11.

(*Question du Chemin de fer Duzdap.*)

Des propositions ont été soumis par la Légation le 17 janvier et le 4 mai.

ARTICLE 12.

(*Réclamations.*)

ARTICLE 13.

(*La Dette.*)

ARTICLE 14.

Les hautes parties contractantes sont d'accord que tout différend qui peut s'élever entre elles quant à l'interprétation ou à l'application des prescriptions du présent traité sera, à défaut d'être résolu par d'autres moyens, à la demande de l'une ou de l'autre des deux parties soumis à l'arbitrage.

ARTICLE 15.

Rien dans le présent traité ne saura en aucune façon préjudicier ni les droits ni les obligations qui incombent aux hautes parties contractantes selon le Pacte de la Société des Nations.

ARTICLE 16.

(*Ratification.*)

Le présent traité sera ratifié et les ratifications échangées à Londres aussitôt que possible. Il entrera en vigueur avec l'échange des ratifications.

En foi de quoi les plénipotentiaires susmentionnés ont signé le présent traité et y ont affixé leurs sceaux.

[E 4086/95/34]

No. 59.

Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received August 19.)

(No. 427.)

Sir,

Tehran, August 10, 1929.

IN the course of an interview with the Minister of Court this morning I informed his Highness that I had received accounts of two conversations which Ala, Persian Minister in Paris, had had in London, one with you, Sir, on the 9th July, as recorded in your despatch No. 350, and one with Mr. Oliphant, of which he sent me a record in a private letter of the 12th July.

2. His Highness said that I had the advantage of him in this matter, as he had received no record as yet of either of these conversations.

3. I said that I had really been astounded by some of the remarks which Ala is reported to have made, especially when he referred in his conversation with Mr. Oliphant to the badness of our relations at the present moment.

4. I said that I had, since I had been here, studied, more or less closely, the state of our relations since the beginning of this century, and undoubtedly there were periods when the state of these relations might almost be said to have been bad; but my own impression was that, in spite of the recent anti-British propaganda arising out of the tribal revolts and the absurd allegations that we had been providing the tribes with arms, our relations had made steady improvement in the last six or seven years, and I should have been inclined to call our relations at the present time friendly and cordial, not merely in Tehran, but also in the provinces, as between our consuls and British subjects in general and the local officials. His Highness at once intervened and said that he entirely agreed with me. In fact, he said that at no time during this century had our general relations been more friendly; he was now perfectly satisfied that we had neither encouraged the tribes nor had we furnished them with arms, if only for the reason that it was not in our interests to do so; but it was, perhaps, hardly realised in London to what extent rumours and vague allegations reached the ears of the Shah. For instance, when Dr. Schaffter was asked to go out from Isfahan to see Ali Mardan Khan, who had really started the recent Bakhtiari trouble, the latter had given it out that Dr. Schaffter had come at my instance in order to encourage the Bakhtiari in their resistance to the Persian Government, and that he had even furnished money for this purpose. In proof Ali Mardan Khan had himself distributed a certain amount of money, which he pretended had been brought by Dr. Schaffter. Everybody knew that Dr. Schaffter had been out there, and they were therefore ready to believe the story of Ali Mardan Khan. Again, he said that one of the geologists of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, meeting, in the course of his journey, some tribesmen, had discussed the present situation in Afghanistan, and was reported to have said that if Reza Shah did not learn wisdom from the fate of Amanullah he would very soon share the fate of Amanullah himself. Taimourtache said he was quite unaware whether this geologist had ever said anything of the sort, but in any case he was reported by these tribesmen to have done so. Again, the Bakhtiari khans, in their original petition to the Government, had requested in the first instance in writing that any settlement should be guaranteed by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, and had later demanded that it should be guaranteed by this Legation. The Bakhtiari khans, he said, did not really wish this; they had put forward these proposals simply to cause trouble and to embarrass the Persian Government. He said he had cited these various reports to show me one way in which this anti-British propaganda had been spread about. Happily, the position now had enormously improved, and all danger of serious trouble was over, but he did not deny the fact that at one moment the position was very precarious; in fact, far more serious than at any time since the present Shah had mounted the throne.

Copies of this despatch have been sent to the Government of India, His Majesty's High Commissioner for Iraq at Bagdad and to all His Majesty's consular officers in Persia.

I have, &c.

R. H. CLIVE.

Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received August 19.)

(No. 430.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of Intelligence Summary No. 16, for the period ending the 10th August, 1929, compiled by His Majesty's military attaché to this Legation.

Tehran, August 11, 1929.

Enclosure in No. 60.

Intelligence Summary No. 16, for the Period ending August 10, 1929.

(Secret.)

Tehran.

1. *Persian Officials.*—Mirza Mehdi Khan Isfandiari, Governor-General of Kerman, has been recalled to Tehran, and Mirza Abul Hassan Khan Pirnia has been appointed in his place. The former either was relieved or resigned, as a charge of bribery was brought against him by the Public Prosecutor.

Mohamed Ali Khan Faruki, late Persian Minister in Angora, leaves Tehran on the 18th August for Geneva, as representative to the League of Nations.

Amir Lashkar Mahmud Khan Airom, until recently G.O.C., Southern Division, and Sartip Mohamed Hussein Mirza, brother of Firuz, and late commanding in Shiraz, have, with certain other persons, been arrested in Tehran on the charge of alleged embezzlement.

2. *Foreigners. French.*—Captain Bertrand, who has been military attaché in the French Legation for nearly six years, and who came here direct from serving in the same capacity in Kabul, is being transferred with effect from the 15th September. He proposes to shortly organise a trip in a large Citroen motor bus from Tunis to Vladivostok, and back by a different route, which he estimates will take about eighteen months.

German.—Thirty Persian students are being sent to Germany to learn railway engineering and other technical work in this line.

The request of Dr. Schniewind, Director-General of Finance, that he should be invested with certain powers necessary for him to undertake his duties, has been refused. He has been informed that he acts only as technical adviser to the Ministry.

Japanese.—It is understood that the Japanese have decided to establish a Legation in Tehran, and that, pending the arrival of a Minister, the present head of the mission will act as Chargé d'Affaires.

3. *Russian Activities.*—It is announced in the local press that the Soviet will allow merchandise from Persia up to a value of 8 million tomans to be exported to Russia on the occasion of the Nijni Novgorod fair to be held this month.

4. *Afghan Affairs.*—Sirdar and ex-King Inayatullah Khan was received in audience by the Shah on the 28th July.

A considerable number of Afghan refugees having arrived in Meshed, the Persian Government have issued certain instructions regarding their stay in Persia.

5. *Hejaz.*—The members of the Hejaz mission to Persia are Sheikh Abdulla Alfazl, Mohamed Abdul Rauf and a secretary. This mission has now arrived in Persia.

6. *Perso-Turkish Frontier Commission.*—This commission commenced work on the frontier at Gorji Bolagh on the 26th July. The Persian members have already been reported. The Turkish delegates are led by Major Mohamed Ibrahim Bey, vice Fazil Bey, resigned, with Moshfik Salami Bey as member, and three officers.

7. *Railways.*—On the 26th July celebrations were held at Ashraf, on the occasion of the completion of the railway line to that place from Bandar-i-Gaz. Ashraf is 25 miles west of the port. It is hoped to have the line completed to Aliabad by the autumn. In the south 86½ kilom. have been laid. It is stated in the press that as soon as the experimental portion of the railway has been constructed, the Government will be in a position to estimate the cost of the entire project, and will then decide on the final alignment.

8. *Telegraphs.*—The line from Bandar-i-Shahpur to Dizful is now constructed and working.

9. *Press.*—The newspaper "Shafagh-i-Surkh" has a leading article vigorously attacking foreign propagandists, who are said to be trying to spoil the reputation of Persia abroad. This article particularly resents any comparison being drawn between Persia and Afghanistan, two nations with entirely different psychology and characteristics, which make it impossible for them to have the same incidents or history.

10. The "Iran," dated the 7th August, has an editorial regarding taxation in Persia. It says that Persia is 300 years behind the civilised world, and unless she increases her State budget she will be unable to cope with present-day civilisation. "We must pay for our freedom, independence, security, education, increase of population, and prevention of disease. We must pay willingly, in order that our deficiencies may gradually be remedied." The article is particularly directed against foreign loans and the resultant commitments. It emphasises the fact that Persians must themselves pay for their progress.

11. *Majlis.*—The Majlis reopened after the summer vacation on the 7th August.

Gilan.

12. *Roads.*—The coastal road between Astara and Pahlavi has now been completed as far as Karganrud, and is open to motor traffic. The remaining portion will also soon be ready, as 400 labourers are employed on this work.

Azerbaijan.

13. *Tabriz.*—On the 8th July severe floods occurred at Tabriz, resulting in the destruction of some of the bazaar, about 2,000 houses, the town water supply, &c. There were many casualties. Villages in the neighbourhood also suffered severely, but crops were not damaged as much as might have been expected.

Khorasan.

14. Prince Amanullah Mirza, G.O.C., Eastern Division, left Meshed for Tehran by air on the 21st July, in response to an urgent summons from the Shah. Sarhang Iraj Khan officiates.

15. Instructions have been received from Tehran for the expulsion from Meshed of all Russians not holding passports. This is the result of the Soviet plan to oust all White Russians from the vicinity of the frontiers. It is probable that many of these will now apply to become Persian subjects.

Persian Baluchistan.

16. Sarhang Murteza Khan has been reposted to Seistan as Frontier Commissioner, and, in addition, he is in charge of arrangements for calling up conscripts.

17. An unconfirmed report states that it is proposed to have "an independent brigade" based on Seistan.

Kurdistan.

18. *Simko.*—The latest news of Simko, the well-known brigand of the Turco-Persian frontier, is that he recently suggested to the Persian Government that he might be pardoned for past offences and be given charge of the area west of Lake Urumia, from Urumia in the south to Khoi in the north. This was, of course, refused, and he remains in Turkish territory, from which he commits occasional acts of brigandage with his few remaining followers.

Fars.

19. The situation in this province has altered considerably for the better. Both the Bakhtiari and Qashqai have been persuaded to cease hostilities. No settlement has, however, been made, but the tribes have just dispersed to their summer grazing grounds, having been granted certain concessions by the Government. A complete report of the revolt will be forwarded separately.

(a.) *Isfahan.*—The very recent news from this area is to the effect that the Bakhtiari have ceased fighting for the time being at least. The garrison of 200 to

300 men, who were beleaguered at Safid Dasht, under the command of Sarhang Mohamed Khan, the original O.C. Troops, Isfahan, have been relieved without opposition. The troops, having relieved Safid Dasht, continued their "victorious march" (unopposed) to Ghaverokh, Deh Khord and Chahar Mahal. The troops were preceded by Samsam-us-Sultaneh, Amir Mufakham, and other peace delegates from Tehran and Isfahan. These appear to have been successful in their negotiations, and the tribesmen are now dispersing. Amir Mufakham has been appointed Ilkhani of the tribe, and Murteza Quli Khan (son of Samsam-us-Sultaneh) as Ilbegi. The latter appointment will be very popular locally.

(b.) *Shiraz*.—There has been no more fighting to report from this area, where the situation is being rapidly restored to normal. On the 13th July a column of 1,000 troops, including pack artillery and machine guns, left Shiraz for Kazerun, and having met with no opposition, they repaired the road *en route*, relieved the garrison, and returned safely to Shiraz on the 28th July. Amnieh posts are being re-established on the Shiraz-Bushire road, and this is now open to traffic. The bridges at Kunar Takhteh and Daliki have been repaired and the telegraph line restored. To the north of Shiraz the bridge at Pul-i-Khan (28th mile) has been mended. It was here that forty soldiers were killed by rebels on the 6th June and their fort burnt. A new watch-tower has been constructed on the hill overlooking the bridge.

(c.) *Kerman*.—Occasional robberies and isolated cases of brigandage continue by the Khamseh Arabs in the area to the west of Kerman. These tribesmen are reported to be very good fighters, but have not yet come up against the troops. A column left Shiraz for Niriz on the 29th July to open the Shiraz-Kerman road. A little raiding may continue in this area, but the situation gives no cause for anxiety.

P. C. R. DODD, Major,
Military Attaché.

Tehran, August 10, 1929.

[E 4121/99/34]

No. 61.

Captain Fletcher to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received August 20.)

(No. 12. Secret.)
Sir,

Mohammerah, July 27, 1929.

I HAVE the honour to forward, for your information, a copy of my despatch No. 73 of to-day's date, addressed to His Majesty's consul for Khuzistan, Ahwaz, regarding Bolshevik activities in Abadan and Mohammerah.

I have, &c.

E. W. FLETCHER,
Acting Vice-Consul.

Enclosure in No. 61.

Captain Fletcher to His Majesty's Consul for Khuzistan.

(No. 73. Secret.)
Sir,

Mohammerah, July 27, 1929.

BOLSHEVIK activities in Abadan and Mohammerah.

General Situation.

I have the honour to report that, except for a demonstration held some days ago by the women relatives of certain deportees, nothing of note has occurred. These women came from Abadan to Mohammerah, where they assembled at the telegraph office and despatched a telegram to the Shah, after which they proceeded to the Shah's statue, where they prayed and wept. Twelve of the principal demonstrators were arrested. In this connexion a wealthy Iraqi contractor, Sheikh Mehdi by name, was also arrested and deported to Iraq without trial, but there is reason to believe that his arrest was really due to private enmity between himself and the Persian chief of police at Abadan.

There have been various rumours of impending trouble planned for to-day, the 40th day of Moharram, when, it is said, processions will be taken out in the streets. The troops are taking all precautions, and so far nothing has occurred.

On the 20th June Mirza Jalal went to Bushire to visit Muvaqqar, who arrived there by aeroplane from Tehran on the 12th June. The Governor of Mohammerah appears to think that Muvaqqar may be removed from the Majlis, and, in any event, his Deputyship will terminate in eight months' time. It is said that Muvaqqar is secretly working for the Royalists against the present Government, but it is difficult to ascertain the truth of this statement.

Meetings are still being held by the leaders of the Busheri element in the house of Mirza Ismail, son-in-law of Muvaqqar. At a recent meeting there was much discussion as to the best means of helping the Russians in their commercial and political designs against the British. The local chief of police is said to be aware of these meetings. He is, however, secretly favourably inclined towards the Russians and the Busheris, and at one of these meetings his munshi was present. Mirza Hassan Khan Kafqazi is, as usual, extremely active, and is the medium by which the Russian, M. Michail, communicates with Muvaqqar's party.

Russian Propaganda.

The Busheris are now helping to disseminate Russian propaganda. Among other typical lies, they state that the British Government having ruined Afghanistan, is inciting them to attack Russia, and is, of course, helping the rebel Persian tribes with arms and ammunition in order to ruin Persia.

It is reported that the Russian consul, Ahwaz, has advised the Iraqi subjects who are without passports and who are now afraid of being imprisoned under the new Persian law, to become Persian subjects, when he will help them in the future in any way he can. There is no doubt that the Russians are now making great efforts to attract the Iraqi Jews to their side. Unfortunately, the Persian authorities seem afraid to deport the most undesirable of these Jews, and even when the undesirable in question is without a passport and has refused to go to Basra to obtain one, and even in spite of repeated requests on my part for his removal and my assurance that the individual is wanted by the Iraqi police.

Local Authorities.

The activities of the secret police sent down from Tehran appear to me to be definitely aimed at proving that the recent troubles here were engineered by the A.P.O.C. and myself, with the object of providing an opportunity for landing British forces. One of these secret police himself, who was formerly employed by the A.P.O.C., volunteered some interesting information. While discounting the greater part of his statement, it seems fairly definite that rewards have been offered for incriminating [*sic*] correspondence from the consulate or the A.P.O.C. relating to the recent troubles, and I have reason to believe that the Persian farrashes of the consulate were approached on the subject. Great efforts are also being made to discover and threaten all persons giving information to the A.P.O.C. or to myself.

The attitude of the Persian authorities appears to be favourable to the Russians. It is said that they hope that the Russian propaganda will destroy the affection and respect of the Arab tribes for the British in Khuzistan. After this has been accomplished, they hope to be able to deal adequately with the Russians themselves. This thing is borne out by the consistent refusal of the local authorities to take definite steps either against the real ringleaders of the recent troubles or against undesirable Iraqis known to be working for the Russians, and would also explain the anti-British attitude of the local chiefs of police at Mohammerah and Abadan, an attitude which latterly has become much more pronounced.

Copies of this despatch are being forwarded to the Foreign Office, London; Minister, Tehran; Resident, Bushire; High Commissioner, Bagdad; and Air Officer Commanding, Bagdad.

I have, &c.

E. W. FLETCHER,
Acting Vice-Consul.

[E 4166/58/34]

No. 62.

Colonial Office to Foreign Office.—(Received August 22.)

Sir,

Colonial Office, August 21, 1929.

WITH reference to the letter from this Department of the 28th March, I am directed by Lord Passfield to transmit to you, to be laid before Mr. Secretary Henderson, copies of a despatch from the High Commissioner for Iraq, and of a letter to the Admiralty regarding the survey carried out by the Director of the Port of Basra of the Persian and Iraq coast lines in the estuary of the Shatt-el-Arab.

2. Lord Passfield would be glad to be furnished, in due course, with any observations Mr. Henderson may have to make and with his views as to the reply to be returned to paragraph 6 of Sir Gilbert Clayton's despatch.

3. Copies of this correspondence have been sent to the India Office and Air Ministry.

I am, &c.

O. G. R. WILLIAMS.

Enclosure 1 in No. 62.

Sir G. Clayton to Lord Passfield.

(Secret A.)

My Lord,

Bagdad, July 22, 1929.

I HAVE the honour to invite a reference to Mr. Amery's despatch Secret A, dated the 28th March, 1929, regarding the Perso-Iraq frontier in the estuary of the Shatt-al-Arab.

2. In accordance with the requirements set out in that despatch, the Director of the Port of Basra has carried out a survey of the Persian and Iraq coast lines at low-water spring tides. The work has been impeded by climatic conditions and the plotting of the Bahmanshir entrance is still in progress, but although the survey is therefore not entirely complete, the results already obtained provide the evidence required for examination of the immediate problem. The results of the survey are shown in a special survey chart, dated the 7th July, 1929, which I am forwarding to your Lordship separately by air mail.

3. The position revealed by the survey is unexpected and two important facts have emerged. The first is that practically the whole area of the Abdullah (Iraq) and the Abadan (Persia) flats are dry at low-water spring tides. As is shown clearly on the chart, these flats have a definite low-water line and do not dry in patches only. This is at variance with the assumption generally taken up in the correspondence which accompanied Mr. Amery's despatch under reply. Under the definition contained in paragraph 3 of Foreign Office letter, dated the 14th March, 1929, i.e., that the base-line for the determination of the limit of territorial waters is the line of mean low-water spring tides, the flats are to be regarded as territory. The suggestion that the whole of the Rooka Channel is in the open sea must, it appears to me, be abandoned.

4. The second point is that the survey shows that both the Abdullah and the Abadan flats have shifted considerably from the positions in which they were charted in the cutting from Admiralty Chart No. 1235, which accompanied the despatch under reply. The Abdullah flat (which, according to the previous paragraph, may be regarded as Iraq territory) has extended almost into the main stream and nearer the Rooka Channel, whereas the Persian territory—the Abadan flat—has receded from the Rooka Channel. Three-mile radii drawn from the extremity of the dry area of each of the two flats as now charted meet one another about half-way up the channel, and the channel itself is roughly about equi-distant from the two land extremities throughout its length. As to the precise territorial and geographical conclusions to be drawn from the data now available, I do not feel qualified to give an opinion. Both the Persian Government and the Iraq Government would appear to have equal rights to control the channel, and the complex problems and difficulties which arise thereby could only be solved satisfactorily by the appointment of the proposed International Conservancy Board to control the navigation of the Shatt-al-Arab and the Rooka Channel.

5. I forward with this despatch a copy of a brief report* by the Port Director containing a historical summary of the changes which have occurred in the estuary, from which he draws the conclusion that the course of the stream is veering and will in all probability be finally diverted to the Rooka Channel itself. I am sending to your Lordship with the new survey chart a copy of the charts†: (1) Plan No. 5; (2) Admiralty Chart No. 1253; and (3) plan showing dredged channel, referred to by Colonel Ward in his report.

6. I have not communicated the results of the survey or any of the information contained in the report or this despatch to the Iraq Government, and I request that your Lordship will inform me in due course of the information which I should communicate to them to supplement the particulars contained in my letter of the 9th April, 1929, to the Prime Minister, stating that His Britannic Majesty's Government required further information before reaching an opinion as to the position of the Rooka Channel. I forwarded a copy of this letter with my secret despatch dated the 10th April, 1929.

7. In sending forward the new survey, I would bring to your notice the fact that it represents 660 miles of soundings carried out as an urgent measure, with respite. The climatic conditions were hot and unpleasant, and the officers concerned were heavily handicapped by a series of severe and heavy dust-storms. I have informed the Port Director that I consider that the rapid accomplishment of the task reflects great credit upon the officers concerned.

I have, &c.

GILBERT CLAYTON,

High Commissioner for Iraq.

Enclosure 2 in No. 62.

Colonial Office to Admiralty.

Sir,

Colonial Office, August 21, 1929.

WITH reference to the letter from this Department of the 28th March, I am directed by Lord Passfield to transmit to you, to be laid before the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, a copy of a despatch from the High Commissioner for Iraq‡ regarding the survey carried out by the Director of the Port of Basra of the Persian and Iraq coast lines in the estuary of the Shatt-el-Arab, together with a copy of a letter which has been addressed to the Foreign Office on the subject.§

2. Lord Passfield would be glad if their Lordships would arrange for the charts forwarded with the enclosed despatch to be reproduced and for copies to be forwarded to this Department and the Foreign Office. He would also be glad to be furnished in due course with any observations that their Lordships may have to make.

3. The Secretary of State proposes, subject to their Lordships' concurrence, to request Sir Gilbert Clayton to convey to the Port Director of Basra an expression of the appreciation of His Majesty's Government of the manner in which, and the speed with which, the survey has been carried out.

4. Copies of this correspondence have been sent to the India Office and Air Ministry.

I have, &c.

O. G. R. WILLIAMS.

* Not printed.
† Enclosure 1.

‡ Not reproduced.
§ No. 62.

[E 4168/58/34]

No. 63.

Sir R. Clive (No. 52) to High Commissioner, Bagdad.—(Repeated to Foreign Office; Received August 22.)

(No. 297.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Tehran, August 22, 1929.

PLEASE see Foreign Office telegram No. 99 to me of 9th March and subsequent correspondence, including your telegram No. 46 to me of 26th March: Shatt-el-Arab. Minister of Court asked me on 20th August when this question would be discussed.

I said as it was a matter for discussion in Bagdad I presumed Persian Minister would raise the question. He said he would send him instructions to do so. He added that Persian Government counted on the goodwill of His Majesty's Government in this matter, and he hoped the negotiations in question would proceed simultaneously with our own, although he admitted they were quite separate.

[E 4196/19/34]

No. 64.

Sir R. Clive (No. 162) to Government of India.—(Repeated to Foreign Office; Received August 24.)

(No. 299.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, August 24, 1929.

MY telegram No. 294.

I am sending by bag on 26th August detailed report of my discussion on 20th August of draft treaty. I do not propose to telegraph gist of this conversation, which on the whole was not unsatisfactory except in the matter of claims, unless you instruct me.

Minister at present asks for absurd compensation in settlement of Bahrein question.

[E 4303/33/91]

No. 65.

Sir R. Clive to Government of India (Foreign Department).—(Repeated to Foreign Office; Received August 29.)

(No. 301.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Tehran, August 28, 1929.

YOUR telegram No. 132 T: Bahreinis.

I had already written 15th August to Minister of Court requesting him to restrain zeal of local officials, more especially as we were discussing Bahrein in connexion with treaty.

Yesterday I read him following telegram of 26th August from consul at Ahwaz:—

“Vice-consul at Mohammerah informs me that local authorities are now forcing Bahreinis to sign document stating that they accept Persian nationality willingly.”

His Highness promised immediately to telegraph to stop this, but said that Persian Government could not admit right of British consuls to protect Bahreinis in Persia until question of Bahrein was settled. In Persia Bahreinis would continue to be considered as Persian subjects, and he referred to protest enclosed in my despatch No. 21 regarding passport question. I said as he knew views of my Government on this point I would not discuss this, but I asked him to have instructions sent to Persian Gulf ports to leave Bahreinis alone and not ask them to register as Persian subjects.

Without definitely promising, he left me under the impression that local authorities would be told not to create trouble over Bahreinis pending result of our negotiations.

(Repeated to Bushire, No. 12, and Ahwaz, No. 27.)

[E 4414/96/34]

No. 66.

Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received September 2.)

(No. 310.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, September 2, 1929.

DJEM, the present Minister of Public Works, has been appointed Governor-General of Khorassan, a post which he has already held, and the present head of the Tehran Municipality, General Karim Agha, has been appointed Minister of Public Works in his place. This appointment is generally interpreted as indicating (1) rebuff to Minister of Court, with whom he has always been on bad terms, (2) determination of Shah to put through railway scheme, as general has for some years past been one of Shah's most intimate friends.

Both last two Ministers of Public Works have been very lukewarm about the railway.

The present chief of police and the new Minister of Public Works are both doing their utmost to undermine the position of the Minister of Court, but it is as yet too early to judge what the effect of the new appointment will be on the latter's position.

(Repeated to India.)

[E 4420/4420/34]

No. 67.

Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received September 3.)

(No. 438.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of despatch No. 60 from His Majesty's consul, Tabriz, dated the 13th August, 1929, on the subject of floods at Tabriz.

Tehran, August 22, 1929.

Enclosure in No. 67.

Consul Gilliat-Smith to Sir R. Clive.

(No. 60.)

Sir,

Tabriz, August 13, 1929.

I HAVE the honour to report that on the afternoon of the 11th instant a storm similar to that of the 8th July burst to the south-east of Tabriz. Very little rain fell in the town itself, and no hail, and the advent of the flood which ensued would have been a complete surprise had not guns been fired by way of warning.

2. The damage done on this occasion is said to be even greater than on the 8th July. The flood revisited the houses of the former sufferers, completing their ruin. It also attacked the prosperous and hitherto immune Maralan quarter, carrying away cut corn, causing houses to fall in, destroying standing crops and, owing to the drift of sharp-edged stones, slicing off the bark of fruit-trees. The fruit itself was undamaged, as no hail and little rain fell in the orchards, but it is doubtful whether many of the trees will bear fruit again. The casualties in the town are said to be heavier than on the former occasion, but reliable data are not yet to hand. The Khiaban, which is a part of the Tehran Chaussee, had been partly repaired since the 8th July. It is entirely wiped out now in many places, and for several miles at the entrance to the town it has been converted into a deep ravine, strewn with millstones and with boulders larger than the millstones.

3. Since the first disaster no attempt has been made to construct dykes or even to repair the American Missionaries Dyke, and it may safely be predicted that the next disaster will be on an even larger scale.

I have, &c.

B. GILLIAT-SMITH.

Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received September 2.)

(No. 439. Confidential.)

Sir,

Gulhek, August 21, 1929.

IN my despatch No. 426 of the 10th August I had the honour to enclose the outline of the proposed general treaty as communicated by me to the Minister of Court.

2. I now beg leave to enclose copy of a letter dated the 20th August which I have received from His Highness, and in which he gives his views on the general question of the treaty and each article in particular.

3. You will observe that in the fourth paragraph of the letter His Highness draws attention to four points which, in his opinion, require to be settled, either as a part of the treaty or separately. The first of these relates to the question of income-tax payable by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company to His Majesty's Government and the Persian claim to part of that tax as set forth in the Minister of Court's letter of the 6th April last, which was enclosed in my despatch No. 193 of the 6th April. At an interview which I had with His Highness yesterday afternoon I told him that I had so far received no reply to this despatch, but the question was doubtless under consideration by the Treasury. He said that if His Majesty's Government were unwilling to refund to Persia a part of this tax the Persian Government would probably themselves impose an income-tax on the company's operations in Persia which, combined with the English income-tax payable, would be a very heavy burden to the company. I made no comment on this beyond saying that I would inform you of what His Highness had said.

4. With regard to the question of telegraphs, I told him that the matter was a complicated one and that I was not in a position as yet to make any definite proposals to His Highness, and I trusted that he would agree to leave this matter for the time being in abeyance. This he agreed to do.

5. I enquired what he meant by his reference to the question of the Shatt-el-Arab in connexion with our present treaty negotiations. He replied that although this had nothing to do with the actual treaty, yet he was mindful of the assurance which I had given on behalf of His Majesty's Government that a reasonable arrangement, agreeable to the Persian Government, would, if possible, be made in regard to this question and that he hoped that the negotiation of this arrangement, even if it did not take place in Tehran but Bagdad, might proceed, *pari passu*, with our negotiations. I said that it appeared to me that it was for the Persian representative in Bagdad to raise the question with the Iraq Government as it had been definitely agreed that the negotiations would take place in Bagdad. He said he would telegraph to the Persian Minister to do so.

6. It is interesting, and I consider satisfactory, that His Highness should state that the successful result of the negotiations between himself and the Anglo-Persian Oil Company must depend on the goodwill and support of His Majesty's Government. I have always considered, as I told Sir John Cadman last spring, that it was advisable, both from our point of view and from his, that the Persian Government should realise that His Majesty's Government had a definite interest in his negotiations, and that a satisfactory settlement was more probable if it coincided with the conclusion of our general treaty in order that both might be submitted simultaneously for the ratification of the Majlis. Taimourtache clearly realises that His Majesty's Government, as the biggest shareholder in the company and with her large political interests in Persia, must be favourable to any agreement that is to be made between the Persian Government and the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. His Highness showed me a letter which he had that morning received from Mr. Greenhouse stating that one of the directors of the company would arrive in Tehran in September to continue negotiations, as Sir John Cadman was unavoidably prevented from coming out on that date although he was prepared to come out again later if necessary.

7. The point made by His Highness in the fifth paragraph of his letter appears to be reasonable. While the treaty of friendship may, it is hoped, be perpetual, the Persian Government can hardly be expected to include in such a treaty articles of a limited duration. His idea is that such articles, while possibly being referred to in the general treaty, should form protocols to the treaty.

8. In the sixth paragraph His Highness enquires what is the position of the Dominions in regard to this treaty. I told him yesterday that the treaty, in accordance with the preamble, was to be made on behalf of His Majesty's Government in Great Britain and the Government of India, but that I presumed that the first sentence of article 1 of the treaty, in which it is stated that there shall be perpetual peace and sincere friendship between the high contracting parties and their successors, would, so far as we were concerned, include all British subjects whether they lived in England, India or any of the British Dominions. He said that, if that was correct, he saw no particular necessity, so far as Persia was concerned, for the adherence of the individual Dominions.

9. You will observe that His Highness suggests an alternative to the second paragraph of article 1. I shall be glad to learn whether you consider that this proposal is considered sufficiently comprehensive. It is certainly both shorter and simpler than the wording of the draft.

10. I told His Highness that it seemed to me that the point raised in paragraph 8 of his letter was unnecessary, and that even should either of the high contracting parties cease to be a member of the League of Nations the engagement would remain in force. If this were your view, he replied, he was quite satisfied.

11. We then came to article 3, and, as foreshadowed in my despatch No. 426, His Highness, as will be seen from his letter, flatly refuses to agree to the second paragraph; in fact, he is only prepared to include this article up to the words "consacré par l'usage international habituel," although he has no objection to the most-favoured-nation treatment, provided this is of limited duration. This could, if necessary, he said, be mentioned in a protocol.

12. His Highness then proceeded to amplify the remarks made in paragraphs 11 to 15 of his letter on the subject of equal rights, perfect reciprocity, &c. He insisted that he had no wish to limit the activities of His Majesty's ships in the Gulf, they were always welcome in Persian ports when they wished to come; but they must ask permission to do so in accordance with international usage. He said that he was prepared to go as far as possible to meet us; for instance, ships wishing to oil at Abadan would be allowed to call there without reference to Tehran, as the Governor would be authorised to give the necessary permission. Similarly, in the case of Bushire, should the Resident (he was always referred to throughout the conversation as His Majesty's consul-general) urgently require to be transported across the Gulf by one of His Majesty's ships, he was prepared to arrange that the Governor should be authorised in exceptional cases to give permission for one of His Majesty's ships to call without reference to Tehran, but no reference to this could be made in the treaty.

13. As I am convinced that His Highness will not give way on this point, I am inclined to suggest that I might be authorised to propose to His Highness an exchange of notes on the subject, wherein the Persian Government will give me an assurance that the Governors of Bushire and Abadan—and any other port that you may consider necessary—would be authorised in urgent cases to give immediate sanction to the visit of one of His Majesty's ships without reference to Tehran.

14. You will observe that the Minister of Court has submitted a counter-draft regarding Henjam in the form of a brief article in the treaty with an additional protocol. After discussing the matter with His Highness yesterday, I consider that he is being far more amenable over this question than was anticipated last autumn during the meetings of the Persian Gulf Sub-Committee. There are four main points on which his draft differs from ours: (a) He offers twenty years' lease instead of fifty; (b) he refuses the postal facilities, as I anticipated; (c) he requires a certificate to be handed to the quarantine officer at Henjam in every case; (d) he asks for a sum to be fixed by mutual agreement in payment of the lease.

15. Regarding (a), I asked him why he suggested twenty years. He said fifty years was too long, and he remembered that we had suggested twenty years' continuation of most-favoured-nation treatment in the draft commercial treaty, and therefore he himself suggested twenty years for the lease. I did not discuss the matter further, but said that I should refer the matter to you. I anticipate that we should have little difficulty in getting a twenty-five years' lease, and it might be possible to get thirty. (b) He said he could not possibly agree to the free receipt and despatch of sealed postal matter at Henjam, as this was contrary to the International Postal Convention. I said that what we proposed was only a practical measure for the convenience of His Majesty's ships. The post office at Henjam was, I imagined, a very small affair, and I doubted whether it would be capable of

dealing adequately with perhaps some thousands of letters at a time arriving for the officers and crews of His Majesty's ships. His Highness replied that he was quite prepared to agree to any reasonable suggestion, provided it was not contrary to the International Postal Regulations, but the mail must pass through the post office; for instance, all the letters for any one ship might be put into one bag at Karachi addressed to the commanding officer. It was for us to suggest any practical method which could be justified in the Majlis. (c) Quarantine. He proposed, I said, that a countersigned certificate should be handed to the quarantine officer, and if he was not there that after an hour's delay the certificate might be handed to the customs officer. I said that this hour's delay seemed to me absurd and unnecessary, and he finally agreed that it would be sufficient if the certificate was handed in as soon as the ship arrived at the quarantine office, whether the quarantine officer was there or not. (d) Regarding the amount to be paid for the lease, I was unable to extract anything definite from His Highness. I asked if he merely meant a nominal rental. He said, in a certain sense, yes; the Persian Government did not want to make money out of it. Eventually, I had the impression that if some such rent as £1,000 sterling was offered, that might be acceptable; on the other hand, whatever rent it is eventually agreed to pay will probably form part of the general financial settlement come to under the treaty.

16. Regarding Basidu, His Highness also submits a counter-draft. I objected to this on two grounds: (a) Because no mention was made of the buildings we were handing over free; and (b) because the right for a British authority to see that the cemetery was kept up was not given. He said that he was quite prepared to add a reference to the property ceded and to agree to a visit once or, if necessary, twice a year of a British authority to see to the upkeep of the cemetery.

17. We next came to one of the most contentious articles in the treaty, namely, the question of Bahrein. I said to His Highness that I understood from his letter that the Persians were asking in return for withdrawing their shadowy claim to Bahrein (a) that we should wipe out the Persian debt; (b) that we should provide them with no less than ten gunboats; (c) that His Majesty's Government should make themselves responsible for British claims. I enquired if His Highness was serious in making these proposals, to which he replied that I had not included all the proposals he had in mind, because he also intended to include the debt owed by the Persian Government to the Indo-European Telegraph Department.

18. I decided at once to say nothing about the discretionary authority I had to give up the £1,510,000 of debt in return for a satisfactory all-round settlement. I took the line rather of deriding his proposals as exaggerated and absurd. I enquired if His Highness had followed in the telegrams the course of recent events at The Hague. If so, he would have noticed that the present Chancellor of the Exchequer was a very careful guardian of the British taxpayers' money, and that he could hardly imagine that Mr. Snowden would be prepared to agree to a sum of money, which could be hardly less than 3 million sterling, being paid over to the Persian Government in order to settle the sovereignty of an island when, if the question were submitted to arbitration, we considered that our claim would almost certainly be acknowledged. As His Highness said in his letter, there were two ways of settling the question of Bahrein, either by arbitration or by friendly agreement. I understood he preferred friendly agreement. He interrupted to say that he most certainly did and that he had not the smallest desire for arbitration. I then left the question of finance and attempted to elicit what His Highness had in mind when in paragraph 22 of his letter he suggests that His Majesty's Government should provide Persia with some ten gunboats. This part of our conversation I have recorded in a separate despatch.

19. In paragraph 23 of his letter Taimourtache speaks of the Persian Government having the right to appoint their "representative" in Bahrein to protect Persian interests. I explained to him that there could be no question of appointing a Persian consul. The Sheikh of Bahrein would not hear of foreign consuls. Bahrein was a small island, and once one country appointed a consul, half a dozen others might wish to do the same, the Americans to protect their missionaries, the Germans to look after the occasional German ship that might call there, and so on. His Highness replied that it was precisely because he realised that there might be difficulties about a consul that he had used the word "representative." He went on to speak of the importance of the Persian colony, of the Persian school, &c. I said that there were always apt to be unfortunate differences between the Sunni and the Shiah inhabitants of the island and that it was much best to leave it to the Political Resident to keep the peace. Finally, he reduced his demand to one of the leading

members of the colony being authorised to speak on their behalf, and though he did not employ the word "agent," his request practically amounted to a sort of unofficial agent. I should be glad to learn whether it would be possible to meet his wishes in this modified form.

Tamb and Abu Musa (article 8).

20. I said that the attitude he adopted about these islands (see paragraph 27 of his letter) was quite unreasonable, and, although we might sympathise with his fears that the islands should become depots for the contraband trade, we could not admit Persian claim to sovereignty.

21. At this point our conversation had lasted nearly four hours and I took my leave. Taimourtache may very likely accompany the Shah on a short trip to the mountains at the end of the week, but I shall hope to resume the conversation at an early date.

22. With regard to paragraphs 29 and 30 of his letter, I should be glad to learn what reply I may give to His Highness on the question of a "small conference" of the interested parties to discuss the question of lighting and buoying in the Gulf. You will observe that he at present declines to include in the treaty any article on the subject, his contention being that the lighting and buoying of the Persian coast is a purely Persian obligation, but that he is willing to discuss the matter with a view to a uniform system being adopted.

23. In paragraphs 31 and 32 of his letter he declines to recede from the attitude he had previously adopted on the question of slavery, in spite of the arguments contained in your telegram No. 109 of the 15th April, which I had already at my last interview put to him as forcibly as I could (see paragraph 11 of my despatch No. 426 of the 10th August). In this connexion I beg leave to refer you to paragraph 10 of my despatch No. 440 of the 21st August.

24. Taimourtache has never taken the smallest interest in the question of the Duzdap Railway, as is shown by paragraph 33 of his letter. I propose to raise the question at our next interview.

25. The question of claims (paragraphs 34 and 35 of his letter) I am dealing with in a separate despatch.

26. I should be glad to learn your views on His Highness's counter-proposal to article 14—arbitration—as given in paragraphs 37–39 of his letter.

27. The supplementary article suggested in paragraph 40 would appear to be an afterthought in order to justify a tax on the Anglo-Persian Oil Company in the event of His Majesty's Government being unwilling to meet him on the question of income-tax, which is referred to in paragraph 3 of this despatch.

28. I hope I may be favoured with your views on Taimourtache's letter as explained above at as early a date as possible.

A copy of this despatch, with enclosure, has been sent to the Government of India.

I have, &c.
R. H. CLIVE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 68.

Taimourtache to Sir R. Clive.

Mon cher Ministre,

Téhéran, le 20 août 1929.

J'ai bien examiné le projet de traité que vous avez bien voulu me soumettre le 10 août courant.

2. Je crois que, si nous maintenions toutes les questions mentionnées dans le projet, le traité serait surchargé. A mon sens, il est préférable de régler les questions dont la réglementation demande des détails (telles que Henjam, esclavage, &c.) par les protocoles annexés au traité.

3. Il y a des questions qui ne peuvent figurer ni dans le traité ni dans les protocoles.

4. Je veux, en outre, attirer l'attention de votre Excellence sur ce point qu'il reste encore quelques questions à régler entre nous, telles que la question de la double imposition (que j'ai soumise à votre Excellence dans ma lettre du 6 avril 1929), la question des contestations télégraphiques (concernant lesquelles votre Excellence me soumet une proposition par sa lettre du 12 juillet écoulé; mais cette proposition demande à être discutée et, une fois acceptée par les deux parties, doit être insérée quelque part), et peut-être d'autres questions qui, toutes en restant des questions séparées, ont pour nous un intérêt considérable et dont la solution dépendrait sûrement du concours du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique (telles que la question de Chatt-el-Arab, nos négociations avec l'A.P.O.C., &c.).

5. En outre, les engagements contractés pour un certain nombre de questions doivent avoir une durée déterminée.

6. En plus, j'ai à prier votre Excellence de vouloir bien me dire à quelles parties de l'Empire de Sa Majesté britannique ce traité s'appliquerait et quelle serait la modalité de l'adhésion des Dominions à ce traité.

7. Également dans l'article 1^{er} du traité il s'agit des territoires pour la défense desquels Sa Majesté britannique est responsable et des chefs d'État dont les relations conventionnelles à la date de la signature du présent traité ne permettent pas la cession d'un tel territoire à une autre Puissance quelconque. Or, pourriez-vous me dire quels sont ces territoires et quels sont ces chefs d'État? N'est-il pas préférable de biffer dans cet article à partir de "pour la défense . . ." jusqu'à la fin de l'article et remplacer cette partie par: "y compris les territoires sous administration, protection ou mandat de celle-ci."

8. Au commencement du paragraphe 2 de l'article 1^{er}, où il s'agit des obligations de la haute partie contractante en vertu du Pacte de la Société des Nations, il est évident que cette obligation ne peut rester en force tant que les parties sont respectivement membres de la Société des Nations.

9. Pour l'article 2 il n'y a pas d'objection.

10. L'article 3 ne peut pas, à mon avis, figurer dans un traité perpétuel, car les avantages du traitement de la nation la plus favorisée doivent être soumis à un délai. N'est-il pas préférable de régler la question des bateaux de guerre par un protocole, même faisant corps au traité, si vous voulez, où l'on pourrait donner plus de régularité à la question?

11. Quant à l'article même:

(1.) Voudriez-vous m'expliquer la signification de la "flotte auxiliaire"?

(2.) Je préférerais voir employé le même terme de "navire" ou "vaisseaux" pour les deux parties, étant donné que je proposerai d'ajouter après "les colonies britanniques" et avant "les facilités": "tant que lesdits navires (ou vaisseaux) des deux hautes parties contractantes se conforment aux lois et règlements en vigueur dans ces ports et territoires."

(3.) Quant au paragraphe 2 de l'article 3, c'est-à-dire "Les hautes parties contractantes conviennent . . ." jusqu'à la fin de l'article, il est absolument inacceptable pour nous. J'ai eu l'honneur d'expliquer longuement les raisons de cette impossibilité. J'ai eu l'occasion de parler à votre Excellence du désir du Gouvernement persan d'avoir des relations d'une parfaite cordialité avec le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique, de resserrer de plus en plus les liens d'amitié, de l'estime mutuel et de la communauté d'intérêts qui, espérons, lient et doivent lier les deux pays.

12. Cet état d'esprit dominait toujours nos négociations. Je me permets de citer à votre Excellence un passage de ma lettre du 10 mai 1928: "... Vous savez que nous tous souhaitons de continuer à resserrer de plus en plus les liens de relations cordiales avec la Grande-Bretagne, nous voulons créer un champ de collaboration entre les deux pays, nous désirons qu'une confiance mutuelle puisse exister entre les deux États."

13. "Pour arriver à ce but, la Perse d'aujourd'hui espère voir ses relations avec l'Empire britannique établies sur de nouvelles bases: l'égalité de droits, la communauté d'intérêts, la reconnaissance de ses légitimes aspirations . . ."

14. Les ressortissants britanniques sur le territoire persan, les bateaux marchands et de guerre britanniques dans les eaux territoriales et ports persans, qui sont également territoire persan, rencontreront toujours les facilités nécessaires et l'accueil amical. Votre Excellence m'a parlé de la possibilité du retard des autorisations à accorder. Pour éviter ce retard supposé, pour les cas que les bateaux de guerre auront à s'approvisionner de combustible ou, par suite d'une avarie, seront obligés d'entrer dans

les ports persans, il y a moyen de trouver une formule satisfaisante. Ce point de vue assuré, quelle serait la raison de ne pas appliquer aux eaux territoriales et ports persans les mêmes dispositions généralement pratiquées par et à l'égard de tous les pays? Pourquoi ne pas considérer la Perse comme n'importe quel autre pays? Nous vous prions de nous accorder les mêmes droits et employer à notre égard le même procédé que vous pratiquez pour entrer dans les ports de tout autre pays étranger.

15. À mon sens, chaque bateau de guerre, pour obtenir le droit d'entrer dans le port d'un pays étranger, doit se soumettre aux règlements en force dans ce port qui sont conformes à la pratique internationale. Cette idée doit être formulée dans l'accord concernant les bateaux de guerre. En plus et pour éliminer tout élément de souci, on pourrait, peut-être, ajouter: "Il reste entendu que les formalités de l'admission des vaisseaux de guerre de l'une des hautes parties contractantes dans les ports de l'autre haute partie contractante, dans le but de s'approvisionner de combustible ou par suite d'une avarie subie, doivent s'effectuer de telle façon qu'une perte de temps inutile soit évitée."

16. Les détails de la question de Henjam, c'est-à-dire les conditions du bail d'une enceinte, sortent absolument des cadres d'un traité. On pourrait, peut-être, se contenter d'un article et renvoyer les détails au protocole annexé au traité.

On pourrait dire, par exemple:

Article 4.—Sa Majesté impériale le Schah de Perse et Sa Majesté britannique se mettent d'accord pour la question du bail de Henjam conformément aux dispositions du protocole annexé à ce traité.

Quant au protocole, je me permets de vous soumettre ci-joint un projet y relatif.

17. Pour Bassidou (Ba-Saidou) je considère qu'un seul article suffirait, la mention du prix 20 à 25 mille roupies et la dépendance des dhows (?) persans des puits de l'enceinte ainsi que la grandeur de l'enceinte n'ayant aucune importance pour figurer au traité.

L'article suivant me paraît amplement suffisant:

Article.—Sa Majesté britannique cède à Sa Majesté impériale le Schah de Perse tous les droits qu'elle avait sur Bassidou. Sa Majesté impériale le Schah consent à charger ses autorités de respecter et de maintenir les tombeaux dans les cimetières britanniques de Bassidou.

18. Pour l'article 6 il n'y a rien à dire.

19. Par l'article 7 vous tranchez à notre préjudice une des grosses questions entre nous.

20. Nous considérons que Bahreïn appartient à l'Empire persan. Vous prétendez le contraire. Nous avons fait des échanges de notes à cet effet.

21. Je rappelle également à votre Excellence notre entretien à ce sujet, qu'une fois les droits persans sur Bahreïn reconnus, il y a toujours possibilité de s'entendre là-dessus. Vous voulez l'indépendance de Bahreïn et la reconnaissance des droits du Cheikh de Bahreïn parce que vous avez signé un traité avec lui. C'est précisément ce droit de conclure un traité qui est contesté par nous.

22. Il faut que cette question soit tranchée ou par la décision d'une autorité reconnue qualifiée par vous et nous ou par une entente. Nous sommes prêts pour les deux solutions. Si vous préférez vous entendre avec nous, nous sommes prêts de reconnaître l'indépendance de Bahreïn et les droits souverains du cheikh. Mais nous devons recevoir des compensations justes pour cette perte. Les îles parsemées dans le golfe Persique, en premier lieu, et les pays côtiers arabes du golfe, en second lieu, servent comme bases de contrebande et repaires des contrebandiers opérant contre nous. Si nous avions la possibilité de prendre possession de Bahreïn et d'autres îles, telles que Tombes, Abou-Moussa, &c., notre lutte contre la contrebande du sucre, du thé des armes, de l'opium, du tabac serait beaucoup plus efficace. Nous serions tout à fait justifiés, si nous demandions parmi d'autres compensations, en échange de l'indépendance de Bahreïn, quelques petites unités navales, par exemple six petits bateaux neufs de 200 tonnes et quatre de 1000 tonnes, pour pouvoir lutter contre la contrebande et policer nos eaux territoriales.

23. Nous avons également une assez grande colonie à Bahreïn (disons entre parenthèses qu'elle y est très mal traitée depuis quelque temps), nous ne pouvons rester indifférents à leurs sort et intérêts. Nos ressortissants doivent avoir le droit de s'y livrer au commerce et à l'industrie; et le Gouvernement impérial doit avoir le droit d'y nommer son représentant pour protéger les intérêts de ses ressortissants.

24. En plus, en échange des pertes territoriales, il est juste que la Perse reçoive les compensations en espèce. Malgré que la Perse n'a pas de grandes dettes à rembourser au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique et qu'une partie de ces dettes qui demande à être approuvée par le Medjliss a été dépensée dans les intérêts britanniques pendant la guerre, néanmoins, on pourrait, peut-être, fixer les limites des compensations en espèce à ce que le Gouvernement persan doit au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique, au Gouvernement des Indes et aux sujets britanniques du chef des réclamations, après la reconnaissance de la justesse de ces réclamations.

25. Il est évident que dans le traité il n'y aurait pas une liaison apparente entre la question de Bahrein et les questions susmentionnées, mais nous devons savoir confidentiellement qu'une relation étroite existe entre toutes ces questions.

26. Ce point de vue expliqué et sous réserve de l'acceptation des points susmentionnés, la rédaction de l'article concernant Bahrein serait la suivante :

Article 7.—Sa Majesté impériale le Schah de Perse et Sa Majesté britannique se mettent d'accord pour reconnaître l'indépendance de Bahrein et les droits souverains du Cheikh régnant. Sa Majesté impériale le Schah de Perse aura le droit d'y nommer son représentant pour protéger les intérêts de ses sujets y résidant. Ces derniers auront la faculté de s'y livrer au commerce et à l'industrie dans les conditions accordées à la nation la plus favorisée.

27. Quant à l'article 8 du projet du traité, les îles de Tomb (avec Nabique Tomb) et Abou-Moussa appartenant incontestablement à la Perse, nous tenons à ce que nous puissions nous-mêmes imposer notre autorité à ces parties de l'Empire. Il est donc inutile de parler dans le traité de *statu quo* actuel quant à la souveraineté sur certaines îles dans le golfe, de Tomb et Abou-Moussa. Surtout l'île de Tomb avec Nabique Tomb a une importance tellement considérable pour nous qu'elle ne peut pas être détachée du territoire persan.

28. L'île de Sirri, dans laquelle depuis très longtemps un poste de douane existe, ne peut pas figurer parmi les territoires contestés.

29. L'article 9 soulève une question qui ne peut pas figurer dans un traité de l'espèce du présent et que je considérerais d'après nos négociations comme réglée. En effet, il serait difficile de contester notre droit de vouloir nous charger du service des fanaux et des bouées dans nos ports et eaux territoriales. Je me souviens qu'au cours de notre conversation du 7 janvier écoulé, je vous avais dit qu'en ce qui concerne les phares, balises, bouées et autres ouvrages de la sorte, destinés à assurer la sécurité de la navigation sur nos côtes, le Gouvernement impérial entendait les avoir entre ses mains et en assurer par ses propres moyens le fonctionnement. Au surplus, reconnaissant la justesse de votre point de vue sur l'utilité qu'il y aurait à unifier le système de l'éclairage et de la signalisation des côtes, et de balisage en général, j'ai suggéré la réunion d'une conférence des représentants des États intéressés pour que chaque État intéressé puisse prendre à sa charge et mettre dans toute la mesure du possible en application sur son propre territoire et dans ses eaux les mesures adoptées.

30. Pour arriver à ce but, la solution la plus simple serait de convoquer une petite conférence des représentants des pays intéressés, d'y discuter la question et adopter les mesures générales applicables dans tous les ports et aux eaux territoriales desdits pays. On pourra s'entendre sur la date et le programme de la conférence par un simple échange de notes.

31. Quant à l'article 10, le Gouvernement impérial de Perse ayant à charge de lutter par tous ses moyens contre l'esclavage et, selon la loi du pays, la simple arrivée dans les eaux territoriales et sur le territoire persan rendant libre tout esclave et les autorités gouvernementales ayant à charge de poursuivre et punir sévèrement tout coupable de l'attentat à la liberté individuelle, le Gouvernement impérial de Perse continuera à maintenir sur son territoire l'abolition de l'esclavage et la répression de la traite des esclaves sans les obligations contractuelles. Néanmoins, vu que la Convention de Genève du 25 septembre 1926, relative à l'esclavage, prévoit, et recommande dans son article 3 de faire les arrangements particuliers, nous n'avons pas d'objection de prendre les dispositions bilatérales contre l'esclavage. Dans ce cas, on pourrait mettre un article dans le traité disant : "Sa Majesté impériale le Schah de Perse et Sa Majesté britannique, préoccupées d'affermir l'abolition de l'esclavage dans toutes ses formes, réalisée sur leurs territoires respectifs, et de contribuer à la répression de la traite des esclaves sur terre et sur mer par tous les moyens en leur pouvoir, en particulier, par l'établissement d'une coopération effective entre eux dans la haute mer ;

"Constatant au surplus que la Convention anglo-persane sur la Suppression de la Traite des Esclaves de mars 1882 est devenue caduque et de nul effet, ont résolu de régler cette question conformément au protocole y relatif annexé au présent traité."

32. Le projet que j'ai eu l'honneur d'envoyer à votre Excellence à cet effet, par ma lettre du 13 janvier écoulé, pourra devenir le protocole en question.

33. Pour la question du Chemin de Fer de Duzdab, soulevé par l'article 11 du projet, je n'ai pas encore un point de vue arrêté ; je considère que ce n'est pas une question importante pour être réglée par un traité, surtout que je doute beaucoup de l'utilité de ce chemin de fer dans son état et sa portée actuels.

34. L'article 12 concernant les réclamations devrait être rédigé (voir question de Bahrein) dans ce sens que les deux hautes parties contractantes considèrent inutile de donner suite aux réclamations et le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique prend à sa charge de les liquider par ses propres moyens.

35. Si votre Gouvernement n'est pas d'accord avec cette solution, alors il est inutile de parler des réclamations dans le traité, étant donné que ces réclamations doivent être en premier lieu vérifiées et reconnues par le Gouvernement impérial, et c'est seulement après leur reconnaissance que nous devons nous entendre sur la modalité de leur liquidation. Or, nous n'avons pas encore fini avec la première étape de la question.

36. La teneur de l'article 13 (dette) devrait être considérée de la même façon que l'article précédent.

37. Pour l'article 14 je n'ai rien à dire sur le principe. Seulement, je voudrais bien élargir et compléter l'article.

38. D'abord, pourquoi nous restreindre à l'interprétation ou à l'application des prescriptions du présent traité pour régler les différends par l'arbitrage ?

Les deux pays étant membres de la Société des Nations, pourquoi n'adopterions-nous pas un des modèles de conventions bilatérales de conciliation, d'arbitrage et de règlement judiciaire recommandés par la Société des Nations ?

39. N'y a-t-il pas moyen de donner au moins à l'article la rédaction suivante :

Article 14. Les hautes parties contractantes sont d'accord que les différends de toute nature, sauf ceux dont l'objet, d'après la législation intérieure de l'une des parties, relève de la compétence de ses autorités judiciaires ou administratives, qui viendraient à s'élever entre elles et qui n'auraient pu être résolus par la voie diplomatique, à la demande de l'une ou de l'autre partie, seront soumis à l'arbitrage. Pour régler la procédure arbitrale une convention spéciale sera conclue entre les hautes parties contractantes.

40. On pourrait, peut-être, ajouter à ce traité ou plutôt au traité de commerce et de navigation, un article supplémentaire, tel que :

Article .—Les hautes parties contractantes se mettent d'accord que chacune d'elles perçoit l'impôt afférent à la partie des revenus produits sur son territoire par les entreprises ayant des établissements stables dans les deux États, à l'exception des entreprises de navigation maritime et aérienne.

41. Si votre Excellence voulait discuter mes points de vue exposés dans cette lettre, je serais toujours à sa disposition.

Veuillez, &c.

TEYMOURTACHE.

Enclosure 2 in No. 68.

Protocole relatif à Henjam.

ARTICLE 1^{er}.

SA Majesté impériale le Schah de Perse consent à donner à bail à Sa Majesté britannique une enceinte (dont les limites sont déterminées par la carte annexée) dans son île de Henjam.

ARTICLE 2.

La durée du bail sera de vingt ans et il peut être renouvelé pour une autre période à déterminer si les deux souverains se mettent d'accord.

[20533]

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ARTICLE 3.

Le but dans lequel Sa Majesté britannique désire avoir un bail sur l'enceinte spécifiée dans l'île de Henjam étant l'approvisionnement en vivres et en combustible de ses vaisseaux de guerre et de la Marine royale des Indes, Sa Majesté impériale le Schah de Perse est d'accord à ce que dans ladite enceinte, Sa Majesté britannique ait le droit de maintenir un dépôt de charbon, les réservoirs de pétrole, une station de T.S.F., le terrain de sport pour la récréation des marins et la cantine navale.

Sa Majesté impériale le Schah de Perse consent à ce que les autorités de Sa Majesté britannique aient le droit de construire les bâtiments nécessaires relatifs aux buts susmentionnés.

La sanitation dans l'enceinte susmentionnée est à la charge des autorités de Sa Majesté britannique.

ARTICLE 4.

Sa Majesté impériale le Schah de Perse consent que pendant la durée du présent bail le combustible, les vivres importés dans l'enceinte par les bateaux de guerre de Sa Majesté britannique et de la Marine royale des Indes pour leurs propres besoins, soit la partie consommée dans l'enceinte, soit la partie mise en dépôt sous la surveillance des autorités douanières de Sa Majesté impériale le Schah, ainsi que le matériel nécessaire pour les constructions des bâtiments et pour le fonctionnement de la station de T.S.F. soient exempts des droits de douane et de taxe de route. Il reste entendu que l'exportation des dépôts mentionnés est également exempte des droits de douane et de taxe de route. Pour chaque importation de ce caractère un certificat sera délivré au préalable par l'officier responsable et dûment autorisé. Toutes autres importations ou exportations à l'effet des besoins de l'enceinte resteront assujetties aux droits et taxes en vigueur.

Les vaisseaux et les autorités de Sa Majesté britannique s'abstiendront de faire les importations à destination de la partie de Henjam qui n'entre pas dans l'enceinte ou d'une autre partie quelconque de la Perse.

La même abstention sera observée pour exportation par ladite enceinte.

Les importations et les exportations en général de l'enceinte resteront soumises aux règlements de Perse quant aux prohibitions et restrictions.

ARTICLE 5.

Conformément à l'usage international, il sera permis aux équipes des navires de Sa Majesté britannique et de la Marine royale des Indes de se débarquer, rester dans l'enceinte précitée et de s'embarquer sans être soumis aux formalités de passeport, qu'ils portent ou non l'uniforme.

ARTICLE 6.

L'enceinte spécifiée restant soumise aux lois et règlements de l'Empire persan, il reste entendu que les bateaux de guerre et d'autres autorités de Sa Majesté britannique en dehors des facilités accordées en vertu de ce protocole et qui sont limitées par les limites de l'enceinte spécifiée, se conformeront strictement auxdits lois et règlements.

ARTICLE 7.

L'Empire de Perse étant signataire de la Convention sanitaire internationale du 17 janvier 1912, l'Empire britannique étant signataire de ladite convention et de la Convention sanitaire internationale du 21 juin 1926; Sa Majesté impériale le Schah de Perse et Sa Majesté britannique se mettent d'accord que dans les limites de leurs engagements respectifs en vertu desdites conventions, leurs prescriptions seront appliquées aux bateaux de guerre de Sa Majesté britannique de la Marine royale des Indes.

Toutefois, pour faciliter l'arrivée desdits bateaux à l'enceinte de Henjam, les deux hautes parties contractantes conviennent qu'à l'arrivée de ces bateaux de guerre, qui doit avoir lieu aux heures régulières, le médecin du bord délivrera un certificat contresigné par le commandant du navire, attestant que les conditions sanitaires du navire sont bonnes et qu'il n'y a eu à bord, depuis le départ, ni cas de peste, de choléra, de fièvre jaune, de typhus exanthématique ou de variole, ni une mortalité insolite des rats.

Un fonctionnaire du service de santé sera présent au débarcadère pour recevoir ledit certificat. Si pendant une heure après l'arrivée du bateau de guerre le fonctionnaire du service de santé ne se présente pas pour opérer cette réception, un officier du bord portera ce certificat audit fonctionnaire et, si ce dernier n'est pas présent à son poste, l'officier remettra le certificat en question au fonctionnaire de la douane et, aucun débarquement ne pouvant avoir lieu avant la remise dudit certificat, dès ce moment l'équipage peut descendre à terre.

ARTICLE 8.

Sa Majesté impériale le Schah de Perse consent à louer à Sa Majesté britannique la station de T.S.F. de Henjam, qui servira strictement pour les besoins des bateaux de guerre de Sa Majesté britannique et de la Marine royale des Indes. Les autorités de Sa Majesté impériale le Schah de Perse peuvent également se servir de cette station, payant la taxe de transmission en usage en Perse.

Les frais de maintien de ladite station sont à la charge de Sa Majesté britannique.

A l'expiration du présent bail une station de T.S.F. remplissant les conditions techniques de ce temps et d'une puissance . . . en bon état de fonctionnement sera livrée aux autorités de Sa Majesté impériale le Schah.

ARTICLE 9.

Sa Majesté impériale le Schah de Perse donne son assentiment à l'usage libre de la rade accostant l'enceinte de Henjam pour le mouillage des bateaux de guerre de Sa Majesté britannique et de la Marine royale des Indes. Il reste entendu qu'aucun bateau ne peut rester en stationnement permanent dans cette rade et que le délai de mouillage accordé à chaque bateau ne doit pas dépasser sept jours.

ARTICLE 10.

En échange du bail de l'enceinte de Henjam, de l'usage de la station de T.S.F., du droit de mouillage dans la rade de l'enceinte et des facilités accordées, Sa Majesté britannique consent à payer aux autorités de Sa Majesté impériale le Schah un loyer annuel de . . .

ARTICLE 11.

A l'expiration du présent bail tous les bâtiments et installations se trouvant dans l'enceinte de Henjam reviendront gratuitement aux autorités de Sa Majesté impériale le Schah.

[E 4421/1016/34]

No. 69.

Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received September 3).

(No. 440. Very Confidential.)
Sir,

Tehran, August 21, 1929.

WITH reference to paragraphs 17 and 18 of my despatch No. 439 of the 21st August, I have the honour to record my conversation with the Minister of Court on the subject of his proposal that His Majesty's Government should, as one of the conditions of Persia renouncing her claim to Bahrein, provide the Persian Government gratis with a number of small vessels (four of 1,000 tons and six of 200) in order to police her waters and deal with the contraband traffic.

2. I said that if, for the sake of argument, His Majesty's Government were prepared to present Persia with ten vessels such as he proposed, how did the Persian Government propose to man these vessels? So far as I was aware, not only could they not provide officers but they could not provide crews. While I did not profess to know anything about naval matters, I imagined that before a British officer was put in command of a gunboat of 1,000 tons he would have had to have some ten years' service; this added to five years' training at a naval college would make fifteen years. Again, I asked what about the Italian gunboats which I understood had been ordered and the contracts which had been made with Italian naval officers? His Highness said that the Italian gunboats *had not* yet been definitely ordered, and that there would be

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no difficulty about the Italian naval officers. Speaking personally (i.e., he had not submitted this to His Majesty or to the Council of Ministers), what he would like would be for British officers to command these vessels and for His Majesty's Government to agree to train in England a number of young Persians so that in time they might be competent to take them over. I showed no enthusiasm for this proposal; instead, I pointed out some of the difficulties in the way. I said, for instance, that, so far as I understood, no British officers and no British crews were kept in a bad climate like the Persian Gulf for more than two years. The Persian Gulf was notoriously one of the worst climates in the world. Supposing, however, that British officers were allowed to volunteer for service in the Persian Gulf, they would almost certainly not be prepared to stay for more than two years and would quite certainly require a very much higher rate of pay than they would receive in the British navy. I added that I felt very doubtful whether any Persian could ever be trained as a naval officer. Practically the only Persians who had ever seen the sea or knew anything about it were the Persianised Arabs who lived on the Persian shore of the Gulf. It was no doubt possible that crews might eventually be trained from this element, but I could not see where the officers were to come from. It was notorious that Persians from the plateau when sent for service to Khuzistan or Persian Gulf ports at once complained of the damp heat and only counted the days until they could be relieved.

3. His Highness did not deny this, but said that about twenty young Persians were at present being trained at the Italian naval school at Leghorn. He refused to take such a pessimistic view of the possibility of eventually creating a small Persian marine service.

4. To return, however, to the question of British officers, he was convinced that Great Britain alone, with her outstanding knowledge of the Persian Gulf and the finest navy in the world, could help Persia in her difficulties in putting down the contraband trade.

5. He was prepared to recognise that Great Britain must always be the first Power in the Persian Gulf. Persia was content with second place, but she wished and intended to establish her right to that second place and to have her territorial waters respected. Persia fully recognised all that Great Britain had done in the Gulf, and that without our controlling hand Muscat, Koweit, &c., would be infesting the Gulf with pirates, and that the traffic in arms and slaves would be general. He did not for a moment wish to contest our claim to control the southern shores of the Gulf. At the same time he wished for the aid and assistance which we alone could give to Persia.

6. I thanked him for this expression of confidence and, without holding out the slightest hope that his proposals would be favourably considered, said that I would refer them to you.

7. Now, putting aside the many practical difficulties in the way of meeting his Highness in this matter, I venture with the greatest diffidence to submit for consideration the following suggestion:—

8. His Majesty's Government, having reluctantly expressed their willingness, in return for a satisfactory all-round settlement, to forgo £1,510,000 of the agreed debt of £2,000,000, the latter might be reduced to £1,000,000, while out of the remaining £510,000 a small fleet of contraband chasers might be provided. The Admiralty would doubtless know the type of vessel most suitable for this purpose, and whether, supposing the objections to Taimourtache's proposal were not insuperable, either British officers could be seconded for service under the Persian Government, or whether ex-British naval officers would be likely to volunteer for this service.

9. There is one objection which occurred to me but which I naturally did not mention to the Minister of Court. As His Majesty's Government and the Government of India have long-standing and intimate relations with the Arab sheikhs and chiefs on the southern shores of the Gulf, and as His Majesty's ships constantly visit and maintain relations with these sheikhs, it might, it seems to me, be embarrassing should Persian vessels commanded by British officers in the course of their duties come into conflict with dhows belonging to these sheikhs and possibly capture them or cause loss of life. However, on this point the Government of India, the Resident in the Persian Gulf and the senior naval officer are far more competent to offer an opinion than I am.

10. Finally, it appears to me to be a question of policy for serious consideration as to whether it would be wise to adopt a completely *non possumus* attitude. On the

one hand, the Persians are notoriously the most ungrateful of people for services rendered to them, and the fate of foreign missions to Persia in the past one hundred years provides a sorry story. On the other hand, might not a Persian naval preventive service under British command afford a possible solution of the slave trade question and render an agreement on the lines proposed by His Majesty's Government unnecessary, while minimising the danger of accepting the Minister of Court's counter-proposal? Again, assuming that the relations between His Majesty's ships and the Persian vessels under British officers would be of the most friendly description, might not this proposal tend to simplify other questions in the Gulf as between His Majesty's Government and the Persian Government?

11. I beg that you will understand that I am not recommending the proposal and that the above remarks are tentative and only submitted in order to assist a consideration of the question in all its bearings.

A copy of this despatch has been sent to the Government of India.

I have, &c.

R. H. CLIVE.

August 24, 1929.

P.S.—Since writing the above my attention was drawn to an article in the "Shafagh-i-Surkh," a Persian paper, whose editor, Dashti, has to my knowledge very intimate relations with the Minister of Court. I accordingly wrote a personal letter to his Highness enclosing this article, and this morning received his reply. I enclose copies of this correspondence, from which it will be seen that the Persian Government are definitely not pledged to purchase the Italian boats.

R. H. C.

Enclosure 1 in No. 69.

Sir R. Clive to Taimourtache.

Mon cher Ami,

Téhéran, le 22 août 1929.

ON m'a attiré l'attention à l'article ci-inclus du "Shafagh-i-Surkh" du 21 août.

J'ai pensé à notre conversation du 20 août, dont j'envoie au Foreign Office un compte rendu. J'ai compris de notre conversation que le Gouvernement n'avait pas actuellement commandé ces bateaux en Italie et qu'aucune décision n'avait pas encore été prise. Est-ce que j'ai bien compris?

R. H. CLIVE.

Enclosure 2 in No. 69.

Extract from the "Shafagh-i-Surkh" of August 21, 1929.

SINCE some time ago the Government had in view to form a navigation department in the Persian Gulf first and then in other Persian ports with a view to prevent smuggling. It was for this purpose that Major De jeune [sic] and Captain Delbrateau [sic], the Italian experts, were engaged in the Government's service. We learn now that the above-mentioned experts have submitted certain schemes and proposals to the Government for approval. Eight boats which were ordered from Italy to be built have now been completed and will be sent [sail] for the Persian Gulf. In view of the fact that the boats will soon reach the Persian Gulf the Government is now considering the establishment of an Admiralty, and preliminary arrangements for this purpose are being made. A naval squadron will for the time being be established.

Enclosure 3 in No. 69.

Taimourtache to Sir R. Clive.

Mon cher Ami,

Téhéran, le 23 août 1929.

EN réponse à votre lettre d'hier concernant l'article du "Shafagh-i-Surkh" et les bateaux commandés en Italie, je m'empresse de vous informer que le "Shafagh-i-Surkh" ne représente aucune opinion gouvernementale; il écrit probablement sur ses suppositions,

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d'ailleurs logiques, de la nécessité de donner une suite aux plans conçus et réaliser ce qui est considéré nécessaire. Seulement, il confond les plans et les projets et la réalisation de ces projets.

Vous m'avez très bien compris: jusqu'à présent il n'y a aucun engagement contractuel pour la réalisation des décisions prises à cet effet.

Très cordialement à vous,
TEYMOURTACHE.

[E 4422/58/34]

No. 70

Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received September 3.)

(No. 441.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of despatch No. 211 from His Majesty's Minister, Gulhek, dated the 24th August, on the subject of police patrols in the Shatt-el-Arab.

Gulhek, August 24, 1929.

Enclosure in No. 70.

Sir R. Clive to Sir G. Clayton (Bagdad).

(No. 211.)

Sir,

Gulhek, August 24, 1929.

I HAVE the honour to report to you that the Administrator-General of Customs, in the course of a recent conversation with a member of my staff, made the following observations on the subject of police patrols in the Shatt-el-Arab.

2. M. Dekerekheer stated that before the departure of M. Samiyee for Iraq he had himself proposed to the Minister of Court that an early arrangement be advocated for the free police and preventive patrolling of the Shatt-el-Arab on the water by the services of both Iraq and Persia in order to assist the Customs on both sides of the river to prevent smuggling. He pointed out that in waters like the Shatt-el-Arab it often happened that pursuit could not be continued far enough when smuggling was going on, and provided the preventive services restrained their energies to action on the water nothing but good could come of such an arrangement.

3. A copy of this despatch is being sent to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs for information.

I have, &c.
R. H. CLIVE.

[E 4424/95/34]

No. 71.

Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received September 3.)

(No. 444.)

Sir,

Tehran, August 24, 1929.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith a copy of a despatch, No. 52 of the 21st instant, in which the acting-consul at Shiraz gives an interesting description of present conditions in Fars.

2. It will be seen that, in spite of optimistic accounts published by Government sources in Tehran, the tribal unrest in Fars is not settled, but for the moment dormant. Meanwhile an alarming increase of brigandage and lawlessness seems to be taking place.

3. The Indo-European Telegraph Department's representative in Shiraz thinks that the Darashuris and the Kashkulis, both important branches of the Qashqai tribe, are already coming south from their summer quarters, with the view of forcing an issue with the Government at a time when they know that the Government's forces in the Shiraz area are depleted, first by troops sent to Isfahan, and second by the 1,500 men sent to Fasa to control the Arab tribes.

4. As regards Bakhtiari, I have no definite information of any value. Persistent rumours reach me of an alliance between Sardar Fatih, his brother-in-law Sartip Khan Kuhgalu, leader of the Boir Ahmadi Lurs (mentioned in paragraph 4 of Mr. Davis's despatch), and Ali Mardan Khan of the Chahar Langs.

Copies of this despatch and enclosure have been sent to the Government of India, His Majesty's High Commissioner for Iraq, Bagdad, and His Majesty's Acting Consul-General at Bushire.

I have, &c.
R. H. CLIVE.

Enclosure in No. 71.

Acting Consul Davis to Sir R. Clive.

(No. 52.)

Sir,

Shiraz, August 21, 1929.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 50 of the 14th August, 1929, I have the honour to report that the situation in Fars has remained unchanged during the past week. Soulet-ed-Dowleh was in Shiraz until the 19th August, when it was reported that he had left for Fathabad, a village situated about 28 miles south-south-east of Shiraz in the District of Kavar. The purpose of his journey is not known, as Fathabad belongs to the Qawam-ul-Mulk and is not in Qashqai territory. Perhaps the Soulet is exerting his influence there on behalf of Yavar Muhammad Taqi Khan Arab, who is still in Fasa. Abdul Husain Khan, leader of the Baharlu rebels, came in from Darab to Fasa, lunched with Yavar Muhammad Taqi Khan, and afterwards returned to Darab to bring Amir Aga Khan Baharlu to discuss terms of settlement in Fasa. It is reported that Yavar Muhammad Taqi Khan is comporting himself with great tact and discretion.

2. The past week has, however, brought forth a notable increase of insecurity on the Bushire-Shiraz road. On the morning of the 12th August Kamarij was attacked by armed men from Banu and Dalleh villages, who killed four inhabitants of Kamarij and carried off three flocks of sheep. On the morning of the 15th August unknown robbers attacked a caravan and three motor lorries coming from Bushire about 7 miles south of Konnar Takhteh, at the foot of the Malu pass, and carried off about 300 tomans in cash, two bales of merchandise, and the rifle of an Amnieh guard who was in one of the cars. On the 16th August it was reported that a caravan of donkeys bringing firewood to Shiraz from Khauch Zinian was attacked about 8 miles out of Shiraz and fifteen donkeys carried off. On the 16th August robbers captured and drove away a herd of sheep at the Rudak pass, but the Amnieh and other armed men pursued them and after fighting recovered the animals. The same day about noon some donkeys loaded with dates were carried off at the same spot. On the night of the 16th-17th August a motor lorry was attacked near Borazjun and a few bales of merchandise, with fifteen tomans in money, were stolen. On the evening of the 17th August two motor lorries coming from Bushire were attacked 5 miles south of Daliki. One armed guard was seriously wounded, and the robbers got away with some 150 tomans in cash and such goods as were useful to them. On the morning of the 18th August seven donkeys and a mule with loads of tea and loaf sugar were carried off by robbers near Ja'farijin, 3 miles from Konnar Takhteh, but the Amnieh pursued them and after much fighting recovered the seven donkeys with their loads.

3. On the Shiraz-Isfahan road fewer robberies have occurred; but on the morning of the 15th August at 6 o'clock 200 mounted robbers, probably Boir Ahmadi Lurs, attacked the Amnieh post at Ab-barik, 12 miles north of Shiraz. One Amnieh man was killed and a second severely wounded. The robbers got away with the rifles and ammunition of the Amnieh guard.

4. In the 5th paragraph of my despatch No. 45 of the 3rd August I reported that a band of Boir Ahmadi Lurs was ravaging the Baiza district and levying supplies and money from the villages there. It is now reported that a band of Boir Ahmadis under Sartip Khan have occupied Ardakan as well as Baiza, and have set fire to the harvest in many villages. On the 16th August this band called on the village of Gayun (or Jayun) for supplies, which the villagers, who had been given arms by the military authorities, refused to deliver up. They took refuge in a small fort and repelled the attacks of the Boir Ahmadi Lurs until late in the afternoon, when their cartridges ran out. The Lurs, exasperated by their

losses, said to have amounted to thirteen killed and many wounded, rushed the village and massacred the inhabitants, men, women and children, with horrible atrocities. Sartip Khan, their leader, was in prison for six months at Shiraz, but was released last summer and sent with the troops to Mamasanni to negotiate with Imam Quli Khan, the Mamasanni leader. Instead, he joined the rebels, and has since been operating on his own account.

5. A copy of this despatch has been sent to His Majesty's consul-general, Isfahan, and His Majesty's consul, Ahwaz, for their information.

I have, &c.

A. W. DAVIS.

[E 4425/4425/34]

No. 72.

Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received September 3.)

(No. 445. Confidential.)

Sir,

Gulhek, August 24, 1929.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith a copy of an interesting and valuable report upon the general situation in the Caspian provinces, prepared by Mr. Vice-Consul Finch, principally from material collected during his recent consular tour.

2. It is interesting to receive confirmation of the reports which I have often heard concerning the Shah's appetite for land in his native Province of Mazanderan. His Majesty's acquisitions seem to have two objects: first, to corner the land over which the railway is designed to go, and, second, to deprive the other wealthy landowners in Mazanderan of their land, and so to undermine their power and influence.

3. The economic penetration of Russian trading agencies and Russian policy in general are described in paragraphs 4, 5, 15 and 29. With the practical direction of the fisheries almost entirely in their hands, the Russians have obvious opportunities for spreading abroad the doctrines of communism. Fishery settlements, such as Hassan Kiadeh, are practically Russian villages and centres of propaganda. The Russian consul at Asterabad seems to be an energetic and faithful disciple of Lenin.

4. I am of the opinion that this report reflects great credit upon Mr. Finch's industry and keenness, and I have so informed him.

I have, &c.

R. H. CLIVE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 72.

Vice-Consul Finch to Sir R. Clive.

(No. 41. Confidential and Secret.)

Sir,

Resht, August 13, 1929.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith a report on the general situation in the Caspian provinces, compiled principally from information collected during my recent consular tour, together with an appendix* (secret) on the military situation in the Asterabad Province, and six photographic illustrations† (single copy only).

2. I have endeavoured to make it as brief as compatible with completeness, and the labour of condensation is in part responsible for my lateness in finishing it. The frequent use of the first person singular is deliberate, in order to keep up the subjectivity unavoidable in the case of information collected when travelling.

3. I am sending a copy of the report, without appendices, to His Majesty's consul-general at Meshed.

I have, &c.

J. P. G. FINCH.

* Not printed.

† Not reproduced.

Enclosure 2 in No. 72.

Report on the General Situation in the Caspian Provinces, July 1929.

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Preface.

IN this report I have not pretended to give any complete outline of the trade of these provinces. Rather, I have tried to work into a piece such political information as I have come upon (not always as well confirmed as I should like), and to attach economic and commercial information which ministers to that and selected by that criterion. My reasons are, firstly, that I do not believe the trade of this area to be of any profound interest to the British, except in so far as it indicates its independence, interdependence, dependence on Russia, &c., or affects the balance of Persian trade (in which aspect it can largely be studied in the customs statistics); and, secondly, in the interests of condensation. Commercial information, as I take it, must be detailed to be good; I have already found the subject to which I have confined myself very unwieldy, because—and this is the first point in the report that I should like to emphasise—the Caspian provinces, though commonly grouped under one expression, resolve, politically, into three distinct entities once the region of well-known generalities is transcended. Gilan is a well-developed trading and agricultural centre, long subjected to European contact, on to which the Russians press their economic weight, and in which they make some tentative efforts with their "European" line of propaganda, communism; Mazanderan is a poorly-developed area rapidly nurturing an estate of the Shah; the situation in Asterabad is handled by the military and moulded by the presence of Turkoman tribes, into whom the Russians insinuate their "Asiatic" line of propaganda—eastern nationalism.

As to the reliability of my information, the trouble is that everybody in these parts lies to an Englishman, even when there can be no point in doing so.

Section I.—*Gilan.*

1. This province is well populated and comparatively democratic; there is no tribal influence, no military despotism, no overwhelming landowner. Its active components are merchants and peasants, with a fringe of mixed seafaring and fishing population.

Communism.

2. The merchant is naturally indisposed to communism, and the Russian has no special need of this means of influencing him, as he has a far readier one—his economic stranglehold. The peasant is, like all of his kind, hard-headed and canny, and only prepared to accept a theory inasmuch as it could fill his pocket. The agitator's most hopeful strategy is to make him intractable to his landlord—a line that has led in the past to jangalism rather than to communism. I have no evidence as to whether it is being pursued; the peasant, like his master, is amenable to plain economic pressure. The seafaring folk and Pahlavi working-classes are at once the most proletarian in situation and the most subjected to Russian proximity. Not only are the port and town of Pahlavi very Russified, but the fisheries (Persryba), though nominally Russo-Persian, are really run by Russians and employ Persian unskilled labour. Attempts have been made during the past year to form unions, containing paid Russian agents and Communist cells, first among the steamer coolies, who had organised themselves to keep the steamer work as an exclusive

preserve, and then among the harbour coolies generally. In each case the authorities detected it and broke it up. The latest and most definite move has, according to the Governor-General of Gilan, been among the fishery employees, whose pay is administered by Russians. Fifteen per cent. of wages, he said, were being deducted for a provident fund which the Persian naturally assumes to be a political fund. The movement was better organised in the outlying fisheries than in Pahlavi because further removed from observation, but also, of course, less intrinsically important. At Hassan Kiadeh a school was started, with a teacher paid by the fishery, which the Persians have insisted on taking over. The foregoing rests on the authority of Mirza Reza Khan Afshar. Propaganda owes largely to the wireless sets of the fisheries and Russian clubs. Most of these folk are a medley of immigrants from Khalkhal and such places, speaking a Turki dialect akin to that of Baku, whence speeches are broadcast in that language. The police have instructions to do what they can to prevent the attendance of Persians at these clubs. Generally speaking, the above instances are not of serious magnitude and are easily detected by the authorities. Far greater is the subtle effect of prolonged contact with a Russian Administration and slow familiarisation with the Russian language and outlook. From all I can learn, it is the fisheries that are the chief engine of propaganda, more so even than the consulates.

Jangalism.

3. The memory of the movement is dormant but not dead. Ihsanullah Khan ('Who's Who,' p. 148) is in Baku, and was recently supposed by the Governor-General, who was himself a Jangali in his day and should know, to be in communication with an otherwise unimportant outlaw in the jungle at Peshtal (near Siahkal), Haidar Khan. The postulates for a serious revival are: (i) a leader; (ii) the weakening or collapse of the central authority; (iii) the complicity, or, alternatively, the collapse, and so impotence to deter (as in 1917-19), of the Russians. Ihsanullah seems to be more of a firebrand than a leader. I do not think the movement could revive without (ii), or become serious without (iii).

Economic Penetration.

4. This is where the bigger events occur, because Russia, as the only export market and the only economical import route, holds the trumps, and because Gilan's significance to Persia is as a factor in the trade balance, and to Russia as a producer of rice, more than as an exponent of sympathetic political doctrine. Adding cotton to rice, the statement applies to Mazanderan. By the deft use of the import licence, the Soviet can discriminate between merchants and undermine opposition. By the additional use of the barter system, it can screw up or down the exchange value of its products, and bring any merchant to heel by threatening him with unsaleable goods. This is less conspicuous in Resht than in Barfurush, which gets surfeited with cement, hardware, and excess piece-goods, while it waits for soft sugar, because the merchants there are fewer and weaker, and the market less developed.

5. The most interesting Russian advance has been in the silk trade, the only large one not dependent on the Russian market. Last year Rustransit bought the bulk of the crop, and this year, in spite of Rustransit's losses, Zakgostorg appears to be doing the same, with the object of getting in with the cultivators. The unsatisfactory business conditions are admirably described in Mr. Rabino's Report on the Trade of the Caspian Provinces for 1909-11 (Annual Series No. 4828). For these the French have abandoned this market since the war; the Italians are now doing so; there remain the Levantine firms, who seem to work precariously without capital. Given sagacity, and capital resources, the Russians ought to be able to get a controlling interest in a few years. They are producing eggs in Armenia, and last winter closed the Caucasian route, climatically and financially the best, to their competitors, the Greeks.

Section II.—Mazanderan.

The Landlords.

6. This has long been, and still is, a domain of the powerful landlord. There used to be three: in the west Amir Mukarram Larijani ('Who's Who,' p. 57); in the centre, Amir Mu'ayyad of Savadkuh ('Who's Who,' p. 54); and from Sari eastwards, Sardar Jalil ('Who's Who,' pp. 365-7). A reference to the careers of

these men will show how the fortunes of the province were bound up with those of the Qajars, and how the activities of the trio retarded its development. It is now peaceful, and the Shah is busily substituting his own tradition for the old one by displacing the trio. Amir Mukarram has put himself out of the arena by debt; Amir Mu'ayyad's family was subjected to all but extermination in 1924 by methods that really amount to assassination (see Section IV of Mr. Trott's report on his tour of that year); there remains Sardar Jalil, an ugly old miser, reputed, on pretty good authority, to have a lot of hard cash as well as land, and whom I met at Sari. He was unexpectedly frank in stating that he dared not set foot out of Sari for fear of his fortune. And the bleeding has started. The following is, I believe, typical of what is happening in various places: The Sardar has contracted to cobble the recently improved road between Barfurush and Meshed-Sar (about 12 miles) for 19,000 tomans. A responsible official in Barfurush remarked that the Sardar was the only man rich enough to lose so much. As the price seems about right, one concludes that the contractor is unlikely to be paid. At the same time, the Shah was reported to be in treaty for buying, or shall we say acquiring, the 'boulouk' (district) of Meshed-Sar, with the port and thirty-three villages, which the new road will benefit.

The Shah and Amir Akram as Landowners.

7. The Shah has acquired the following properties:—

- (1.) Kushk-i-Sera and dependencies, in the bulouk of Aliabad. The owner was intimidated into surrendering his title-deeds, and palmed off with the governorship of Do-Dungeh in Hizar Jerib.
- (2.) Karfa, south of Barfurush, adjoining Aliabad. Conditions unknown.
- (3.) The boulouk of Kia Kela, thirty-three villages, formerly taken over by the Persian Government from Messrs. Toumaniantz on account of their debt, and including a cotton gin and cocoon 'siccateur.' I am unaware of how it passed to Sardar Sepah, as he then was.
- (4.) Najjar Kela, where the Aliabad-Barfurush road crosses the River Talar, adjoining Kia Kela. Part payment made.
- (5.) Nokandeh-Ka, east of Kia Kela, from Sardar Jalil. Transacted in Tehran, through Taimourache. No payment.
- (6.) The garden and estate on the western outskirts of Barfurush, known as the Bagh-i-Koussis, now as the Bagh-i-Shahpur, formerly owned by M. Koussis, of Messrs. Koussis and Theophylaktos, timber merchants. A fine property, with some exotic trees, and on which a cement palace is being built for the Valiahd. Koussis was persuaded to transfer his interest to two persons to whom he owed 2,000 tomans. Amir Akram paid them their debt in exchange for the estate and presented the latter to the Shah.
- (7.) The Shah, as mentioned, was reported to be in treaty, through the Cadi of Ferikenar, for the bulouk of Meshed-Sar.

8. Chiragh Ali Khan, Amir Akram (who is not in 'Who's Who,' but who ought to be, I think. He is well described in the paragraphs 'Amul to Barfurush' of Section I, and the personalities in Section IV, of the report of Mr. Trott's 1924 tour), is the Shah's first cousin, and steward ('pishkar') of the Valiahd. He is the agent in most of these transactions, and is similarly feathering his own nest. His acquisitions include:—

- (1.) Roshanabad, south of Barfurush. The owner, Muqimoff, extracted a third of the price, and died in a fit.
- (2.) Kashteleh, south of Barfurush. One thousand tomans said to have been paid.
- (3.) Ganjruz, or Ganjafruz, south of Barfurush. The owner was promised the governorship of Savadkuh, but was disappointed.

9. An adequate map of this area (if such a thing could be found) would show that these properties, tending to nucleate, in the case of the Shah, round Aliabad, Kia Kela (and Meshed-Sar), and, in the Amir's, round Ganjruz, lie in the regions served by the newly-made motor road from Tehran to Meshed-Sar, with its branch from Najjar Nela to Kia Kela, except the Ganjruz area; and a new short cut from Shirgah to Barfurush via Ganjruz is being undertaken. Or perhaps the proposition might be put round the other way.

Commercial activities.

10. Trade and cultivation are quickly expanding, as the result of improved communications, the advent of railway construction, and the encouragement of the Amir Akram, who is taking his share in the profit of it, and presumably passing some on to his cousin, or he could hardly command the authority he seems to have. My impression was that the Governor-General, Hajji Hassan Arfa, has little authority as against the Amir. The branch of the Imperial Bank of Persia established about five years ago in Barfurush is doing quite a brisk business now; and, with the demand for labour created by the railway, the road construction, the usual municipal improvement schemes (geometrical streets, hospitals, public gardens, &c.), in Barfurush and Sari, and the Valiahd's palace, together with the export of market produce to Tehran permitted by the new road, the purchasing power of the folk must surely have risen, though for the better-to-do the cost of living has advanced.

11. The Amir Akram's commercial activities throw some light on his influence. His henchman is a Barfurush merchant named Qannad, rapidly becoming the richest of his class in the town. According to what I heard—

(a.) The Amir caused all mubashirs (bailiffs) to be instructed to dispose of their wool-clip to Qannad at 33 krans per pood. Wool should fetch 50 krans per pood, the profit being divided in the ratio of 5 krans for Qannad to 12 krans for the Amir.

(b.) Qannad had just become the head of the Silkworm Board, which controls the distribution of eggs. These are mainly imported by Messrs. Handjian. All money advances and credits were made either by Qannad or by Handjian through Qannad, who thus acts for Handjian, the board (and the Amir). He contracted for the cocoons at a flat rate of 14 krans per shah batman, including broker's commission. Admittedly, Gilan cocoons fetch a higher price, but the rate at present demanded in Resht, though not yet accepted by the buyers, is 30 krans per shah batman. It was also stated, on less good authority, that the cultivators had in some cases been forced to accept more eggs than they could rear, and had their accounts debited therewith.

(c.) The Amir did not participate in the cotton trade, but rented out his land under this crop for 6 toman per jerib of 10,000 sars.

12. The Shah, as mentioned, has a cocoon siccateur and cotton gin at Kia Kela, managed by an officer, Naib Ali Akbar Khan. Cocoons were sold to Rustransit last year, but this year it was not operating. Last year's cotton on this estate was sold to Izadi of Barfurush, for 40 toman per bale of 7½ poods (cleaned). The proceeds were given as 15,000 toman, which would give a crop of 375 bales. It was raised from the descendants of the "American" seed imported by Perskhlopok five years ago (see Mr. Trott's report), which the Naib told me was less preferred by the peasant than the native seed, because the staple, though better, sticks out from the stalk instead of hanging down, and is thus more liable to damage by heavy rain. No connoisseur of cotton, I cannot comment. I could not learn whether the seed had degenerated in the Mazanderan climate.

13. Another commercial venture is worth mention because the Shah is interested in it, namely, the syndicate for timber exploitation, generally known as "Tabari" (Société commerciale et industrielle des Produits forestiers de la Perse). It is working the forest of Mahmudabad at Temishan, 3 miles west of Izzetdeh, and at a spot christened Tabarabad, a mile and a half east of Mahmudabad. The resident director is M. Kulak, once manager of the Banque d'Escompte at Barfurush; Muhammad Ali Malik (son-in-law of Muin-ut-Tujjar, the President) is local manager in Mazanderan; and I believe M. Ordinaire is concerned. I saw the lumber camp at Tabarabad. The forest runs close to the sea, and wood is brought down on a 74-centim. trolley line (made out of material taken over from Amin-uz-Zarb's derelict works at Mahmudabad) to a steam-saw at the back of the dunes, whence the timber is man-handled over and put on to Turkoman boats for shipment to the railway and port works at Bander-Gez and Bander-Shah. The saw is of what appears to be up-to-date German pattern, capable of working eight parallel reciprocating blades at once. Woods exploited are oak (mazu), and iron wood (anjilu) for sleepers, and for planks maple (afra), hornbeam (mamraz, rurpadz), and the zelkova cronata (known here as "oja," in Gilan as "azad," Fr. Microcoulier, Rukapkaer). Sleepers are hewn, and rather rough hewn. Unhealthy climate had driven away something

like 80 per cent. of the labour during May. There were also signs of timber exploitation in the magnificent forest of Anazan (part of the Hyrcanian forest, in fact, between Ashraf and Bander-Gez) near Galugah.

Communications.

14.—(a.) Mention has been made of the Tehran-Barfurush-Meshed-Sar road, and of the Ganjruz short-cut. The principal remaining obstacle, the Talar River at Najjar Kela, was in June being spanned by a girder bridge of German manufacture.

(b.) Aliabad-Sari-Ashraf-Bander-Gez-Mulla Kileh (Qara Su)-Asterabad. Good for cars, dead straight, and quite unrecognisable from "Routes" No. 1, Stage 9, as far as Sari. From 4 miles beyond Sari to Mulla Kileh, where the drier ground of the steppe is reached, execrable in all but the best weather.

(c.) The coast road from Resht to Meshed-Sar became generally possible for touring cars at the end of May, with the completion of wooden bridges over most streams. Soft sand in dry weather, and boggy patches in wet, are the enemies. The Babul at Meshed-Sar and the Safid Rud in Gilan have still to be ferried, except for a short period when the latter is very low and fordable, but two Germans are now in Resht to consider bridging the latter at a point below the present passage. This is not yet a through route for commercial motor transport.

Russians.

15. Their institutions and functionaries, except for the fishery at Meshed-Sar, have been reduced in the last couple of years, the reasons apparently being economy and concentration further south. The vice-consulate at Barfurush was handed over last September to the bank, whose present manager is M. Alexandre Benedik. The Cotton Syndicate (Perskhlopok) employs only two Russians, and shares the Caravanserai Gulabayof in Barfurush with the bank. It is not directly working cotton cultivation as in 1924. During June it was buying, not for cash, but for short bills (ten or fifteen days), apparently to help out the bank, which was said to be short of funds. The Russian school in Barfurush was closed by the Persian authorities in February, because its programme did not conform to Islam or the law of the land. This may mean fear of a Communist training centre, and a repercussion of the disturbance in the Resht Education Department in January. I did not hear of any specific Communist propaganda, for which Mazanderan seems hardly ripe, except, perhaps, in the fisheries. As an instance of the use of the licensing system, the entire quota for citrus fruit exportable from Meshed-Sar was last winter granted to a crony of the bank manager, until telegrams to Tehran elicited an increase in the quota.

Conclusion.

16. The appropriate paragraphs above tend, I think, to show how the Shah and his family are consolidating themselves in their native province. To me the most striking general proof of Amir Akram's influence and of the Royal will to enrich the province is the exclusion of the military, of whom none were visible but the handful directing the Kia Kein estate. The Amir has made himself responsible for the tranquillity of the area. Usually, the military seem to be the minions of their generalissimo, but it looks as if he would not have them in his own pet province, because he knows how much of the wealth they absorb. Thus is the Pahlavi tradition being built up here. The folk, though pleased, no doubt, with the development of trade and labour, seemed to me indifferent to it; and may one not question whether, in a time of crisis, it would produce the support that Muhammad Ali Qajar called up from Mazanderan and Asterabad?

Section III.—Asterabad.

General Description.

17. This has been more expanded, because it is a part of Persia less known. The province divides into (a) a region comprising the northern watershed of the Elburz and a long strip sloping gently to the coast as far as the south-eastern corner of the Caspian, and east of that to a line roughly 8-10 miles north of the base of

the range, partaking of the oozy climate of the Caspian littoral; (b) the steppe, where Central Asian conditions begin with abruptness. The former is inhabited by a mixture of people of Turkish extraction, degenerate-looking, of whom the best known are the Hajjilar and the Qajars, except at the eastern end, where Guklan Turkomans appear at the foot of the Gurgan defile; the latter by Turkoman tribes akin to the inhabitants on the other side of the frontier. There are no great towns. Bander-Gez is a filthy little place, just a bottle-neck for imports and exports of the province and the hinterland of Shahrud and Damghan, but it has the best protected roadstead in the South Caspian. Perskhlopok has an unnecessarily large cotton cleaning factory there. The large fishery installation at Mulla Kileh (mouth of the Qara Su) has recently been recommissioned. Asterabad itself is a city of refuge, enclosing many fields and gardens in the amplitude of its crumbled walls, and is a mart where Turkomans exchange their produce for their requirements. The population can hardly exceed 8,000. There are no banks or big merchants in it. But the province is full of traces of the civilisation obliterated by the Mongols in the 13th century. The Persian ideal should be to recapture what they can of the ancient prosperity of Gurgan (Jorjan), though probably natural dessication renders complete realisation impossible.

The Gurgan and the Atrek.

18. The Persian steppe comprises the valley of the Gurgan and the southern side of the Atrek valley. But "valley" is a misnomer; the feature of the Gurgan is that it has no valley, only a bed; after debouching from the hills, it pushes through a channel determined by scarcely perceptible accidents of ground, deepened by the softness of the soil, until it finds the Caspian. Reference to a map will show that it has undergone change towards the mouth and left one or two dry beds. The character of these steppes is most sensationally illustrated by the accidental diversion of the Oxus from the Aral to the Caspian by the Mongols, resulting from operations to flood out the town of Urganj. This digression is intended to give the clue to the region's agricultural possibilities and the problem of the irrigation. The soil of the Gurgan plain is described as a rich mixture of vegetable and animal deposit. Good wheat and barley are grown on it; also opium. To extend this cultivation and render the ground generally suitable for cotton, irrigation is needed. Owing to the softness of the soil, the river is said to require gradual damming lest too much pressure should merely divert it. Last autumn a pump was installed at Pahlavi-Dezh (Aq Qaleh) to irrigate an area on behalf of the short-lived society "Sosagperse" (in which the Shah partook), but the venture was abortive, and the pump lies idle.

19. The Atrek, unlike the Gurgan, deposits salt, and so is barren. This helps to explain why many nomad Turkomans, who pass the winter on the banks of the Gurgan, in summer pass right across the Atrek into Russian territory, and why the Gurgan is a source of attraction to Persian territory for Turkomans. The suggestion would be that the interest of the Shah and the military in the agricultural development of the Gurgan has its political as well as its economic side: to attract and attach a wholly settled Turkoman population in Persian territory. The extravagance, from any other standpoint, of the new railway port Bander-Shah rather confirms this notion. Bander-Shah lies on the steppe slightly south of Khojeh Nefes, and opposite Ashurada at the mouth of the Bay of Asterabad.

The Turkomans.

20. Those who are interested in these people should certainly read the account of their tribes on pp. 23-33 of Mr. Rabino's Report on the Trade and General Condition of the City and Province of Asterabad (No. 4381, Annual Series), November 1909, and of their life in Chapter XI of his book, "Mazanderan and Asterabad" (Gibb Memorial, New Series, No. VII, 1928). The Persian army have occupied the steppe for the last five years or so, abolished the system of "sakhlo," and "sarkardas," and substituted the 3½ per cent. tax on harvests, which is said to be actually collected (by the military at least, if it does not go much further), instead of a claimed tribute of 12 krans per family, which it would often have taken double that amount to obtain.

21. Considered as a problem in Russo-Persian relations, the first point that claims attention is (a) that the population on either side of the frontier is of one stock and creed. Their Sunnism, in which they are enthusiastic, is a handle that

either side can turn. The Persian is a Shiah, but the Bolshevik is an atheist, and the Turkoman takes full account of what he preaches in Moscow, even if he finds it impolitic to repeat it in Bokhara. There is a Sunni school on the Persian side at Gumush Teppeli, to which students cross from Turkmenistan. The Russians have done some propaganda for their educational centre in Bokhara, stressing its Turkoman character. The Persians voted money last winter for the extension of State schools on the steppe, but it has produced no result as yet, and may have been embezzled. The Russians in Kizil Arvat tried to interfere with the Turkoman marriage customs described on pp. 96-97 of Mr. Rabino's book, and the consequent resentment reacted to the Persian advantage. On the whole, the equilibrium seems delicate.

22. (b.) The ever-present opening for friction is the migration of the nomads across the frontier. This and kindred matters used to be dealt with by a Russo-Persian Frontier Commission at Gumbad-i-Kabus, extinct since the revolution, to the detriment of good relations. The Turkomans, needless to say, smuggle. On the other hand, it may be worth repeating that fewer of the Persian Turkomans than one might suppose are proper nomads. Of the two main branches, the Guklans are all settled cultivators, and the Yamuts are divided into "chumur" (cultivators) and "charwa" (nomads), the latter numbering about one-third. The cultivators have retained from their previous nomadism the tent dwellings ("obehs" or "alachiks") and the predatory habits, though in this respect it is chiefly the charwa, especially those of the Qanyukhmaz and the Igdir, that earn for these folk their bad reputation. Both parties seem to want to settle the fluid population permanently on their own side, to do which the propitious method would be to transform them into cultivators; and it is into this part of the picture that schemes for developing the Gurgan plain will fit. It need scarcely be said, however, that Persian fears lest the Russians should filch their nomads are nothing beside their fears lest the Russians should succeed in irredentising the whole of the Yamuts and the Guklans into union with their brethren over the border, fears greatly accentuated since the creation of the quasi-autonomous Turkmenistan Soviet Republic.

23. (c.) The recent incident of Khan Jumaid has increased the general nervousness. This person is a Turkoman of Khiva, who has, I understand, a long account with the Russian Government, harking back to Tsarist times. Having made Imperial Russia too hot for him, he took refuge in Afghanistan, whence he returned at the revolution to establish himself in Khiva. The Bolsheviks have only recently been able to dislodge him, and he appeared in Persia at a place given as Chinaran, north-east of Gumbad-i-Kabus. (I can only find a "Chinar Dereh," near Maraveh Teppeli, on the maps.) The idea persists locally that it was the notion that he had much treasure with him, rather than Russian pressure, that caused him to be attacked. His immediate suite numbered only about 300 men, but, owing to the ferment into which his presence threw the whole neighbourhood, the Persian troops were virtually almost cooped up in Gumbad-i-Kabus, and had their supply convoys plundered right and left. I could get no satisfactory explanation of the Khan's sudden decampment to Afghanistan via Khorasan, unless it was for value received.

24. (d.) As I was prevented from visiting all but the corner of the Jaaferbai country, I have no details as to the inter-tribal relations. Generally speaking, the Daz Yamuts command the most influence, and at present supply the Deputy to the Majlis, Muhammad Akhund. The Guklans are as a rule on bad terms with their immediate Yamut neighbours, the Igdir. Though by no means disarmed, the tribes are at the moment on the common defensive against the military occupant, and probably tend to sink differences. There seem to be no outstanding personalities.

25. (e.) I am for the same reason without evidence as to the cross-current of pan-Turanianism. Turkomans of consequence sometimes send their sons to Constantinople to be educated. The Turks, during and directly after the war, sent many emissaries to Turkestan with this propaganda. The current is probably submerged at present by the interplay of others now more active.

26. Because I think this question to be the most interesting one in the consular district, I have pushed my observations above to their limit; but, apart from the transitory nature of a tour, I was unable to visit the area as I had planned, and so must ask not to be taken too seriously. To resume, unless the Persians are going to subjugate the Turkomans completely by employing a large force (which they have not at present got there), one would say that their policy ought to be to conciliate and attract them. One objection, I suppose, is that what the Turkomans by long habit consider attractive is robbery of their neighbours; however that may be, the

impression I got of Sarhang Ahmad Khan Hakimi, and of the reputation for rapacity that the military seem everywhere to acquire, was that neither he nor his inferiors would make a success of a policy of endearment.

The Military.

27. The army are in control of this province, the Governor, Hajji Izz-ul-Mamalik ("Who's Who," p. 162), having but shadowy authority. The steppe is a military zone, with military Vice-Governors, responsible to Hakimi, at Gumush Teppeh, Pahlavi-Dezh (Aq Qaleh) and Gumbad-i-Kabus. To enter it requires a permit. I had previously heard that such permits were refused to M. Laktionov, the Russian consul at Asterabad, though I believe they had to let him go to Gumush Teppeh. I thus foresaw that I should probably, for reasons of precedent, be unable to carry out my original itinerary; but I applied to go to Gumush Teppeh, just to see what would happen. After procrastinations, which I presume gave time to telegraph to Tehran, permission was refused on the ground that no foreign representative could enter the military zone. So I left it at that, decided to go to Katoul, Pindarisk and Ramian, and thence to explore two trans-Elburz routes (an account of which will be sent separately for the Route Book), and informed the Governor accordingly. From Pindarisk until I was safely in the mountains soldiers insisted on escorting me, and were, of course, sent to see that I did not make a moonlight flit on to the precious steppe. At a village later on an n.c.o. posed as being a regular outpost, whom I discovered to have preceded me up the road by only a couple of hours. And at intervals one or two horsemen kept on showing themselves—the same men, like a stage army. From which I concluded that it was desired to make an impression that the country was more strongly garrisoned than it really is. Indeed, I believe that the origin of the secretiveness about the steppe is to conceal the number and disposition of the force maintained there, in particular its smallness. It amounts roughly to 800 men; for details, see the appendix.*

28. I formed an unfavourable impression of Sarhang Ahmad Khan Makimi, the commandant at Asterabad. He is a Tabrizi of humble origin, with a long experience of Asterabad, where he has greatly enriched himself. It was he who got Sartip Pazlullah Khan Zahedi removed from the Northern Brigade. He was surly and suspicious.

Russian Consulate.

29. M. Laktionov, until recently, I understand, in Kerman, seems to be a very energetic Bolshevik, and to have screwed up the pitch considerably since his arrival early in the year. He visits Bander-Gez every few days, and inspects Perskhlopok, Persazneft, the bank and the steamship agency. He keeps the Russian colony up to the mark in its political views, and is said to have an espionage on their correspondence. His right-hand man in Bander-Gez is the steamship agent, Ilya Magreshivilich. By his influence the Railway Syndicate were jockeyed into the dismissal of five White Russian employees, under threat, so a German informed me, of holding up material in transit. He was enormously interested in my arrival, and immediately went round to all the officials that I saw. I hope he heard nothing but good of me.

Section IV.—The Railway and Bander-Shah.

30. It seems best, as the Central Administration and finance are all in Tehran, to limit this mainly to the appreciation of eye-witness.

31. In the middle of June 27 kilom. of rail were laid from Bander-Gez in the direction of Ashraf, and about 15 in the direction of Bander-Shah, which lies 19 kilom. from Bander-Gez. I travelled over the latter section on a ballast train, drawn at rather more than a running pace by a petrol locomotive. The line is now (August) reported to be through to Ashraf. Between Bander-Gez and the Qara Su River the ground is swampy. The line crossed numerous culverts, which all appeared to be temporary. The bridge over the Qara Su, about 50-foot span, was temporary, the permanent bridge being in the course of erection at the side. The line is slightly embanked throughout east of Bander-Gez. Evidently it is hard for a layman to give an opinion, and the swamps must be an obstacle, but I was not impressed with

* Not printed.

great solidity in the track or speed in the progress. Between 3,000 and 4,000 workmen are employed in the Bander-Gez area, all, according to general report, grossly overpaid for what they do. The majority are shovelling earth and stones for 2 to 3 krans a day, but they shovel about a quarter of what a European would do in the time. Against this, of course, there is the obvious unhealthiness of the region, to which the natives are succumbing more than the Europeans, because the latter are not already riddled with malaria, and take some care of themselves. The inevitable Greek contractor is in evidence. A Persian official informed me that there had been irregularities at Bander-Shah, which had caused the removal of a German, not, I think, for participation so much as for failure to control. I was told by the German in charge at Sari that the next section, from the Mazanderan Plain to Firuzkuh, would involve twenty-six tunnels and 31 kilom. of tunnelling, but that much depended upon the standard maximum curve to be adopted.

32. Wooden sleepers supplied by the Tabari syndicate (paragraph 13) were being used from Bander-Shah to Qara Su; iron thenceforth to the westward point that the line had reached. A number of iron sleepers had been imported from Germany because the Tabari could not deliver theirs on time. The cost of iron ones was given as 24 krans each, of wooden 14 to 16 krans each. Iron would probably be more proof against damp and worm in the wooded district, and against theft in the woodless; but I believe that the line is generally to be continued on wooden sleepers, for reasons of cost, keeping the money in the country (and providing the Tabari with business).

33. Bander-Shah has no natural harbour, being outside the protection of the bay. To reach the required depth of 4 metres a pier 1,400 metres long has to be built. The piles were (in June) in position for about 1,200 metres from the shore. Construction is all wooden. The piles are imported from Russia, and cost 20 tomans each at Bander-Shah. They are coniferous wood, and I presume this has something to do with the effect of sea water; there are no conifers on the Caspian littoral, except some varieties of cypress. To make a harbour of Bander-Shah, a mole to the north, at least as long as the pier, would be necessary.

34. My general impression of the Germans was that they had reached a mood of disillusionment over the difficulties of dealing with Persians who do not know their own minds for two minutes, and with Russians who make difficulties over the transit (cf. paragraph 29).

35. The Minister of the Court visited the railway and port two days after I did, and was rumoured to have been displeased.

J. P. G. FINCH.

[E 4426/104/34]

No. 73.

Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received September 3.)

(No. 446.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of Intelligence Summary No. 17 for the period ending the 24th August, compiled by the military attaché to this Legation.

Tehran, August 25, 1929.

Enclosure in No. 73.

Intelligence Summary No. 17, for the Period ending August 24, 1929.

(Secret.)

Tehran.

1. *Foreigners: Japanese.*—It is reported that M. Akio Kasama, Japanese delegate to the Geneva Labour Bureau, has been appointed Japanese Minister in Persia.

2. *Soviet.*—The present Perso-Soviet Commercial Agreement, originally made for two years, expires on the 1st October, and a further agreement is under

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discussion. In this connexion the following figures are published for goods exported from Persia to the U.S.S.R. :—

For the first nine months of 1927-28: goods valued £244,658.
For the first nine months of 1928-29: goods valued £2,187,333.

3. *Treaties*.—The Perso-Danish provisional agreement was due to end on the 10th August, but has been extended pending the conclusion of a permanent agreement.

4. A new treaty for a period of five years is now being concluded between Persia and Italy. The previous treaty was due to expire on the 10th November.

5. An exchange of identic notes, forecasting a treaty between Iraq and Persia, was formally made at Bagdad on the 11th August.

6. *Hejaz*.—The members of the Hejaz mission, after having paid official visits to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the Prime Minister, the Minister of Court, &c., were received in audience by the Shah on the 12th August, and were given Persian decorations. They were one day entertained to lunch by His Majesty's Minister and are due to leave Tehran on the 25th August. During their stay in Tehran a provisional treaty of friendship was discussed between the Hejaz representatives and the Persian Government, and will probably be signed before they leave.

7. *Iraq*.—The Persian consulate-general in Iraq has been raised to the status of a Legation and Samii appointed as Persian Minister.

8. *Railways*.—In the north, the line having been completed to Nikka, it is expected to reach Sari in one month's time. The construction of bridges at Qara Su and Tika is progressing. There are said to be three petrol-driven engines and forty-eight wagons already available, and two steam locomotives are shortly expected. It is likely that some form of local service will be started in this sector whenever possible with a view to showing some result from the heavy expenditure involved and for experimental purposes. A great deal of work is being done at the terminus at Bandar-i-Shah, mostly in connexion with dredging the harbour and the drainage of the marshes near Bandar-i-Gaz; £30,000 are said to have been sanctioned for these objects. There appears to be an idea current that the railway, for the time being at least, will go no further than Sari on the northern section and up to Dizful on the southern.

9. *Roads*.—The new road from Dizful through Khorremabad to Kermanshah is now fit for motor traffic as far as Alishtar, 30 miles north-west of Khorremabad. Work continues on the remaining portion up to Kermanshah.

10. *Majlis*.—The first reading of the Persian Nationality Law was passed by the Majlis on the 15th August and was approved for a second reading at their next meeting. There was considerable discussion, which centred round the articles dealing with liability to conscription, formalities regarding applications for naturalisation and the circumstances under which nationality may be relinquished. Certain articles are somewhat obscure, but appear to materially affect British subjects.

11. *Press*.—The "Sitareh Jahan," dated the 14th August, publishes a leading article on the necessity of Persia possessing a naval force in the Persian Gulf. It suggests a fleet of one 1,000-ton ship and four 300 tons each for the protection of the coast and the prevention of smuggling of sugar and arms. It is optimistically hoped that in fifty years' time Persia may rank with the leading naval Powers of the world. The above fleet is estimated to cost half a million pounds, and the purchase price will be spread over five years, the necessary credits being obtained from the Government sugar monopoly. The question of lighting in the Gulf is also mentioned. It is stated that this is at present under the control of the English, who may at any time decide to discontinue the lighthouses, and for this reason it is necessary for Persia to establish her own lighting arrangements. Further, the construction of the railway in the south will increase the importance of the port of Bander-i-Shahpur, which will soon become the chief port of call in the Gulf.

Azerbaijan.

12. *Tabriz*.—A further very serious flood occurred at Tabriz on the 11th August. It is believed to have caused even more damage than the previous flood on the 8th July. A sum of 30,000 tomans was sanctioned by the Government after the first flood for the purpose of constructing a dam to protect the city.

13. A steamer service, consisting of three ships, is shortly to be inaugurated on Lake Urumia.

Khorasan.

14. Prince Amanullah Mirza, General Officer Commanding, Eastern Division, returned to Meshed from Tehran on the 1st August.

15. Preliminary steps in the establishment of two important commercial institutions—the Meshed branch of the National Bank, and the Meshed Chamber of Commerce—were taken in July. The former will probably be open to the public in August, and the latter has twenty-two elected members, of whom six only are known or suspected to have Russian sympathies.

Fars.

16. *General*.—The situation regarding the revolt of the tribes in the south is at present outwardly calm, but it cannot be said that any degree of finality has been reached—in fact, there is strong evidence on every side of a further outbreak in the not very distant future. The recent trouble has been the most serious menace which the present Government have had to deal with, and a second outbreak may have far-reaching results. Notices have been posted in Bushire and other towns warning the people against purchasing rifles from deserters from the army.

(a.) *Shiraz*.—Since the opening of the Shiraz-Bushire road brigandage has increased, although the road is nominally open to both motor and animal transport. The Imperial Bank of Persia recently asked the Amniah for an escort to convoy a consignment of silver from Bushire to Shiraz. This request was refused, and they were informed that the Persian authorities could not undertake responsibility for safeguarding the specie in transit. The Darashuri and Kashkuli appear to be moving down from their summer encampments fully one month earlier than usual; they are at present in Semirum, near Abadeh. It is said that they and other tribes in this area intend to shortly force an issue with the Government. A band of Boir Ahmadi Lurs (Kuhgalus) has recently been ravaging the country about 25 miles north of Shiraz. On the 16th August this band called on the village of Gayun (or Jayun) for supplies; the villagers resisted and fired on the Lurs until their ammunition gave out; the whole village, including women and children, was then massacred with horrible atrocities. The leader of the Boir Ahmadis was Sartip Khan. The recent withdrawal of troops from the Shiraz area would complicate the situation in the event of another outbreak. Soulet-ed-Dowleh left Shiraz on the 7th August, returning on the 10th August. It is understood that he visited Ali Khan and Mehdi Surkhi, probably at Siyakh, and made arrangements for the sheep looted by the Qashqais to be returned to their rightful owners. Yavar Muhammad Taqi Khan Arab has succeeded in making arrangements with the Baharlu Arabs and is now in Fasa, 95 miles south-east of Shiraz, with 1,500 troops. The Baharlus have made a nominal submission to the Government and have renounced all intention of fighting for the time being.

(b.) *Isfahan*.—Although the Governor-General has assured the British consul-general that the Bakhtiari trouble is finally at an end, this would appear to be far from the truth. Sardar Fatih, who was originally sent down by the Persian Government to use his influence with the Haft Lang Bakhtiaris, and his brother-in-law, Sartip Khan, a leader of the Kuhgalu, a Lur tribe, are said to be plotting with Ali Mardan Chahar Lang, who was the leader of the recent revolt, to restart hostilities on a larger scale than before.

(c.) *Kerman*.—The Kerman-Bunder Abbas road continues to be unsafe. Motor traffic between Anar and Rafsinjan proceeds under escort. A good deal of brigandage is still rife in the Kerman area.

It is reported that the Lashani insurgents who were making trouble in the Niriz district have been driven out by Yavar Muhammad Taqi and the Baharlus. On conditions in Darab no news is available.

PERCY C. R. DODD, Major,
Military Attaché.

Tehran, August 24, 1929.

[E 4657/95/34]

No. 74.

Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received September 13.)

(No. 314.)

Tehran, September 12, 1929.

(Telegraphic.) R.

FOLLOWING is résumé of conversation yesterday with the Shah at audience which I had requested in order to present the military attaché.

After preliminary polite conversation the Shah enquired whether I had anything special to say to him.

I said that, while you were pleased to note the improvement in tribal situation, which appeared to be on the way to a satisfactory settlement, you had felt that unjustified suspicions of British policy in Persia and recent anti-British [group omitted] were very discouraging. Policy of His Majesty's Government had been consistent and had not changed. They wished to see strong independent Persia, financially sound and capable of maintaining order. They were anxious for early settlement of treaties now under consideration.

His Majesty complained of the attitude of the British press, which I later contested, said that so many reports of British sympathy with tribesmen had reached him that he could not ignore them and maintained hotly that there was no analogy between the situation in Afghanistan and in Persia, but added finally that he was grateful for my assurance; he now entirely believed in the good faith of His Majesty's Government and was as anxious as His Majesty's Government for earliest settlement of treaties.

Minister of Court interpreted.

Full report by bag.

(Repeated to India, No. 176.)

[E 4658/19/34]

No. 75.

Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received September 12.)

(No. 315.)

Tehran, September 12, 1929.

(Telegraphic.)

MY immediately preceding telegram.

Interview was very cordial.

I gained following impressions:—

1. His Majesty has temporarily, at any rate, got over his suspicions of British policy.

2. He genuinely desires most friendly relations, as he realises more and more that these are essential to Persia.

3. He is anxious for earliest possible treaty settlement. I said I hoped that treaty could be signed by the end of the year and ratified by Noruz (21st March).

(Repeated to India, No. 177.)

[E 4672/3303/34]

No. 75A.

Colonial Office to Foreign Office.—(Received September 14.)

Sir,

Downing Street, September 13, 1929.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to transmit to you, for the information of Mr. Secretary Henderson, copy of a note from the High Commissioner for Iraq to Sir R. Clive and copy of a note from the Council of Ministers, Bagdad, to the Ministry of Justice, both dated the 12th August, on the subject of the provisional agreement between Iraq and Persia.

I am, &c.

S. H. WILSON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 75A.

Sir G. Clayton to Sir R. Clive.

(Confidential.)

Sir,

Bagdad, August 12, 1929.

I HAVE the honour to refer to correspondence ending with my despatch, Confidential, dated the 29th July, 1929, regarding the provisional agreement between Iraq and Persia.

2. I am now glad to be able to report that the agreement was concluded by exchange of letters in due form during the morning of the 11th August, 1929. The text of the letters was as given in your despatch No. 193 dated the 14th July. They were signed on behalf of the Persian and Iraq Governments by his Excellency Sami'i Khan and his Excellency Tawfiq Beg-al-Suwaidi respectively.

3. At the same time the Minister for Foreign Affairs addressed to the Persian Minister the letter, of which a copy is enclosed, undertaking that there will be no change in the procedure now in force for the disposal of the estates in Iraq of deceased Persians pending the conclusion of a specific agreement on the subject between the two States.

I have, &c.

GILBERT CLAYTON,

High Commissioner for Iraq.

Enclosure 2 in No. 75A.

Minister for Foreign Affairs, Iraq, to Persian Minister.

M. le Ministre,

August 11, 1929.

WITH reference to our conversation on the 7th August, 1929, on the subject of the making of inventories and handing over of the estates of Persians who die in Iraq without heirs or with heirs in Persia.

At your request, I have the honour to inform you that the procedure now in force in Iraq in this connexion is the same as in the past, and will continue in force pending the conclusion of a new agreement on the subject between the two kingdoms.

Please accept, &c.

Enclosure 3 in No. 75A.

Council of Ministers to the Ministry of Justice.

(No. 1966.)

Bagdad, August 12, 1929.

I AM directed to forward to you herewith, for information, copy of the provisional agreement between Iraq and Persia which was signed yesterday morning by his Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs and his Excellency Sami'ee Khan on behalf of their respective Governments, also copy of a letter which has been addressed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs* to Sami'ee Khan on the subject of the making of inventories and handing over of estates of (deceased) Persians in Iraq.

ABDUL QADIR RASHID,

Secretary to the Council of Ministers.

Enclosure 4 in No. 75A.

Minister for Foreign Affairs, Iraq, to Persian Minister.

M. le Ministre,

Bagdad, le 11 août 1929.

J'AI l'honneur de porter à la connaissance de votre Excellence que mon Gouvernement, animé du désir sincère de porter à leur conclusion dans le plus bref délai possible les négociations en cours avec le Gouvernement persan et relatives à la conclusion du traité d'amitié, des conventions d'établissement, commerciale et de navigation ainsi que des accords particuliers réglant les questions demandant à être

* Enclosure 2.

[20533]

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réglées entre les parties intéressées, m'a chargé de vous communiquer, en son nom, les dispositions suivantes, pour constituer règlement provisoire des relations entre nos deux pays :

1. Les représentants diplomatiques et consulaires de la Perse en Iraq jouiront, sous condition de réciprocité, des droits, privilèges, immunités et exemptions consacrés par les principes et la pratique du droit commun international et qui ne seront en aucun cas inférieurs à ceux accordés aux représentants diplomatiques et consulaires de la nation la plus favorisée.

2. Sous condition de réciprocité, le Gouvernement persan aura la faculté de nommer sur le territoire iraquien ses représentants consulaires, qui pourront y résider en toute place où ses intérêts économiques et culturels paraîtront de nature à justifier leur établissement. Ils ne peuvent, toutefois, exercer leurs fonctions qu'après avoir reçu l'exequatur d'usage.

3. Les ressortissants persans seront admis et traités sur territoire iraquien conformément aux règles du droit international et en aucun cas, sous condition de réciprocité, plus défavorablement que les ressortissants de la nation la plus favorisée.

La compétence des autorités à connaître les questions de status personnel devant être réglée ultérieurement entre les deux États, les ressortissants de l'un sur le territoire de l'autre resteront provisoirement soumis en cette matière aux tribunaux de leur pays de résidence.

4. Sous condition de réciprocité, les produits du sol et de l'industrie persans importés en Iraq bénéficieront à tous égards du régime accordé aux produits de même nature de la nation la plus favorisée.

5. Les dispositions susmentionnées entreront en vigueur à dater d'aujourd'hui et resteront en force jusqu'à la conclusion, des traités, conventions et accords respectifs, ci-dessus prévus, et au plus tard jusqu'à un an.

Veuillez, &c.

[E 4698/321/34]

No. 76.

Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received September 16.)

(No. 452.)

Sir,

Tehran, August 31, 1929.

I HAVE the honour to report that on the 27th August I discussed with the Minister of Court the question of the Duzdap Railway, which it is proposed should form the subject of article 11 of the treaty.

2. His Highness adopted the attitude that the Duzdap Railway was of very little use to Persia, and that, as time went on, its value was likely to decrease, especially when the Kerman-Bunder Abbas road became a regular highway for the Kerman trade. It was true that for the last few years the Kerman carpet trade had passed by Duzdap, but the new road to Bunder Abbas would soon be in full working order. There was, in fact, very little Persian export from Duzdap, although he admitted there was a fair amount of import from India, but that, he said, was more to the advantage of India than Persia. I replied that, from my information, I was not prepared to agree with his depreciation of the Duzdap Railway as an important trade route. This route provided an outlet for the trade from Khorasan, and was the sole means of preventing the Russians having a monopoly of the trade of the province. Again, I had been given to understand that the railway from Duzdap to Mirjawa had been of considerable value to the Persian authorities during the operations last winter against Dost Mohamed. Moreover, an increasing number of tourists and pilgrims were making use of this route every year.

3. The Government of India considered that this railway was of mutual advantage. This being so, it was unreasonable that India should alone bear the loss on running. In fact, I understood that the Financial Department of the Government of India would be only too glad to see the loss cut and the rails pulled up. This, however, appeared to be a retrograde step in the case of a trade route which was slowly but surely gaining in importance. If the Persian Government would accept in principle the proposals which I had already submitted to him, it might be that the Government of India would be prepared to discuss the financial details in regard to the share of loss to be borne by Persia.

4. His Highness, however, was quite unmoved, and said that the Persian Government would shoulder no liability for the railway. The most they were prepared to do would be to purchase a certain amount of rolling-stock from the Government of India.

5. I said that it seemed useless for us to continue discussing the matter further, and that it would be best if he submitted counter-proposals. This he said he would do.

6. Since this conversation with the Minister of Court, I have received a visit from Djem, the newly-appointed Governor of Khorasan, who left for his post to-day.

7. Djem, who has for the past year been Minister of Public Works, and has once previously been Governor-General at Meshed, did not at all share Taimourtache's views of the unimportance of this trade route, and frankly admitted that the Meshed-Duzdap-Quetta route provided an invaluable check on the former Russian trade monopoly of the province. He considered, in fact, that the closing down of the railway would be a great loss to Khorasan, and professed to see nothing unreasonable in the principle of the terms offered by the Government of India, although the amount of compensation to be paid by Persia for loss on running expenses was obviously a matter for discussion. I asked him, therefore, when he got to Meshed to look into the question thoroughly with a view to converting the Minister of Court to a more reasonable frame of mind. I warned him, and he perfectly understood, that if the Persian Government adopted an absolutely *non possumus* attitude, the Government of India might decide to close down the railway rather than shoulder an annual loss which was not at present compensated by the volume of trade. The Government of India very naturally wished to regularise the position and had offered a reasonable basis of settlement.

8. Djem said he hoped himself to visit Duzdap before long, as he was very anxious that Seistan should be linked up with Duzdap by a good road. He went on to speak of the potential wealth of Seistan and of the necessity for a trade outlet for that district.

9. It is true that Djem, although generally popular, and a man who for many years past has occupied a number of high official posts, does not carry much weight, but he is genuinely anti-Bolshevik and will, I feel certain, do his best to get his Government to maintain the trade route via Duzdap.

A copy of this despatch has been sent to the Government of India.

I have, &c.

R. H. CLIVE.

P.S. *September 3, 1929.*—Since writing the above I have received from His Majesty's consul for Seistan a report on the Duzdap Railway, of which I beg leave to enclose a copy.

Major Daly's report is drawn up in accordance with instructions I sent him on the 29th July requesting him to report on the railway, with special reference to—

- (a.) General economic position.
- (b.) Value to Persia, strategic and economic.
- (c.) Value to India, economic.
- (d.) Effect on foreign staff of abolition of Capitulations.

I did not ask His Majesty's consul to report on the strategic value to India of this railway as being a matter on which the General Staff in India alone is competent to express an opinion.

Major Daly, it will be seen, reduces the net annual loss to the Government on working expenses to the basis of a 10 per cent. subsidy to Indian and, to a lesser extent, British, export trade to Persia by this railway. This is an original and interesting point. Apart from this, however, I have the impression that, broadly speaking, both Indian and British interests stand to lose considerably if the railway is given up, and that the chief gainer would be Soviet trade.

I do not wish it to be inferred from this that every effort should not be made to induce the Persian Government to adopt a reasonable attitude and, if possible, to share part of the present loss on the railway.

R. H. C.

Enclosure in No. 76.

Consul Daly to Sir R. Clive.(No. 60. Confidential.)
Sir,*Seistan and Kain, Camp Birjand,
August 19, 1929.*

REPORT on the Nushki-Duzdap Railway.

In accordance with the instructions conveyed in your Excellency's telegram No. 23 (No. 10 to Duzdap) of the 30th July, 1929, I have the honour to report as under:—

(1.) *General Economic Position.*

The following figures for the financial year 1928-29 have been obtained from the North-Western Railway Headquarters, Lahore. Separate figures for each section of the line were requested, in order that it might be possible to differentiate between the portions in British and Persian territory:—

	Gross earnings. Rupees.	Working expenses. Rupees.	Net loss. Rupees.
Indian section—			
Nushki-Dalbandin	247,777	525,900	278,123
Dalbandin-Mirjawa	272,493	863,798	591,305
Persian section—			
Mirjawa-Duzdap	777,870	814,601	36,731
	1,298,140	2,204,299	906,159

Figures for the first eight months of 1927 disclosed a similar annual loss of approximately 8 lakhs of rupees. It is probable that a certain reduction of maintenance expenses could be effected if the Persians were to permit the free removal of stone for ballast from the Duzdap quarries (originally started by the railway). The facility might at least be demanded for the Persian section.

Decrease in goods traffic by this line is without doubt principally due to the crushing taxation imposed on imports. Such decrease cannot, however, be confined to importations by the Nushki route, and must have resulted on all frontiers. Tea and sugar, however, form the greater part of goods traffic, and these commodities (and also tobacco) are particularly affected by the monopoly taxes. The recorded figures for imports of these "monopoly" commodities into Persia probably bear little relation to the real quantities imported, since it is well known that smuggling is largely resorted to all along the Persian Gulf sea-board. Goods imported via the railway cannot escape the customs, and so it is easily to be understood that import of the monopoly goods via the railway suffers in particular. As no change of fiscal policy can be looked for, much increase of traffic in sugar, tea and tobacco cannot be anticipated.

A further set-back to trade via the Duzdap route has been given by the extremely unfavourable rate of exchange between India and Persia. This cannot be permanent and some revival may be expected when the rate improves.

(2.) *Value of the Railway to Persia.*(a.) *Strategic.*

It has been readily acknowledged by Persian military commanders that the successful operations in Persian Baluchistan, which culminated in the subjugation of Dost Mohamed, could not have been carried out but for the assistance afforded by the Government of India. Such assistance could not have been given but for the existence of the railway. In the event of further disturbances in Baluchistan it is inconceivable that the Central Government would be in a position to deal with the situation were the railway non-existent. The maintenance of good order in Persian Baluchistan is a matter in which the Government of India are interested, inasmuch as effective control by the Central Government minimises the dangers of raids into British territory and the consequent diplomatic friction liable to result therefrom. This being so, it can be assumed that His Majesty's Government would always be prepared to afford such assistance as might be in their power, by supply of war-stores, rations, &c., for the use of a Persian force operating in South-East Persia for the maintenance of the authority of the Central Government. Were the railway to cease to exist, the line of supply from India by road would be as lengthy and difficult as existing lines of communication within Persia, and effective assistance could not be

given. The railway has been of considerable service to the Persian military authorities for the transport of troops between Mirjawa and Duzdap, and was freely used during the operations in Baluchistan.

In the event of a subsequent extension by Decauville line to Seistan, it would be of inestimable use for the rapid transport of Persian troops towards the Afghan frontier. To move any large body of troops to Seistan under existing conditions would in all probability be quite beyond the resources of the Persian army.

(b.) *Economic.*

The railway encourages traders to import via Duzdap. Goods are controlled with great ease there by the customs authorities, and the expenses of "collection" of customs dues reduced to a minimum.

Smuggling is much resorted to in South Baluchistan and in the Persian Gulf. The absence of risk, speed and facility of importation by the railway renders it preferable to traders to import goods by that means, although it involves payment of customs. As a result smuggling on the eastern frontier is practically non-existent and the maintenance of an expensive "protection" service is unnecessary. If the railway were removed, and recourse to expensive and slow transport with its attendant risks unavoidable, it is highly probable that many importers would run the extra risk of smuggling goods over the frontier. The land frontier between Persia and Baluchistan would be extremely difficult to guard and an extremely expensive customs preventive force would be necessary.

Persian customs receipts at Duzdap have been as follows:—

Year.	Millions of Krans.	Year.	Millions of Krans.
1920-21	3.3	1925-26	8.4
1921-22	5.45	1926-27	10.2
1922-23	8.00	1927-28	7.9
1923-24	10.00	1928-29	8.9

In this connexion it is interesting to note that an estimate of the total value of imports and exports via Koh-i-Malik Siah (the Persian customs post), before the railway was constructed, was 4.5 million krans. Customs revenue derivable from goods of this value, even at present rates in force, would not amount to half a million krans. It is almost a certainty that if the railway ceased to function the Persian customs receipts from trade via the Nushki route would dwindle to considerably less than half the present-day figure, and costs of collection would enormously increase.

But for the railway, the town of Duzdap would cease to exist. It quickly sprang up at rail-head, and would equally rapidly disappear. What the commitments of the Persian Government and its nationals amount to at Duzdap is difficult to judge, but they cannot be negligible to a State in the financial condition of Persia. There is a steadily increasing revenue from taxation at Duzdap.

Assuming that the Central Government intends to maintain and extend its control in Persian Baluchistan, the cost of living of its officials, rationing of garrisons, and of public works, would inevitably increase if the facility of importation of goods by rail were to cease. All public buildings in Baluchistan are largely constructed of materials imported by rail by the contractors.

The potentialities of Seistan as a grain-producing area, with resultant advantage to the revenues, are immense, and although the Central Government is probably financially incapable of much development of the Seistan Province at present, the idea of a "Decauville" line from Duzdap to Seistan has been flirted with. The cessation of the Nushki-Duzdap line would entail abandonment of all hope of the development of Seistan in the future.

To recapitulate, the railway confers the following economic advantages on Persia:—

1. Increase of customs receipts at Duzdap from roughly half million to 9 or 10 million krans per annum.
2. Smuggling reduced to a minimum and costs of collection of revenue extremely low.
3. The cost of control of Persian Baluchistan will be far less than if no rail existed.
4. The town of Duzdap is continually growing. It may in time act as a centre for trade in Baluchistan and a factor in encouraging the Baluchis to turn to trade and adopt more settled forms of livelihood—an object the Government is said to desire.

(3.) *Value to India Economically.*

The loss under which the railway is operating has been referred to in paragraph 1. The following figures have been compiled with a view to ascertaining the value of the trade in the interests of which such loss is incurred:—

	Krans.
Total value of annual imports by the Nushki-Duzdap Railway	43,399,616
1. Imports from United Kingdom	7,309,529
2. Imports from India	28,023,056
3. Imports from foreign countries	8,067,031
	43,399,616

Figures under 1 may be regarded as reliable. Those under 2 undoubtedly include certain goods of Japanese and other origin re-exported from India, but it would be safe to assume that some 25 million krans represents the value of Indian trade. The value of Empire goods carried is therefore in round figures 32,400,000, and that of foreign goods 11 million krans, or approximately 81 lakhs and 27½ lakhs of rupees respectively, the goods of British origin being roughly three-quarters of the total. We may, then, regard the working loss on the railway of 8 lakhs per annum as incurred in the interests of Empire trade of 81 lakhs value, being, in fact, a subsidy of 10 per cent. Whether such a subsidy is economically worth while I am insufficiently expert to judge.

In this connexion we cannot, however, afford to lose sight of the considerable increase of activity on the part of the U.S.S.R. to push Soviet trade in East Persia, south of Meshed. Khorasan, from its proximity to Russia, must always be a stronghold of Russian trade; but hitherto we have held our own at Birjand and south thereof. Subsidised Russian trade in oil, piece-goods and sugar already compete at Birjand and Seistan with imports from India via Duzdap. The Russians are known to be attempting to push their trade as far south as Duzdap, and will open a new line of attack via Chahbar as soon as the contemplated Chahbar-Bampur road is constructed. With the help of the railway British trade should be able to hold its own, and eventually drive the subsidised Russian trade out of the market south of Birjand. The loss of the railway would completely alter the situation. Before the railway existed, South-East Persia was easier of access by the trade routes with India than from Meshed. Now a quite passable road exists, and motor vehicles are plentiful. If the railway were withdrawn, Seistan, Duzdap and North Baluchistan would be within easier reach of Meshed than India, and we must envisage the extinction of British trade in East Persia. The political aspect, the loss of prestige to ourselves and gain of influence by the U.S.S.R. nearer India than has ever been possible in the past, are matters which perhaps do not suitably fall within the scope of this report.

The effective reply to the Russian attack would appear to be maintenance of the railway and a subsidy in the form of low freight charges, until such time as the subsidised Russian trade ceases to exist in the south.

It has been advanced by the railway authorities in India that even a considerable decrease in freight charges would not materially affect cost of goods in Persia, since the principal cost of importation is due to the high customs tariff. In the event of the Persians agreeing to share a portion of the loss on the railway, it would perhaps be in their own interests as well as ours if they could be induced, if not to reduce customs on goods imported by rail, which it is improbable they would agree to, to at least assist by foregoing "Rahdari" on goods so imported, in consideration of reduced charges on the railway. The increase of trade which might well result would in all probability reimburse the railway for reduced charges, and to a still greater degree benefit the Persian Customs and compensate for any sacrifice of Rahdari.

(4.) *Effect on Foreign Staff of Abolition of Capitulations.*

I find it a very difficult matter to afford any useful information on this matter. Since the abolition of the Capitulations there has been no regular Persian court of law at Duzdap, and such matters as have arisen, concerning the railway staff, have

been settled, when practicable, by negotiations between His Majesty's vice-consulate and the Military Governor for the time being.

Cases have occurred of Persians travelling on the railway without tickets, and the railway authorities have applied to His Majesty's vice-consul to effect recovery of the fares. As the amounts involved have been trifling, I have recently instructed His Majesty's vice-consul not to press for recovery at this juncture, when negotiations *re* the railway are pending. It seemed to me to be inadvisable to constantly raise petty questions of this nature locally, while the whole position is so anomalous. The Persians would not recognise the railway laws, as existing in India; His Majesty's vice-consul could not with propriety act as plaintiff in a Persian court to recover railway fares on behalf of the railway.

In the event of the continuation of the railway, under agreement with the Persians, it would seem highly necessary for some machinery to be devised for safeguarding the legal rights of the railway and its employees. If the line is to be operated on a "partnership" basis—Persia contributing a portion of its upkeep, the management continuing in the hands of the North-Western Railway, it would seem necessary that the existing railway laws should have force over the Persian section. It would be quite impracticable for the administration of such laws to be in the hands of a Persian court. It is not difficult to imagine the inconvenience to the railway if, for instance, in the event of a fracas between a Persian traveller and the railway officials, such a case had to be heard in a Persian court at Duzdap. The railway officials concerned would be interminably delayed at Duzdap. An official operating a train might conceivably be arrested by the Persians on some charge, and the working of the line delayed or even imperilled. I can only offer as a suggestion that the Persians should agree to the application of the law as it exists in India in relation to railways, and that all transgressions of railway regulations, or offences committed on trains in the Persian section, within the railway precincts at Duzdap and Mirjawa, should be referred to some form of tribunal, which might, for example, consist of His Majesty's vice-consul, Duzdap, and a Persian official deputed for such cases. As regards civil or criminal cases involving railway officials permanently stationed at Duzdap, and which originate outside the railway premises, it would be difficult to contend that they should likewise be referred to such a tribunal, since it would confer a special status on railway officials, and probably be repugnant to Persian national pride.

Some arrangement would be essential for the recognition of the railway station enclosures, trains and the permanent way, as a legal "neutral strip," in which the tribunal suggested would alone have jurisdiction and Persian laws would not be enforced. This would overcome such difficulty as that now presented by the recent Persian Passport Law. As it now exists, every employee of the railway would need to obtain a visa every time he entered the Persian section—a manifest impossibility. Under the arrangement suggested, railway personnel could visit all parts of the line and the stations in Persian territory without such restrictions. They would, of course, need the usual visa to leave the line (outside certain reasonable limits) or stations. The passport question is only an example of the countless small difficulties which are liable to arise, as at any time the Persians are capable of producing laws and regulations which would be vexatious and troublesome to railway personnel and travellers on the line. If on every occasion such matters have to be the subject of fresh negotiations, the existence of the railway may be a constant cause of friction. Some such arrangement as that suggested would appear to minimise causes of friction and difficulties in carrying on the routine of the line.

If I have in this report advanced views or made suggestions which were uncalled for in your Excellency's telegram, it is because a perusal of the files in this consulate and His Majesty's vice-consulate at Duzdap, and the experience of my predecessors and of His Majesty's vice-consuls at Duzdap, of which I find record, have convinced me of the multifarious difficulties likely to occur in an attempt to operate a railway on Persian soil under Indian regulations, or inadequate Persian laws, and with Indian personnel. This alone induced me to offer suggestions, which practical experience of such difficulties in the past leads me to believe might obviate friction with the Persians in the future.

A copy of this despatch is being forwarded to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department.

I have, &c.

C. K. DALY, Major.

[E 4700/52/91]

No. 77.

Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received September 16.)

(No. 454.)

Sir,

Tehran, August 31, 1929.

IN continuation of my despatch No. 439 of the 21st August, I have the honour to report that at an interview with the Minister of Court on the 27th August his Highness said that he wished to discuss article 8 of the draft treaty in so far as it related to the ownership of Tamb and Abu Musa.

2. He said that the population of Tamb, according to his information, was approximately sixty persons, of whom thirty were Arabs and thirty were Persians, and at Abu Musa forty, of whom thirty were Arabs and ten Persians. Of the two islands, Tamb, which was much nearer to the Persian than to the Arab coast, was much the most important from the point of view of the Persian Government, for the very definite reason that the Government were convinced that Tamb was used by the Arabs as a regular depot for smuggling and not merely as a casual place of call by smugglers.

3. It was therefore of vital importance to the Persian Government to be in a position to control this centre of the smuggling trade. What importance, he asked, had this small island for the Sheikh of Shargah other than to use it for this illicit traffic? In these circumstances he was not prepared to accept article 8 of the draft treaty, especially as the Persian Government had never admitted the claim of the Sheikh of Shargah to this island and persisted in their own claim.

4. I replied that the Persian claim to these islands was of a most flimsy nature and appeared merely to rest on the fact that the Island of Tamb was considerably nearer to the Persian coast than to the Arab coast. I said that the French Government might just as well apply this argument to the Channel Islands.

5. His Majesty's Government in their capacity as the protecting Power of the Trucial Sheikhs could not be expected to sacrifice territory which they were satisfied belonged to these sheikhs without their consent, and there was no reason to suppose that the Sheikh of Shargah would consent to hand these islands over to the Persian Government. Why could we not, he then asked, leave the Persian Government to deal directly with the sheikh? I enquired what he meant by this. Were the Persian Government prepared to offer a sum of money in purchase of the islands? Certainly not, he replied. I said that if the Persian Government intended to try and seize the islands this would create a most serious incident. As he himself had admitted, His Majesty's ships in the Persian Gulf were there to maintain peace and order, and peace and order could only be maintained if the just rights of the Arab sheikhs were upheld.

6. The impression I gained from this conversation was that Taimourtache would have liked us to have proposed a deal whereby the Persian Government kept Tamb and left Abu Musa to the Sheikh of Shargah. I naturally made no such suggestion nor gave his Highness in any way to understand that His Majesty's Government would give way on the question of the ownership of Tamb.

7. On the other hand, assuming that his Highness is correct in saying that Tamb is used as a regular depot for smuggling, it is only natural that the Persian Government are anxious to stop this. It appears to me, therefore, that if the Persian Government were prepared to offer a sum of money which would be acceptable to the Sheikh of Shargah to purchase the island outright, this might afford a solution of the question.

8. I should be glad to learn as soon as possible the views of the Government of India and the Resident in the Persian Gulf on this suggestion.

Copies of this despatch have been sent to the Government of India, His Majesty's acting consul-general at Bushire and to the senior naval officer in the Persian Gulf.

I have, &c.

R. H. CLIVE.

[E 4701/4701/34]

No. 78.

Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received September 16.)

(No. 455.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of despatch No. 52 from His Majesty's consul-general, Meshed, dated the 31st August, on the subject of impressions of Persia carried back to India by the Indians who visit Meshed on pilgrimage.

Tehran, September 4, 1929.

Enclosure 1 in No. 78.

Consul-General Law to Sir R. Clive.

(No. 52.)

HIS Britannic Majesty's consul-general, Meshed, presents his compliments to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran, and transmits a copy of Meshed despatch No. 64-C dated the 27th August, 1929, to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India respecting impressions of this country carried back to India by the Indians who visit Meshed on pilgrimage.

Meshed, August 31, 1929.

Enclosure 2 in No. 78.

Consul-General Law to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India (Simla).

Sir,

Meshed, August 27, 1929.

IN view of the large number of Indians who visit Meshed on pilgrimage, it may be of interest to the Government of India to know what sort of impressions of this country they take back with them to India. I have the honour therefore to submit the following notes on the subject:—

2. The number of Indians who visit Meshed is roughly a hundred a month on an average throughout the year. They come mostly from Karachi, Bombay, the Punjab and the United Provinces; a very few from Baluchistan and Bihar and Orissa; about 5 per cent. from Madras. They represent a variety of classes, but mostly zemindars. Officials, whether of native states or of Government, represent from 20 to 25 per cent.; Indian officers and soldiers anything from 5 to 10 per cent. A large portion of the Indian visitors to Meshed are educated men, who observe carefully what they see here, who visit Persians and discuss affairs with them freely, and who are interested to compare conditions in India with those in Persia. Sometimes they stay as long as three or four months in Meshed and are able, therefore, to form more than hasty first impressions. A great many of them call at this consulate during their stay in Meshed and discuss with me frankly the condition of affairs here as it strikes them. They all seem to come to Meshed with a preconceived notion of Persia derived mainly from what they read in the papers or from accounts of this country given them by Persians visiting India. They return to India frank, and, on the whole, decidedly unfavourable critics of this country. I can best illustrate the general opinion formed of Persia and the Persians by these Indian visitors if I quote two conversations I recently had, one with an Extra-Assistant Commissioner from Multan, the other with an Indian officer of the Sindh Horse from Quetta—conversations which are typical of many others I have had.

3. Sayed Qasim Ali Shah, an Extra-Assistant Commissioner of Multan District, has been four months in Meshed. This is his first visit to Persia, but he had previously entertained many Persians at his home in Multan. He had there formed the impression that the Persians were a go-ahead people, that the country was progressing rapidly in every direction under the reforming influence of the new Shah. I have seen him

frequently during his stay in Meshed, and each time he comes to see me he seems to be more disillusioned. He is now returning to India via Kerbela and Najaf, thankful to shake the dust of Persia off his feet. The one good thing about the country, in his opinion, is the security of the roads.* He also praised the management of the Shrine here, which after all is a very important point for pilgrims. The Mutawalli Bashi, who controls the Shrine on behalf of the Shah, strikes him as honest and capable, anxious to get things done well and ready to help foreign visitors in every way possible. The Mutawalli Bashi gave him facilities to see the Shrine library, hospital and orphanage—the last named a comparatively new institution presided over by a Turkish lady doctor. He considered these institutions to be well managed in every way. For the rest he stated quite bluntly his opinion that “there was neither honesty nor truth nor morality in this country.” The officials, without any exception, he described as corrupt. The military he found obliging and pleasant whenever he chanced to meet them, and he stated that they “kept out of all rows and intrigues,” and did not interfere in matters not their own concern. Of the police, however (and it is with the police that Indians and all foreigners have most to do), he had nothing but abuse: “uncivilised, dishonest, discourteous, unfriendly and anxious to give trouble to Indians.” The attitude of the police, he says, is quite frankly hostile. “This is a new Persia,” they say to the Indians. “You will find it is altered now; no more concessions and no more preferential treatment for your people.” He considered Meshed not only the most immoral, but the dirtiest town he had ever seen. He has yet to visit Kerbela.

4. Jemadar Sayed Ryaz Hussain of the Sindh Horse is himself a resident of Mianwali District. He did not spend so long a time in Meshed, but had formed very clear-cut views about Persia before he came to see me, and expressed them with a directness and incisiveness which I imagine would leave a very strong impression among his listeners when he gets home. He considered the favourable accounts of Persian progress which he had read in the newspapers in India to be deliberately false propaganda spread abroad with the object of making Indians discontented with the British connexion and disposed to the same blessings of “Swaraj” as Persia enjoys. Jemadar Sayed Ryaz Hussain said that he received his first impressions of the real Persia on the road between Duzdap and Meshed. The execrable surface of the road and the twisted, irregular stumps of trees that did duty for telegraph-poles along the road were, in his opinion, typical of the general inefficiency of the country. But what struck him most unfavourably was the unfriendliness and cupidity of the ordinary Persian. On the road to Meshed the lorry in which he and his family and some other Indians were travelling overturned. They waited on the roadside till another lorry came up, and asked the driver and two or three other Persians to help them to right their lorry. The Persians, he said, refused to lend a hand till the Jemadar had paid over 5 tomans in cash. He never got over, and he never will get over, his disgust at this treatment. By such things are nations judged! It is the same or even worse in Meshed, he went on. In the course of his stay in Meshed he had not met a single honest or decent Persian; from responsible officials down to the pettiest trader or Shrine officials, they were all out to loot their Indian co-religionists. He added that, in his opinion, the worst thing about Persian life was the unfriendliness of the Persian, not only towards foreigners, but towards themselves. No one trusted or helped or wished well to his neighbour.

5. Both Sayed Qasim Ali Shah and Jemadar Sayed Ryaz Hussain said that they thought it their duty when they went back to India to tell people quite frankly what they thought the real Persia was like. I have no doubt that these unfavourable impressions are shared by 90 per cent. of the Indians who come to Meshed. The effect on Jemadar Sayed Ryaz Hussain was to make him thankful that “Swaraj” had not yet been introduced in India, because, he said, “if India gets complete ‘Swaraj,’ it will sink to the level of Persia within six months.”

6. Most Indians whom I have seen are struck by what they consider the unpopularity of the present régime and by the general poverty and discontent they see round them; a few of them by the gross delays in the administration of justice; all of them by the extent to which—as they see it—officialdom encroaches on the liberty of the subject, especially in the notorious matter of the compulsory headgear. They cannot understand how the Persians tolerate this. Not having been in Persia before, they do not realise that many of the evils they observe are no novelty; and having no acquaintance with Kajar Persia they take no account of any directions in which there has been some progress. They judge Persia by the only real standard of comparison

* Lately, however, round Meshed and notably on the Meshed-Tehran road, there is anything but security on the roads.

they have—namely, India; or by the purely imaginative and coloured picture they had in their minds before they came to see facts as they are. The extent of the difference between the two is the extent of their disillusion and disappointment.

7. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran.

I have, &c.

H. D. G. LAW.

[E 4703/96/34]

No. 79.

Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received September 16.)

(No. 459. Confidential.)

Sir,

Gulhek, September 4, 1929.

IN my despatch No. 351 of the 29th June I had the honour to report the arrest and degradation of Prince Firuz, the Minister of Finance. The prince is still under detention in his house, and Farzin, for some months Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs and recently Acting Minister of Finance, has now received the substantive appointment of Minister of Finance.

2. Another perhaps even more important Cabinet appointment is that recorded in my telegram No. 310 of the 2nd September, of General Karim Agha as Minister of Public Works.

3. Now the disappearance of Prince Firuz and the appointment of General Karim Agha may have a profound influence on the course of Persian politics. When in February 1927 the then Persian Cabinet was reconstituted it was very soon realised that, apart from questions connected with the army, the control of the whole machinery of Government was centred in three men, Taimourtache, the Minister of Court, who was outside the Cabinet but yet dominated it; Prince Firuz, the Minister of Finance; and Daver, Minister of Justice. These three men were intimate friends and for more than two years completely controlled the situation; it was an open secret, however, that Prince Firuz, who, with his shady past had never been popular in the country, had an ever-growing number of enemies; in fact, his continued presence in the Cabinet solely rested on the unwavering support of Taimourtache. There were three noted opponents of Prince Firuz, General Karim Agha, the head of the Municipality of Tehran; General Mohamed Khan, the Chief of the Police; and General Shaibani, a former Chief of the General Staff, now acting as Military Governor of Fars and Commander-in-chief of the troops in that province. All three men were intimate friends of the Shah, and while the downfall of Prince Firuz was their chief objective none of them had any special affection for the Minister of Court.

4. As reported in my despatch No. 351 of the 29th June, His Majesty suddenly and unexpectedly, during the absence in Mazanderan of Taimourtache, degraded Prince Firuz, and there is little doubt that this was done mainly at the instigation of these generals and on no definite pretext. Taimourtache was undoubtedly shaken when he learnt the news of Firuz's downfall; Firuz was not only a lifelong friend, but far the cleverest speaker in the Majlis, upon whom Taimourtache could always rely to defend his policy. Moreover, Firuz, knowing that he depended on the goodwill of the Minister of Court, could be counted on to do what he was told and not to strike out on any new line independently.

5. The whole policy of Taimourtache has been to have a Cabinet entirely subservient to himself. I have good reason to believe that when Faruki, the present Ambassador in Angora, returned on leave in the end of July, the Shah wished to make him Minister for Foreign Affairs. This did not at all suit Taimourtache, who succeeded in dissuading His Majesty by urging that Faruki's work at Angora and at Geneva was at present far too important to be confided to anybody else. Similarly, he opposed the appointment to the Ministry of Finance of anyone who would not be entirely under his orders. In this he succeeded when Farzin, who can only be described as a polite nonentity, was appointed acting Minister; the impression naturally prevailed that Taimourtache had succeeded in reasserting his authority and was as powerful as ever. But for two or three weeks past rumours have been prevalent that the Minister of Court had never really regained with His Majesty the authority which he had before the arrest of Prince Firuz, and consequently the appointment, a few days ago, of General Karim Agha as Minister of Public Works was looked upon as confirming the truth of these rumours. The general is an illiterate and uneducated soldier, with considerable native shrewdness and tenacity

of purpose and a dog-like devotion to the Shah, who has a great personal liking for him. The weak-kneed but likable Djem, who was but a lukewarm supporter of the railway project, has been relegated to Khorasan, and there is little doubt that if the Shah is determined, in spite of financial considerations, to insist on the railway being built, he will find in General Karim Agha a devoted servant to carry out the policy, and financial considerations will not count. But the very fact of the general's presence in the Cabinet will mean that in future the latter can no longer be dominated to the same extent by the Minister of Court, and it is somewhat ominous that the three men now most highly in favour are all of them generals.

6. From the point of view of our treaty negotiations, I consider that the disappearance at the present moment of the Minister of Court would be fatal; however, it is too early to talk of his disappearance; he is so clever and has made himself so indispensable to the Shah that he may yet find a way of trimming his sails to meet the present turn of affairs.

7. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India.

I have, &c.
R. H. CLIVE.

[E 4704/95/34]

No. 80.

Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson. — (Received September 16.)

(No. 461. Confidential.)

Sir,

Gulhek, September 7, 1929.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith a copy of a despatch, No. 53 of the 27th ultimo, which I have received from the acting consul at Shiraz. Mr. Davis's impressions of the state of uncertainty now existing in the south is borne out by all the reports which reach me. Amir Lashkar Shaibani left Tehran by aeroplane to return to Shiraz on the 30th August. I hear that the Shah told the general to come to Tehran once a month to report progress in person.

2. Regarding the second paragraph of Mr. Davis's despatch, one serious effect of the continued brigandage on the road south of Shiraz is that the Imperial Bank of Persia, who have some 600,000 silver tomans at Bushire awaiting despatch to Tehran, cannot move the money. The military will not supply a safe escort, and the cost of moving it by aeroplane would be as high as 2½ per cent. Mr. D'Alton tells me that if security on this road is not shortly restored the silver position may become serious.

3. Current Tehran rumours indicate that Ali Khan has forwarded to the military authorities an ultimatum of twelve conditions, including no interference with the Kashgai tribe by any troops, no taxation for seven years, no conscription and of course no surrender of arms. All this tends to show that the Kashgai troubles are still far from being settled, even if there is unlikely to be serious fighting.

4. I am sending copies of this despatch, with its enclosure, to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, His Majesty's High Commissioner for Iraq and to His Majesty's consul-general at Bushire.

I have, &c.
R. H. CLIVE.

Enclosure in No. 80.

Acting Consul Davis to Sir R. Clive.

(No. 53.)

Sir,

Shiraz, August 27, 1929.

IN continuation of my despatch No. 52 of the 21st August, I have the honour to report that the situation in Fars has remained essentially unchanged during the past week.

2. On the Shiraz-Isfahan road no robberies or disturbances have been reported; but the Shiraz-Bushire road has been anything but safe. On the night of Thursday, the 22nd August, a mail car was attacked near the Amnieh post at Chinar Rahdar,

10 miles west of Shiraz. One Amnieh guard was killed, another seriously wounded, and some bales of goods were looted. On the 22nd August it was reported from Kazerun that robbers attacked a motor lorry coming from Bushire about 2 miles north of Dalaki on the previous afternoon and took away a quantity of loaf-sugar. Amnieh guards from Dalaki were sent in pursuit of the robbers, but failed to overtake them, and one of the Amnieh men died from excessive heat.

3. On the road from Shiraz south-eastward towards Fasa robberies have also taken place, and one village near Kushk-i-Maidan, only 4 miles from Shiraz, was attacked at night and some 2,000 sheep and cattle carried off by robbers.

4. It is reported that Yavar Muhammad Taqi Khan 'Arab has asked for reinforcements to be sent out to Fasa, where he already had 1,500 men; 700 men, infantry and cavalry, accordingly left for Fasa on the 25th August. Four hundred men have also been sent out to the Baiza district to keep in check the Boir Ahmadi Lurs, under Sartip Khan, whose depredations were mentioned in paragraph 4 of my despatch No. 52. Sartip Khan, with a following of about 2,000 men, is now encamped at Tang-i-Tir, between Baiza and Ardakan. The Government troops have not attempted to attack the Boir Ahmadi, nor are they expected to do so. Owing to these movements of troops, Shiraz is almost denuded of forces; the number available is believed to be about 600, of whom 400 are in town and 200 on outpost duty.

5. Amir Lashkar Habibullah Khan Shaibani left Shiraz secretly yesterday morning, the 26th August, at 5 A.M., by military plane for Tehran. His going is not yet a matter of public knowledge in Shiraz.

6. Saulat-ud-Dauleh, whose going to Fathabad was reported in paragraph 1 of my despatch No. 52, returned to Shiraz on the 23rd August. It transpires that he went out to interview his half-brother, 'Ali Khan, who was lying ill near Kavar. 'Ali Khan has now recovered from his illness, but is still in Kavar with only forty personal guards. He has, however, ordered the fighting men of the Shishbuluki and Farsimadan tribes to reassemble south of the Bushire-Shiraz road. These two tribes never went to their summer grazing grounds at all this season. Meanwhile, the Darashuri and Kashkuli tribes, who had gone to Semiran, alarmed at the fact that the trouble in Bakhtiari has been patched up, and fearing that troops may be rushed back to Fars to attack them while they are separated from the other Kashgai tribes, have begun their southward migration two months before the usual time. They have already reached Ardakan and are expected to reach the Bushire-Shiraz road in twenty days' time.

7. It is reported that the Persian Government, in the person of Amir Lashkar Habibullah Khan Shaibani, are not satisfied with the results of the Saulat's liberation and his attempts at mediation. At first he was able to secure some measure of peace and security, but now the province is in disorder once more. The Saulat says that he has done his best, but that the Government promised to release his eldest son, Nasir Khan, and the tribes will never rest until they get Nasir Khan, however much he, the Saulat, may exercise his diminished influence in the interests of peace and order. It is probable that General Shaibani has gone to Tehran, as stated in paragraph 4 above, to explain the situation and to seek instructions. The outlook, it must be admitted, is very black, as the Government have in Fars nothing like the force required to keep the tribes in order, and at the same time the Government's prestige is at a very low ebb owing to its visible failure to chastise the Bakhtiari, the Kashgais, the Khamseh Arabs, and even petty rebel tribes like the Boir Ahmadi and the Mamasannis and the independent robber bands which infest the Bushire road.

8. It is to be feared that this confessed weakness of the Persian Government may incite the tribes to attempt a big effort; but, on the other hand, they do not like fighting during the rainy season, and the Kashgais at least are still short of ammunition.

9. A copy of this despatch has been sent to His Majesty's consul-general, Isfahan, and His Majesty's consul, Ahwaz, for information.

I have, &c.
A. W. DAVIS.

Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received September 16.)

(No. 467.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 18 for the period ending the 7th September, compiled by the military attaché to this Legation.

Tehran, September 8, 1929.

Enclosure in No. 81.

Intelligence Summary No. 18 for the period ending September 7, 1929.

(No. 94/35. Secret.)

Tehran.

1. *Persian Officials.*—Mirza Mohamed Khan Djam having been appointed Governor-General of Khorassan, left Tehran on the 29th August to take up the appointment. He has formerly held this post, which became vacant on the appointment of Taqizadeh as Persian Minister in London.

Sartip Karim Agha Khan, acting president of the Tehran Municipality, has been appointed Minister of Public Works, vice Mirza Mohamed Khan Djam, above.

M. Hovannes Khan, late Persian Minister in London, has been appointed Persian Minister in Tokyo.

Mirza Mohammed Ali Khan Farzin, acting Minister of Finance, has been confirmed in the appointment as from the 1st September, 1929.

2. *Railways.*—In the south, 90 kilom. of rails have been laid, mostly to the north of Ahwaz. To the south of Ahwaz the construction of bridges is the main work in preference to the laying of rails on completed portions. When the ground is ready rails can be laid at the rate of 1 kilom. a day. At Ahwaz itself there is a triangle of lines, one branch into Ahwaz from the south and one from the north, and the direct line which avoids Ahwaz. Work on the steel bridge over the Karun is proceeding. When this is built the area between the piers will be filled up, thus constructing a dam over which the road will run. The bridge is expected to be ready by the end of February. It is hoped that the Bander Shahpur section will be ready by November of this year, and the line from the port to Dizful (210 kilom.) by April 1930.

A second wharf is under construction at Bander-i-Shahpur.

3. *Banks.*—Branches of the National Bank of Persia have been opened at Shiraz, Meshed, Resht, Ahwaz and Kerman.

The Russian Bank proposes to open branches in Shiraz and Sari.

4. *Treaties.*—The Perso-Norwegian treaty has been extended one year to the 30th December, 1930.

Treaties are under consideration between the Persian Government and the Hungarian and Austrian Governments.

5. *Air Service.*—The Junkers Company have now arranged a bi-weekly service between Tehran and Bagdad with effect from the 12th September.

6. *Education.*—Over 100 Persian students will leave in the middle of September via Russia to complete their education in European countries in various subjects.

7. *Motor Transport.*—The following motor vehicles were imported into Persia during the year March 1928 to March 1929:—

Country of Origin.	Cars.	Lorries, Light and Heavy.
United Kingdom	96	28
United States of America	1,403	1,476
France	32	107
Germany	8	78
Italy	21	11
Unclassified	9	9
Total	1,569	1,709

8. *Roads.*—25,000 tomans has been sanctioned for the construction of the road to Shamshak. So far the road is through for motor traffic a little beyond Lashkarak, 10 miles north-east of Tehran (16½ miles by road).

9. A sum of 55,000 tomans is being asked for road construction in Mazandaran. This is additional to the amount already sanctioned for expenditure on the coastal road.

10. The coastal road between Resht and Meshed-i-Sar has been generally passable for cars for the past three months. It is not an easy road, and is unfit for commercial motor transport. Twenty-two bridges have been made between Rud-i-Sar and Meshed-i-Sar. There are still two places where it is necessary to make use of ferries.

11. Further details of the Pahlavi-Astara road show that this road will suffer from the same difficulties of sand and bog as the Resht-Meshed-i-Sar road. It is reported to be fit for wheeled traffic from Khan Rud (south of Astara) to Kerganrud. Work is also being done from the Pahlavi end. The total distance is given as 134 kilom., of which 73 kilom. are said to be fit for wheeled traffic. It is also stated that of the seventy-three necessary bridges only one or two have been made. It is possible that these 73 kilom. are split up by unbridged gaps.

12. The following is an extract from the annual report received from His Majesty's consul at Seistan:—

As a result of the occupation by the Persian Government of the province of Persian Baluchistan, the following roads have been completed for motor traffic:

Duzdap-Mirjawa.
Duzdap-Gwarkoh-Shurab-Fahreli.
Gwarkoh-Khwash.
Shurab-Bam.

13. *Upkeep of Old Roads.*—Very little work was done during the year on the main Duzdap-Meshed road. Only a few breaches made by the winter rains being repaired. These during the summer form sandy nullahs which cause inconvenience to drivers of motor vehicles. Only one small gang of about ten men appeared to be regularly employed on the stretch of 78 miles between Safidawa and Shusp. No attempt whatsoever has been made to improve the road between Seistan and Dorabi, the junction of the Meshed-Duzdap main road. This stretch is about 78 miles in length, and is in an appalling condition. During February and March, Seistan was practically isolated by a heavy overflow of the Helmand, which flooded the country for miles.

14. It may be noticed that road construction is one of the foremost policies of the Government.

Fars.

15. Amir Lashkar Shaibani paid a flying visit to Tehran on the 26th August and returned to Shiraz on the 30th August. The object of his visit appears to have been to explain the present situation and to ask for orders for the future. The Shiraz-Isfahan road has lately become safer, but robberies continue on the Shiraz-Bushire road and the Shiraz-Fasa road. A village only 4 miles from Shiraz was attacked on the night of the 25th August and 2,000 sheep carried away. The military appear to be active in attempting to stop robberies, but the task is beyond their power. Yawar Mohamed Taqi Khan has asked for reinforcements to be sent to Fasa—he already has 1,500 troops there—and in consequence 700 cavalry and infantry left Shiraz for Fasa on the 25th August; 400 have also been sent to the Baiza district to watch the Boir Ahmad Lurs, who are led by Sartip Khan. The latter is in the vicinity of Tang-i-Tir, between Baiza and Ardakan, with a large following. Shiraz itself is now very short of troops, only about 600 being left there, of whom 200 are on outposts.

Ali Khan has ordered the fighting men of the Shishbuluki and Farsimadan sections of the Qashqais to reassemble south of the Bushire-Shiraz road. The Darashuri and Kushkuli sections have reached Ardakan. The future outlook is not very reassuring. The Government are sending what reinforcements are available, and a quantity of munitions and equipment to Shiraz, but even so there are not nearly sufficient troops available to keep the Fars tribes in order. Government prestige is very low owing to their failure to cope with the Bakhtiari, the Qashqais, the Khamseh Arabs and even petty rebel tribes like the Boir Ahmadis and independent robber gangs. This may incite the tribes to greater efforts, but on the other hand they do

not like fighting in the rainy season, which will soon be approaching, and the Qashqai, at least, are short of ammunition. The situation will become definitely serious should trouble break out elsewhere, i.e., in Persian Baluchistan.

Isfahan.

16. Samsam-es-Sultaneh and Sardars Mohtasham, Fateh and Iqbal returned to Shiraz on the 26th August and proceeded to Tehran, where they were interviewed by the Shah on the 31st August. The Shah asked Sirdar Muhtasim for the latest news about the Bakhtiari, and received the reply that the tribe were not really recalcitrant, but that they had suffered a great deal from the former Military Governor, Naib Sarhang Sadiq Khan. Sardar Muhtasim is reported to have said afterwards that the tribe was not yet satisfied and there was likelihood of further trouble. Ali Mardan Khan is still at large in the Feraidan district with a following of 150 sowars. Khaibar, the notorious brigand, is said to be giving trouble in the vicinity of Urijin, and Sardar Bahadur, brother of Sardar Assad, is on his tracks. It is also reported that a Civil Governor, Mudabbir-ul-Mulk, has been appointed to Chahar Mahal in place of Naib Sarhang Sadiq Khan, the late Military Governor, and that Government troops are shortly to be withdrawn from Chahar Mahal.

17. It is about this season of the year that the tribespeople bring in their produce to pay for piece-goods, &c., which they have already bought, and to pay for fresh stocks. The risings this year have completely stopped the normal course of this business, and as a large part of the Isfahan trade is with the Bakhtiari, and to a lesser extent with the Qashqai, the effect has been severely felt. These circumstances, combined with the troubles over the opium, have produced conditions of greater depression than have been experienced for several years.

Khuzistan.

18. Abdullah, the son of the Sheikh of Mohammerah, has been arrested and sent to Tehran. He was serving as a lieutenant in the army in Khuzistan. The sheikh is not on good terms with his son.

19. His Majesty's consul at Ahwaz reports that the Persian Arabs in his area would like to see Sheikh Chassib return to Mohammerah, and would welcome him as their leader. Sheikh Chassib, who is a son of the Sheikh of Mohammerah, is at present in England, and it is believed by the Arabs that the British Government will not give him permission to return.

Gilan.

20. A through telephone line between Resht and Kazvin is now open.

21. Plans are in progress to bridge the Safid Rud between Resht and Lahijan, near Astaneh. The work is under the supervision of Germans.

22. Conscription has been started in Astarabad, Sadam Rastag and Astarabad Rastag. The quota to be raised is said to be 6,000, but is unlikely to reach that figure.

23. Four hundred troops sent from Gilan to Astarabad last winter have been shipped back to Gilan.

24. It is reported that the Persian Government have purchased a number of lighthouses in the Caspian Sea from the Soviet for 13,000 toman.

Hamadan.

25. On the evening of the 28th August two lorries were attacked by robbers 2 miles north of Burujird. Persian and French nationals were wounded. The Persian Government encourage the use of this road, and it is much used particularly by lorries belonging to Mr. Banister, transport contractor to the Anglo-Persian Oil Company.

26. *Persian Baluchistan.*—Information has been received that the tribes in this area may again give trouble and are considering sending an ultimatum to the Shah for the return of Dost Mohamed from Tehran.

PERCY C. R. DODD, Major,
Military Attaché.

Tehran, September 7, 1929.

[E 4759/58/34]

No. 82.

Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received September 18.)

(No. 316.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, September 16, 1929.

MY despatch No. 439, 21st August, paragraph 5. See also Bagdad confidential despatch to Colonial Office of 2nd September.

Colonel Ward, Director of Basra Port, is here until 17th September. His personal view is that Conservancy Board which it is hoped to form by agreement between Great Britain, Persia and Iraq should in addition to control of navigation in Shatt-el-Arab be charged with superintendence of lighting and buoying throughout the Gulf.

This seems to me *prima facie* good solution, which might appeal to the Persian Government.

In view of lamented death of Sir Gilbert Clayton, which may, I fear, delay discussion between Persia and Iraq, I submit for consideration that I might be authorised to discuss in general terms with Minister of Court the idea of Conservancy Board, and perhaps suggest his putting this forward to Iraq Government as Persian proposal.

I could hint that board might be given control of lighting and buoying in the gulf and be created under tripartite agreement.

(Repeated to India, No. 178, and Bagdad, No. 170.)

[E 4369/19/34]

No. 83.

Mr. A. Henderson to Sir R. Clive (Tehran).

(No. 458.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, September 25, 1929.

I HAVE received your despatch No. 439 of the 21st August, enclosing a copy of a letter addressed to you on the 20th August by the Persian Minister of Court, in which his Highness sets forth at length his views on the nature of a treaty settlement of the various questions outstanding between Persia and this country.

2. It will require some little time and much discussion between the interested Departments of His Majesty's Government before I am in a position to send you detailed instructions on each of the various questions raised in your despatch and its enclosure. It appears, therefore, desirable, in order that there may not be a prolonged break in your conversations with the Minister of Court, to formulate in advance for your guidance in these discussions my general impressions on some of the more important political questions involved, even though these will require to be supplemented later by more detailed instructions.

3. In the first place, I am glad to observe that the Persian Government have apparently realised the necessity for a final and definite renunciation of their antique claim to sovereignty over the Bahrein islands; and I welcome the inclusion in paragraph 26 of Taimourtache's letter of a draft article by which Persia recognises, once and for all, the independence and the sovereign rights of the ruling Sheikh. It is, in my opinion, a distinctly favourable omen that the Persian Government have themselves put forward at this early stage a draft which, although not entirely acceptable in itself, can at least be regarded as a basis for further discussions.

4. It would be unwise to attach importance to the absurd compensation required by the Persian Government as a condition of the withdrawal of this claim. Taimourtache himself admits, in paragraph 25 of his letter, that there can be no direct connexion in the treaty between the Bahrein article and the concessions which he considers Persia entitled to expect in return. Persia will, in any case, obtain many advantages from the treaty, and I do not consider that the inability of His Majesty's Government to agree that the Persian pretensions to these Arabian islands have any market value need prove an insurmountable obstacle to an agreement. You should, therefore, continue to take the line that the Persian proposals do not merit serious consideration; and you should make it clear that, as was very fully explained in Sir Austen Chamberlain's note of the 18th February last to the Persian Minister in London, His Majesty's Government regard the Persian case about Bahrein to be unfounded; that they consider themselves entitled to insist, and as an essential part of the general settlement, on the unconditional abandonment of Persia's pretensions on

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the Arabian side of the Gulf, and that Persia obviously loses nothing, but, on the contrary, stands to gain, by the abandonment of such shadowy and worthless claims, which merely render difficult the establishment of satisfactory relations both with her immediate neighbours and with His Majesty's Government.

5. As regards the Islands of Tamb and Abu Musa, I approve your language to the Minister of Court, as reported in your despatch No. 454 of the 31st August. It is impossible for His Majesty's Government to admit that Persia has any legal claim to either of these islands, or to sacrifice the rights of the Arab owners, with whom they are in close treaty relations. In their opinion it would be difficult to challenge the legal right of ownership of the Jowasimi Arabs, based as it is on possession during the past two centuries. Any attempt by Persia to occupy these islands by force could only be regarded as a flagrant case of aggression against the territorial integrity of the Arab rulers, and could not be permitted. You will, no doubt, have opportunities, in discussing this question with the Minister of the Court, of drawing his attention to the fact that it would be impossible for His Majesty's Government to betray the interests of the Arab chiefs which have been entrusted to them.

6. The possible solution of the question of the Island of Tamb suggested in paragraph 7 of your despatch No. 454, whereby the Persian Government should purchase the island from the Jowasimi sheikhs, is one worthy of serious consideration. You will realise, however, that a solution on such lines would present numerous difficulties and may ultimately prove to be impracticable. No mention of it can, therefore, be made at present to the Minister of Court.

7. As regards the Island of Sirri, mentioned in paragraph 28 of Taimourtache's letter, it would be well to make it clear that neither His Majesty's Government nor the Government of India have ever admitted Persia's claim to ownership; but it is certainly not for them to object to the omission of all mention of this island in the treaty if the Persian Government so desire. The Jowasimi Arabs still claim this island, and the main object of His Majesty's Government in proposing to mention it in the treaty was to meet the Persian Government's supposed views and to assist them in finding a means of saving face in connexion with the abandonment of their claim to Tamb and Abu Musa.

8. Finally, you should make it clear to the Minister of Court that His Majesty's Government cannot contemplate the possibility of themselves satisfying the just claims of British subjects which have not yet been settled by the Persian Government. You may think it desirable in this connexion to refer to paragraphs 10-14 of Taimourtache's note, in which he insists, in reply to an apparently innocuous proposal regarding the visits of British warships to Persian ports, on the wish of Persia to be treated in the same way as other nations are treated by Great Britain. I leave it to your discretion whether to point out that His Majesty's Government have every sympathy with Persia's wishes in this respect, and have themselves no wish nor intention of treating Persia differently from other nations. But they expect Persia, on her part, to recognise her responsibilities and obligations, as do other nations, and to settle the just claims of foreigners. Some of the claims of British subjects have been outstanding for more than twenty years. His Majesty's Government trust that she will realise the absolute necessity of arriving at an early and equitable settlement of this matter.

9. I shall hope to send you further and more detailed instructions at an early date.

I am, &c.

ARTHUR HENDERSON.

[E 4933/259/34]

No. 84.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received September 27.)

Sir,

India Office, September 26, 1929.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to transmit to you, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a letter from the Political Resident, Bushire, dated the 13th August, on the subject of slave traffic in the Persian Gulf.

I am, &c.

A. HIRTZEL.

Enclosure in No. 84.

Consul-General Barrett to Sir R. Clive.

Sir,

Bushire, August 13, 1929.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that on the 15th May his Excellency the Governor of Bushire brought to my notice, through my interpreter, that he had received a petition from Abbas Husain Ghulam Rodani, of Minab, near Bunder Abbas, that his brother and others had been kidnapped by Bashkirdis, who sold them as slaves. The names given were Ahmed, son of Husain Ghulam Abbas, son of Meshedi Husain, and Dadi, son of Ali Dad Shanbli.

The Governor brought this matter to my notice in this manner as he did not wish official recognition to the British position on the Arab coast.

With the help of Khan Bahadur Isa Abdul Latif, O.B.E., the Residency agent on the Oman coast, I managed to recover Dadi, son of Ali Dad, but failed to recover the other two men mentioned, for whom search is still being made.

I have, however, recovered Ali Ghulam Ali and Mahommed Abdullah, two Persians, both belonging to Ramishk, a village in Rodan, who had been kidnapped by Bashkirdis and sold to Baluchis, who subsequently sold them in Arabia.

I brought these three men to Bushire in H.M.S. "Triad" on my return from the Trucial Coast on the 2nd August and, at my request, the Governor of Bushire came on board and questioned the slaves.

It appears that in each case the method of capture was similar. Badi-bin-Ali Dad had been to Bunder Abbas to buy dates and was returning with two companions to his native village by night. They were suddenly fired on by armed men, who seized them.

In the morning Dadi's two companions were released as they were old, but he himself was detained, kept by the Bashkirdis for some days, and then sold to Baluchis, who, on a favourable opportunity offering, shipped him from a Mekran port to Suwaik on the Batinah coast of Muscat.

The experience of Ali Ghulam Ali and Mohammed Abdullah was even more unfortunate. They were travelling to Bunder Abbas in search of work, accompanied by thirteen companions. The Bashkirdis fired upon them by night, killing nine and capturing three, while three escaped. In other respects their experience corresponds with that of Dadi-bin-Ali Dad.

The senior naval officer has taken the three released slaves with him to Muscat, and as they say they are able to recognise and are willing to give evidence against the Batinah slave dealers, I hope it may be possible, with the help of the Muscat State authorities, to deal a blow at the slave trade. From Muscat the slaves will be repatriated via Bunder Abbas.

This case is of particular interest as it shows that it is not only Persian Baluchis who sell each other into slavery according to their tribal habits, as the Persian Foreign Minister naively informed Mr. Parr on the 25th October, 1923. Persian tribesmen have kidnapped and sold into slavery free-born Persian subjects journeying in their own country.

M. Pakravan should hereafter find it difficult to say that the British Government are "trying to point out the existence of this trade in certain places inhabited by Persian tribes while the Persian Government are sure that since many long years slave trade does not in any way exist in Persia."

I am sending copy to Government of India.

I have, &c.

C. C. J. BARRETT,

Political Resident in the Persian Gulf and
Consul-General for Fars, &c.

Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received October 3.)

(No. 470.)

Sir,

Gulhek, September 12, 1929.

I HAVE the honour to report that I recently asked the Minister of Court to be good enough to enquire of the Shah whether His Majesty would be graciously pleased to receive me in audience in order that I might present Colonel Dodd, the new military attaché.

2. His Majesty received me yesterday afternoon at the Palace of Saidabad. The Minister of Court was present, and informed me that His Majesty wished to see me before I introduced Colonel Dodd. Taimourtache said he would himself interpret the conversation.

3. As always happens on occasions of audiences with His Majesty, a long time is spent in talking about extraneous and entirely unimportant matters. At length His Majesty said to me, was there anything I wished to say to him? As I had good reason to know that His Majesty particularly wished to discuss Anglo-Persian relations, I made the following remarks:—

His Majesty's Government were pleased to learn that the recent tribal disturbances were on the road to settlement. I did not, however, wish to conceal from His Majesty the disappointment felt by you, Sir, on learning of the unjustifiable suspicions of the attitude of His Majesty's Government which had been aroused in Persia by recent events. These suspicions were widespread; they had, I understood, even reached His Majesty and appeared to have gained so much credence that His Majesty's Government felt very much discouraged that the friendly attitude of His Majesty's present Government and of the late Government towards Persia were so little appreciated. It seemed so obvious to anyone who had studied events in Persia for the past eight years that the policy of His Majesty's Government towards this country had been entirely consistent; I could cite many instances to prove this. His Majesty's Government had throughout supported the Central Government; they wished to see a strong and united Persia, capable of keeping and maintaining order; the idea that His Majesty's Government should suddenly have changed their policy by supporting revolting tribesmen, and even providing them with arms, was so ridiculous, that it was astounding that anybody could have believed it. At the present moment we had two treaties under discussion, a commercial and a general treaty, and it was the wish of my Government that these treaties should be settled and signed with the least possible delay; it seemed even desirable to work for a definite time limit, and that the treaties should, if possible, be signed before the end of the present year, with a view to ratification by No Ruz (the 21st March next). I trusted, therefore, that His Majesty would believe me when I said that the policy of His Majesty's Government towards Persia had in no way changed. His Majesty's Government were animated with the most friendly feelings towards Persia, and sincerely hoped that when these treaties had been finally settled that we should enter on a new era of increased friendship and good feeling.

4. His Majesty replied to my remarks at considerable length, and Taimourtache made notes of what he said in order that nothing should be omitted. His Majesty began by admitting that it was true that much suspicion had been aroused during the summer as to the attitude of His Majesty's Government. Reports had reached him from so many quarters that it was impossible to ignore them. While he himself failed to see that His Majesty's Government had anything to gain by supporting recalcitrant tribesmen against the Central Government, he had felt bewildered by these reports and, for that reason, had wished to hear definitely from me that there was no foundation for them. His Majesty then spoke of events in Afghanistan, and said he wished me to understand that there was no resemblance whatever between Afghanistan and Persia, neither between ex-King Amanullah and himself nor between the Afghan and Persian peoples. (There is no doubt that among the reports which had most annoyed His Majesty were some to the effect that certain Englishmen in Persia had, in speaking with Persians, drawn comparisons between Persia and Afghanistan, and hinted at the possibility of His Majesty sharing the fate of ex-King Amanullah if he attempted to go too fast with his programme of reforms.)

5. His Majesty then referred to the unsympathetic attitude of the British press, especially to an article which had appeared in the "Near East" some time ago

to the effect that Persia would be better advised to devote her energies to internal reforms in the country rather than indulge in absurd claims to Bahrein and elsewhere in the Persian Gulf.

6. I should here mention that there are only two British journals which are regularly studied by the Persian authorities, namely, the "Times" and the "Near East," but every single word which appears in either of these two papers with regard to Persia is translated for His Majesty, and considered to be, if not absolutely the official view of His Majesty's Government, at least the echo of British public opinion.

7. His Majesty continued to speak at length on the unsympathetic attitude of the British press, which appeared to him to make no allowance for the difficulties of the Persian Government or to recognise the changes which had taken place since the war, and were still taking place.

8. He then referred to our treaty negotiations and said that many Persians had wondered why there was such a long delay in coming to terms; it was vaguely known that negotiations had been going on for some time, and no one could understand why things were not already settled up; it was his earnest desire to see these treaties brought to a conclusion with the least possible delay, and he entirely reciprocated what I had already said to him on the subject.

9. In reply to His Majesty I first alluded to his remarks about the British press. I told him that the "Near East" was an entirely unofficial paper which, so far as I was aware, received no inspiration from the Foreign Office, but, apart from this particular article to which His Majesty had taken exception, my impression was that the "Near East" had on the whole been very sympathetic towards Persia in the last two or three months. As regards the "Times," I had only seen one article about Persia, which had appeared some time in July. The tribal difficulties were discussed, but, it seemed to me, in a perfectly fair spirit. The criticisms, such as there were, were not objectionable, but appeared to me to have been written in a sympathetic and helpful spirit. The British press had written nothing to my knowledge about our treaty negotiations because they were probably wholly unaware of them; at His Majesty's own request these negotiations had been kept absolutely secret, and as there were matters, especially in the general treaty, which might be called contentious, it was obviously much better so. I added that I felt sure my Government would be glad to learn that His Majesty was anxious that the treaties should be settled with the least possible delay, and that I had no doubt that, for their part, they would do everything possible to hasten matters.

10. I then referred to His Majesty's remarks about Persian suspicions and anti-British propaganda. I said that I had heard from many sources in Persia of the efforts which were being made by Soviet agents to create suspicion between our two countries, and I especially regretted that in Abadan and Mohammerah, whither the Persian Government had recently sent a considerable new police force, many of these police agents appeared to adopt an almost anti-British attitude, and even to foster the usual suspicions that His Majesty's Government had been aiding and abetting the tribesmen. There was a persistent undercurrent of anti-British Soviet propaganda in Khuzistan, and these police agents, instead of showing up the authors, appeared themselves to be somewhat in the hands of these Soviet agents. His Majesty expressed great surprise at this, and said he would have the matter enquired into; he was himself going to Khuzistan in November when he would take steps to regularise the whole position. "Regulariser" was the word used by Taimourtache in interpreting what His Majesty said. He said that he himself had the impression that recently the anti-British propaganda on the part of the Soviet agents had been less virulent, and he wondered if this were true. I said I had seen no particular signs of it, although certainly quotations in the Persian papers from the Russian press had lately been calmer, and it might be that, pending the result of negotiations for the resumption of diplomatic relations with His Majesty's Government, the Soviet press had received instructions to be less violent towards Great Britain.

11. At this point His Majesty said that he would like to see Colonel Dodd. Some general conversation followed, His Majesty being most friendly, even jocular, and the colonel took his leave. I then expressed my thanks to His Majesty for giving me the opportunity of this frank exchange of views. Finally, His Majesty said that in any communication that I might make to my Government of this conversation, he hoped I would say that friendship with Great Britain was his definite and considered policy; he wished our relations to be placed on a firm treaty basis with the least possible delay, and he was convinced that, after that, with mutual goodwill, our present friendly relations would be still further increased.

12. As reported in my telegram No. 315 of the 12th September, His Majesty was exceedingly cordial throughout the audience, and was in a far better temper than I have often seen him.

13. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India.

I have, &c.
R. H. CLIVE.

[E 5056/1429/34]

No. 86.

Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received October 3.)

(No. 482.)

Sir,

Tehran, September 19, 1929.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copies of the "Messenger de Téhéran" for the 13th September, 1929, containing the official text of the Perso-Italian Treaty of Friendship and Final Protocol, signed at Tehran on the 5th September, 1929.

I have, &c.
R. H. CLIVE.

Enclosure in No. 86.

Extract from the "Messenger de Téhéran" of September 13, 1929.

TRAITÉ D'AMITIÉ ENTRE L'EMPIRE DE PERSE ET LE ROYAUME D'ITALIE.

SA Majesté impériale le Schah de Perse et Sa Majesté le Roi d'Italie, également animés du désir de consolider les rapports d'amitié traditionnels entre les deux États, ont résolu de conclure un Traité d'Amitié, et ont nommé à cet effet pour leurs plénipotentiaires :

Sa Majesté impériale le Schah de Perse :

Son Altesse Mehdi Gholi Khan Hédâyat, son Président du Conseil des Ministres ;

Sa Majesté le Roi d'Italie :

Son Excellence M. Giulio Danéo, son Envoyé extraordinaire et Ministre plénipotentiaire à Téhéran ;

Lesquels, après s'être communiqué leurs pleins pouvoirs, reconnus en bonne et due forme, ont convenu des dispositions suivantes :

ARTICLE 1^{er}.

Il y aura paix inviolable et amitié sincère et perpétuelle entre l'Empire de Perse et le Royaume d'Italie, ainsi qu'entre les ressortissants des deux États.

ARTICLE 2.

Les États contractants sont d'accord pour continuer leurs relations diplomatiques et consulaires conformément aux principes et à la pratique du droit commun international. Ils conviennent que les représentants diplomatiques et consulaires de chacun d'eux recevront, sur le territoire de l'autre, le traitement consacré par les principes et la pratique du droit commun international et qui, en tout cas et également sous condition de réciprocité, ne pourra être moins favorable que le traitement accordé aux représentants diplomatiques et consulaires de la nation la plus favorisée.

ARTICLE 3.

Les hautes parties contractantes conviennent de soumettre à des procédures de règlement pacifique tout différend qui viendrait à surgir entre elles et qui n'aurait pu être réglé à l'amiable dans un délai raisonnable par les procédés diplomatiques ordinaires. Elles se réservent de déterminer dans chaque cas, par un compromis spécial, la procédure qui leur paraîtra le mieux appropriée.

Elles conviennent d'ailleurs que si toutes les deux elles venaient à adhérer à une formule générale recommandée par la Société des Nations, elles l'appliqueraient au règlement de tous les différends auxquels elle s'adapte, nonobstant, s'il y a lieu, les dispositions qui précèdent.

ARTICLE 4.

Le présent traité sera ratifié et l'échange des ratifications aura lieu le plus tôt que faire se pourra ; il entrera en vigueur avec l'échange des ratifications.

En foi de quoi, les plénipotentiaires respectifs, dûment autorisés à cet effet, ont signé le présent traité et y ont apposé leurs sceaux.

Fait à Téhéran, le 5 septembre 1929.

Protocole final.

Au moment de procéder à la signature du Traité d'Amitié conclu aujourd'hui entre l'Empire de Perse et le Royaume d'Italie, les plénipotentiaires soussignés ont fait la déclaration suivante, qui constituera partie intégrante du traité même :

Les deux États contractants se réservent le droit de réexaminer les dispositions de l'article 3 du Traité d'Amitié à partir du moment où dix ans se seront écoulés depuis l'échange des ratifications dudit traité.

Fait à Téhéran, le 5 septembre 1929.

[E 5057/95/34]

No. 87.

Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received October 3.)

(No. 485.)

Sir,

Tehran, September 20, 1929.

I HAVE the honour to enclose herein a copy of a despatch from the acting consul at Shiraz giving his impression of the present situation in Fars.

2. News of the reported death of Sartip Khan, the Boir Ahmedi leader and brother-in-law of Sardar Fatih Bakhtiari, has not reached me from any other source. If it is true, Amir Lashkar Shaibani's task will no doubt be lightened.

3. With regard to the reports mentioned by Mr. Davis in his first paragraph concerning the Baharlu tribe, news has reached me (the source of which was one of the Qashqai tribe at present living in Tehran, who is usually well informed) that the Government forces under Yavar Mohammed Taghi Arab finally inflicted a severe defeat on the Baharlu tribe, one important chief being killed, another being wounded, and the town of Darab occupied.

4. The autumn migration of the Qashqai tribe is due to take place within a fortnight or so. It remains to be seen whether Amir Lashkar Shaibani will endeavour to deal them a blow as they proceed south across the Shiraz-Bushire road.

Copies of this despatch and its enclosure have been sent to the Government of India, His Majesty's High Commissioner for Iraq, Bagdad, and His Majesty's acting consul-general at Bushire.

I have, &c.
R. H. CLIVE.

Enclosure in No. 87.

Consul Davis to Sir R. Clive.

(No. 55.)

Sir,

Shiraz, September 11, 1929.

I BEG leave to inform you that in the fortnight which has elapsed since my despatch No. 53 of the 27th August was written the situation in Fars has not changed materially, except on the Fasa side, where, it is understood, Yavar Muhammad Taqi Khan 'Arab, Governor of Laristan, has advanced towards Darab with a force of 1,500 men. Since he left Fasa his doings have been obscure; according to one account he reached Darab without fighting and opened negotiations with the Baharlu

leaders. A contradictory report says that his advance was opposed, that there was heavy fighting, and that he is now surrounded by rebels. Until confirmation is forthcoming it is impossible to say what has really taken place.

2. North of Shiraz on the motor road to Isfahan no incidents have occurred; but it is reported that the Abdul Yusufi, a section of the Shaibani branch of the Khamseh Arab tribes, indulged in a certain amount of robbery and looting in the Tang-i-Bulaq, a few miles off the main road on the old caravan route which the telegraph line follows from Sivand to Meshed-i-Murghab (Pasargadae). A ghulam of the Indo-European Telegraph Department was also robbed while on duty near Dehbid on the 1st September.

3. Disorders on the Shiraz-Bushire road have also been less frequent of late. On the morning of the 30th August a few donkeys loaded with piece-goods were carried away by robbers about 4 miles south of Kazerun. On the morning of the 31st August a military force had an encounter with robbers and outlaws about 3 miles north-west of Kazerun. The robbers eventually fled, and are said to have left two of their number prisoners in the hands of the soldiers. On the 6th September a few Kazerunis were robbed and beaten by rebels near the town of Kazerun.

4. Sartip Khan, leader of the band of Boir Ahmadi outlaws mentioned in paragraph (4) of my despatch No. 52, is reported to have been killed in a private feud. The kalantar of one of the villages in Baiza district invited Sartip Khan with seventeen of his followers to a banquet at which the whole party were treacherously shot. Since his death there has been no news of disturbance in Baiza, from which all troops have been withdrawn. The Kashkuli tribe of the Qashqais, migrating downwards from Ardakan, are now moving into Baiza.

5. Saulat-ud-Dauleh is still living quietly in Shiraz. His half-brother, 'Ali Khan, is reported to be in Firuzabad. Nasir Khan is still in Tehran, but his wife and children have been allowed to leave the capital and come to Shiraz. The Qashqais hope that Nasir Khan himself will follow them. Malik Mansur Khan, the Saulat's second son, is still with the Darashuri tribe near Ardakan.

6. Amir Lashkar Shaibani, who went to Tehran on the 26th August, as reported in paragraph (4) of my despatch No. 53, returned to Shiraz on Sunday, the 1st September. According to popular rumour, he has been authorised by the Shah to make peace with the Qashqais, granting them all their demands; but there is no official confirmation of this rumour, nor has the Persian Government yet taken any steps to make any definite terms or give any specific assurances to the Qashqais.

7. Copies of this despatch have been sent to His Majesty's consul-general, Isfahan, and His Majesty's consul, Ahwaz, for their information.

I have, &c.

A. W. DAVIS.

[E 5059/3704/91]

No. 88.

Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received October 5.)

(No. 487.)

Sir,

Gulhek, September 20, 1929.

IN my telegram No. 300 of the 26th August I had the honour to report that a Treaty of Friendship had been signed here between the Persian Government and delegates from the Hejaz on behalf of Ibn Saud.

2. I enquired recently of Taimourache about this treaty. He told me that it would in due course be published.

3. Meanwhile, he could tell me that it was a very simple treaty in five articles relating to perpetual friendship, exchange of diplomatic and consular representatives in accordance with international practice, protection of Persian pilgrims to Mecca, and eventual ratification. His Highness assured me that there was nothing else.

4. The treaty has not yet been published.

5. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India and to His Majesty's High Commissioner for Iraq.

I have, &c.

R. H. CLIVE.

[E 5060/104/34]

No. 89.

Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received October 3.)

(No. 488. Secret.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of Intelligence Summary No. 19 for the period ending the 21st September, compiled by the military attaché to this Legation.

Tehran, September 21, 1929.

Enclosure in No. 89.

Intelligence Summary No. 19 for the Period ending September 21, 1929.

(Secret.)

Tehran.

1. *Persians.*—It is stated that His Majesty the Shah will pay a visit to the Province of Azerbaijan during the autumn to inspect the damage caused by the recent floods in that area.

His Majesty returned to Tehran for the winter from his summer residence at Saidabad on the 18th September.

Shahzadeh Amir Azam Azudi has been appointed *chef de cabinet* of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

Sartip Mohamed Hussein Mirza, brother of Firuz, and Amir Lashkar Mahmoud Agha Airum, who have been imprisoned for some weeks on a charge of peculation, have been released. It is probable that they have refunded their illicit gains.

2. *British Subjects.*—Mr. J. W. Blanch arrived in Tehran on the 18th September to take up his appointment as a probationer vice-consul.

3. *Railways.*—Much praise has been bestowed by the engineers on the steel railway bridge now being placed in position over the Karun River near Ahwaz. This bridge was obtained from the Patent Shaft and Axletree Company in England at a cost of £30,500.

4. *Aerial Matters.*—The Junkers Company are submitting a proposal and estimates for the establishment of a school of instruction for pilots and mechanics in Tehran. The preliminary proposals have been sanctioned by a local commission appointed for that purpose.

5. It is stated in the local press that plans for a new aerodrome at Jask have been prepared but have not yet been finally approved.

6. *Telegraphs.*—The construction of new lines has been temporarily held up for lack of funds, and consequently a special grant of 40,000 tomans has been sanctioned to allow the work to proceed. The major portion of this credit is assigned to Luristan and Persian Baluchistan.

7. An estimate of 70,000 tomans has been prepared and submitted for approval for construction of the line Shiraz-Fasa-Niriz-Saidabad.

8. The "Iran," dated the 13th September, states that the new line Mianeh to Kazvin is progressing well; that the Pahlavi-Astara line will shortly be built; that the Meshed-Kuchan telegraph line is under construction and the Meshed-Lutfabad line has been repaired.

9. *Wireless.*—The plant of the three new wireless sets have now arrived in Tehran. It is proposed to install the short-wave set at Najafabad, the long-wave at Kasri Kajar and the central plant in the Maidani Sipah. The two former will be connected with the central plant by an underground cable. The above places are all municipal areas or on the outskirts of Tehran.

10. *Majlis.*—The Nationality Bill, having been passed by the Majlis, became law with effect from the 11th September.

The following matters, amongst others, have also been discussed in the Majlis: Government purchase of wheat, the Perso-Soviet Postal Agreement, a Bill for revising the present law concerning the registration of land and documents, and the financial situation in Persia. In reference to the latter, the Minister of Finance stated that, on

the whole, the financial situation of the Government had greatly improved during the past few years. Certain defects were being attended to, but, generally speaking, there was no cause for anxiety.

11. *Miscellaneous*.—Investigations have brought to light a deficiency of grain in the Government grain stores to a value stated to be about £70,000. Steps are being taken to trace and prosecute the individuals responsible for the deficiency.

12. The new prison being built in Kasri Kajar (Tebran) is nearing completion. It is constructed on modern lines, with a female wing, bathrooms, laundry and instruction rooms.

13. A veterinary school is shortly to be opened in Tehran under the Ministry of War.

Persian Gulf.

14. The Persian sanitary ship "Ibn Sina" is reported to be now on duty in the Gulf and is chiefly employed for the disinfection of ships and the destruction of rats.

Kermanshah.

15. The main Bagdad-Tehran road in the vicinity of Kermanshah has recently been the scene of several incidents. Early in the month the Kalhurs and some other tribes raided the Shah's estates near Shahabad (the former Harunabad) and some Kakavand brigands were active in the vicinity of Bisitun. Transport was held up, but for the most part travellers were not molested. A force of 200 men was despatched to Kermanshah and Shahabad, and the situation now appears to be normal once again.

Isfahan.

16. The situation in this area remains quiet. Cattle raids continue, but nothing of importance has recently occurred.

Fars.

17. It is understood that, as a result of his recent visit to Tehran, Amir Lashkar Shaibani has been granted full powers to deal with the situation in the south. Malik Mansur, second son of Soulet-ed-Dowleh, has been appointed Ilkhani of the Qashgai. Ali Khan is reported to be still at Firuzabad, and to have sent a letter to Shaibani demanding twelve terms on behalf of the tribe, which include the following: (1) opium monopoly to be withdrawn; (2) conscription not to be enforced; (3) the Qashgai not to pay any taxes for seven years; (4) no interference in tribal country by the military authorities. It is reported that about the 9th September an engagement took place in the vicinity of Darab between Government troops under Yawar Mohamed Taqi Arab and the Baharlu: the troops were victorious, Sultan Khan, nephew of Ahmed Agha Khan, chief of the Baharlu, being killed and Abdul Hussein Khan, Baharlu, wounded. The Isfahan-Shiraz-Bushire road is now, more or less, open, but numerous robberies have occurred on the Shiraz-Bushire section. Nevertheless, drivers prefer this road to the new Khorremabad route, which is said to be very costly in wear and tear to vehicles.

18. The Imperial Bank of Persia have over half a million tomans' worth of silver at Bushire awaiting despatch to Shiraz. The recent revolt has upset the economic and food situation in Shiraz, and it is probable that some hardship may be experienced this winter.

Kerman.

19. The only remnants of the rebellion are in the south-west corner of this province, where some bands of Sheikh Abul Hassan Sarkhui are hovering.

20. There is an enormous quantity of goods at Bunder Abbas waiting to be forwarded to Kerman. Also considerable consignments of machinery too heavy for animal transport, but sent to Bunder Abbas in preference to Duzdap in anticipation of the opening of the new motor road Bunder Abbas-Kerman. These goods have been lying at Bunder Abbas for many months and prices have risen at Kerman, but the public, traders and authorities appear indifferent whether the road is opened or not.

Khorasan.

21. With the capture and execution of Zulfo and the capture of Allah Quli, his brother, together with the annihilation of the latter's gang of robbers, the authorities hope that the roads of North Khorasan will now be safe again for travellers. Ghamou and Shaban, two other well-known brigands, have also recently been captured and hanged in Meshed.

Tabriz.

22. The situation in Saujbulagh and neighbouring district appears to have become normal. On the 20th August the bulk of the troops stationed in Saujbulagh returned to their respective quarters at Urumia, Salmas and Tabriz. The military authorities, unable to forgo the time-honoured but sorry show of prisoners in chains, found it necessary to parade eighteen Kurdish youths and old men through the streets of Tabriz.

23. It is rumoured that the Bolshevik school at Tabriz is to be closed for lack of funds.

Persian Baluchistan.

24. The G.O.C. Persian Baluchistan is responsible for the following information: The command in East Persia is to be redistributed. The Amir Lashkar's command will extend to Birjand only. The Rais-i-Tip (Sarhang Mohamed Khan) will have an independent command in Baluchistan, including the ports thereof, and may also command in Kerman.

25. Conscription in the Duzdap-Birjand area will come into force early in September. It had previously been postponed indefinitely.

PERCY C. R. DODD, Major,
Military Attaché.

Tehran, September 21, 1929.

[E 5098/58/34]

No. 90.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received October 5.)

Sir,

Admiralty, October 2, 1929.

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit herewith, for your information, copy of a letter of even date and number addressed to the Colonial Office.

I am, &c.
O. MURRAY.

Enclosure in No. 90.

Admiralty to Colonial Office.

(Confidential.)

Sir,

Admiralty, October 2, 1929.

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to refer to your letter of the 21st August regarding the survey carried out by the Director of the Port of Basra of the Persian and Iraq coastlines in the estuary of the Shatt-el-Arab, and to request that the following observations may be put before the Secretary of State for the Colonies:—

2. The results of this survey are of great importance as regards the control of the mouth of the Shatt-el-Arab and the Rooka Channel. As it is evident that the Abdulla and Abadan banks must now be regarded as territory and the 3-mile limit measured from them, the Rooka Channel is for a considerable portion of its length within Persian territorial waters, unless the starting-point of the frontier between

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Iraq and Persia as fixed by the Delimitation Commission can be ignored and the text of the 1913 protocol taken as the overriding authority as regards this point. My Lords consider that, by thus insisting on the text of the protocol, a strong case could be put up for maintaining that the dividing-line between Iraq and Persian waters should be drawn at right angles to the general trend of the low-water line along the Persian coast east of the extreme point of the Abadan bank, and a line drawn across the mouth of the river from the extreme end of the Abadan bank to the extreme end of the Abdullah bank. Such a dividing-line would, with the present position of the banks, put the whole of the Rooka Channel outside Persian waters. This would also have the advantage of preventing Persia from making a protest against the dredging of the Rooka Channel in her waters without her consent.

3. Persia might, however, argue, and would get some support from the replies of various countries to the League of Nations *questionnaire* on territorial waters, that she had a right to measure a 3-mile limit from the island now formed at low water off the Abadan bank and close to the Rooka Channel. This country has, however, always opposed such claims.

4. Although the general tendency of the changes in these banks has been in favour of Iraq, my Lords consider that, in view of their shifting nature, it is inadvisable to agree to any definite division of the waters based on their positions, and that it would be better for Iraq to claim the whole of the navigable river, wherever that may happen to be, on the ground of the text of the 1913 protocol and the practical necessities of the situation.

5. From the British point of view, the peculiar difficulties of the position in respect of territorial jurisdiction might perhaps be used as arguments, from the opposing points of view, to get Persia and Iraq to agree to a tripartite agreement in which this country should participate.

6. My Lords concur in the proposal in paragraph 3 of your letter under reply to express appreciation of the manner in which, and the speed with which, the survey has been carried out.

7. A copy of this letter has been sent to the Foreign Office, India Office and Air Ministry.

I am, &c.
ALEX. FLINT.

[T 11893/816/378]

No. 91

Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received October 14.)

(No. 506.)

Sir,

Tehran, October 4, 1929.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith a copy of an English translation of the new Persian Law of Nationality which was passed by the Majlis on the 15th September last and which has now received the Royal assent and has become law, enforceable from the 11th September, 1929.

2. The translation has been made from the Persian text published in the official journal of the Ministry of Justice, this being the only official version which has hitherto appeared. Should the printed text which will eventually be published by the Majlis press differ from that which has been translated, I shall not fail to inform you.

3. I am sending copies of this despatch and enclosure to the Foreign and Political Department of the Government of India, to His Majesty's Acting High Commissioner at Bagdad, and to all consular officers in Persia.

I have, &c.
R. H. CLIVE.

Enclosure in No. 91.

*Persian Law of Nationality as passed by the National Consultative Assembly.
Dated Shahrivar 16, 1308 (September 7, 1929).*

(Translation.)

ARTICLE 1.

The following persons are deemed Persian subjects:—

- (1.) All residents of Persia with the exception of those whose foreign nationality is established. The foreign nationality of a person is considered as established when his documents of nationality are not objected to by the Persian Government.
- (2.) All those persons whose fathers are Persian, whether those persons were born in Persia or abroad.
- (3.) Those born in Persia of unknown parents.
- (4.) Those born in Persia of foreign parents one of whom was born in Persia.
- (5.) Those born in Persia whose fathers are foreign subjects, but who at the time of reaching the age of 18 are residing in Persia.
- (6.) All foreign women who marry a Persian husband.
- (7.) All foreign subjects who have obtained Persian nationality.

NOTE.—Children born of foreign political or consular representatives are not subject to paragraphs (4) and (5).

ARTICLE 2.

Persons mentioned in paragraphs (4) and (5) will have the right, after reaching the age of 18, to adopt the nationality of their father within one year, on condition that during the above period they submit a written declaration to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, annexed to a certificate from their father's Government, to the effect that that Government will recognise them as its own subjects.

ARTICLE 3.

Reciprocal treatment will be observed in regard to those children born in Persia of nationals of States in whose territories children born of Persian subjects are deemed, according to regulations, to be their own subjects and whose Governments do not allow those persons to resume Persian nationality except by (special) permission.

ARTICLE 4.

Those possessing the following conditions can obtain Persian nationality:—

- (1.) Having reached the age of 18 (full) years.
- (2.) Having resided in Persia for five years, whether continuously or in broken periods.
- (3.) Not being a deserter from conscription.
- (4.) Not having been condemned in any country for an important offence ("junheh") or crime ("jinayat") of a non-political nature.

In regard to paragraph (2) of this article, a period of sojourn abroad in Persian Government service is counted as a sojourn in Persia.

ARTICLE 5.

Those who have rendered some service, or afforded notable assistance, to Persian public welfare can be accepted as Persian subjects without the observance of the condition of residence.

ARTICLE 6.

If, within a period of five years from the date of issue of the document of nationality, it be found that the person who has been accepted as a Persian subject is a deserter from conscription, or if before the expiry of the time-limit laid down in the Persian Law of Prescription (Statute of Limitations) it be found out that the

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person who has been accepted as a subject has been condemned for an important offence ("junheh") or a public crime ("jinayati-umumi"), the Council of Ministers will issue a decree discharging him from Persian nationality.

ARTICLE 7.

Those who have obtained, or who shall obtain, Persian nationality will enjoy all the rights given to a Persian except the right of promotion to the positions of Minister or acting Minister, or to any political post abroad. But they cannot attain to the following situations except after ten years from the date of issue of the document of nationality :—

- (1.) Membership of Legislative Assemblies.
- (2.) Membership of provincial or district assemblies.
- (3.) Engagement in the Persian Foreign Office.

ARTICLE 8.

Applications for (Persian) nationality must be submitted to the Foreign Office directly or through Governor-Generals or Governors, with the following enclosures :—

- (1.) Certified copies of document of identity of the applicant, his wife and his children.
- (2.) A certificate from the police office stating the period of sojourn of the applicant in Persia and certifying that he has no bad record and that he has adequate wealth or definite employment to secure his livelihood.

The Foreign Office will give a receipt stating the date of receipt of the application and, if necessary, will complete the information about the applicant and will forward it (the application) to the Council of Ministers for an appropriate decision by them as to its acceptance or rejection. In case of acceptance of the application, a document of nationality will be issued to the applicant.

ARTICLE 9.

The wives and minor children of those who acquire Persian nationality in accordance with this law will be recognised as Persian subjects. The wife, however, within a period of one year from the date of the issue of the document of nationality of her husband, and the minor children within one year from reaching the age of 18 (full) years, can give a written declaration to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and can accept the nationality of the father's or husband's previous country as the case may be; in the case of male children, however, the certificate mentioned in article 2 must be annexed to the declaration.

ARTICLE 10.

The acquisition by the father of Persian nationality will have no effect whatsoever on the children who have reached the age of 18 (full) years on the date of the application by the father.

ARTICLE 11.

Non-Persian women who become Persian in consequence of marriage can, after separation from or after the death of their Persian husband, return to their original nationality on condition that they inform in writing the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. But any widow who has children from her former husband cannot enjoy this right until her children reach the age of 18 years. In any case the woman who in virtue of this article becomes a foreign subject will have no right of possessing immovable property, except within the limits of the rights which may be granted to foreign subjects. If she had previously possessed, or inherits later, immovable property in excess of that which foreign subjects are allowed to possess, she must, within one year from the date of relinquishing Persian nationality or from the date of coming into possession of the inheritance, as the case may be, transfer the excess property, in some way or other, to Persian subjects; otherwise the said property will be sold under the supervision of the local Public Prosecutor and, after deducting the cost of the sale, the price will be paid to her.

ARTICLE 12.

Persian women who marry foreign subjects will remain Persian subjects, unless according to the law of the country of the husband the nationality of the husband is imposed on the wife by virtue of the marriage; but in any case, after the death of the husband or cessation of the marriage, on the mere submission of an application to the Foreign Office annexed to the certificate of the death of the husband or the document proving the cessation of the marriage, the original nationality of the woman, with all rights and privileges, will again accrue to her.

ARTICLE 13.

Persian subjects cannot relinquish their nationality except on the following conditions :—

- (1.) That they have reached the age of 18 full years.
- (2.) That the Council of Ministers shall have authorised their discharge from Persian nationality.
- (3.) That they shall have given an undertaking previously that within one year from the date of relinquishing their nationality they will transfer, in some way or other, to Persian subjects, the rights in respect of immovable property which they possess in Persia or which they may in future obtain by inheritance, even if Persian laws permit their possession by foreign subjects. The wife and children (whether minor or not) of him who, in virtue of this article, relinquishes Persian nationality, will not be discharged from Persian nationality unless the authority given by the Council of Ministers includes them also.

ARTICLE 14.

If a Persian national obtains foreign nationality without observing the above-mentioned stipulations, his foreign nationality will be deemed as null and void and he will be recognised as a Persian subject. But at the same time all his immovable property will be sold under the supervision of the local public prosecutor and after deducting the cost of the sale the price will be paid to him. In addition he will be deprived from attaining to the positions of Minister, Assistant Minister, member of legislative assemblies, or member of provincial, district or municipal councils, or to any other Government employment.

ARTICLE 15.

Persian subjects who personally or through their father's acts have changed their nationality in virtue of these stipulations, and who desire to return to their original nationality, will be accepted as Persian subjects immediately upon application.

ARTICLE 16.

This law will be put into effect from the 20th Shahrivar, 1308 (11th September, 1929).

[E 5280/5280/34]

No. 92.

Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received October 14.)

(No. 510.)

Sir,

Gulhek, October 3, 1929.

I HAVE the honour to enclose herewith a memorandum which has been prepared by the acting oriental secretary showing the number of foreigners at present employed in the Persian Government service, either directly under contract with the Majlis or indirectly with the National Bank or in the service of the Railway Syndicate.

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2. It will be seen that there are no English or Russians directly employed in Persian Government service, although I understand that there are about twelve Englishmen engaged in the operations of the Railway Syndicate in Khuzistan, i.e., the southern section. At the same time, a few Russians, some of them so-called White Russians, are employed in the Road Administration and with the northern section of the railway, but none of them hold Majlis contracts. It is, in fact, an axiom with the Persian Government not to employ in their service under formal contract either Englishmen or Russians.

3. All the most important contracts are held by Germans. A considerable number of Frenchmen are also employed, but mainly as teachers or professors in the schools. One of the most important positions held by a Frenchman is that of M. Hesse, who is, to all intents and purposes, legal adviser to the Persian Government. He it is who is the chief adviser to the Minister of Court in the present negotiations with foreign Powers for new commercial treaties.

4. Apart from Mr. Carrel, who succeeded Mr. Poland last year as so-called head engineer for the Railway Department, there are at present no Americans employed under contract with the Persian Government, although the Ulen Company represent the large American interest in the Railway Syndicate. I understand that Mr. Carrel is unlikely to have his contract renewed, and in any case desires to leave the country.

5. Apart from the Belgians, who for nearly thirty years have continued, with considerable success, to administer the Persian Customs, the few remaining contracts with foreigners present no particular interest; nobody takes seriously the contracts with two Italian naval officers as instructors to the non-existent Persian navy, least of all the Minister of Court.

6. I am sending copies of this despatch and of its enclosure to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India and to His Majesty's High Commissioner for Iraq.

I have, &c.
R. H. CLIVE.

Enclosure in No. 92.

Memorandum on Foreigners now employed by the Persian Government.

THE following summary shows the number of persons of foreign nationality now employed in Persia, either under contract passed by the Majlis or in the Railway Syndicate and the National Bank. The employees of the two last-named institutions are engaged under short-term contracts by the Railway Syndicate and the bank and not under contracts passed by the Majlis. The information concerning Majlis contracts has been compiled from the Majlis official records, which may possibly contain some errors.

(A.)—Germans.

Eleven Germans hold contracts passed by the Majlis, eighty-two are employed in the Railway Syndicate and twenty in the National Bank. Details are as follows:—

1. *National Bank.*—The director, Dr. Lindenblatt, holds a contract from the Majlis expiring in November 1930. The rest of the staff, in Tehran and in the provincial branches, are largely German, the number of Germans being twenty.

2. *Persian Financial Administration.*—Dr. Scheer is the inspector-general of the Ministry of Finance under a Majlis contract expiring in February 1930. Dr. Schmiewind is the economic and financial adviser to the Ministry of Finance under a Majlis contract expiring at the same time as Dr. Scheer's.

3. *Mining Expert.*—Herr Hoffmann is engaged under a Majlis contract for mapping the mining areas of Persia for a period of not more than three years from the 1st January, 1928.

4. *The Majlis Press.*—Herr Mauser is the technical director of the Majlis press under a Majlis contract expiring April 1930.

5. *Ancient Languages, &c.*—Professor Herzfeld is engaged under a Majlis contract as a professor of ancient languages and history of Persia up to May 1931.

6. *Industrial and Technical School.*—Dr. Strunk, with two German assistants, have Majlis contracts for instructing in the school up to June 1930. Two other Majlis contracts engage one blacksmith and one carpenter up to June 1931.

7. *Railway.*—The German personnel of the railway technical staff is at present as follows, as far as can be ascertained:—

Directing board, clerical staff and supervisors of purchases	...	22
Engineers and experts	...	25
Surveyors, technicians, &c.	...	30
Women typists	...	5

Total number of Germans employed by the syndicate ... 82

(B.)—French.

Forty-three French subjects hold Majlis contracts as follows:—

1. *School Teachers or Professors.*—Fifteen teachers have contracts as teachers in Persian middle schools for three years, expiring September 1931. Twelve others have similar contracts expiring in September 1932. Some of these teachers have not arrived.

2. *Instructors in Botany and Gardening.*—One French professor has a contract as a professor of botany and director of a school for horticulture and the study of Persian plants of a medical or industrial importance, the contract being for five years from June 1929. Another professor has a contract for teaching garden management and studying plantation and development of fruit trees in Persia, the expiration of the contract being similar to the last.

3. *Public Health, &c.*—Professor Neveu-Lemaire has a contract as medical adviser to the State Health Administration for three years from April 1928. Another contract has been passed for a bacteriological expert to teach in the Agricultural School and to manufacture animal serums for five years from June 1929. Another contract engages a veterinary expert and technical superintendent of measures against animal diseases for the same period as the bacteriological expert.

For the Pasteur Institute, a French expert holds a Majlis contract for five years from January 1927.

Mdlle. Pin, a Frenchwoman, also holds a Majlis contract as an expert in women's diseases.

M. Rouge has obtained a contract expiring in January 1932 as engineer of the new Persian Gulf sanitary ship, the "Ibn Sina."

4. *Wireless.*—Three contracts, for two years, expiring in June 1929 and since renewed, have been passed for wireless experts of French nationality. The names of the present electrical engineers are MM. Brossier, Berger and Clarisse; their contracts expire in 1931 (July, April and March respectively).

5. *Museum, &c.*—Professor Godard holds a contract as an expert for the Persian museum, library and antiquities, lasting till April 1933.

6. *Law School.*—M. André Hesse has a contract as a teacher to the Law School expiring in June 1930; his wife has also a contract in a similar capacity. Two other Frenchmen are engaged under Majlis contracts as teachers in the Law School up to June 1930.

(C.)—Americans.

Two Majlis contracts:—

1. *Animals' Diseases.*—A contract appointing an American expert for the Animals' Diseases Hospital for three years from the 13th February, 1927, has passed the Majlis, but he has not hitherto arrived.

2. *Railways.*—Mr. Carrel holds a Majlis contract as head engineer of the railways for one year, expiring the 28th December, 1929.

A number of Americans are employed in the southern section of the railway. The Tehran office of the Railway Syndicate gives the number as thirty-seven.

(D.)—Belgians.

Customs.—Twelve Belgians have Majlis contracts for employment in the Customs Administration; the present contracts expire in March 1930.

(E.)—Italians.

Navy.—Two Majlis contracts exist—one for an Italian instructor to the navy for three years from March 1928, and the other for a naval engineer for three years from the same date.

(F.)—Chinese.

Four Majlis contracts:—

Four contracts have been passed by the Majlis for tea-cultivation experts for three years from the 1st March, 1929.

(G.)—Swiss.

Finance.—M. Walder holds a Majlis contract as Treasurer-General for two years ending February 1930, and another Swiss was engaged by contract as Comptroller-General of the Finances for a similar period, but this individual apparently never arrived.

(H.)—Russians.

No Russians hold Majlis contracts; but a certain number of Russians, some of them White Russians, are employed, some without contracts, in the Road Administration, in the northern section of the railway, and in departments of the Ministry of Public Works.

A. C. T.

October 2, 1929.

[E 5281/104/34]

No. 93.

Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received October 14.)

(No. 511.)

Tehran, October 5, 1929.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of Intelligence Summary No. 20 for the period ending the 5th October, compiled by the military attaché to this Legation.

I have, &c.

R. H. CLIVE.

Enclosure in No. 93.

(Secret.)

Intelligence Summary No. 20 for the Period ending October 5, 1929.

Tehran.

1. *Persians.*—Reference paragraph 1 of Intelligence Summary No. 19, final sub-paragraph. It is reported that the former has lost his rank and that the latter paid 33,000 tomans.

2. *British Subjects.*—Second-Lieutenant J. E. Orton, Sherwood Foresters (on leave), left Tehran for Isfahan en route for Karachi on the 26th September.

3. *Other Europeans.*—Hamid Kholuei Bey, the Egyptian Minister, died on the 23rd September. A funeral ceremony was held on the 25th September.

The contracts of M. M. Brosier, the Director of Wireless Telegraphy, and two of his assistants, have been renewed.

4. *Military.*—Twenty students left Tehran for Europe on the 24th September under Colonel Kazim Khan. They were destined for Berlin and Paris—seventeen for the former city, three for the latter, and are cadets for the Army Medical Service.

5. A firman was issued on the 28th September calling to the colours all those who will reach the age of 21 during the year 1308 (March 1929 to March 1930).

6. *Aerial.*—Permission has been given for the flight of six aeroplanes of the Dutch East India aerial mail over Persia.

7. *Railways.*—Thirty-nine students have left Tehran for various courses in railway practice and administration in Germany. The Shah interviewed them and there was the usual dinner and laudatory speeches.

8. *Majlis.*—The purchase of wheat and the alimentation of Tehran, the salaries of the newly-engaged French teachers for the schools, the Rented Properties Bill, were the chief subjects of discussion. There was an uproar when an Under-Secretary announced that the various Ministries were the sole channel of appeal by which their respective employees could obtain redress; he later apologised, but the Government was defeated.

9. Ministers are frequently exhorting their subordinates to behave with diligence and circumspection, offering veiled threats to those whose lapses from virtue are discovered. General Karim Agha Khan is especially prone to this form of harangue.

10. *Miscellaneous.*—Reference Intelligence Summary No. 19, paragraph 12. The prison is complete and has been inspected by the Minister of the Interior; it is not, however, yet in use.

Persian Gulf.

11. The zeal of the quarantine authorities is causing considerable inconvenience to travellers, and all who contemplate travelling up the Gulf should adhere to the letter of all regulations concerning vaccination and inoculation.

Fars.

12. Robbery is still prevalent both on the Shiraz-Bushire and the Shiraz-Isfahan roads. In the southern section conditions have relapsed to olden times. Khans collect tolls from caravans, both animal and motor, but these do not necessarily preserve the payers from being plundered. Traffic ceases two hours before sunset on the latter road. Both animal and motor convoys have been attacked; a few casualties have been caused. A post lorry was looted near Borasjun and the contents destroyed; amnieh guards pursued the attackers, but without result.

13. Qashqais are migrating without trouble. The Darashuris were reported at Dasht-i-Barm on the 25th September. A party of Shishbulukis were seen on the Bushire road on the 20th September proceeding towards Khaneh Khabis and Siyakh; they were unarmed.

14. Reference Intelligence Summary No. 19, paragraph 17. Yavar Mohamed Taqi Khan 'Arab succeeded in reoccupying Darab; during his advance the Baharlu rebels asked for an armistice, but it was refused, and the troops advanced. A sudden attack by rebels in the neighbourhood of Darab caused momentary confusion, but it is reported that the skirmish resulted in about twenty casualties to the Baharlus, but in none to the troops! A further advance toward Niriz was held up near Khairabad; reinforcements of a reported strength of 200 have been sent to Yavar Mohamed, but the latest reports show that he is unable to advance. Kayumars Khan, with a strong party of rebels, is reported to be waiting to descend upon the Government forces from about Lar, south of Darab.

15. It is considered that the present strength of the Government troops will not admit both of the occupation of Niriz and the safety of the lines of communication, Shiraz-Niriz.

16. A reliable report states that numbers of Boir Ahmadiis under Shukrullah Khan have appeared in the neighbourhood of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company's installation at Mishun and have looted Shah Tashim, which is the water source for this region. No further details are yet obtainable.

17. It is rumoured that Ali Khan has presented an ultimatum consisting of six conditions. The former three refer to the Qashqai tribe only; the latter to the whole Province of Fars. Confirmation of this will be obtained:—

- (1.) Appointment of an Ilkhani from the tribe and with the consent of the tribe.
- (2.) Collection of taxes from tribe by Ilkhani and payment of them by him to Government.
- (3.) No disarmament.
- (4.) No conscription.
- (5.) No dress reformation.
- (6.) No census.

Kermanshah.

18. Reference Intelligence Summary No. 19, paragraph 15. An exaggerated account of one of the incidents has appeared in the Persian press, in which an engagement with the Lurs near Bawandpur is said to have resulted in some 300 casualties. Some twenty prisoners were reliably reported as being seen in Kermanshah, but no reliable estimate of the casualties sustained by the Lurs can be obtained.

19. The statement that Shahab-ud-Dowleh, brother of the ex-Vali of Pusht-i-Kuh, has been appointed Governor of Pusht-i-Kuh is refuted by the Chief of the General Staff.

Saujbulagh.

20. Simko is reported to be at Raizi, 12 miles south-west of Kam Rash, on the 8th September.

Tabriz.

21. It is reported that an encounter has taken place between Turkish and Persian troops near Ovadjik Chai, south of Bayazid, during the sitting of the Turco-Persian Boundary Commission. It is thought that this is an annual harvest raid by Turks into an area which, though claimed by them, has for years been *de facto* Persian territory.

Miscellaneous.

22. Rain has caused considerable damage in the town and region of Bander-i-Gaz. Roads have been cut, but are in process of repair.

23. The following distances have been fixed for the motor post between Kerman and Bandar Abbas:—

	Farsakhs.
Kerman-Bandar Abbas	92
Baft-Kerman	49
Sirjan-Rafsinjan	53

24. The allegations of the Persian Minister in Iraq that Iraqis have been selling arms to the Persian rebel tribes have been refuted. Similar allegations with regard to Kuwaitis have been proved to have been groundless.

25. A short digest of a reliable report on the copper mines of Bahrasman is given in Appendix I.

W. COOPER, Captain, R.A.S.C.,
Officiating Military Attaché.

Tehran, October 5, 1929.

P.S.—1. Shiraz.—Two reliable reports state that Soulat-ud-Douleh arrived yesterday from Shiraz by aeroplane. The death of Sartip Khan Boir-Ahmedi is said to be incorrect.

2. A report (unconfirmed) states that Dost Mohamed was secretly allowed to depart from Tehran a day or two ago, and it is thought that he has gone to his tribe.

W. C.

APPENDIX I.

Digest of a Report on the Copper Mines of Bahrasman.

The mines are situated about 230 kilom. north-north-east of Bandar Abbas and about 20 kilom. south of Sarduih in the mountainous region of Kuh-i-Shah; few names mentioned in the report are traceable on the existing map.

The central zone is bounded by the peaks shown below:—

North.—Kuh-i-Surkestan.

South.—Alun Kuh.

East.—Kuh-i-Sartsu.

West.—Kuh-i-Mahir Babun.

Divergent figures are given as to the estimated capacity of the various zones, but it seems certain that copper ores exist in considerable quantities. The fuel difficulty at the moment remains insoluble; there is not sufficient water power in the neighbouring areas to provide for complete electrification of the area.

The outlet of the mining zone to the south lies via Baft to Bandar Abbas; the new route which has been decided upon for the Kerman-Bandar Abbas road lies via Tarun and Saidabad, and not on the mine route via Baft and Dowlatabad. The central mining region is estimated to be 17 farsakhs from Baft, and the route to it lies via Narab Halirud, Khoremabad and Shasht Pich. A motor road capable of sustaining heavy traffic is a vital preliminary to the exploitation of the area.

[E 5282/95/34]

No. 94.

Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received October 14.)

(No. 512.)

Sir,

Tehran, October 5, 1929.

I HAVE the honour to enclose herein a copy of a despatch from the acting consul at Shiraz containing his appreciation of the situation in Fars on the 25th September last.

2. I have received since that date reports which state that Yavar Muhammad Taghi Arab, in spite of his initial successes against the Baharlus, was subsequently besieged by that tribe in Darab; the situation was, however, relieved to some extent by the despatch of aeroplanes from Shiraz.

3. With reference to paragraph 3 of Mr. Davis's despatch, all my information confirms the reports of a tense atmosphere in and around Borasjun. One Ghazanfar-us-Saltaneh appears to have established himself in that town with a band of armed tribesmen; and the local inhabitants are said to be leaving the town in fear of trouble.

4. With reference to paragraph 2 of my despatch No. 485 of the 20th September last, I have still no confirmation of the report of the death of Sartip Khan, the Boir Ahmedi leader; in fact, my information leads me to think that the report was inaccurate.

5. Mr. Greenhouse, the acting representative in Tehran of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, is fully acquainted with the disquieting situation described in paragraph 4 of the enclosure to this despatch, and he has made personal representations on the matter to the Minister of Court.

Copies of this despatch and enclosure have been sent to the Government of India, His Majesty's Acting High Commissioner for Iraq, Bagdad, and to His Majesty's acting consul-general at Bushire.

I have, &c.

R. H. CLIVE.

Enclosure in No. 94.

Acting Consul Davis to Sir R. Clive.

(No. 59.)

Sir,

Shiraz, September 25, 1929.

IN continuation of my despatch No. 55 of the 11th September, 1929, on the subject of the situation in Fars, I have the honour to report that no important developments have occurred in this district during the past fortnight. It has been confirmed, however, that Yavar Muhammad Taqi Khan Arab, the outcome of whose advance from Fasa to Darab was doubtful when my last report was written, has succeeded in reoccupying Darab. When he and his troops had advanced 2 farsakhs from Fasa, the Baharlu rebels sent envoys to ask terms of peace. Muhammad Taqi Khan offered them terms which they stated they could not accept without reference to their leaders in Darab, and they therefore requested an armistice of two days in which they might go to Darab and consult with the rebel chiefs. Yavar Muhammad Taqi Khan, believing that they were asking for two days' respite merely in order to collect forces and organise resistance, refused to grant an armistice. Instead, as soon as the rebel envoys had left, he ordered an immediate advance of all his forces, who met no opposition till they were near to Darab. There a small force of mounted Baharlus under Kazem Khan suddenly attacked the Persian Government troops, who were momentarily thrown into confusion. However, they rallied and beat off the attackers, who lost twenty killed and wounded. The Persians suffered no casualties. Darab was then occupied without further opposition. Two days later Yavar Muhammad Taqi Khan advanced northwards from Darab towards Niriz, but was held up at Khairabad by a strong force of rebels. Reinforcements from Shiraz, 200 strong, were hastily sent out to Darab, but, as far as is known at present, Muhammad Taqi Khan is still at Khairabad unable to advance. A strong force of Baharlu rebels under Kayumars Khan is also reported to have occupied an impregnable mountain fortress in Lar, south of Darab, whence he is controlling the neighbouring district and watching for an opportunity to descend upon the Government forces.

2. The position south-west and west of Shiraz is still unsatisfactory. On the Bushire-Shiraz road conditions are just the same as they were in the old lawless days. Every khan along the route is collecting tolls ("rahdari") and grazing taxes, which amount to 20 krans per mule on the average. Other animals and motor vehicles are mulcted in proportion. Even these payments do not ensure freedom from robbery, which is usually the work of outlaws and brigands, though the tribes are conveniently at hand to get the blame. The Qashqais' migration to winter quarters seems to be passing off peacefully enough up to date. The Darashuris have already reached Dasht-i-Barm, quite near their winter quarters around Shahpur and Kazerun. A party of Shishbulukis were observed on the Bushire road on the 20th September in the course of their migration. They had come on to the Bushire-Shiraz road from the north at Masjid-i-Bardi, about 4 miles from Shiraz, followed the road as far as 3 miles beyond Chinar Rahdar, and then turned south towards Khaneh Khabis and Siyakh. The men were unarmed; only one gun was observed in the hands of a young boy. They were quite peaceful and did not interfere with traffic on the road. On the same day, the 20th September, eighty Persian troops with one mountain gun left Shiraz early in the morning and proceeded towards Kazerun. Saulat-ud-Dauleh left Shiraz on the 13th September, and stayed with the tribes for a few days to collect revenue and settle disputes which had broken out between the Kashkuli Khans.

3. On the 13th September it was reported from Mian Kotal that twenty-seven donkeys laden with loaf sugar had been carried away by robbers about 2 miles south of the pass. The robbers were said to be Muhammad Ibrahim, of Pul-i-Abgineh, with sowars of the Farsimadan Qashqais. The Amnieh pursued and fought the robbers, but without inflicting or suffering any casualties. A report from Konar Takhteh also stated that two motor lorries were attacked by robbers on the afternoon of the 20th September about 4 miles north of Dalaki, near an Amnieh post. The Amnieh opened fire on the robbers, who escaped, but were unable to carry off any booty. A passenger in one of the motor lorries was killed. On the morning of the 21st September robbers attacked two charvadars 3 miles south of Kazerun. One of them was wounded, and the robbers carried off nine donkeys laden with piece-goods and two rifles. On the morning of the 23rd September a post lorry from Bushire was attacked by robbers about 1 mile north of Borazjun. The post ghulam was killed, the Amnieh guard accompanying the lorry was wounded, and the post bags were opened and rifled. Amnieh guards from Borazjun went out in pursuit of the robbers, but without result.

4. According to a report received from the Anglo-Persian Oil Company on the 23rd September, large numbers of Boir Ahmadi tribesmen under Shukrullah Khan have appeared in the neighbourhood of the company's operations at Mishun, and have looted the village of Shali Taslim, from which the company obtains its water supply. Several Persians were killed there. The raiders appear to be moving on Behbahan, and the company fear that their operations may be subjected to interference, and even fear damage to life and property in Mishun itself and Gach Qaraquli. The authorities in Fars have been requested to do everything they can to avert this danger.

5. On the Shiraz-Isfahan road a series of robberies was reported in the district of Abadeh. On the 10th September thirty mounted Boir Ahmadi tribesmen carried off about 1,800 sheep and thirty donkeys from a point 7 miles west of Yezdikhast. On the 11th September thirty unmounted Boir Ahmadi appeared near Dah-i-Girdu and carried off eighteen sheep, nine donkeys and three cows. On the 12th September ten Qashqais appeared 2 miles west of Abadeh and carried off sixteen sheep. Cars on the road have not been interfered with. The Amnieh guards stop all traffic on the road two hours before sunset, and many complaints of ill-treatment, exactions and delays imposed by them are heard. On the Shiraz-Bushire road also they hold up all traffic two hours before sunset, and their reputation for illegal exactions is worse than on the Isfahan road.

6. A copy of this despatch has been sent to His Majesty's consul-general, Isfahan, and His Majesty's consul, Ahwaz, for their information.

I have, &c.
A. W. DAVIS.

[E 5284/5284/34]

No. 95.

Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received October 14.)

(No. 514. Confidential.)

Sir,

Tehran, October 5, 1929.

I HAVE the honour to report that the National Bank published in the end of September their first balance-sheet covering a period of just over six months, that is, from their inauguration in September 1928 until the 21st March, 1929, the end of the Persian year.

2. The balance-sheet (Enclosure 2 in this despatch) struck me as peculiarly meagre and unenlightening, and I requested Mr. Tollinton, who is acting officer in charge of commercial matters, to gather such information as he could from the acting manager of the Imperial Bank of Persia and other sources as to the real position of the National Bank. The accompanying interesting memorandum is the result of his enquiries.

3. It was always expected that Dr. Lindenblatt, knowing that he could count on the full financial support of the Government for the first two years, would contrive to show a paper profit in the balance-sheet of the National Bank. I have little doubt now that Mr. Wilkinson was inclined last spring to take too seriously the competition of this institution, and it was perhaps unfortunate that the chairman of the Imperial Bank of Persia at the annual meeting referred in his speech to our "principal rival the National Bank of Persia." This phrase has been seized on with joy and triumph by the whole Persian press. Again, the Imperial Bank of Persia would almost appear to have acted too hastily in lowering their rate of interest for advances from 8 per cent. to 7 per cent. as it was universally believed—and rightly so—that they had allowed themselves to be forced into doing this because the National Bank had lowered their rate. In a country like Persia 7 per cent. is far too low to be profitable, and the bankers have told me that 9 per cent. more nearly represents the economic rate.

4. Mr. Wilkinson informed me last February of the business in French silver francs referred to in the memorandum, and told me that the Imperial Bank of Persia had been first offered the business by their Paris agents. The amount eventually purchased was about £150,000 worth. Mr. Wilkinson had refused it on the ground that Persia did not require this silver, and that it must almost certainly have a detrimental effect on the rate of exchange, which was at that time 49 krans to the pound. Mainly as the result of this purchase by the National Bank, the exchange rate for the pound fell from 49 to 52, or about 6 per cent. in a month.

5. It may therefore be argued with some reason that economically the National Bank has actually been detrimental to Persian interests.

6. Since last March the National Bank have opened some twelve provincial branches, and I am informed on first-rate authority that for some time to come the majority of these branches can only be a loss.

7. The fact is that in the present state of Persian trade and industry there is no room for several banks all doing the same class of business, and so far the National Bank have not attempted to take up any of the outside lines open to them but closed to the foreign banks.

8. Moreover, the Persian has confidence in the Imperial Bank of Persia. He has as yet no confidence in the National Bank, and would in any case hesitate to place his money on deposit in an institution under Government control. He could never be sure that the Shah or the Government did not have access to the state of his private account. This helps to explain the statement in the memorandum that current accounts in the Imperial Bank of Persia are higher than ever.

9. Copies of this despatch, with enclosures, have been sent to the Government of India and to His Majesty's Acting High Commissioner for Iraq, Bagdad.

I have, &c.
R. H. CLIVE.

Memorandum on the Balance-sheet of the National Bank of Persia.

IN considering the first balance-sheet of the National Bank of Persia, it must be remembered that these figures only represent the transactions of a period of just over six months (September 8, 1928-March 20, 1929), and that during these months only the Tehran branch of the bank was functioning. (The second branch to be established was that at Bushire, which was, it is true, opened in the first days of March, but can, for all practical purposes, be considered to have been non-existent in so far as its transactions could affect the balance-sheet.)

(A.)—*The Balance-sheet (excluding the Profit and Loss Account).*

The balance-sheet can hardly be said to give a clear and satisfactory exposition of the position of the bank. It has been described by the acting manager of the Imperial Bank of Persia as "incomprehensible and unaudited." It is open to a large number of criticisms, the most salient of which must clearly be that no disinterested outside firm has been called in to carry out its audit. In addition to this no provision is apparently made for the creation of a reserve fund, nor is any allowance made to cover "contingencies." The statement that 38,146,449.40 krans' worth of the bank's debts are covered is of little value in view of the failure to explain what is being considered satisfactory "cover," especially in a country such as Persia where legal redress is cumbrous and unsatisfactory. Even should these debts be adequately covered, it is worthy of note that the uncovered debts are more than enough to turn the profit into a heavy loss.

It is also to be noted that the total turnover has been swelled by the somewhat childish expedient of writing in the un-paid-up capital on both sides of the account.

On the credit side of the balance-sheet no distinction is made between the funds held on behalf of private persons and those held on behalf of the Government. It is probable that the item "Créditeurs" represents the bank's holdings of Government funds, as the figure under this heading corresponds roughly with the sum in the sugar and tea monopoly funds on the 21st March last. Whether any other Government funds are held under the heading "Caisse d'Épargne, &c.," is difficult to say, although it would seem very unlikely that the Government would deposit any of its money in the bank at a fixed term. It is none the less generally believed in local banking circles that private accounts could hardly total so large a sum.

(B.)—*The Profit and Loss Account.*

This account is almost equally unsatisfactory. The item "Frais généraux" can hardly be seriously taken to account for the total expenses of the bank during its first six months. A conservative estimate of the amount paid out in salaries to the eighteen European assistants in Tehran would account for two-thirds of this sum. It is stated that the average salary of these employees may be taken to be at least 500 tomans per mensem, while the pay of the large subordinate staff, who are said to number over 100 in Tehran at the present time, must inevitably have carried the bank's expenses above the figure mentioned. In addition to these salaries, all the current expenses of running the bank have to be accounted for. It seems, indeed, difficult to resist the conclusion that the salaries of the staff are paid for separately by the Ministry of Finance, although no official confirmation of this is obtainable.

The gross profit of 1,893,393.85 krans is largely accounted for by the purchase and minting of French silver francs. I understand that the Imperial Bank of Persia refused to undertake this business on the grounds that it would be damaging for the kran exchange, and Mr. d'Alton, the acting manager, informed me that he was convinced that this action on the part of the National Bank had seriously affected the kran rate.

The general methods of the National Bank have been typical of a newly established institution, which desires at all costs to make itself popular. It has been responsible for the lowering of the rate of interest from 8 to 7 per cent., a course in which it has been followed by the Imperial Bank of Persia. The bank offers particularly favourable rates to individuals, and has, I am credibly informed, recently been in the habit of charging no interest whatever on advances made to customers who would be worth acquiring. Despite this, I have been privately assured by Mr. d'Alton that the Imperial

Bank of Persia has lost little or no business. The current accounts of this concern are higher than ever, but are counterbalanced by a slight falling off in advances. The average Persian merchant of any standing, while ready to take loans from the National Bank, apparently still prefers to leave his deposits in the Imperial Bank of Persia.

In view of the small profit announced by the National Bank, and in view of the fact that it has now no less than sixty-two employees of and above the rank of the ordinary bank clerk, it is difficult to see how this concern can economically continue its existence unless it receives continued Government support. It is rapidly becoming more and more heavily overstaffed. It maintains four German employees in Tabriz, where the Imperial Bank of Persia has found no need for more than two Englishmen. Two young Germans have been despatched to Duzdap to open a branch in a town where the Imperial Bank of Persia branch run on the most economical lines has never yet covered expenses. Local opinion is to the effect that the majority of the German employees of the National Bank are only too willing to receive their high salaries, but take little or no interest in the possibility of the ultimate failure of the bank as a whole. It appears, in fact, that the project of the National Bank is almost as grandiose as that of the Trans-Persian Railway, and as little likely to be an economic concern for many years to come.

B. TOLLINTON.

Enclosure 2 in No. 95.

Banque nationale de Perse (Société anonyme).

BILAN établi au 29 Esfand 1307 (20 Mars 1929).

ACTIF.		PASSIF.	
	Krans.		Krans.
Capital non versé ...	12,000,000	Capital ...	20,000,000
Encaisse, métaux précieux et billets de banque étrangers ...	42,651,465.25	Dépôts en Caisse d'Épargne et à termes fixes ...	55,378,559.85
Effets de commerce es-comptés ...	6,874,368.05	Créditeurs ...	90,155,938.15
Disponibilités en banques ...	64,898,320.45	Bénéfice net ...	474,518.05
Débiteurs ...	39,584,861.30		
(dont couverts: krs. 38,146,449.40)			
Inventaire ...	179,711.95		
Amortisation pour inventaire ...	179,710.95		
Frais de fondation ...	314,297.15		
Amortisation pour frais de fondation ...	314,297.15		
	166,009,016.05		166,009,016.05

COMPTE PERTES ET PROFITS.

	Krans.		Krans.
Frais généraux ...	924,867.70	Intérêts, commissions, bénéfices sur devises ...	1,893,393.85
Amortisation pour inventaire	179,710.95		
Amortisation pour frais de fondation ...	314,297.15		
Bénéfice net ...	474,518.05		
A être distribué comme suit:			
6 pour cent dividende pro rata temporis sur le capital versé de krans 8,000,000	257,333.35		
Report pour l'année 1308	217,184.70		
	274,518.05		
	1,893,393.85		1,893,393.85

Krans 10 = environ 1 dollar.

[E 5285/172/34]

No. 96.

Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received October 14.)

(No. 515. Confidential.)

Tehran, October 6, 1929.

Sir,

AT the risk of wearying you with pessimistic views on the subject of the trunk railway project from the Caspian to the Persian Gulf, I have the honour to enclose—as being of possible interest—copies of an unofficial correspondence with the United States Chargé d'Affaires in regard to the financial prospects of the railway if and when built, apart from the cost of construction and the question of how that construction is to be financed. I would refer you in the latter connexion to my despatch No. 337 of the 15th June.

2. I have the impression that the leading members of the railway syndicate, both German and American, have considerably modified their original views since undertaking the preliminary contract for the 100-mile section in the north and south respectively; they find dealing with the Persian authorities, especially since Taimourache has been relieved of all work in connexion with the railway, discouraging to the last degree, and this, perhaps, is not surprising when it is realised that the present Minister of Public Works is an illiterate general and that the chief Persian adviser on railway matters is a young nephew of the Prime Minister, whose sole qualification is that he has spent two terms on the electrical side of a German engineering college. Moreover, the Persians, being entirely ignorant of railway matters, are absurdly suspicious both of the Germans and of the Americans and always imagine that they are being robbed. At the same time their attitude is quite irresponsible. An estimate, with a beautiful picture of a magnificent railway station at Ahwaz, to cost 200,000 tomans, was sanctioned by the Shah the same day and the money paid over to the syndicate. A simultaneous request for a few thousand tomans to build a modest railway repair shop at Ahwaz was turned down. No one now denies that the railway must cost from 20 to 30 million sterling, and no one has a clear idea where the money is to be found. It is useless to pretend that the 5 or 6 million tomans annually received from the sugar and tea monopoly are anything like a gilt-edge security. The monopoly tax is admittedly too high and is unpopular, while, if a contraband preventive service is to be organised, the cost should properly come out of the profits of the sugar and tea monopoly. The remaining securities are the customs and the oil royalties, and of these the oil royalties undoubtedly are in the nature of a gilt-edge security, but I hesitate to believe that the Persian Government will lightly pledge this invaluable nest-egg in order to finance the building of the railway.

3. At the same time, I learn privately that the syndicate are at present engaged in negotiations with the Persian Government for a final contract to build the line, and a reliable informant tells me that they have even offered to complete it in seven-eight years and find the money on the security of—

- (a.) The sugar and tea monopoly.
- (b.) The oil royalties.

On the latter point I feel very sceptical. I cannot believe it will be so easy to find the money, which can hardly be less than 15 million sterling, to be borrowed before the railway is completed, and that at a rate of interest including sinking fund, which can hardly, I imagine, be less than 10 per cent. This is also the view of the acting chief manager of the Imperial Bank.

4. Regarding the enclosed correspondence, I decided to write privately to the United States Chargé d'Affaires to show the present loss on running of the Duzdap Railway, after a conversation I had had with him in which he told me that the Ulen Company had made an estimate showing a considerable profit over working expenses from the moment that the railway should be completed. I am not in a position to question the figures given in Mr. Williamson's reply, but I am inclined to consider them rather as an *ex parte* statement which has been made on insufficient data, in order to impress the Persians. Moreover, no account is taken of the fact that the railway would almost certainly be under Persian and not foreign management.

5. There are several points in Mr. Williamson's letter which are entirely beside the question. The fact remains that the Duzdap Railway is the main trade route between East Persia and India and, in spite of carrying a trade which, over the past

three years, has averaged some 8 million tomans (say £1,600,000), shows an annual loss on running expenses of £60,000.

6. Copies of this despatch and enclosures have been sent to the Government of India and to His Majesty's Acting High Commissioner for Iraq, Bagdad.

I have, &c.

R. H. CLIVE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 96.

Sir R. Clive to Mr. Williamson.

Dear David,

[Undated.]

WITH reference to our conversation yesterday evening, you may find the following figures relating to the Duzdap Railway of interest. This railway is run by the Indian Railway Administration and is 1-metre gauge.

		Weight in Batmans.	Value in Krans.	Customs Receipts (Krans) (including Monopoly Tax and Compound Road Tax).
1926-7	...	3,331,000	78,855,000	10,000,000
1927-8	...	2,762,000	82,642,000	8,000,000
1928-9	...	3,210,000	79,277,000	9,000,000

These figures relate to combined imports and exports.

Annual loss on working expenses for past three years averages somewhat over eight lacs of rupees—£60,000.

In view of these figures, I cannot but feel that those who estimate an immediate surplus of profit over running expenses as soon as the trunk line may be completed are somewhat optimistic.

R. H. CLIVE.

Enclosure 2 in No. 96.

Mr. Williamson to Sir R. Clive.

My dear Sir Robert,

Tehran, September 30, 1929.

THANK you very much for your memorandum concerning the revenues of the Duzdap Railway line, which I confess are not conducive to optimism.

With such figures at hand, it would certainly appear that a railroad in Persia would have considerable difficulty in making its operating expenses. Yet the Duzdap Railway has to overcome certain difficulties that a trans-Persian line would not face; as of possible interest, I have outlined them as follows:—

1. Duzdap is some 1,600 kilom. from its port, Karachi. This entails a 1,000-mile rail haul before any goods reach Persia.
2. The line passes through 300 or 400 miles of Baluchistan at a dead loss, with no local traffic to depend upon.
3. The line ends at an uneconomic point in the wilderness. Incoming goods have to be distributed thence, and outgoing goods must be collected there, at an exorbitant cost for animal or motor transport. This discourages trade.
4. The line serves less than 25 per cent. of Persia's population, and this population does not possess 25 per cent. of Persia's wealth. The proposed trans-Persian line serves 49.7 per cent. of the population of the country and passes through the richest sections.
5. The line was built in wartime and, like the Bagdad Railway, may be uneconomic in its planning.
6. The line is not a through line, and the question of return cargoes is always difficult of adjustment in these cases.

[20533]

M

I am sorry that I have no available copy of my forecast for the trans-Persian railroad's estimated revenues. In summary, however, the following estimates have been conservatively made from the known figures of Persia's trade in 1306.

		Actual Import and Export Tons.	Estimated Tonnage for the Railroad.	
South Persian ports and Kermanshah	...	263,204	167,600	
North Persian ports		224,726	120,000	
		Total	...	287,600
Internal traffic, being lumber, coal, petroleum products, &c.				90,000
Gross Revenue.		Tons.	Average Haul in kilom.	Ton-kilom.
Internal freight	...	90,000	250	22,500,000
External freight	...	287,600	600	172,560,000
Total ton-kilom.		...		195,060,000

By charging a freight rate in conformity with the average rate of Asian and African railroads, namely, 0.30 kran per ton per kilom., the above figures give a gross revenue of 58,318,000 kran.

The cost of maintenance and of operation is variously estimated by the German and American engineers. I have taken the highest figures: working expenses, 47,650,000 kran.

This leaves a balance of about a million toman for salaries and administrative expenses.

These figures have been prepared after much research and suppose that Persia's commerce is actually as represented by the 1927-28 statistics. They do not, moreover, allow for a probable expansion of trade or for the certain development of internal resources, once a suitable port and transportation facilities have been established.

It is on these considerations that I base my belief that the proposed railway will be able to pay for its working expenses out of revenue, the Duzdap figures notwithstanding; the capital expenditure for the original construction, of course, comes under a very different head.

I hope you will forgive my long and boring *exposé* of my favourite economic topic, and believe me, Sir Robert,

Very sincerely yours,
DAVID WILLIAMSON.

Enclosure 3 in No. 96.

Sir R. Clive to Mr. Williamson.

(Private and Confidential.)

My dear David,

Tehran, October 5, 1929.

THANKS for your letter of the 30th September with estimates of freight, &c., on the trunk railway.

I want to correct a mistake in my letter. The Duzdap Railway is the Indian standard gauge, not metre gauge as I said.

While not questioning your estimates, which I am not qualified to do, I do think there is one terribly important factor to be considered, i.e., who is to run the eventual railway? The Persian character being what it is, will they ever allow suitable foreign control of the management? If they don't, is anyone optimistic enough to expect a realisation of your estimates? The Julfa-Tabriz line is a potty little affair, but the lessons to be learnt from its history cannot entirely be ignored.

Yours sincerely,
R. H. CLIVE.

[E 5263/19/34]

No. 97.

Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received October 14.)

(No. 331.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Tehran, October 13, 1929.

I INFORMED the Minister of Court yesterday of my proposed visit to Persian Gulf, including Bushire, Henjam, and perhaps Bandar Abbas.

I said I had no intention of disturbing the waters. I should not visit Bahrein nor Arab side, but I proposed to end up at Abadan. The relations this summer between Persian authorities, especially the new police and our vice-consul, left much to be desired, and I did not consider this was the fault of the vice-consul. I told him it was essential that relations between our consuls in south and Persian authorities should be of the best, and that you were in favour of my visiting the Gulf and Abadan.

He quite understood.

Date of visit fits in well, as his Highness joins the Shah about 24th October at Resht, and will return here with His Majesty about 8th November.

The Shah left last week for Kurdistan and will visit Tabriz and Caspian Provinces and inspect northern section of railway.

(Repeated to India, No. 188, Bushire, No. 130.)

[E 5261/19/34]

No. 98.

Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received October 14.)

(No. 332.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, October 13, 1929.

I HAVE thought it best to await further instructions before taking action on your despatch No. 458 of the 25th September regarding the General Treaty negotiations. Is there any chance of my receiving instructions by the bag due here on the 18th October?

I have explained to Teymourtache that the necessity for inter-departmental consultation made the 18th October the earliest date on which my instructions could be expected; and he agreed that if they arrived then it would be well to have a discussion before the 23rd October, when I leave for Bushire.

[E 5261/19/34]

No. 99.

Mr. A. Henderson to Sir R. Clive (Tehran).

(No. 252.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, October 15, 1929.

YOUR telegram No. 332 of 13th October: Negotiations for General Treaty.

Detailed instructions concerning Henjam and Basidu were sent by bag on 10th October in my despatches Nos. 478 and 483, but you will see that certain points regarding Henjam may require discussion by you with Resident and senior naval officer during your visit to Gulf before you broach them with Persians.

The position regarding Persian naval proposals is set forth in my despatch No. 475 of 9th October. Memorandum is now being prepared for submission to Cabinet. You may assure Minister of Court that the matter is being carefully considered, while making it clear that the nature of our definite reply cannot yet be indicated.

Slavery (see my despatch No. 474 of 9th October).—Comments of Government of India are awaited; meanwhile, draft treaty article and protocol are being prepared here.

Arbitration.—Whole future policy of His Majesty's Government regarding conclusion of bilateral treaties of arbitration is under review as consequence of signature by His Majesty's Government of optional clause. We have therefore proposed to other Departments concerned, albeit most reluctantly, postponement of further discussion of new proposal of Minister of Court pending decision of His Majesty's Government on the general question, which may take considerable time.

[20533]

M 2

Claims.—We are preparing draft general article and protocol regarding establishment of arbitral commission, and have communicated with Persian Railway Syndicate as suggested in your telegram No. 320 of 28th September.

Tamb.—We await views of India on proposals in your despatch No. 454 of 31st August.

Remaining questions are under discussion with other departments, but we hope to get instructions to you by date of your return from Gulf. Meanwhile, it would be well for you to act on my despatch No. 458 of 25th September before you leave for Bushire.

[E 5256/2/34]

No. 100.

Mr. A. Henderson to Sir R. Clive (Tehran).

(No. 254.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, October 21, 1929.

YOUR despatch No. 439 of 21st August, paragraphs 11 to 13: Visits of His Majesty's ships to Persian ports.

Following are views of Admiralty, after consulting Commander-in-chief, East Indies, and senior naval officer, Persian Gulf:—

Persians are within their strict rights in international law in requiring His Majesty's ships to obtain permission before entering their ports, but in practice these rights are greatly modified, as a matter of international courtesy and convenience. Apart from special exceptions (*e.g.*, naval ports and inner waters), it is unusual for any country to require more than formal notice for visits of foreign warships to its ports. In case of vessels on regular patrol of given area even this is often dispensed with, *e.g.*, North Sea Fishery Patrol (see paragraph 3 in Admiralty letter of 1st May, sent to you on 6th June), and visits to Bahamas by United States ships employed in prevention of liquor smuggling. Circumstances of these cases are very similar to those in Persian Gulf, and there is therefore nothing unusual or derogatory to Persia in provisional arrangements embodied in your memorandum of 18th May, 1928, which article 3 of our draft treaty would perpetuate. In the first instance, an endeavour should be made by use of these arguments to retain the arrangement set forth in paragraph 2 of that article. Only in the last resort and subject to the following modifications would we be prepared to consider as minimum terms (under which it would not be altogether impossible for His Majesty's ships to carry out their duties) the rules indicated in paragraph 12 of your despatch:—

1. Proposed special arrangements at Bushire and Abadan to apply to all visits and not merely to cases of emergency, and also to apply to Kharag Island.
2. Unless it can be made clear that the Governor's permission will not be withheld, proposal should be modified so as only to require that His Majesty's ships should give reasonable notice to the Governor.

Even subject to these modifications acceptance of Persian proposal would cause much inconvenience to His Majesty's ships, as unforeseen circumstances may always entail alteration of programmes. Persians are grudgingly giving the barest civilities and facilities and yet ask for most generous and friendly treatment in their proposals for formation of a Persian navy.

The foregoing will indicate to you nature of our desiderata, and you have full discretion to employ whatever method you consider best calculated to secure a satisfactory settlement. You are best able to judge whether it is preferable to discuss the question further with the Minister of Court before you leave for Bushire, or to defer such conversation until you have talked the matter over with senior naval officer and Political Resident.

(Repeated to India, No. 38.)

[E 5424/1/34]

No. 101.

Mr. A. Henderson to Acting British Consul-General, Bushire.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, October 22, 1929.

FOLLOWING for Sir R. Clive on arrival:—

"My despatch of 10th October: Henjam protocol.

"Admiralty, on further consideration of instructions sent to you regarding article 6, view with much anxiety the possibility of trouble with Persian officials and soldiers in reserved area, and they suggest as means of guarding against this danger that you might in the first instance decline to entertain any proposal for a substantial rent in article 10, but finally yield on this point on condition that protocol includes a provision to the following effect:—

"Notwithstanding Persian sovereign rights and in order to avoid incidents inseparable from a *dual* control, the British Government will have complete jurisdiction over the leased territory during the period of the lease.

"Admiralty do not insist on the precise wording given above, and would be satisfied with any provision which in practice secured for British personnel and employees freedom from Persian police interference or official persecution in normal times.

"I shall be glad to receive your views, by telegraph, after consultation with senior naval officer and Political Resident, on the feasibility of securing adequate safeguards on these lines. I realise that it may be very difficult for you to prevail upon the Persians to concede what is desired; but would it be possible to take the line with them that some such arrangement is necessary to avoid the practical difficulties which are otherwise inevitable, and that His Majesty's Government may fairly expect it as a complement to the rather intangible privileges indicated in the present Persian draft, especially if they should agree to pay a substantial rent for the area?

"These suggestions are intended to supplement, and not replace, those contained in my despatch of 10th October concerning article 6."

(Repeated to India.)

No. 101A.

Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received October 23.)

(No. 337.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, October 22, 1929.

YOUR telegram of the 15th October: Treaty negotiations.

I informed Teymourache on the 21st October that his naval proposals were being referred to the Cabinet. I also spoke to him on the questions of Bahrein and of the private claims of British subjects against the Persian Government in the sense of the instructions contained in your despatch No. 458 of the 25th September. I added that I hoped to receive definite instructions on returning from my forthcoming visit to the Persian Gulf, when I would also discuss his draft Henjam Protocol.

Teymourache replied assuring me of his great anxiety that both our treaties, as well as an arrangement between the Persian Government and the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, should be signed and ratified by March 1930. The present Majlis was under his control, but the Deputies would lose interest after the No Ruz holiday in anticipation of next summer's election. After that, it would be more difficult to get things settled.

He realised that delay was inevitable owing to the necessity for inter-departmental discussion, but he hoped that such delay would be reduced to a minimum.

(Repeated to India.)

[E 5461/634/34]

No. 102.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received October 23.)

Sir,

India Office, October 22, 1929.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to transmit to you, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of despatch from His Majesty's consul for Seistan and Kain, dated the 12th September, respecting Sarhad affairs.

I am, &c.

A. HIRTZEL.

Enclosure in No. 102.

Consul Daly to Government of India (Simla).

(Confidential.)

*Seistan and Kain (Camp Duzdap),
September 12, 1929.*

Sir,

SARHAD affairs.

I have the honour to report on the present situation in the Sarhad and Persian Baluchistan.

Ever since the subjugation of Dost Mahomed there have been constantly recurring rumours of impending disturbances. For various reasons which will be explained below, I have always somewhat doubted the ability of the tribes to take any concerted action (*vide* my telegrams No. 271 (No. 34 to Tehran) and No. 365 (Tehran, No. 43)), and that such doubts were justified would appear to be supported by the fact that during the recent disturbances at Shiraz, when the Sarhad was practically evacuated by Persian forces, the tribes did not take advantage of what appeared to be, for them, a golden opportunity. This being so, I was the more surprised to receive further reports from Duzdap (*vide* telegram No. 428 (Tehran No. 51)) of the avowed intention of the tribes to give trouble. I have therefore been at some pains to endeavour to discover the underlying causes of these recurrent rumours.

The ostensible object of the Baluchis has always been to secure the return of Dost Mahomed from Tehran. With the exception of his immediate relatives, I do not believe that there is any general desire of the Baluchis to see Dost Mahomed back in the Sarhad. He has at least as many enemies as supporters, and since his subjugation the Persians have taken all possible steps to increase the influence of persons opposed to him. Dost Mahomed never had any great personal influence in the Sarhad, although much was accomplished in his name. The real power was wielded by his brother, Nowsherawan, who is a much stronger character and has always imposed his views on Dost Mahomed. Had Nowsherawan been removed to Tehran instead of D. M. Khan, it is probable that the Sarhad would have been less unsettled. This has been admitted to me by high military officials, but they explain that Dost Mahomed's name was so well known throughout Persia that political considerations made it necessary to detain him, to prove that they had been definitely victorious in the "war." They could not hope, at the time, to induce both Dost Mahomed and Nowsherawan to proceed to Tehran.

Nowsherawan will doubtless always be a potential source of trouble, but he can achieve little without the support of the tribes in the Bampur area, which he is unlikely to secure, and in the Sarhad the Persians have replaced a number of sardars by men who have long had family feuds with the relations of Dost Mahomed.

Idu Khan is now the person who is likely to be of the greatest embarrassment to the Persians. He is extremely ambitious, and considers that he has not been sufficiently rewarded by the Persians for assistance afforded them during the operations against Dost Mahomed. He has let it be known that he considers he should be made Governor of the Sarhad and Baluchistan. His influence is by no means so great as it was, and he now has many enemies among the tribes. Nevertheless, he has sufficient power to enable him to encourage a truculent attitude among some of the tribes, although he knows full well he could not secure sufficient unity to achieve success should they take up arms against the Persians. Should the Persians succeed in peacefully administering the Sarhad and Baluchistan, they

would have no further use for Idu Khan. He has realised this, and I am now convinced that it is he who from time to time instigates certain tribes to concert measures for rebellion. He invariably promises his support, and is invariably sent for by the General Officer Commanding and asked to use his influence to stop the spread of disaffection. He returns to the tribes and explains that the time is not yet ripe for rebellion, since he has been unable to secure unity and that somehow their intentions have become known to the Persians. Rumours of rebellion then subside, until such time as Idu Khan considers that the General Officer Commanding requires a further reminder of the difficulty of controlling the tribes without Idu Khan's assistance. The process is then repeated. It is worth noting that Idu Khan always contrives to have the news of an impending outbreak conveyed to the Persians, and also always conveys the news to a source which he knows to be in touch with this consulate. It is inconceivable that he would give notice of his intentions if rebellion were seriously contemplated.

I have recently conversed with Yawar Iskandar Khan, who enjoys the confidence of the General Officer Commanding, their wives being sisters. He conveyed to me that the General Officer Commanding had at length become aware of Idu Khan's double dealings and had warned him that his intrigues were discovered. A report which reaches me from a source believed to be reliable is to the effect that the General Officer Commanding contemplates arresting Idu Khan and removing him to Tehran, but that, before he can safely do so, he considers it necessary to definitely detach Jiand, the Sardar of the Yarmahommedzai. To this end he has twice sent for Jiand recently, but the latter has excused himself, and it is believed that Idu Khan has suspected trouble for himself and has endeavoured to frighten Jiand by declaring that the Persians intend to arrest him. Should the General Officer Commanding succeed in removing Jiand's distrust, he would have little difficulty in winning him over. He would doubtless promise the restoration to him of land which he formerly owned, but which Idu Khan succeeded in gaining from him during the British occupation, when his influence was great.

Further, Jiand is known to distrust Idu Khan. He has recently let it be known that the punishment he received from General Dyer during the British occupation of the Sarhad was the result of Idu's intrigues. He had wished to submit to General Dyer, but Idu Khan had twice secretly advised him not to do so, saying that he would be received well at first and subsequently punished.

The agitation reported in my telegram No. 428 (No. 51 to Tehran) is reported to be already losing force.

I have endeavoured to explain the somewhat involved politics of the Sarhad, as interpreted by me, because I believe that, unless the Persians satisfy Idu Khan's ambitions, or remove him from the Sarhad, he will continue to cause unrest among the tribes for some time to come. It is difficult to always accurately gauge the possibilities when a report of disaffection among the tribes is received. With such inflammable material as the Baluchis, Idu Khan may one day play the game once too often and be unable to control a situation brought about by himself.

I shall continue to keep the Government of India and His Majesty's Minister informed of reports of unrest which may be received in the future, but I am inclined to the belief that no serious rebellion in the Sarhad is at all likely unless conditions alter.

I cannot discover that the Baluchis have any considerable grievances. They are oppressed, in a petty way, by officials, but not more so than the subjects of the Persian Government elsewhere. There is some discontent on account of subsidies being four months in arrears, and the subsidies of some of the less important Sirdars have been curtailed or abolished, but the discontent on this score is not very great, since payments are made from time to time.

A copy of this despatch is being sent to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran.

I have, &c.

C. K. DALY, Major.

[E 5541/52/91]

No. 103.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received October 28.)

Sir,

India Office, October 25, 1929.

IN continuation of previous correspondence, I am directed by the Secretary of State for India to forward, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of the correspondence between this Office, the Government of India and the Political Resident, Bushire, on the points raised in Tehran despatch No. 454 of the 31st August, 1929, in regard to Persian claims to Tamb, Little Tamb, Abu Musa and Sirri.

2. On the question generally Mr. Benn agrees with the views of the Government of India, which coincide largely with those expressed in paragraphs 5-7 of Foreign Office despatch No. 458 of the 25th September, 1929, to His Majesty's Minister. The correspondence with the Political Resident now forwarded makes it additionally clear, in Mr. Benn's view, that it would be politically impossible to consider any compromise in this connexion which would involve, or have the appearance of involving, the sacrifice of the interests of the Trucial Arabs.

3. The Political Resident's despatch of the 25th September to Tehran appears to dispose of Persian allegations as to the employment, or suitability, of Tamb and Little Tamb for a smuggling base. On the question of the purchase by Persia of Arab rights in those islands, the Secretary of State notes that the Minister of Court, in the interview reported in Tehran despatch No. 454 of the 31st August, showed no disposition to adopt this solution of the problem. It is possible that at a later stage his Highness might display a more accommodating disposition on this point. Even, however, should he do so, Mr. Benn entirely agrees with the Government of India that it would be a mistake to communicate to the Trucial sheikh concerned any offer which was not really substantial. He feels, in this connexion, some apprehension that, even should the Persian Government ultimately be prepared to agree to the buying out of Arab rights in Tamb and Little Tamb, it is not improbable that they would expect the transaction to be financed by His Majesty's Government as part of the general settlement. Having regard to the strength of the Arab case, the Secretary of State is of opinion that no compromise should be considered save on the basis of actual payment by Persia.

4. Copies of this letter are being sent to the Colonial Office, Admiralty and Air Ministry.

I am, &c.
J. C. WALTON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 103.

Paraphrase Telegram No. 3125 from India Office to Government of India of October 7, 1929.

I SHALL be glad if you will telegraph your observations on Tehran despatch No. 454 of 31st August: Abu Musa and Tamb. That any financial transaction between Persia and Shargah should be conducted only through us would, of course, be essential.

Enclosure 2 in No. 103.

Paraphrase Telegram No. 3071 S from Government of India to India Office, October 10, 1929.

WITH view expressed in paragraph 20 of Tehran despatch No. 439, viz., that attitude adopted in paragraph 23 of his letter over Tamb and Abu Musa by Taimourtache is quite unreasonable, we are in agreement. This is equally the case as regards his paragraph 28 about Sirri, for, for treaty purposes, all three islands are inextricably linked up. The object of Taimourtache seems clearly to be to

manœuvre us into a position in which, Sirri having been summarily excluded, we will be tempted to split difference over other two islands by spirit of reasonableness. Abandonment of Sirri in consequence simply of long tacit acquiescence by His Majesty's Government in Persian occupation is, however, utmost we could dare to contemplate in weakening of Arab case. Offer by Persia to buy Arabs out of Tamb would have the advantage of implying recognition of existing rights of Arabs by Persia. But as the sheikh has already suspicions of our motives (see the Resident's letter to Tehran of the 25th September, of which copy is sent by this air mail), it would be dangerous for us to pass the offer on to him unless it were really substantial. The letter in question seems, incidentally, on expert naval opinion, to dispose finally of belief—whether real or pretended—of Persians that use as smuggling depot is or could be made of Tamb.

Foregoing refers to your telegram No. 3125.

Enclosure 3 in No. 103.

Paraphrase Telegram from Government of India, Simla, to Political Resident, Bushire, of September 24, 1929.

TAMB and Abu Musa.

Please telegraph your views on suggestion contained in Tehran despatch No. 454, dated the 31st August.

Enclosure 4 in No. 103.

Paraphrase Telegram from Political Resident, Bushire, to Government of India, Simla, of September 26, 1929.

YOUR telegram of the 24th September. As there is no harbour at Tamb and the place is exposed to heavy sea, it is not and cannot be used as depot for smuggling. Tamb does not belong to Shargah, but to Rasal Khaimah; any attempt therefore to induce sheikh to forgo claim in return for Persian return of Abu Musa must be fruitless. Sheikh of Rasal Khaimah is particularly suspicious. Now imagines that Government of India are robbing him of his share of revenue accruing to Tamb lighthouse. It is extremely unlikely that any pecuniary offer Persia would be prepared to make would induce him to forgo his sovereignty over Tamb. Question of royalty of air force refuelling station Tamb R is a matter over which he is being particularly obstinate.

Copy of my reply to Minister goes to you by air mail.

Enclosure 5 in No. 103.

Political Resident, Bushire, to Government of India (Simla).

(Confidential.)

Sir,

Bushire, September 25, 1929.

WITH reference to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran's despatch to the Foreign Office, London, No. 454 of the 31st August last, I have the honour to forward, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of my letter to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran, No. 138 of even date.

I have, &c.

C. C. J. BARRETT,
Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

Enclosure 6 in No. 103.

Lieutenant-Colonel Barrett to Sir R. Clive (Tehran).

(No. 138. Confidential.)

Sir,

Bushire, September 25, 1929.

I HAVE the honour to refer to paragraph 8 of your despatch No. 454 of the 31st August, 1929, to the Foreign Office, relating to the ownership of Tamb and Abu Musa.

The points on which you would appear to desire to learn my views fall under the following heads:—

- (a.) The population of the islands of Tamb and Abu Musa and the extent to which the former is used as a depot for smuggling.
- (b.) The likelihood of the Sheikh of Shargah agreeing to hand over Tamb to the Persian Government—
 - (1.) In return for a Persian acknowledgment that Abu Musa belongs to Shargah.
 - (2.) In return for a sum of money.

2. I have consulted the senior naval officer, Persian Gulf Division, who agrees with the following observations:—

- (a.) The population of both Tamb and Abu Musa varies with the season. In winter the population of Tamb is estimated to be 25 Arabs and 4 Persian men, exclusive of families. The Persians include the sheikh's servant, who is entrusted with the task of hauling up the sheikh's flag, and 2 employed as water carriers for the lighthouse staff. In the summer the Persians remain on the island, but all the Arabs leave for the pearl fisheries. Their wives and families go to Khasab or Bakha on the Arab coast.

The population of Abu Musa is 50 Arabs, 2 Persians and 3 Baluchis, but in summer the Persians and Baluchis remain on the island, but all the Arabs except two—left as guards—depart for the pearl banks.

His Majesty's ships have had Tamb under observation for some considerable time, but Captain Boyes states definitely that not the slightest sign of its use by smugglers has been seen. He adds that, as Tamb is an open anchorage, too close to the starting-point on the Arab coast and not close enough to the distributing centres, the smugglers, who, incidentally, are almost all Persians, would not use it as a depot. The senior naval officer reports that, owing to the better surveillance exercised on the island trade routes leading from the Gulf ports, the smuggling business has to a considerable extent shifted to Barkhat Khan's territory. Bandar Sirik is now a popular entrepôt.

- (b.) Although Sir Percy Cox made an agreement with Sheikh Saggah-bin-Khalid of Shargah in 1912, whereby the latter agreed to the construction of a lighthouse on his island of Tamb, the island at present belongs to the Sheikh of Ras-al-Khaimah and not to the Sheikh of Shargah. The exact date on which the ownership changed hands is difficult to ascertain; but it is a fact that Sheikh Sultan-bin-Salim of Ras-al-Khaimah now claims the island, and that his flag flies on it. He has, moreover, recently made a complaint to the Residency agent that he is receiving no share of the revenues derived from ships passing the Tamb lighthouse.

The Sheikh of Shargah claims and actually exercises certain rights—including the flying of his flag—on Abu Musa, but he does not question the Ras-al-Khaimah claim to Tamb. The two sheikhs are, of course, closely related, both being off-shoots of the same Jowasmi stock. In the past Ras-al-Khaimah and Shargah have sometimes been under one ruler.

If the Sheikh of Shargah were asked to consent to the transfer of Tamb to the Persian Government under either of the conditions (1) or (2) mentioned, he would state that the island was not his property.

As Abu Musa belongs to Shargah, the Sheikh of Ras-al-Khaimah would certainly refuse to forgo his claim, about which he is very insistent, in return for the waiving of the Persian claim on the Sheikh of Shargah's island. I do not think he will accept any sum of money which

Persia is likely to offer for Tamb. He is a man of obstinate and suspicious temper, and will suspect the motive of any offer he may receive. The lighthouse which the British Government built on the island gives it a considerable importance to us; and the sheikh has recently been persuaded by some busybody that he can obtain large revenues from it.

Copies of this letter are being sent to the Government of India and to the senior naval officer, Persian Gulf.

I have, &c.

C. C. J. BARRETT,
Political Resident in the Persian Gulf and His Majesty's Consul-General for Fars, &c.

[E 5600/33/91]

No. 104.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received October 30.)

Sir,

India Office, October 28, 1929.

IN continuation of previous correspondence relative to the negotiations with Persia, I am directed by the Secretary of State for India to forward, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of the telegraphic correspondence with the Viceroy on the 1st and the 22nd October.

2. The point taken in paragraph 2 of the Secretary of State's telegram No. 3046, and in the opening paragraph of the Viceroy's telegram No. 3171 S, to which Mr. Benn attaches much importance, will be adequately covered, if the instructions proposed to be sent to Sir Robert Clive (see Foreign Office letter of the 15th October), in reply to paragraph 9 of his despatch No. 439 of the 21st August, issue as at present drafted.

3. As regards paragraph 4 of the Secretary of State's telegram of the 1st October, Mr. Benn agrees with the Government of India that, provided that Bahrein is enumerated in the catalogue of treaty States to be appended to article 1 of the draft Anglo-Persian Treaty, it is unnecessary to press for particular reference to our special treaty relations with Bahrein in the Bahrein article. The question of the steps to be taken to regularise our position in Bahrein on the recognition by Persia of Bahreini independence will form the subject of a separate communication.

4. As regards the maintenance of an unofficial Persian agent in Bahrein, it will be seen, from the correspondence now forwarded, that Mr. Benn had hoped that it might be possible to reach a compromise on this point on the basis accepted by Taimourtache, as reported in Tehran despatch No. 439 of the 21st August. But both the Political Agent, Bahrein, and the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf see very strong objection to the recognition of any form of Persian agent, whether official or unofficial, and their objections are shared by the Government of India. In a matter of this nature Mr. Benn feels that he has no option but to be guided by the expert opinion of the local authorities. The possible compromise which the Government of India state that they are exploring in consultation with the Resident might, perhaps, afford a means of satisfying Persian desires on this point without giving rise to embarrassing reactions.

5. In the light of the Government of India's telegram of the 22nd October, the Secretary of State agrees that no objection need be taken to the giving to Persia of the assurance of most-favoured-nation treatment in commerce and industry for Persian nationals in Bahrein proposed in the last sentence of Taimourtache's counter-draft, on the understanding, however, that reciprocal treatment will be secured in the treaty for Bahreinis in Persia.

6. A further communication will follow in due course, on the receipt of the views of the Government of India on the other points raised by the Persian counter-proposals.

7. Copies of this letter are being sent to the Dominions Office, Colonial Office, Admiralty and Air Ministry.

I am, &c.

J. C. WALTON.

Enclosure 1 in No. 104.

*Paraphrase Telegram from India Office to Government of India, No. 3046,
October 1, 1929.*

I SHALL be glad if your observations on Persian counter-proposals in Tehran despatch of the 21st August, No. 439, can be telegraphed as early as possible.

2. Please refer to paragraph 7 of letter from Taimourtache enclosed in the despatch mentioned above. For retention of formula used in British draft to cover Arab protectorates I propose to press. Protectorates might be specified in explanatory exchange of notes, in which reference to treaties by which cession of territory is precluded could be introduced.

3. By mail of the 26th September there have been sent proceedings of Inter-Departmental Conference on Persian counter-draft in regard to Henjam.

4. Taimourtache's letter, paragraph 26. Bahrein. Persian counter-draft:—

(a.) Your views as to desirability of pressing for reference to special treaty relations would be welcomed by me. Point is to some extent covered *vis-à-vis* Persia by reference proposed in connexion with article 1 in paragraph 2 above. Absence of reference would not, presumably, give rise *vis-à-vis* sheikh to exaggerated idea of his independence of His Majesty's Government. It might, however, be well, in advance of signature of Persian Treaty, to prepare ground for action, *e.g.*, on lines suggested in your telegram of 7th May, to regularise our position in Bahrein. To enable the matter to be considered here further, I shall be glad to learn your views.

(b.) Local representation of Persia. I think, subject to views of Political Resident and yourself, that compromise in regard to Persian representative might be found in arrangement finally accepted by Taimourtache (see Clive's despatch, paragraph 19). An informal arrangement seems, however, desirable, to which reference would not be made in treaty.

(c.) Persian counter-draft, third sentence. Are we in a position, subject to reciprocity for Bahrein in Persia, to give assurance on lines proposed, and do you see any objection, if so? If practicable, there would, *prima facie*, be advantage in this.

5. By mail of the 3rd October there are being sent proceedings of Inter-Departmental Conference on article 10—*Slavery*.

Enclosure 2 in No. 104.

*Paraphrase Telegram from Government of India to India Office, No. 3169 S,
October 22, 1929, repeating Telegrams from Political Resident in the Persian
Gulf to the Government of India.*

OUR comments on the two following telegrams from the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf with reference to your telegram No. 3046 of the 1st October—treaty negotiations with Persia—will follow.

Bushire telegram of the 13th October to Government of India:—

"Persian interests are impartially safeguarded by the Political Agent, and that this arrangement should not be altered I should much prefer. Following telegram has been received by me from the Political Agent, whom I consulted:—

"In any capacity, Persian agent, even though our nominee, most undesirable. Were he nominee of the Persian Government it would be a calamity, as position would certainly be abused by him. Please await letter sent by to-day's post."

"Same influential position *vis-à-vis* Sheikh Hamad as is now held by Qusaibi would, I fear, gradually be acquired by unofficial Persian representative. In Bahrein, Persian merchants are divided into two opposing camps, between which, in my experience, there is very little agreement. Enmity of others would be roused by grant to one of them of semi-official position, which he would attempt to turn to his financial advantage."

On the 18th October Political Resident telegraphed as follows to us:—

"All Gulf Arab principalities in treaty relations with us are clearly covered by the formula used in the British draft. Principalities are possibly covered by the Minister of Court's wording, but this is not free from doubt, owing to the peculiar nature of our relations with them. Koweit and Bahrein are independent States under British protection, but are not British protectorates, while maritime protection only is granted to Qatr and Trucial sheikhs. It is open to question in the case of the latter whether anything more than their ships are entitled to our protection under the treaty. They reply, I urge, for these reasons, that retention should be pressed for of the formula used in the British draft, or that a form of wording be used, in the alternative, to show that States not only entitled to full protection, but any modified form thereof, are covered by article.

"Protection of foreigners, including Persians residing in Bahrein, is given us under our special relations with Bahrein, and if Persia could be persuaded to acknowledge these relations definitely, I consider that it would be of distinct advantage. Objections to Persian official or unofficial representative are shown in my telegram of the 13th instant, No. 1009. We must always bear in mind the extreme weakness of Sheikh Hamad's character, and his indolence; and his sons and brothers, though somewhat less malleable material, may also be objects of intrigue. Definite acknowledgment by Persia of our privileged position would be helpful here, though to persuade sheikh to agree in a formal document to accept in more important matters, in return for protection against external foes, the advice of the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, should not present great difficulty.

"Reference to the Persian school is made by Taimourtache in paragraph 19 of his letter. Arab complaints have in the past been roused by the aggressive nationalism and flag-waving tendency of this school."

Enclosure 3 in No. 104.

*Paraphrase Telegram from Government of India to India Office, No. 3171 S,
October 22, repeated to His Majesty's Minister, Tehran, No. 157 T.*

WITH paragraph 2 of your telegram No. 3046 we are in agreement. Precisely what we want included would apparently be left out by Taimourtache's draft. It seems certainly advisable, on the other hand, that catalogue of our treaty States should be given by us to Persian Government.

Paragraph No. 4 of your telegram. There seems no need, provided that Bahrein is enumerated in catalogue of our treaty States, to press for particular reference in Bahrein article to our special treaty relations with Bahrein, though we are, of course, in agreement with the Resident's view, that the more categorical the admission by Persia of our special treaty relations, the better it will be. That we should endeavour to get sheikh to agree formally to accept the Resident's advice in more important matters, we also agree with Resident. Our securing of official recognition by Persia of his independence would clearly be an appropriate occasion on which request to give such an assurance could be made to him.

That there are objections to a Persian agent, however informal his status, we agree with the Resident. Verbal explanation made by Taimourtache to His Majesty's Minister of the sort of thing he really wants seems plausible, but that Persian inch would speedily grow to an ell is, in our view, certain. Resident is being consulted by us whether, as a possible compromise, some selected Persian might be recognised by us ourselves as custodian of foreign affairs and as non-official spokesman of the Persian colony, *vis-à-vis* not the sheikh but the Political Agent.

No objection is seen by the Resident to giving to Persia an assurance of most-favoured-nation treatment in commerce and industry, and that the sheikh will be guided by our advice he is certain.

We will shortly telegraph our views on the other points.

Foregoing refers to our telegram No. 3169 S of the 22nd October.

[E 5593/19/34]

No. 105.

Mr. A. Henderson to Sir R. Clive (Tehran).

(No. 526.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, October 31, 1929.

I OBSERVE from paragraphs 27-39 of the letter addressed to you by the Persian Minister of Court on the 20th August, a copy of which was enclosed in your despatch No. 439 of the 21st August, that his Highness has proposed that the general treaty now under negotiation with the Persian Government should contain a very much wider provision relating to arbitration than that hitherto contemplated by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom.

2. His Highness suggests that instead of confining arbitration to questions of interpretation arising out of the treaty, all disputes, whatever their nature, which cannot be composed through the diplomatic channel, save such as fall within the competence of the judicial or administrative authorities of one of the parties to the treaty, shall be submitted to arbitration.

3. The future policy of His Majesty's Government in regard to the general question of their entering into bilateral treaties of arbitration is at present under consideration, as a consequence of the signature by His Majesty's Government of the Optional Clause of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice, and it is not yet determined (1) whether or no they should, in view of that signature, abandon the practice of concluding bilateral treaties of arbitration; (2) if not, what should be the form of such bilateral treaties, and to what reservations they should be subject; and (3) to what extent arbitration commitments may properly be undertaken otherwise than as a result of common action by all His Majesty's Governments. It is clearly essential to await a decision on these general questions before considering the attitude to be adopted in regard to the present Persian proposal. Such a decision may not be taken for some considerable time.

4. You should, therefore, for the present defer all further discussion with the Persian Government regarding the proposed arbitration provisions in both the general treaty and the commercial treaty. You will, of course, understand that the explanation given in the foregoing paragraph is intended solely for your private information and should not be communicated to the Persian Government. If any explanation to the Persian Government becomes necessary, it should be confined to the statement at the beginning of paragraph 3, namely, that the future policy of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom in regard to the general question of their entering into bilateral treaties of arbitration is at present under consideration, as a consequence of the signature by them of the Optional Clause of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice.

I am, &c.

ARTHUR HENDERSON.

[E 5098/58/34]

No. 106.

Foreign Office to Colonial Office.

Sir,

Foreign Office, November 5, 1929.

I AM directed by Mr. Secretary Henderson to request you to inform Lord Passfield that he has had under consideration your letter of the 21st August and the letter addressed to the Colonial Office by the Admiralty on the 2nd October, regarding the results of the recent survey of the Persian and Iraq coastline in the estuary of the Shatt-el-Arab, and to transmit to you the accompanying copies of minutes by the legal advisers to the Foreign Office on the subject.

2. In considering these minutes, reference should be made to the chart cutting prepared by the Admiralty at the request of this Department, showing the frontier line according to the Turco-Persian Frontier Protocol of 1913, the low water line of the Abadan and Abdullah banks, as determined by the latest survey, and the 3-mile limits as measured from the ends of these banks, of which it is understood a copy has been furnished to the Colonial Office.

3. There appears to be a strong case for considering (a) that the mouth of the Shatt-el-Arab is a line joining the extreme end of the Abdullah bank and the extreme end of the Abadan bank close to the North Beacon (and a little east of it); and (b) that the Iraq-Persian frontier runs down the low water mark on the south-west side of the Abadan bank, as far as the extreme end of the bank, close to

North Beacon. It seems, therefore, that the Iraqi Government can justifiably treat the waters of the Shatt-el-Arab, down to the imaginary line joining the extreme ends of the Abdullah and Abadan banks, as national waters. Should a dispute arise with Persia on this point, the Iraqi Government could certainly maintain the contentions set forth in the opening sentence of this paragraph. It is, however, evidently in the interests alike of His Majesty's Government and the Iraqi Government that such a dispute should be avoided.

4. As regards the Rooka Channel, it will be observed from the first enclosure herein that it could reasonably be contended that the channel lies wholly within Iraq territorial waters. Owing, however, to the fact that there is no generally recognised principle of international law governing the limitation of the territorial waters of two riparian States at the mouth of a river, such a claim might well be contested by Persia. Should disagreement arise on the point and the case be submitted to arbitration, the result could not be predicted with certainty. Mr. Henderson, therefore, considers that the importance of avoiding a dispute with Persia on this point is still greater than in the case of the questions dealt with in the preceding paragraph of this letter.

5. In Mr. Henderson's view, the risk of such disputes can best be met by the establishment of the proposed Shatt-el-Arab Conservancy Board, on which Persia would be represented. I am, therefore, to suggest for the consideration of Lord Passfield that the Acting High Commissioner at Bagdad should be instructed, in reply to paragraph 6 of the late Sir G. Clayton's despatch, Secret. A, of the 22nd July, to lay stress upon this aspect of the matter in any communication which Major Young may be instructed to make to the Iraqi Government on this subject.

6. Copies of this letter are being sent to the Admiralty and the India Office.

I am, &c.

MONTEAGLE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 106.

Minute by Mr. Beckett.

THE protocol of 1913 is, of course, the governing instrument with regard to the boundary between Persia and Turkey (now Iraq) in the Shatt-el-Arab, but in view of article 5 of the protocol, it would, I think, be difficult to maintain now that any delimitation of the frontier which was actually settled by the Delimitation Commission was wrong and should be reversed. But I do not think it is necessary to do this. The Delimitation Commission stopped or began their delimitation of the frontier at the point 2 miles below the fort marked with an arrow on the last Admiralty plan. The frontier below that point has not been delimited at all. It may be that changes in the configuration of the banks have occurred since that time, with the result that more land has been created, or it may be that the commission, since they only visited the district at high water, made a mistake and did not carry their delimitation as far seaward as they should. But I do not think it matters which, since we can maintain now not that any of the work of delimitation which they did was wrong and should be changed, but that there is now a piece of frontier which they have not delimited at all. We are not, therefore, contesting any of the delimitation which they actually did, but merely maintaining that it was not quite complete, and this seems to me to be an entirely different thing, and there is nothing inconsistent with article 5 of the protocol in such a contention. Consequently, we can now say that as regards the undelimited portion, the matter is governed simply by the protocol, and its terms are the only thing which can be applied to ascertain the boundary on this lowest portion. It is clear now, as the result of the survey, that the land must be regarded as going to the end of the Abadan bank and Abdullah bank, respectively, and that a line drawn across between the ends of these two banks must be regarded as being the mouth of the river and the point where national waters stop and territorial waters begin. The references to low waters marked on p. 10 show that the protocol itself contemplated that a low water mark must be taken for ascertaining territory on this boundary, or, in other words, that the ordinary principles of international law must in this respect be adopted.

We have, therefore, in respect of this piece of undelimited frontier, to apply the words of the protocol, which provide that "the frontier follows the course of the Shatt-el-Arab to the sea, leaving the river and all the islands therein under Ottoman sovereignty on the following conditions and with the following exceptions. . . ." For the reasons given above, we have to apply that principle as far as the land at low

water mark goes, and that now takes us on the left bank of the river, at any rate as far as North Beacon, and, for the reasons which I will give later, I think that North Beacon is the point which must be taken as being the end of the land. The frontier, therefore, follows the low water mark of the Abadan bank down as far as North Beacon, where the land and the river end and we meet the open sea, the whole of the river as far as this point being now Iraq national waters. Though there may be no definite rule laid down, it does seem to be reasonable to say that, for the purpose of ascertaining the boundary between Persian and Iraq territorial waters outside the mouth of the river, one should draw a line joining the extreme ends of the Abdullah and Abadan banks, and then draw another line from the end of the Abadan bank, following the general lie of the coast, and that the boundary between the two territorial waters would be the line which bisects in two equal parts the obtuse angle formed at the junction of these two lines. At any rate, this would be a reasonable contention, and it is one which would clearly put the whole of the Rooka Channel in Iraq territorial waters.

There is, of course, the islet which appears at low water south-east of North Beacon, an islet which is not, even at low water, joined to the Abadan Island. I have marked this islet "X" on the Admiralty chart. The Admiralty point out that if the matter is governed purely by the ordinary rules of international law, Persia would find some support from the replies of the various countries to the League of Nations *questionnaire* in maintaining that this islet X is Persian territory, and that her territorial waters must be measured from it. Whether or not that contention would be good if the matter were left to be decided purely according to the rules of general international law, it seems to me to be unnecessary to go into that now for two reasons:—

- (1.) In this case the matter is not left to be governed by the ordinary rules of international law, since the protocol itself contains provisions as to the principles to be supplied. I refer to letter (a) 3, on p. 10, which provides "All islets which now exist, or which, though not now in existence may be formed, and which may be joined at low water to the Island of Abadan, belong to Persia." It is clear, therefore, that the protocol itself has provided that in the case of islets off the Abadan Island, Persia shall only be able to claim those islets which are joined to the Island of Abadan at low water, and that, therefore, she cannot claim this islet X. It will be seen also that the same principle is adopted in letter (c), which says that the shore includes all lands joined to the bank at low water. It seems to me, therefore, that the words of the protocol themselves provide a good argument against any claim on the part of the Persians to sovereignty over the islet X, and to the measurement of her territorial waters on the basis that islet X is her territory.
- (2.) Even if what I have said above in (1) is wrong, and Persia could claim islet X and measure her territorial waters from it, it does not seem to me that if one joins the end of the Abdullah bank to islet X, and then draws another line from islet X, north-west, following the general line of the Persian coast and bisecting the very obtuse angle so formed, any of the Rooka Channel does come within Persian territorial waters. I have no instruments to do this accurately, but, at any rate, this could be confirmed. If this is the case then I am not sure that islet X really becomes of any great importance at present.

W. E. BECKETT.

October 25, 1929.

Enclosure 2 in No. 106.

Minute by Mr. Malkin.

I AGREE, and I only want to add that the bit at the end of the Delimitation Commission's line (marked on map No. 4, annexed to the protocol), which strikes away from the coast and goes out to sea, cannot on any hypothesis be regarded as representing a piece of the frontier delimited by them, or that, if we have to argue that it is to be disregarded, there should be no insuperable difficulty in doing so.

H. W. MALKIN.

October 25, 1929.

[E 5769/1016/34]

No. 107.

Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received November 8.)

(No. 350.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, November 7, 1929.

MY despatch of the 21st August.

I have consulted the senior naval officer, and submit the following views in case His Majesty's Government decide to consider the naval proposals of the Minister of Court.

It is eminently desirable that the Persian naval force should be limited, as far as possible, and the senior naval officer suggests that it should consist of two sloops of 600–700 tons, armed with two 12-pounders and machine guns, and of a tonnage which would enable them to dock at the floating dock at Abadan, provided the Anglo-Persian Oil Company have no objections. One might be fitted as a training ship, and the other, possibly, with suitable accommodation for the Shah. Four shallow-draught motor-launches of 150–200 tons, mounting one 3-pounder. This force, if properly run, should be able, together with the existing customs motor dhows, to deal with contraband trade.

The senior naval officer estimates that the annual upkeep would cost £40,000, and capital outlay roughly £140,000.

The senior naval officer has seen and concurs in the above.

(Repeated to India and Bagdad.)

[E 5801/1/34]

No. 108.

Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received November 10.)

(No. 354. Secret.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, November 10, 1929.

YOUR telegram 23rd October received through the Resident, Bushire: Henjam.

Since visiting island I fully appreciate the necessity of limiting, and if possible excluding, Persian military and police. I submit it would be worth paying your sum to obtain this, more especially if by so doing new Persian navy would not be able to land there as of right; as senior naval officer pointed out, the Italian naval advisers, had they ever toured the gulf, must have realised that Henjam was only possible base in eastern waters of the gulf.

Should it be possible to obtain satisfactory limitation of Persian military and police as well as quarantine regulation similar to that in force in number of ports whereby vessel signalling clean bill of health is ordinarily exempted from inspection, would His Majesty's Government in last resort be prepared to pay rent in excess of £1,000? It must be remembered, however, that £1,000 rent is only supposition on my part, as Minister gave no indication of sum he expected to obtain.

(Repeated to India, No. 208, Bushire, No. 143, for senior naval officer.)

[E 5890/19/34]

No. 109.

Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received November 13.)

(No. 356.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Tehran, November 12, 1929.

YOUR telegram No. 267 of the 9th November: General treaty negotiations.

Four of the questions which especially interest the Minister of Court are his naval proposals, the question of the removal of the Residency from Bushire, the telegraphs question, and the position on the Shatt-el-Arab (the Conservancy Board); and I had hoped that when I returned to Tehran after visiting the Persian Gulf I should have found instructions awaiting to speak to Teymourache on questions such as these. I am not yet, however, authorised to speak to him on any one of these questions. On the other hand, His Majesty's Government wish him to give way on the question of men-of-war, to modify his counter-proposals about Henjam, to make a new slavery convention, to withdraw his request for representative at Bahrein and his claim to Tamb.

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I have now been back a week but have not yet seen his Highness. While I do not despair of getting him to meet us on some or even all these questions, I do not want to put them forward until I can simultaneously have something to offer (see my telegram No. 337 of the 22nd October). In this treaty it is almost impossible to hope to settle individual articles by themselves as in a commercial treaty. The whole treaty is one of give and take, and we cannot hope to take until we have settled how far we are prepared to give.

I cannot further delay going to visit the Minister of Court, and I propose to have a friendly general talk with him regarding my visit to the Persian Gulf and Abadan. I trust, however, that it may be possible to send me very early instructions on the points mentioned in paragraph 1 above, and that I have made myself clear.

(Repeated to India.)

[E 5926/56/91]

No. 110.

Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received November 15.)

(No. 520.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a note from the Persian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, dated the 10th October, on the subject of compensation for the seizure of a dhow by the Persian customs officials at Tamb.

Tehran, October 15, 1929.

Enclosure in No. 110.

Persian Ministry for Foreign Affairs to Sir R. Clive.

(Translation.)

M. le Ministre,

October 10, 1929.

IN reply to your Excellency's note No. 340 of Mehr. . . in which you refer to the memorandum No. 36 of 18th Bahman, 1307 (7th February, 1929), I have the honour to state that the purport of the said memorandum was that, apart from the question of the sovereignty of the Tamb (Tunb) Island, the authorities of the British Government, in accordance with the notes of the 3rd August and the 7th September, 1928, reserve the right to claim compensation for the passengers on board the boat (dhow) which was taken at Tamb (Tunb) by the customs officials of the Imperial Government to Lingah for carrying smuggled goods.

This claim of compensation was, as mentioned in the notes of the 4th August [sic] and the 7th September, based on two points, which are as follows:—

1. A boat (dhow) which did not belong to a Persian subject and which was carrying fifteen women and children was taken to Lingah by the Persian customs ship and all the effects and belongings of the passengers, such as money, jewels and even their clothes, were taken from them.

2. The boat (dhow) in question was not carrying smuggled goods, but the sugar and tea which were in the boat consisted of the provisions required for six weeks of navigation.

As it has already been explained in this Ministry's note of 29th Shahrivar, 1307 (20th September, 1928), (1) the Persian customs officials have taken this action in Persian territorial waters; (2) according to the *procès-verbaux* received from the Customs, which are now available and which are all signed by Abid-ibni-Rashid Debai, the captain of the boat (dhow), in the presence of some witnesses, Abid Rashid and his father are Persian subjects; the passengers of the boat did not number more than five (three men, who were Persian subjects, and two women); and the only thing which was taken from them consisted of 400 rupees (which were smuggled). This sum of rupees was also, after completion of the examination (trial), returned to them against a document which was given by them.

It was even offered to the women on board the boat (dhow), who were proceeding to Kishm, that they should proceed to their destination with all their effects on board the ship "Hassan Talen Bostan," which had met them on their way, but the women refused the offer.

(3) The sugar and tea which were found in the boat (dhow) were not, according to the said *procès-verbaux*, carried as provisions, but were being carried to Kishm as smuggled goods. The list of the same is as follows:—

	Batmans.
Tea	16
Lump sugar	27
Sugar	33
Rice and dates	6,000(?)

The period of voyage of the people concerned to their destination could not exceed one week or two. And if even we take the view of the Legation and admit six weeks, five passengers would not require more than four batmans of lump sugar and half a batman of tea for their provision for six weeks.

In view of the reasons mentioned above and as admitted by the captain (of the dhow) himself, the tea and sugar carried by the boat in question were considered as smuggled goods. While taking the foregoing well-established facts into view, your Excellency will admit not only that the allegations made against the customs officials of the Imperial Government in taking the belongings and clothes of some women and children constitute a most surprising hypothesis, but that the pursuance of the matter by the authorities of the honourable British Government in such cases and to such an extent causes much regret.

I avail, &c.

HASSAN ALI GHAFARI.

[E 5930/104/34]

No. 111.

Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received November 15.)

(No. 531. Secret.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of Intelligence Summary No. 21 for the period ending the 19th October compiled by the officiating military attaché to this Legation.

Tehran, October 19, 1929.

Enclosure in No. 111.

(Secret.)

Intelligence Summary No. 21 for the Period ending October 19, 1929.

Tehran.

1. *His Imperial Majesty the Shah.*—The Shah commenced his autumn tour on the 8th October, and will spend about a month journeying to Hamadan, Kermanshah, thence to Tabriz, and through Gilan to Mazanderan, to Astrabad, where he will witness the Turcoman races. The Minister of Court will join him in Mazanderan and will return with him to Tehran about the 8th November.

2. *British Subjects.*—Three officers of the Razmak Brigade on leave left Duzdap for Tehran, via Meshed, on the 12th October.

No formal contracts are held under the Persian Government by British subjects; a few British are employed by the railway syndicate in the southern section.

3. *Foreign Representatives and Subjects.*—M. le Commandant Doursoun, of the Turkish General Staff, has been appointed military attaché to the Turkish Embassy. European engineers have been engaged for municipal work at Bander-i-Gez, Hamadan and Kermanshah.

The Eastern Development Company is in the hands of a band of crooks, chief among which is a Hungarian Jew known as Kufferstein.

4. *Military School.*—Before leaving on tour the Shah distributed commissions to eighty cadets (not 105, as notified in the press). Forty-five were graduates of the

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higher course, and thirty-five of the lower course. This latter course was established only four years ago; the students are selected n.e.o.'s, who are nominated yearly for a two years' course of instruction. They are commissioned as third lieutenants—"naib seyum"—but, according to the existing regulations, they cannot be promoted above the rank of captain. Those nominated to the higher course are normal students who must be graduates of a high school ("motovasseteh"). The courses are referred to as "officers' school" and "lieutenants' school."

5. *Aviation*.—Three biplanes, type D.H.9.A., arrived at Pahlavi from Russia on the 24th September; one left for Tehran on the 26th. They are housed inadequately in a shed on the joint Junkers-Persian aerodrome.

Two Junkers all-metal monoplanes—two-seaters—were seen pegged in the open on the Tehran aerodromes on the 15th October. The surface of the landing-ground was in process of repair by a gang of labourers.

One D.H.9.A. type aeroplane carried out a thirty-minute flight from the Tehran aerodrome on the 12th October.

6. *Majlis*.—M. Dadgar has again been elected president, and Mohamed Hashim Mirza Afsar and Mirza Ahmed Khan Shariab Zadeh have been elected first and second vice-presidents respectively.

7. *Miscellaneous*.—Steps are being taken to inaugurate an agricultural bank after the German model, but no details are yet available.

The increased establishment of schools at a budgeted cost of 20,000 tomans has been put into operation.

Two new power stations are about to be opened; a new fire station is in course of erection. The gate leading to the Gulistan Palace from the Meidan-i-Sipah has been demolished; it is thought that several others will be pulled down as a result of the town planning policy.

The Bagdad-Tehran air mail is now a twice weekly service. Machines leave Tehran on Mondays and Thursdays, and return on Tuesdays and Fridays.

A Junkers plane made a forced landing at Mayami on the Meshed-Tehran route on the 8th October. The under-carriage was swept away by the failure of a wheel. The plane formed one of a convoy hired by Nawab Salar Jang; one of his suite was seriously injured.

Kerman.

8. A coal deposit, reported on the outskirts of the town, is nothing more than a 20-inch seam of poor peat. The Governor-General's report to Tehran, referring to a "coal mine" was exaggerated.

9. The provocative attitude of Kerman officials is the subject of an enquiry. It is alleged that it was a contributory cause of the recent revolt. Peculation and extortion were especially rife.

10. Sartip Ali Shah Khan Rahimi, commanding Kerman "Teep," advanced from Sirjan about the middle of September, and is stated to have carried out a combined operation in conjunction with a column from Darab against Sheikh Abdul Hassan Sarkuhi (see Intelligence Summary No. 19, paragraph 19). No confirmation of the rumoured success of the troops is yet available; the local press claim a large number of rebel casualties in an action near Khashuabad, but the losses of the Government forces are not mentioned. The presence of troops on the Kerman-Bunder Abbas road has not prevented the raiding of motor traffic.

11. Ali Jan is still at large; troops sent out to apprehend him have so far met with no success, but are reported to be ravaging villagers.

12. Sardar Mujallal, an enterprising Kerman landlord, has started to make roads on his estates for motor traffic. The following have been completed:—

	Miles.
Rayin to Quarial-ul-Arab	27
Rayin to Mahun	40
Rayin to Bahramjird	39

A road from Rayin to Sarbizan is projected. It is not thought that these roads will be more than widened tracks, fit for horse transport, wheeled and pack. Cars may negotiate them, but lorry traffic would certainly cause rapid deterioration. A full report on their alignment and construction will be forwarded.

13. A later report states that the forces of Sheikh Abdul Hassan have been dispersed and that he is a fugitive.

Fars.

14. News of the military situation during the last fortnight has been scanty. Brigandage is still rife and convoys are frequently attacked; post cars are not immune.

15. Sixty infantry and one armoured car passed through Abadeh for Shiraz on the 4th October.

16. Boir Ahmadis are pillaging in the sarhads of Abadeh; 320 infantry left for Shiraz from Isfahan on the 6th October, but returned to protect Abadeh. An aeroplane reconnaissance was undertaken from Shiraz on the 7th October; the result is not known. There is continual trouble round Ahmedi and Chagodak. Casualties are reported to have been sustained by both military and ammieh on the Borasjun-Bushire road.

17. A daylight robbery of the post van at Yazdikhast resulted in the occupants becoming casualties; an assistant was killed.

18. A commission for the consideration of claims resulting from the commandeering of transport is now sitting. Wear and tear has been construed to include all breakages and accidents. It would seem that the Government would be infinitely better served were there a law and a system of impressment; a subsidy scheme might also be of use.

19. An engineer has been engaged for the reconstruction of the Shiraz-Bushire road, but there is no indication of the commencement of work.

Khorassan.

20. It is reliably reported that the new road now in course of construction between Sabzewar and Nishapur is rapidly being made. Work is proceeding in several sections, and some 500 labourers have been seen; it is estimated that the new track will be ready in about three months. A great improvement on the old road will be effected. On this latter a Buick car took five hours to cover 60 miles in the hands of an expert driver. Rain has been known to cause lorries to become immobile for upwards of three weeks. The Sabzewar-Shahrud section will be put in hand next year.

21. A coal mine, which now yields 200 kharvars of good average coal, is situated 80 miles to the east of Meshed in the Agdarband area. It is operated by a Persian.

22. A favourable report upon a coal deposit in the Turaq area, 6 miles south of Meshed, has been given by an erstwhile Russian mining engineer. A Persian group, which includes several Meshed merchants, is seeking a concession for mines in this area.

23. A later report will be submitted upon the quality of this coal and upon the possibilities of its use for industrial purposes in the Meshed area.

Northern Provinces.

24. The import of all arms and ammunition into Resht was prohibited on the 18th September.

25. Heavy rain in Mazanderan and Gilan has interfered considerably with traffic in those provinces. Resht is partially under water, and boats are in use in the streets. The Siahrud Bridge has been completely destroyed, and transport crosses the stream with great difficulty. Large areas about Lahijan are inundated.

26. The Sahvezan-Pounel Railway has been put into repair, and a petrol locomotive is working on it. This may speed up the work on the sea wall at Pahlavi.

27. A telegraph office has been opened at Baneh in Kurdistan.

Sarhad.

28. A report that Dost Mohamed has left Tehran is unfounded.

H. J. COOPER, *Captain*,
Officiating Military Attaché.

[E 5931/95/34]

No. 112.

Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received November 15.)

(No. 532.)

Sir,

Tehran, October 20, 1929.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a copy of a despatch which I have received from the acting consul at Shiraz concerning the local situation as on the 9th October.

2. With regard to paragraph 2, the selection of Malik Mansur Khan as Ilkhani of the Kashqai tribe was announced in a Tehran paper near the end of September; it is possible that the appointment is merely a temporary one.

3. Since Mr. Davis wrote I have received reports that robbers attacked the Persian post car at Yezdikhast on the 13th October; the chauffeur was wounded, and his assistant killed; and four persons, one a member of the Amnieh Department, were carried off. It seems probable that the assailants were Boir Ahmedis.

4. All local rumours confirm the reports of trouble in the districts of Dashti and Dashtistan, near Bushire. I observe, however, that the Tehran press reports on the 16th October that two rebels named Seyyid Abdul Karim and Mohammed Ibrahim have surrendered to the military garrison at Kazerun.

5. Copies of this despatch and of its enclosure have been sent to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, His Majesty's Acting High Commissioner for Iraq, and to His Majesty's acting consul-general at Bushire.

I have, &c.

R. H. CLIVE.

Enclosure in No. 112.

Acting Consul Davis to Sir R. Clive.

(No. 68.)

Sir,

Shiraz, October 9, 1929.

IN continuation of my despatch No. 59 of the 25th September, 1929, on the subject of the situation in Fars, I have the honour to report that although it was feared that the migration of the Kashqai tribes to their winter quarters might be the occasion of further serious disturbances in this province, the migration is already far advanced and no serious outbreak has yet occurred. There is therefore reason to believe, or at least to hope, that hostilities may be avoided this season. The Farsimadan tribe is already in its winter quarters. The Kashkuli tribe has moved down from Ardakan and has already crossed the Bushire-Shiraz road in its southward trek. The Shishbuluki tribe is in the region of Guyum, about 20 miles north-west of Shiraz on the road to Ardakan. The Darashuri tribe is in Saiza. Malik Wansur Khan is also in Saiza, and is said to be collecting revenue and levying 5,000 sowars from the Darashuris, on whose instructions and for what purpose is not known. Soulet-ed-Dowleh himself is still in Shiraz, but it is expected that he will also go to Baiza in a few days to try and compose the differences which exist between various sections of the Darashuri tribe. He patched up a peace among the factions of the Kashkuli tribe a short time ago, but the Darashuris have been on the verge of civil war, one party supporting the claims of Nasrullah Khan to the headship of the tribe while the other is trying to give it to the son of Ayaz Kika, who was Kalantar of the Darashuri tribe in 1919 and who died some four years ago. Ali Khan, the Soulet's half-brother, is in Firuzabad, the winter residence of the Ilkhani of the Kashqais. He is apparently inactive, for no news of his doings comes to hand.

2. It is observed that in Legation News Circular No. 19 of the 27th September, paragraph 17, the statement is made that Nalik Nansur, the second son of Soulet-ed-Dowleh, has been appointed Ilkhani of the Kashqais. No announcement of his appointment has been made in Shiraz.

3. From Darab it is reported that the Baherlu Arabs and the Sarkuhi tribesmen who had come down from Laristan to their assistance were caught between the military forces of Yavar Muhammad Taqi Khan Arab and a body of reinforcements which had been hurried out from Shiraz at his request, and suffered a severe defeat. Sheikh Hassan Sarkuhi, the leader of the Sarkuhi rebels, managed to escape, but his followers surrendered and the Daharlu Arabs also tendered their submission to Yavar Muhammad Taqi Khan. Three Arab rebels captured by the latter and sent in to Sharaz were publicly hanged, an act for which the Arabs immediately took

reprisals in the shape of attacks on amnieh guards on the Shiraz-Fasa and Shiraz-Niriz roads.

4. The Shiraz-Isfahan road has remained open and no robberies have been reported along it since the date of my last report. In the district of Abadeh, however, the Boir Ahmadiis have been lately operating on a considerable scale, the number of mounted and armed robbers mentioned in reports recently received amounting to 500. They carried off 1,600 sheep from the village of Chahbazanga, 7 miles west of Abadeh, on the 26th September, killing two shepherds. On the 8th October it was learned that they had pillaged Kivirlar, 21 miles west of Abadeh, Ben Mirdu, 24 miles west of Abadeh, and Semiran, 52 miles west of Kumisheh. A force of 320 infantry which arrived at Abadeh on the 6th October and set out towards Shiraz on the 8th October were hurriedly sent back again to protect Abadeh.

5. On the Bushire-Shiraz road rather fewer robberies have occurred and the road from Shiraz to Kazerun may even be said to be comparatively safe. From Kazerun to Borazjun, however, security is very doubtful, while from Borazjun onwards to Bushire the road is definitely unsafe owing to fighting which has broken out around Ahmadi and Chaghudak in which rebels from Tangistan and Dashtistan are involved. Chazanfar Khan of Borazjun has also collected many armed men around himself and is reported to be meditating some action against the Government, with which he is not on good terms.

6. A copy of this despatch has been sent to His Majesty's consul-general at Isfahan and to the acting consul at Ahwaz for their information.

I have, &c.

A. W. DAVIS.

[E 5934/95/34]

No. 113.

Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received November 15.)

(No. 535.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of despatch No. 31 from His Majesty's consul, Kermanshah, dated the 12th October, on the subject of the situation in Pushti-Kuh.

Tehran, October 20, 1929.

Enclosure in No. 113.

Consul Cowan to Sir R. Clive.

(No. 31.)

Sir,

Kermanshah, October 12, 1929.

I HAVE the honour to report such facts as I have been able to gather regarding the recent troubles in Pushti-Kuh. It has not been easy to get at the facts, as the local authorities were extremely reticent, and I fear not always strictly truthful.

2. Towards the end of the first week in September a party of tribesmen raided the Shah's estates near Shahabad. It was at first reported that the raiders were Kalhurs, but later it became known that they were some of the Malik Shahi tribe from Pushti-Kuh, though it is practically certain that they had among them a number of Kalhur malecontents.

3. A few days later news arrived that a detachment of about 250 troops were besieged at Husainabad on the Pushti-Kuh frontier, and that the Military Governor of Pushti-Kuh, General Salar Nizam, was with his force besieged at Deh Bala. The customs posts in Pushti-Kuh were closed down, and the personnel beaten and expelled.

4. To meet what seemed to be a serious menace the Persian authorities had a handful of seasoned troops under Colonel Bagher Khan at Shahabad and 400-500 raw recruits in Kermanshah or the neighbourhood, including a detachment of recruits despatched for training to Isfahan, who were recalled from Bisitun. There was also a lack of competent regimental officers. The most capable officer, Major Haji Ali Khan, who alone seems able to handle recruits, had left to get married in Tehran, whence he was recalled the day before his wedding. Transport was commandeered and all

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available troops were rushed out to Shahabad, but the military authorities wisely enlisted the aid of the Kalhur tribe, who bore the brunt of the fighting. An important factor was the assistance of two aeroplanes, a monoplane and a biplane, the pilot of the latter being a German. This machine made several trips to the scene of the operations, and bombed the rebels, the Chief of Staff himself dropping the bombs. At least a day was lost by lack of maps at headquarters here, and the staff applied to me for the loan of maps which I gave them. The Kalkhurs are reported to have fought well, and the whole outbreak was crushed in about ten days. I have been unable to ascertain casualties.

5. The rising appears to have been organised by Ali Kuli Khan, a son of the Vali, who is usually on bad terms with his father. Whether the Vali and his other sons had any hand in instigating it is at present unknown. Responsible authorities here profess to believe that they had not. There is, however, a belief, which I know to be well founded, that a much larger tribal rising was intended, which might ultimately have spread all over Kurdistan. It was intended that the Kalkhanis and Gurans should rise, and they would have been supported by the Waladbegi and Babajani tribes, with whom they have a secret alliance. Such a rising would have been serious, but was prevented by the prompt action of Colonel Bagher Khan, who at once arrested Fath Ali Sultan Kalkhani, and held him as a hostage for the good behaviour of his tribe. This had the effect of keeping the Kalkhanis quiet until it was too late for their intervention to be effective.

Copies of this despatch are being sent to his Excellency the High Commissioner, Bagdad, and His Majesty's vice-consul at Hamadan.

I have, &c.
PATRICK COWAN.

[E 5940/104/34]

No. 114.

Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received November 15.)

(No. 548.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of Intelligence Summary No. 22 for the period ending the 2nd November, compiled by the officiating military attaché to this Legation.

Tehran, November 3, 1929.

Enclosure in No. 114.

(Secret.)

Intelligence Summary No. 22 for the Period ending November 2, 1929.

Tehran.

1. *British Subjects.*—Three officers of the Royal Corps of Signals, Waziristan District, India, passed through Tehran on the 23rd October *en route* for Bagdad and Cairo by motor van.

2. *Foreign Subjects.*—The contract of M. Brossier, the wireless telegraphy expert, has been renewed for a further period of two years at a salary of 4,200 tomans per annum.

3. A branch of the Italian Bank is about to be established in Tehran.

4. The air mail service Baku-Moscow has been suspended.

5. In order to eradicate any impression of Russian hostility towards Asiatics, which the course of events on the Sino-Russian border may have produced in Persia, the "Shafagh-i-Surkh" has embarked upon a Russophile propaganda campaign, the inspiration of which seems to be undoubtedly Russian.

6. Commercial agreements are the subjects of conversations between the Persian Government and the Turkish, Italian and Dutch Governments.

7. It is reported in the press that the head of the Perso-Turkish Frontier Commission, Mushfigh Salami Bey, has been relieved owing to indisposition by Farrokh Bey, counsellor to the Turkish Embassy in Moscow.

8. Reference Intelligence Summary No. 18, paragraph 1 (iii). The members of the mission to Japan have not yet been appointed. Hovannes Khan is reported to look upon the appointment as slight, and may refuse to proceed to Japan.

Communications.

9. A telegraph line is about to be erected between Shahrud and Shirvan.

10. A through postal service is about to be instituted between Tehran and Tabriz.

11. The Majlis has referred to a committee the following single articles:—

"The National Consultative Assembly authorises the participation of the Persian Government in the stipulations of the Telegraphic Conference held in the year 1928 in Brussels."

"The National Consultative Assembly approves the participation of the Persian Government in the stipulations of the Wireless Telegraphy Conference held in Washington in the year 1927."

Khorasan.

12. The wood shortage in the province is acute.

13. The Bajgiran-Kuchan road is reported to be in process of repair by the Russians, and that the greater part is already in good order. They are reported to be able to put the Kuchan-Meshed section into repair.

14. The town improvements are proceeding apace.

15. Conscription is being enforced in the Seistan, Kain, Gonabad areas. Active steps are being made in other areas to prepare the conscription census.

16. Excessive military repression is reported from Kuchan. Taqizadeh and Agha Valiaboff, a prominent Meshed merchant, were suddenly arrested on the 15th October; the reason is unknown.

17. The troops of the Meshed garrison were engaged in manoeuvres during the week ending the 19th October between Chinaran and Meshed. The main objects of the exercises were to practise officers in the issue of orders and reports, and the troops in the use of ground and cover. Intercommunication by means of the new field telephones purchased in Germany and by helio supplied by the Government of India last year was tried out. A separate report will be rendered.

Bushire.

18. Messrs. Junkers' machines made twelve trips between Bushire and Shiraz during September.

19. Sixty-four passengers were carried on the Bushire-Tehran route, and 504 bags of silver and 601 kilog. of miscellaneous freight from Bushire to Shiraz.

20. Bridges between Daleki and Kumar Takhtah, which were demolished by rebels during the summer, have not yet been repaired.

21. Khariz, having been wrested from the Zabiti of Tangistan at the beginning of September, was recaptured by the Tangistanis, who are endeavouring to drive the followers of Sheikh Hussein from Bullak, Ahmadi and Chah Kotah.

22. The Persian gunboat "Pahlavi," which was handed over to the customs authorities for the suppression of smuggling, has been returned to the military authorities, as the vessel proved to be useless on the preventive service.

Sarhad.

23. Reference Intelligence Summary No. 18, paragraph 26. The rumours of simmering revolt which have been received from time to time from the Sarhad have never been confirmed, neither have the tribes openly revolted. Some comment upon the situation is therefore considered to be appropriate.

Just as the situation in Fars did not suffer complete deterioration in the summer, when there was every possibility of the Kashkais and Bakhtiaris joining forces against the Central Government, neither did the Sarhad tribes take advantage of the opportunity which has been offered them of demanding by armed threat redress of their wrongs. It seems that internal dissension has been responsible for the inexplicable inactivity. The predominant factors may now be summarised as:—

(1.) The power of Dost Mohamed was more apparent than real, and he has many enemies. His detention has not resulted in an extension of his power.

(2.) Nowsherawan, Dost Mohamed's brother, is alleged to have been the power behind him, and much that was accomplished in his name was instigated by Nowsherawan. Without the support of the Bampur tribes he is not formidable.

- (3.) The detention of Nowsherawan would have had a greater effect in the Sarhad than the incarceration of Dost Mohamed.
- (4.) Idu Khan is a stormy petrel, ambitious, and considers himself inadequately rewarded by the Persians for his assistance against Dost Mohamed. He succeeded in obtaining land formerly owned by Jinaid during the British occupation, but this latter has not yet been definitely detached from him by the Persian Government. Should this be accomplished, then it seems certain that Idu Khan will be sent to Tehran, as his intrigues and double dealings are now well known, and his continued presence is a definite source of embarrassment to the Government.
- (5.) The grievances of the Baluchis are reliably reported to be considerably less than is generally supposed. They suffer the usual petty oppression of Persian officials, and their subsidies are not paid regularly; on the other hand, they are alleged not punctually to discharge their liabilities to the Government.

24. The continuance of the policy of the Persian Government in replacing serdars by men of known antipathy to Dost Mohamed, the curbing of Nowsherawan and the detachment of Jinaid from Idu Khan, even with such mercuric material as the Baluchis, will go far toward the suppression of revolt, though it may not achieve progressive pacification.

Fars.

25. With reference to Intelligence Summary No. 21, paragraph 28, postscript, paragraph 2, to Intelligence Summary No. 20 refers.

26. By the 9th October the migration of the Kashkai tribe was approaching completion; the Farsimadan tribe had arrived in its winter quarters; the Kashkuli tribe was athwart the Bushire-Shiraz road moving southward; the Shishbuluki tribe was about Guyun on the Ardakan road, 25 miles north-west of Shiraz; the Darashuri tribe was in Baiza.

27. Soulet-ed-Dowleh was in Shiraz, but was expected to endeavour to effect a settlement with the Darashuris, for this purpose journeying to Baiza, where Malik Mansur Khan was alleged to be collecting taxes and making a levy of 5,000 sowars from the Darashuris. The purpose of this levy is not yet known. Soulet achieved a form of settlement among the Kashkais, but he may have greater difficulty in composing the differences of the Darashuris.

28. Reference Intelligence Summary No. 21, paragraph 13. Some of the followers of Sheikh Abdul Hassan surrendered to Yavar Mohamed Taqi Khan, and the Baharlus also submitted. Three Arab rebels captured by the latter officer were hanged publicly in Shiraz; this was immediately reflected in attacks on amnieh posts on the Shiraz-Fasa and Shiraz-Niriz roads by the Baharlus.

29. Reference Intelligence Summary No. 21, paragraph 13. It is confirmed that Sheikh Abdul Hassan, with his brother and one son, is a fugitive.

30. An unconfirmed report states that Sayyid Abdul Karim and Mohamed Abraham, rebels of the Kazerun area, have surrendered to the garrison of Kazerun.

31. In the Boalur district, 14 miles south of Borasjun, many villages have been taken by the Dashtis. There have been many casualties.

32. The Kazerun forces have been engaged with outlaws at Band Dallah and Pirmollat, 4 miles north of Kamarij. The result of the engagements is not yet known.

33. Boir Ahmedis continue to pillage and murder. Spasmodic movements of troops are reported between Shiraz and Isfahan. There is no evidence of a concerted effort to restore order in this area. About Borasjun and Kazerun robberies still take place. The Bunder Abbas-Kerman post has been robbed at Tangizagh.

Kurdistan.

34. Reference maps Carte provisoire de la Frontière turco-irakienne, sheet No. 10 (Kani Rech), and Iraq Survey Sheet 1" = 2 miles, No. 10, south-west sq. 35 c. Deryasor is now deserted. The inhabitants have crossed the Rudbar-i-Girdia, which forms the Turco-Iraq frontier in that district, and have built a new village, called Karapoki, opposite the remnants of Deryasor, about 900 yards south-east of boundary pillar No. 93.

35. The Governor of Kurdistan, Mofakham-ul-Mulk, has been recalled to Tehran.

36. Simko is reported to have left Raizi for the Shirwan district, and is being afforded supplies by Sheikh Ahmad of Barzan from villages in the Girdi area. The column sent under the Kaimakam of Neri from 5th frontier battalion from Neri to the Raizi district, on finding Simko had left, spent a few days there, and then dispersed to its peace stations.

Kermanshah.

37. Reference Intelligence Summary No. 20, paragraph 18. A press report states that the troops sent to deal with the insurgents have returned to Kermanshah (the 25th October, 1929), and that most of the officers of the regiment have been promoted in recognition of their successes. The ex-Vali of Pusht-i-Kuh is now in Bagdad, where he has been for some time. The press reported that he had fled there. His sons are reported to have joined an outlaw band of the Birawand tribe; this also is an error. They fomented trouble at Deh-Bala, but it is understood they are again in Iraq.

38. Amanullah Khan Kazemi, who has caused unrest in Luristan, is reported wounded; he later surrendered to the troops, and has been sent to Tehran. He is an unimportant individual, and nothing is known of him.

Astarabad.

39. There have been a series of earthquake shocks at Bander Gez, but no damage is reported.

Afghanistan.

40. Relief at the termination of the régime of oppression, charlatanry and hypocrisy of Bacha Saquao in Afghanistan is expressed in the Persian press.

H. J. COOPER, *Captain,*
Officiating Military Attaché.

Tehran, November 2, 1929.

P.S.—*Appointments.*—The following appointments are announced in the press: Sarhang Ali Khan Zerehpash, Governor of Pusht-i-Kuh. M. Saghat-ul-Mulk, Governor of Kurdistan ("Who's Who," vol. II, p. 330).

Aviation.—Permission has been accorded to Costes, the French aviator, to fly over Southern Persia on his return to France.

H. J. C.

[E 5892/19/34]

No. 115.

Mr. A. Henderson to Sir R. Clive (Tehran).

(No. 556.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, November 21, 1929.

IN paragraphs 8, 9 and 10 of your despatch No. 439 of the 21st August you reported on certain questions, relating to the preamble and article 1 of the draft general treaty with Persia, which had arisen in the course of your negotiations with the Persian Minister of Court. I propose in the present despatch to formulate, for your information and guidance, my observations on each of these questions.

2. I approve the language held by you to Taimourache, as reported in paragraph 8 of your despatch under reference. Under the existing constitution of the British Empire, His Majesty cannot be at peace with any foreign country in respect of one part of his Empire and at war in respect of another. The question of the participation of the Dominions in the present treaty (which has never yet been contemplated) would arise in an acute form if arbitration provisions of a general character were included in it, because hitherto it has been the policy of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom only to enter into arbitration commitments of a general character in common with the whole of the Empire. For the reasons given in my despatch No. 526 of the 31st October, it is not at present possible to give you any information about the readiness of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom to enter into general arbitration commitments *vis-à-vis* Persia; therefore

this point must be held over for consideration at a later stage of the negotiations. It is almost certain that, if His Majesty's Government do enter into such commitments with Persia, they would prefer, following the general British practice, those commitments to be placed in a separate arbitration treaty (in which the Dominions could participate without being involved in the general Anglo-Persian treaty). There seems in any case to be no scope for a Dominions accession clause in the present treaty, because (1), on the assumption that the treaty contains no general arbitration provisions, there seems to be no reason for Dominion participation, and (2), on the very improbable assumption that this treaty does contain general arbitration provisions, the participation of the Dominions would more suitably be effected by signature on their behalf.

3. I hope that no further communication need be made to Taimourtache on this subject; but, if you find it necessary to return any reply in writing to paragraph 6 of his Highness's letter of the 20th August, I shall be glad if you will first submit the terms of the proposed communication to me for my approval.

4. As regards the question raised in paragraph 9 of your despatch, it is essential to preserve in the second paragraph of article 1 the words: "Tout autre Chef d'Etat dont les relations conventionnelles avec cette haute partie contractante à la date de la signature du présent traité ne permettent pas la cession de son territoire à une autre Puissance quelconque," because without them Iraq and the sheikhs on the Arabian coast of the Gulf would not be covered. As regards the sheikhs, the position is that His Majesty's Government have a series of treaties which place many of the sheikhs under British protection, although they are not technically "British Protectorates," and the generic term usually employed to describe them is "a veiled protectorate." Consequently, it seems unsafe, and politically undesirable, to contend that they would be covered by the word "protection" in the Persian formula. On the other hand, there would be no harm in substituting the Persian formula: "y compris les territoires sous administration, protection ou mandat de celle-ci" for the words "pour la défense desquels celle-ci est responsable" in the British draft; and the second paragraph of the article would then read as follows:—

"Chacune des hautes parties contractantes d'accord avec les obligations lui incombant par suite du Pacte de la Société des Nations et du Traité multilatéral pour la Renonciation de la Guerre, signé à Paris le 27 août 1928, s'engage à respecter l'intégrité territoriale et l'indépendance politique de l'autre haute partie contractante y compris les territoires sous administration, protection ou mandat de celle-ci, et de tout autre Chef d'Etat dont les relations conventionnelles avec cette haute partie contractante à la date de la signature du présent traité ne permettent pas la cession de son territoire à une autre Puissance quelconque."

5. The first part of this formula would cover all British Protectorates and mandated territories, and the second half of it the sheikhs of the Arabian shore of the Persian Gulf and also Iraq, provided that at the time of the signature of the treaty the 1922 Anglo-Iraqi treaty has not been replaced. In is, indeed, evident that this condition will in fact be fulfilled, for the new Anglo-Iraqi treaty now in course of preparation is only to enter into force after Iraq's admission to the League of Nations in 1932.

6. As regards Taimourtache's question, "What are the territories and which are the heads of States" to which the article applies, the adoption of his formula renders it unnecessary to reply except as regards the heads of States. A list of these heads of States is attached as Annex 1 to this despatch; this might form an annex to article 1 of the treaty, or, if the Minister of Court prefers, it could be embodied in an exchange of notes, which would state merely that the heads of States whose treaty relations with His Britannic Majesty preclude cession of territory to another Power are as given. A list of the Asiatic territories under the administration, protection or mandate of His Britannic Majesty is also attached for your information as Annex 2 to this despatch. This has been prepared in preference to a list giving all the territories under "administration, protection or mandate" for which the Government in London are responsible, because it might be asked why such a list does not include the mandated territories of the Dominions, and it is desirable to avoid correspondence both with Persia and with the Dominions on the application of the article either to the Dominions themselves or to their mandated territories. The Asiatic territories are all those which could conceivably be of any interest to Persia, and this list, though not suitable for inclusion in the treaty or even for an exchange

of notes, can be used to give information to the Persians if (which seems unlikely) such information is really required.

7. As regards paragraph 10 of your despatch, the view of His Majesty's Government is that the treaty is being concluded on the basis that Great Britain and Persia will both continue to be members of the League of Nations and parties to the Kellogg Pact, and does not contemplate circumstances where this fundamental basis does not exist. I shall be glad if you will reply to the above effect, and should add that His Majesty's Government have no intention of withdrawing from the League of Nations, and presume that Persia has no such intention either; the question raised by Taimourtache is therefore purely academic.

8. You might also point out that the Kellogg Pact has no means of denunciation, and that, even in the event of withdrawal from the League of Nations, both parties would remain bound by the terms of the pact.

9. I observe, lastly, that the text of the draft treaty enclosed in your despatch No. 426 of the 10th August, although it contains in the clause of the preamble relating to the appointment of plenipotentiaries the words "for India," does not include the words "for Great Britain and Northern Ireland." This omission should be rectified in any subsequent draft of the treaty.

I am, &c.

ARTHUR HENDERSON.

Annex 1.

List of Heads of States whose Treaty Relations with His Britannic Majesty preclude Cession of Territory to another Power.

The King of Iraq.
The Sheikh of Koweit.
The Sheikh of Bahrein.
The Sheikh of El Katr.
The Sultan of Muscat.
The Sheikhs of Abu Dhabi, Dabai, Ajman, Shargah, Ras-al-Khaimah and Umm-al-Qaiwain.

Annex 2.

*List of Territories in Asia under the Administration, Protection or Mandate of His Britannic Majesty.**

Palestine and Transjordan.
Malay States:—

(a.) Federated Malay States—

Negri Sembilan.
Pahang.
Perak.
Selangor.

(b.) Unfederated Malay States—

Johore.
Kedah.
Kelantan.
Perlis.
Trengganu.
Brunei.

North Borneo (State of).
Protectorate of Aden.
Sarawak.
Wei-hai-wei.

* This list does not include territories forming part of His Majesty's Dominions.

[E 6071/96/34]

No. 116.

Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received November 22.)

(No. 361.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Tehran, November 21, 1929.

DIRECTOR-GENERAL of Ministry for Foreign Affairs has been dismissed. Farzin, Minister of Finance, has been appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Moshar-ul-Mulk, a former Minister for Foreign Affairs, Minister of Finance. (Repeated to India, No. 214.)

[E 6072/96/34]

No. 117.

Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received November 22.)

(No. 362.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, November 21, 1929.

MY telegram No. 361 of 21st November: Political situation.

The crisis resulting in the dismissal of the Director-General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs arose through the inadvertent publication in the Persian press of the judicial safeguards. This infuriated the Shah, who insisted on his instant dismissal.

Farzin, the new Minister for Foreign Affairs, is a polite futility, and Teymourache will still in effect control Persia's foreign relations. The appointment of Moshar-ul-Mulk, however, as the Minister of Finance will not be agreeable to him. Moshar-ul-Mulk has always been disposed to be friendly towards us, but he is a man of considerable character and obstinacy, who will not allow himself to be controlled by the Minister of Court.

[E 6105/835/34]

No. 118.

Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received November 25.)

(No. 551.)

Sir,

Tehran, November 8, 1929.

I HAVE the honour to report that I reached Bushire by air from Tehran at 2 P.M. on the 23rd October and left there on the evening of the 24th October to embark on H.M.S. "Triad."

The following observations are the result of my enquiries on the spot into the position of the Residency, the difficulties which the Persian Government could make for the Resident if they wished to, and the question of the flagstaff:—

The Residency is not the property of the Government of India, but the ground on which it is built belongs to three or four Persians (including Mr. Malcolm, a British-protected Persian Armenian). A very small rent is paid—a few hundred rupees a year—in fact, the same as has always been paid since the house was built some seventy-five years ago. The ground on which the flagstaff is erected outside the Residency is similarly leased. The flagstaff, with its flag by day and its light by night, serves as a beacon for mariners, and in case of its removal at least a fortnight's notice would be required to warn shipping.

If the flagstaff has to be removed, three alternatives present themselves:—

- (a.) To transfer it as it is to the back courtyard of the Residency. The possible objection to this is that the Persians might extend the post office and thereby shut out the lights from the view of shipping coming from the east.
- (b.) To erect the top half only of the flagstaff in the Residency and make special arrangements for placing the lights.
- (c.) To hand over the flagstaff to the Persians as part of the general settlement, satisfactory arrangements having first been made for the proper working of the lights at night.

The objection I see to alternative (b) is that, while the Persians would have nothing to say to the erection of a flagstaff on the top of the Residency, they might—and I imagine justifiably—object to lights being placed on the British Residency and consulate-general as a beacon to shipping in the Gulf.

My own view is that, if it is definitely decided to remove the Residency, the question of handing over the present flagstaff to the Persians should be considered.

I attach a rough sketch of the frontage on the sea at Bushire, which includes the Governor's house, the flagstaff, the Residency and the Persian Post Office.*

The present Resident at Bushire is strongly in favour of moving the Residency outside Persia to either Bahrein or Koweit—preferably Bahrein—and has given his reasons in full to the Government of India.

The following list of points, which is probably far from comprehensive, gives some idea of the difficulties which the Persians might make for the Resident, although at present the *status quo* is being correctly maintained:—

- (a.) Refuse permission to him and to British naval officers to land or embark at Reshire.
- (b.) Refuse permission for the continued use of the British wireless station at Bushire. In any case, under the general treaty now being negotiated this "station" is to be handed over to the Persian Government. Rapid communication between Resident and His Majesty's ships will therefore certainly be cut off.
- (c.) Refuse permission for continued use of private telephone between town and Sabzubad Residencies.
- (d.) Stop consular postal bags and insist on all mail matter coming through the Persian Post Office.
- (e.) Insist on all British warships obtaining permission through Legation in Tehran before visiting Persian port.
- (f.) Force Persians owning land on which town Residency is built to sell to Persian Government.
- (g.) Demand title-deeds for all ground occupied by Sabzubad Residency which it might be difficult to furnish to the satisfaction of a court of law. I attach copy of a letter from Colonel Barrett.
- (h.) Insist on passport formalities and every kind of inoculation every time the Resident returns to Bushire from a tour.

I admit that some of these are extreme measures which, so long as our relations with the Persian Government are reasonably friendly, the latter are unlikely to take, but this does not alter the fact that in the almost universal opinion of those who have studied this question (including the three last Residents and the present senior naval officer) the maintenance at Bushire of the Persian Gulf Residency has become an anachronism.

One final point on this subject. It would, in my opinion, be a very great mistake and quite useless if the Government of India were to expect the Persians to share any part of the cost of removing the Residency. It appears to me to be one of those cases in which a Government has to cut the loss. It might well be possible to sell some of the houses, including the Residency at Sabzubad, or to reserve by agreement one or more of them for the occupation of British officers and personnel in the naval service of the Persian Government should the recent proposals of the Minister of Court materialise. But it is obvious, in any case, that a considerable financial loss would have to be faced. I have the impression, however, that it might not be difficult to effect certain economies in other directions.

The very fact of the Government of India being willing to move the Residency should be highly appreciated by the Persian Government as an act of special friendliness and sympathy with present-day Persian aspirations, and once a decision is come to, I would propose to emphasise this forcibly to the Minister of Court, but I trust the decision will not be long delayed. I have the impression that, even if the removal of the Residency does not figure in the treaty, it will be a valuable card in the negotiations regarding the Persian Gulf, in which case the sooner I can have this trump in my hand the better.

I have, &c.

R. H. CLIVE.

P.S.—Copies of this despatch have been sent to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India and the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

R. H. C.

Enclosure in No. 118.

Consul-General Barrett to Sir R. Clive.

Dear Sir Robert,

Bushire, October 28, 1929.

I FEAR I may have given you a wrong impression about our holding at Sabzubad.

The original grant to Captain Felix Jones appears to have been no bigger than could be covered by a field officer's tent, but we have acquired by purchase various bits of land subsequent to the purchase of Captain Felix Jones's property. We hold regular title-deeds certified by the Kadhis for all these bits.

I have seen the correspondence leading up to the purchase of Captain Jones's property and the final acceptance by the Government of Bombay, but I have not seen the grant made by the Persian Government to Captain Jones. No doubt it was in order as they sent soldiers to pull down an extra building he had erected in the '50's.

Yours sincerely,

C. C. J. BARRETT.

[E 6106/259/34]

No. 119.

Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received November 25.)

(No. 553.)

Sir,

Tehran, November 9, 1929.

I HAVE the honour to enclose herewith copy of a despatch on the subject of slavery from the Resident at Bushire which reached Tehran during my absence in the south.

2. From this despatch it will be seen that there is a regular traffic, although admittedly on a fairly small scale, across the Gulf and to the Muscat coast of Persian Baluchis sold as slaves.

3. Colonel Barrett gives as a very rough estimate the figure of 100 annually, but he admitted to me in conversation that this was almost certainly an under-estimate. A truer figure would be from 200-500 a year.

4. I shall inform the Minister of Court of this and point out that at this rate there is a steady drain of able-bodied men from Persian Baluchistan whom Persia, with her very small population, can ill afford to lose. I propose to use this information in a final attempt to induce his Highness to accept our original proposals for a new Slavery Convention before acting on the instructions contained in your despatch No. 503 of 24th October last.

Copies of this despatch, without enclosure, have been sent to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India and to His Majesty's consul-general, Bushire.

I have, &c.

R. H. CLIVE.

Enclosure in No. 119.

Consul-General Barrett to Sir R. Clive.

(No. 153.)

Sir,

Bushire, October 15, 1929.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that the three slaves mentioned in my letter No. 115/1859 of the 13th August, 1929, were repatriated from Muscat to Bunder Abbas on the 28th August, but I have been unable hitherto to trace the other two men mentioned by the Governor of Bushire.

Enquiries made at Muscat show that there is a steady, though small, trickle of slaves from Persian Mekran to the Arab coast along two main routes. The northern route is from Bungi and Sirik to Katar, Abu Dhabi, Khor Fakkan and Dibba, while the southern is from the Mekran ports of Sudaich, Ghallaq, Gohurt, Parag, Puzim and Kunerak to ports on the Batinah coast of the Muscat coast.

The principal slave supplier in Mekran is Barkat Khan. He is a man of great generosity and is said to repay any present from the Oman sheikhs fourfold. The Katar and the Trucial sheikhs are reported to send him occasional presents of rifles and ammunition and to receive slaves in return.

Most of the slaves engaged in the Trucial coast pearl fisheries are slave-born and live in Arabia, but a limited number of both Mekran slaves and captives recently enslaved is brought to Oman. The captures and enslavements in Persian Mekran are carried out entirely by the inhabitants themselves. The information I have received shows that Barkat Khan, against whom the Persian Government is said to be powerless to act, is the chief offender. His practice is to take a son or daughter from a defaulting member of his following in lieu of the payment of dues. To the east of Barkat Khan's territory lawless brigandage secures the slave supply.

There is no doubt that the magnet of the pearl fisheries attracts the slave dealers, but the supply area which used to be centred in Africa now appears to have shifted to Persian Mekran. It must be emphasised, however, that the numbers of newly made slaves imported by sea are very small. As a very rough estimate the figure of 100 annually is given.

His Majesty's ships are always on the look out for slave dhows, and have recently redoubled their efforts, but effective action by sea alone is very difficult. It is usually impossible to differentiate slaves who are afraid to declare themselves from the ordinary crew of a dhow.

Persian authority throughout Mekran is still shadowy, and it is difficult for Tehran to enforce unpalatable measures on the Baluch chiefs, but it is to be hoped that as control becomes more effective measures will be taken against Barkat Khan and his fellow chiefs to cut off the supply of slaves at its source.

As an example of the present powerlessness of the Persian Government, I may mention a report I have just received from the Indo-European Telegraph Department, that on the 17th September, 1929, two slaves who took refuge with the officer commanding troops, Jask, were returned by him to their masters, as a result of threats or bribes from the latter.

A copy of this despatch is being sent to the Government of India.

I have, &c.

(For Political Resident in the Persian Gulf,
and Consul-General for Fars, &c.),

A. A. RUSSELL.

[E 5890/19/34]

No. 120.

Mr. A. Henderson to Sir R. Clive (Tehran).

(No. 274.)

(Telegraphic.) P.

Foreign Office, November 27, 1929.

YOUR telegram No. 356 of the 12th November: Treaty negotiations with Persia.

Every endeavour will be made to reduce to a minimum the delay in sending you instructions on the four points mentioned in paragraph 1 of your telegram, and I am disappointed at not being able to do so in the immediate future. As you are aware, each of these points has involved consultation not only with other Government Departments but with other Governments (*i.e.*, India and Iraq), and some delay is still unavoidable. Instructions on individual questions will therefore still be sent separately, as and when ready, irrespective of degree of interest taken in them by Minister of Court.

Although I have every sympathy with you in your difficulties, this procedure seems to be the only practical one, and I am prepared to leave you entire discretion whether or not to postpone action on such instructions as you have already received.

[E 6240/255/34]

No. 121.

Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received December 2.)

(No. 557.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a memorandum from the Persian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, dated the 11th November, on the subject of the carrying of revolvers and cameras by pilots and passengers respectively when flying over Persian territory.

Tehran, November 14, 1929.

Enclosure in No. 121.

Copy in Translation of a Circular Memorandum from the Persian Ministry for Foreign Affairs addressed to His Majesty's Legation, Tehran, dated Aban 20, 1308 (November 11, 1929).

THE Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the Imperial Government has the honour, in continuation of its circular memorandum of the 31st Farvardin, 1308 (the 20th April, 1929), in connexion with the flight of foreign aeroplanes over Persian territory, to bring the following to the notice of that honourable Legation:—

1. There would be no objection as to the carrying of cameras by the passengers of the aeroplanes. But (the transport of) special photographic apparatus, which is carried by the aeroplanes themselves, is forbidden.

2. In view of the fact that certain requests have been received from some time ago from some of the honourable representatives of the foreign Governments in Tehran to the effect that, since it happens often for their pilots who are flying over Persian territory to cross outside Persia (over) certain uninhabited and isolated places where complete order is not yet established, and that at the time of their forced landing they would be in need of arms for defending themselves, permission may be given for carrying a revolver, the matter has called the attention of the Imperial Government's officials (concerned), and that necessary instructions have, consequently, been issued so that the pilots may be allowed to carry a revolver with them.

It is requested that the matter may be brought to the notice of the concerned quarters.

MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

[E 6242/95/34]

No. 122.

Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received December 2.)

(No. 560.)

Sir,

Tehran, November 13, 1929.

I HAVE the honour, with reference to my despatch No. 425 of the 10th August last, to report that Ali Mardan Khan, who was mainly responsible for instigating the revolt of the Bakhtiari this summer against the Central Government, has come to Tehran. He has been received and pardoned by the Shah. Having arrived here in the old style Bakhtiari dress, he was seen ordering a modern suit of clothes, with Pahlavi hat, for his audience with His Majesty.

2. This would appear to indicate the end of the Bakhtiari trouble, which at best was never more than a half-hearted affair.

Copies of this despatch have been sent to the Government of India, His Majesty's High Commissioner for Iraq and to His Majesty's consul-general at Isfahan.

I have, &c.

R. H. CLIVE.

[E 6243/6243/34]

No. 123.

Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received December 2.)

(No. 561.)

Sir,

Tehran, November 14, 1929.

HIS Majesty the Shah's recent tour through the northern portion of his dominions is in many respects worthy of record, and I therefore have the honour to submit a short description of the journey.

2. The itinerary is set forth in detail in the first enclosure to this despatch. His Majesty travelled with a retinue which was by many considered to be rather smaller than was fitting. The whole party was accommodated in about a dozen cars; the Minister of Court did not start with the Royal party, but joined it only towards the end of the tour at Sari. The Shah took with him his Master of Ceremonies, the Amir Nizam, and a few Persian notables, including Amir Nasir, the eldest son of the Kashgai chief Soulet-ed-Dowleh.

3. Interesting notes on the first part of the journey will be found in the enclosed despatches from the consular officers at Hamadan and Kermanshah. The visit to Shahabad, the former Harunabad, on the 12th October was doubtless caused by the Shah's desire to see his property in that district.

4. At Senneh, the administrative capital of Persian Kurdistan, His Majesty was the guest of a local notable named Asif-i-A'zam. The story goes that when the Royal party was on the point of starting from Senneh the Shah's host sent him a present of 500 sovereigns and two silk carpets; the Governor of Kurdistan (Mufakham-ul-Mulk) also sent a silk carpet and a carved tray of local workmanship; both the donors were heartily cursed for their pains and their gifts were rejected, the Governor being since recalled to Tehran.

5. It was surprising that the party travelled by car all the way through Persian Kurdistan and Azerbaijan; preparations for the party had no doubt been made some time previously, and the weather was kind. The Shah is reported to have been favourably impressed by the state of the roads in this district.

6. Mr. Gilliat-Smith's enclosed despatch will show what happened at Tabriz. I learn that when His Majesty first entered the city he was very gracious to the Governor-General, Mansur-ul-Mulk, but had little to say to the Amir Lashkar, Hussein Agha Khaza'i. The extract from the newspaper "Tabriz," to which Mr. Gilliat-Smith refers, is enclosed in translation; the large sum obtained by Boudaghiantz from the Persian Government refers to the settlement of the Stevens claim for the Urumia Lake concession.

7. Mr. Finch's remarks concerning the Royal visit to Resht and district will be found in the last enclosure. The Shah opened the new railway line on Monday, the 4th November, and made a journey in the Royal saloon, which had just arrived in time, from Sari to Bandar-Shah. At Gumush Tepe he witnessed the annual horse-races arranged by the Turkomans, and arrived back in Tehran on the 6th November.

8. His Majesty appears to have been very pleased with the new railway line, and is said to have presented M. Mavrogordato, of the Railway Syndicate, with a Persian decoration.

9. I think that the objects of His Majesty in making the tour may be summed up as follows:—

- (1.) To inspect his Kurdistan properties;
- (2.) To see from personal investigation how recruiting was progressing in the northern provinces;
- (3.) To create a pro-Pahlavi spirit in Tabriz, hitherto somewhat lukewarm in its support of the new régime;
- (4.) To see the northern section of the railway;
- (5.) To attend the races; and
- (6.) To inspect his large properties in Mazanderan, and (I hear) to make arrangements to purchase still more land in that neighbourhood.

10. The Turkish Ambassador and the German Minister attended the races at the invitation of His Majesty. I was also invited to be present, but my visit to the Persian Gulf made it impossible for me to accept.

11. I am of opinion that on the whole His Majesty's tour was a success. Preparations are now being made for the Shah's visit to Khuzistan in a week or

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ten days' time. His Majesty will inspect the southern section of the railway, and is expected to pay a visit to Abadan.

I have, &c.
R. H. CLIVE.

P.S.—A copy of this despatch and enclosures has been sent to the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India.

R. H. C.

Enclosure 1 in No. 123.

Itinerary of Shah's Journey, October 8 to November 6, 1929.

October 8:	Tehran-Kazvin.	October 24:	Tabriz-Ardebil.
" 9:	Kazvin-Hamadan.	" 26:	Ardebil-Astara.
" 10:	Hamadan-Kermanshah.	" 27:	Astara-Pahlavi.
" 12:	Kermanshah-Shahabad (formerly Harunabad).	" 29:	Pahlavi-Resht.
" 13:	Kermanshah-Senneh.	" 30:	Resht-Lahijan.
" 15:	Senneh-Saqqiz.	November 1:	Lahijan-Barfarush.
" 16:	Saqqiz-Saoujbulagh.	" 4:	Barfarush-Sari.
" 18:	Saoujbulagh-Urumia.	" 4:	Sari-Gumush Tepe.
" 20:	Urumia-Khoi.	" 5:	Gumush Tepe-Bandar Shah.
" 21:	Khoi-Tabriz.	" 6:	Sari-Tehran.

Enclosure 2 in No. 123.

Vice-Consul Summerhayes to Sir R. Clive.

(No. 59.)
Sir,

Hamadan, October 12, 1929.

I HAVE the honour to report that the Shah arrived in Hamadan by car on the afternoon of the 9th October from Kazvin and left the next morning for Kermanshah, from where it is understood that he will proceed to Tabriz via Kurdistan.

Large crowds greeted him cheerfully, though the day was the dustiest experienced this summer, and this unfortunate circumstance seems to have had a bad effect on the whole visit, for Mohsen Khan Kharagozlou, one of the Deputies for Hamadan and a nephew of the Amir Toman, in whose house the Shah stayed, told me that the dirtiness of the town was practically the sole subject of His Majesty's conversation with the Governor and the Director of the Municipality, and that none of the petitions which had been prepared in hopes of their receiving Royal consideration were accepted.

The Amir Nizam, another of the Kharagozlou family, was in attendance, but the suite was very small and the show made was far from impressive.

A reception tent had been erected outside the town, but as had been the case on similar occasions in recent years no foreigners were invited there.

I have, &c.
C. H. SUMMERHAYES.

Enclosure 3 in No. 123.

Consul Cowan to Sir R. Clive.

(No. 32.)
Sir,

Kermanshah, October 14, 1929.

I HAVE the honour to report that His Majesty the Shah arrived at Kermanshah on the 10th October and was the guest of Amir Kull. As usual, the town was cleaned up for his arrival, and strict orders were issued regarding his reception. The throwing of flowers and presentation of petition was strictly forbidden.

2. His Majesty arrived about 5 P.M., and though large crowds were in the street there was no cheering. The Shah is reported to have been in an unusually affable mood, and the only official who incurred his displeasure was the Rais-i-

Adliyah, whom he reprimanded for the corruption alleged to be rampant in his department.

3. The Shah visited the various military departments, and paid particular attention to the recruiting commission which is now sitting.

4. On the 12th October His Majesty went to Shahabad, where he spent the night, returning on the morning of the 13th and proceeding immediately to Senneh. On his way he opened officially the new Taq-i-Bustan bridge over the Qarasu. From Senneh he is to proceed via Saqqiz, Saoujbulak and Urumia to Tabriz.

I have, &c.
N. PATRICK COWAN.

Enclosure 4 in No. 123.

Consul Gilliat-Smith to Sir R. Clive.

(No. 78.)
Sir,

Tabriz, October 24, 1929.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 10 of to-day's date, I have the honour to report that the Shah left for Ardebil and Astara this morning at 6 A.M.

Yesterday morning His Majesty received at the barracks the local mullahs, merchants and notables, and in the afternoon the various chiefs of Government Departments. He likewise inspected, in the course of the day, some of the scenes of recent destruction caused by floods, being accompanied only by his chauffeur and one adjutant, also the site of the new monument to be erected in his honour on the grounds of the former Kadjal Cemetery, now rapidly being converted into a garden and boulevard.

During the reception of the merchants and notables, His Majesty approached one, Fathullayoff, who was wearing his Pahlavi hat on the back of his head, and himself placed it on Fathullayoff's head in the proper position, saying: "Haji, this is the way to wear your hat." The crowd of merchants and notables, as if by a signal, immediately readjusted their headgear, although many of them were already wearing the famous hat with the required decorum.

When His Majesty left at 6 A.M. this morning he did so without any warning, and many of the guards posted along the Tehran road did not present arms, as he passed before they were aware that he was coming, he not being expected before 8 or 9 A.M. His Majesty will lunch at Sarab and will be the guest of the Deputy Wahaboff to-night at Ardabil. To-morrow morning he will leave for Astara.

The Shah is said to have received only some 200 petitions, all of them of little or no importance, as opposed to 3,000 petitions upon his last visit to Tabriz. Discontented elements in the population appear to have been successfully muzzled, and some arrests were effected before the Shah's arrival.

Opposite the "Ark," in the principal Khiaban of the town, a comparatively new and well-built mosque was pulled down at the time when houses were being destroyed in order to make room for new streets. A wine shop has since made its appearance on this site. This was to have been the subject of a long protest to the Shah, but the authorities appear to have prevented the protest reaching His Majesty's ears.

According to gossip rife among the European colony, Djibrail Budaghiantz was severely reprimanded by the Shah for having obtained many millions from Persia at a time when the country was exceptionally poor, i.e., in connexion with the Lake Urumia transaction. I do not believe the tale, and I think the version published in the local paper "Tabriz" to be the more accurate one, according to which His Majesty advised Budaghiantz to spend his money in Persia for the benefit of Persia. A copy of the "Tabriz" of the 22nd October is herewith enclosed.

The visit of the Shah has been a very short one, and it has passed off without the occurrence of anything of importance. Little enthusiasm was evinced by the crowds lining the station road on the day of His Majesty's arrival, and since then the town has worn its everyday appearance. On the first day the principal Khiaban was beflagged to a certain extent, but not so the bazaars.

I have, &c.
B. GILLIAT-SMITH.

Enclosure 5 in No. 123.

Extract from the "Tabriz" of October 22, 1929.

(Translation.)

IN a report which deals with the detail of the arrival of His Majesty to Tabriz and the introduction of the notables to His Majesty, the paper says:—

" From the statements of His Majesty, which are published below, it can be understood how much His Majesty's attention has been drawn towards the economics of the country. When the Governor-General was introducing the merchants to His Majesty, and when the turn of Bodaghiantz came and Bārōn Gabriel (Bodaghiantz) was introduced, His Majesty, with much kindness and in the manner of encouragement and advice, said certain words to him which can almost be summed up as follows:—

"Invest your capital for the improvement of internal trade.""

Enclosure 6 in No. 123.

Vice-Consul Finch to Sir R. Clive.

(No. 58. Confidential.)

Sir,

Resht, November 10, 1929.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that His Imperial Majesty the Shah passed on tour through Gilan from the 26th to the 30th October last. He reached Ardebil from Tabriz on the evening of the 24th, and Astara on the 25th. On the 26th he travelled by the newly-arranged coast route (one can hardly yet call it a road) in his Lincoln saloon to Pahlavi. He lunched at Kerganrud, and was received there by the notables of Talish, and he reached Pahlavi in the afternoon after a voyage of some eight hours, of which two were spent at Kerganrud. He slept the nights of the 26th and 27th at the governorate of Pahlavi. On the 27th, after spending some hours in the bath, he visited all the Government offices and institutions, the fishery, the burnt palace on Mianpushteh Island, which used to be the house of M. Khoshtaria, and inspected the port. I have not heard of any notable comment that he made, other than that the place did not seem to have made very much progress since he was there in August 1928, or even since he was there about four and a half years ago. On the afternoon of the 28th he travelled to Resht. He was expected to lodge at the governorate, but after remaining there a quarter of an hour he moved to the barracks outside the town, and spent the night there. On the morning of the 29th he made a tour of the town, inspecting the Government offices, schools, municipality, &c., and the troops. In the afternoon he retired to the Bagh-i-Muhtashim, the property of Sardar Mu'tamid, where he lodged last year, and there he received the Valiahd, on the latter's arrival in the afternoon. At midday on the 30th he left for Lahijan, and was received by the local magnates at the passage of the Safid Rud at Reshtabad. The following day he continued towards Mazanderan. From there his intention was to go to Asterabad to hold a race meeting, as last autumn, on the steppe. Besides the Governors and local officials who attached themselves to his train at the different stages of his journey, he had an escort of about forty soldiers, who followed the convoy in Chevrolet vans.

2. On his arrival at the Resht barracks he retired, according to most reports, to a room, where he closeted himself, and saw nobody for the rest of the evening; the general supposition is that this was in order to take opium. His reception on arrival at Pahlavi partook very much of the scramble and disorder of amateur theatricals, because everyone had been given so many false alarms for several days of his advent that the thing rather missed fire when it came, and because, instead of stopping at a reception tent prepared for him at the entrance of the town, he went straight on to his lodging, which disconcerted the arrangements. At Resht there was an interval of several hours between the time he was expected and the time he arrived (about 5 P.M.), and school children and suchlike had been parading, under instructions from the authorities, since about 11 A.M. I witnessed his progress down the main street. It was accompanied by an applause which would have been rather lukewarm on a similar occasion in England, but allowing for oriental habits in such matters the reception could probably be described as normal. Apart from a vague, unfocussed discontent that certainly exists on account of conscription, the attitude

of the people seemed to be a rather languid, but not unfriendly, curiosity. The Gilak, however, is sluggish and inarticulate.

3. The only untoward incident of which I have heard occurred at the Safid Rud. The Shah commented upon the lack of cultivation at that spot, and remarked that, even if the changes of the river-bed did constitute a discouragement, some tobacco might be sown there. Thereupon, a Resht merchant named Sheikh Ahmad Sigari, had the imprudence to say that they might plant it if the taxes were not so high, and brought upon himself several minutes of the most unkingly abuse from the Royal mouth.

4. The attitude of the authorities was more interesting than that of the people. The journey from Resht to Lahijan was punctual and programmatic, but those from Astara to Pahlavi, from Pahlavi to Resht, and the arrival from Tehran of the Valiahd were accompanied by such a degree of uncertainty and lack of organisation, and by the closure of the roads to all traffic for so many unnecessary hours beforehand, that, whether it be true or not, the same suggestion automatically occurred, not only to myself, but to all Europeans and Americans with whom I have conversed on the subject of the visit, namely, that besides the lack of time-table, &c., that is natural in this country, there was some deliberateness about it all, presumably to minimise the risk of assassination. Moreover, the whole quarter of Pahlavi round the building where the Shah lodged was closed to all possible traffic during his stay, and after a certain hour at night no ferry-boats were supposed to ply across the harbour. Such precautions, if precautions they were, would seem quite unnecessary, as far as the local people are concerned; but that was the impression that was given.

I have, &c.

J. P. G. FINCH.

E 6244/97/34]

No. 124.

Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received December 2.)

(No. 562.)

Sir,

Tehran, November 16, 1929.

I HAVE the honour to report that the Persian press has recently published *in extenso* the Persian version of the "safeguards," as applicable to foreign nationals in Persia. The "Iran" and the "Sitareh Iran" on the 7th November contained the first such announcement; the words used were: "The regulations relating to the status of foreign subjects in Persia have been communicated by the Ministry of Justice in a circular memorandum to all Government representatives and tribunals with request to put them in force. The following provisions apply to British subjects." Then followed a text which was practically of the same purport as our eighteen safeguards. The following small differences were noticed:—

Safeguard 2.—The words "which punishes false evidence" at the end are omitted in the Persian version now published.

Safeguard 12.—First paragraph, towards the end. Instead of our version, "non-Moslem British nationals in Persia," the Persian version is fuller, saying "non-Moslem British nationals living or residing in Persia."

Safeguard 15.—Instead of "imprisonment for debt" a literal translation of the Persian version now published reads "compulsory fulfilment of obligations."

Safeguard 17.—The words "of a pecuniary nature" are not included, so the category is wider and more to our advantage.

In *safeguard 18* the words "as in the past" are left out.

2. On the following day the "Sitareh Iran" published a further list of provisions applicable to Soviet nationals in Persia. A translation of the text is enclosed. It will be seen that the number of articles is sixteen only, and the following differences from our text are noteworthy:—

- (1) Our safeguard No. 1 does not exist for Soviet nationals at all.
- (2) Our safeguard No. 14 is also missing from the text applicable to the Soviet.
- (3) Soviet safeguard No. 1 corresponds to our No. 2 and is practically the same. At the end it includes the words "relating to false evidence" instead of "which punishes false evidence." In the recently published list of safeguards applicable to us the latter phrase was not included.

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- (4.) Soviet safeguard No. 2 corresponds to our No. 3 and is practically the same.
- (5.) So on till Soviet safeguard No. 5, our No. 6. Here there is the important difference that the last paragraph of our No. 6 is omitted. So Soviet premises can presumably be entered by force without a search warrant.
- (6.) So on till Soviet safeguard No. 10. This nearly corresponds to our No. 11, except that the words "A sum of money . . . up to "voted" are missed out.
- (7.) The personal status section, No. 11 of the Soviets, is much shorter than our No. 12, and simply says that non-Moslem Soviet nationals will be subject to their national laws, subject to reciprocity.
- (8.) Our No. 14 is missed out completely, as mentioned above.
- (9.) In Soviet No. 13, our No. 15, the expression "imprisonment for debt" becomes "compulsory fulfilment of obligations."
- (10.) In Soviet No. 15, our No. 17, the words "of a pecuniary nature" are not to be found.
- (11.) Soviet No. 16 is not quite the same as our No. 18. The starting words are slightly different, and "as in the past" are not included.

3. On the 10th November a third text was published, setting out the provisions applicable to "foreign subjects" as a whole. The text is practically the same as our eighteen safeguards except that the personal status section, which is No. 11, reads merely: "With regard to personal status, foreign subjects are subjected to their own national laws." Inviolability of domicile from search without a regular warrant is included. It appears that Soviet nationals are the only foreign subjects who do not enjoy this benefit.

Copies of this despatch and enclosure have been sent to the Government of India and to all His Majesty's consular officers in Persia.

I have, &c.
R. H. CLIVE.

Enclosure in No. 121.

Extract from the "Sitareh Iran" of November 8, 1929.

(Translation.)

IN all civil and commercial cases in which one of the parties is a Soviet national, only written proof will be accepted. In every case—even in criminal cases—the judgment will be written and will contain the grounds of law and fact on which it was based. The parties to a suit, or those authorised by them, will have the right to obtain copies of the evidence and of the judgment on payment of the regular fees.

In view of the fact that in criminal cases oral evidence is normally admitted as proof, the interests of the accused are safeguarded by articles 215 and 216 of the Penal Code relating to false evidence.

2. Wherever one of the parties is a Soviet national, no jurisdiction, except the courts belonging to the Ministry of Justice, will be competent to deal with the suits. The criminal courts belonging to the Ministry of Justice, generally speaking, will alone be able to award sentences of imprisonment (against Soviet nationals). When martial law, however, is proclaimed, and the legal enquiry of a suit reverts to a specially formed court, such court is empowered to deal with cases in which a Soviet national is charged. Moreover, in fiscal matters and, generally speaking, in a dispute between (Government) departments and a Soviet national regarding a purely administrative matter, the administrative courts (tribunals) will be competent.

3. Soviet nationals will only be amenable to lay tribunals and will be subject only to lay law.

4. The police courts will be competent only in matters of very small import and in acts punishable only by the infliction of a small fine. They cannot sentence to prison except in the case where Soviet nationals themselves request that the fine may be changed to imprisonment.

According to law, the police courts can never sentence to more than one week's imprisonment. It is clearly understood that they will not be able to sentence to corporal punishment.

5. A Soviet national arrested *flagrante delicto* for an act coming within the category of misdemeanour or crime will not be kept in prison for more than twenty-four hours without being brought before the competent judicial authority.

In cases other than those *flagrante delicto*, a Soviet national will not be arrested or imprisoned without an order emanating from the competent judicial authority.

6. Soviet nationals who are arrested and imprisoned will have the right—in conformity with the prison regulations—to communicate with their nearest consul and consuls, or their representatives will have permission to visit them on condition that the prison regulations are complied with.

Such requests made for communication with consuls will be forwarded immediately by the Government authorities.

7. The Imperial Government has made generous provisions for release on bail which will be the rule in all cases except cases of crime (crime as it is defined in the Penal Code).

The amount demanded for release on bail will be reasonable and will vary according to offence.

Where there is an appeal against judgment given, the same facilities for release on bail will be accorded until judgment on appeal is given.

8. Since, in accordance with Persian law and except in special circumstances, suits are held generally in open court, those people interested in a suit or in the fate of the parties thereto have the right to be present in the court, in the capacity of spectators, excepting in special circumstances, but they will have no right to take part in the proceedings.

9. In criminal cases the accused is absolutely free to choose his own counsel, who may even be chosen from his compatriots.

10. The Imperial Government has taken the decision to improve the state of the prisons in order to bring them more into conformity with modern usage. Meanwhile Soviet nationals condemned to prison for a period of more than a month will, at their own request, be transferred to a prison fulfilling the necessary hygienic conditions. Imprisonment for one month or less is convertible into a fine.

11. With regard to questions of personal status, Soviet non-Moslem nationals in Persia, will, on conditions of reciprocity, be subject to the provisions of their own national laws.

12. As regards taxes, Soviet nationals will receive the same treatment as Persian subjects and will not be called upon to pay any impost, taxes, or other fiscal dues on any account whatever which Persian subjects are not called upon to pay.

13. All questions relating to security for costs, execution of judgments, service of judicial documents, "commissions rogatoires," orders for the payment of costs and expenses, free judicial assistance and compulsory fulfilment of obligations are left to be regulated between Persia and U.S.S.R. by special conventions.

14. Seeing that in civil or commercial matters Persian law allows arbitration and clauses in agreements providing therefor, and since the arbitral decisions rendered in pursuance thereof shall be executed on the order of the president of the court of first instance, who is obliged to issue that order unless the decision should be contrary to public order, it is clear that Soviet nationals will be in complete enjoyment of this legal arrangement.

15. Soviet nationals cannot be arrested or suffer restraint in their individual liberty in order that civil claims against them may be provisionally safeguarded, except where there would seem to be a serious risk that the distraint to be made owing to any act on the debtor's part on his possessions which are actually in Persia would not be effective and could not otherwise be assured.

16. As regards property and rights concerning immovable property, it is understood that Soviet nationals are permitted to acquire, occupy or possess such property on Persian soil as is necessary for their dwelling and for the exercise of their commerce and industry.

[E 6245/96/34]

No. 125.

Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received December 2.)

(No. 567. Confidential.)

Sir,

Tehran, November 16, 1929.

IN the course of my conversation with the Minister of Court yesterday the question of his official position arose. I had referred to the delays always experienced in getting a reply even to the most urgent matters unless it was referred to His Highness personally. I said I knew he was overburdened with work, and consequently hesitated to trouble him too often. In the case referred to in another

despatch of the Indian Marine officers who had been invited to attend a ball at Abadan, but were not permitted to land, I had, however, at once written to him, as it struck me that the refusal of permission to land was so outrageous and unfriendly. He told me that, on receipt of my letter, he had referred to nobody, but had immediately sent an urgent telegram to the Governor to allow these officers to land. I said that if His Highness had been away, as he was last week, there was absolutely nobody who would take the responsibility to do anything. This was an extremely unsatisfactory state of affairs. Ghaffari, the Director-General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the acting head of that department, could apparently take no responsibility at all.

2. His Highness then proceeded to explain his own position as follows: At present it suited the Shah to make his Minister of Court the real head of the Government with a dummy Prime Minister who did absolutely nothing except draw a salary of 1,500 tomans a month (about £3,000 a year). If for any reason he (Taimourtache) disappeared from the scene, the present system would inevitably change, the dummy Prime Minister would disappear also, and a new Minister of Court, who concerned himself with the protocol and such-like things, would be appointed. He could, if he wished, be President of the Council to-morrow, but he did not wish to be President of the Council, when he would be forced to appear before the Majlis to defend his actions. Moreover, in his present position he was in daily communication with the Shah. This suited His Majesty, who used him as an intermediary through whom directions were given to the Ministers. He said: "I am, as you know, the real Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Ghaffari is nothing more than my under-secretary."

3. "When I disappear," he went on, "His Majesty will have to appoint a Prime Minister who will have full authority and take responsibility. At present he knows of no one to fill this rôle."

4. I said I had heard a rumour that Mustaufi might again be brought back. He replied that the only possible result of again making Mustaufi Prime Minister would be that he would sterilise every single department of Government. He then went on to say that he was feeling the strain and was very tired. He could not go on indefinitely, and he again urged me to hurry on our negotiations.

5. This conversation is illuminating. The present arrangement whereby the Minister of Court is a Grand Vizier in all but name would appear to be a temporary expedient, due to the personality of Taimourtache and the idiosyncrasies of the Shah. It is unconstitutional and no one expects it to last. The present Council of Ministers is merely a dummy committee to give effect to the decisions of the Shah and of the Minister of Court. But the latter may already foresee the end of this régime, which depends firstly on the life and health of the Shah, secondly on the health of the Minister of Court and the favour accorded to him by his Imperial master. I know of no one who could conceivably replace Taimourtache, who, in spite of the rebuff received by the appointment of General Kerim Agha as Minister of Public Works, is still indispensable to His Majesty, but Taimourtache is but human. His health has suffered in the past two years, and I feel he has definitely come to realise that, for many reasons, his present position cannot be permanent. In any case, he wishes to take a long holiday in Europe next summer. It may be that he feels that by choosing his own time to disappear from the scene he will later be able to return with undiminished power and even greater authority.

6. Copies of this despatch have been sent to India and Bagdad.

I have, &c.

R. H. CLIVE.

[E 6246/2/34]

No. 126.

Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received December 2.)

(No. 569.)

Sir,

Tehran, November 16, 1929.

I HAVE the honour to report that in the course of a long conversation yesterday evening with the Minister of Court extending over four hours, I raised the question of the visits of British warships to Persian ports.

2. I told his Highness that he appeared to be under a complete misapprehension as to the attitude of His Majesty's Government in this matter.

He seemed to think that we were asking from the Persian Government what we should not expect to receive from other countries. I pointed out to him that in France, Germany and Spain, to mention only three countries, standing permission was given in peace time for foreign warships to enter their ports, all that was required being that due notice should be given. In the case of Italy and Spain it was laid down that the usual rules governing the visits of foreign warships did not apply where special agreements were made. We were only asking that in peace time the three or four British sloops stationed in the Gulf should have standing permission to call at Persian ports, due notice in advance being given wherever possible. It was not as though our sloops were constantly running in and out of Persian ports, with the exception of Henjam, which was an entirely separate matter. For instance, when I visited Bandar Abbas the other day, it was the first occasion for two years that H.M.S. "Triad" had put into that port. On the other hand, as he was aware, His Majesty's consul-general at Bushire was at the same time Political Resident in the Persian Gulf; this was in accordance with an old-standing arrangement with the Persian Government. The Senior Naval Officer had frequently to communicate at short notice with the Resident; sometimes the Resident had at short notice to leave Bushire and cross to the other side of the Gulf. I might mention two occasions in the past six months when it could be said that H.M.S. "Triad" had called at Bushire in Persian interests. On one occasion three Persians who had been sent as slaves to the Trucial coast had been rescued, thanks to the efforts of the Political Resident, and were brought to Bushire, where the Governor saw them. On another occasion, the Resident crossed over to Koweit to enquire into the truth of the allegation that Koweit was the centre of the traffic in arms which his Highness pretended were being smuggled into Persia. The Political Resident and the Senior Naval Officer wished nothing better than to collaborate with the Persian authorities in the common interest of suppressing arms traffic, slavery, &c. I could see absolutely nothing wounding to Persian *amour-propre* in our present proposals.

3. His Highness began by saying he regretted he could not agree. The Persian Government were determined to have a small Persian navy of their own and to insist on their territorial waters being respected. The town of Bushire was considered throughout the Gulf as being nothing less than a British port where British warships could come and go as they pleased. Conditions existing in one country could not necessarily be applied in another. The Persian Government considered it essential to establish their sovereign rights in the Gulf. It was not that British ships were unwelcome in Persian ports, but, as things were to-day, the Persian Government felt bound to insist on permission being applied for in each case. I replied that his Highness was being quite unreasonable. To cite an instance, one of His Majesty's ships might be at Basra and wish to call at Bushire for a few hours on its way eastwards. If it was necessary to apply for permission through Tehran one must count from five to seven days before that permission could be obtained. This delay might upset the whole programme laid down for this ship. Why could his Highness not be satisfied with a notification through His Majesty's consul to the Governor? In the case of ships not stationed in the Gulf wishing to call at Persian ports, application would always be made through diplomatic channels, but the names of the ships in the Gulf were communicated every month to the Persian Government, and were perfectly well known to the Persian authorities. His Highness, however, persisted in his attitude, but finally said that once we admitted the principle that application must be made in each case for permission to call at a Persian port, it might be possible to authorise the Governors, under standing instructions, to sanction the visit without having to refer to Tehran, thereby eliminating any delay.

4. I decided to leave the matter at that for the moment, and referred to a recent case at Abadan, when a vessel of the Royal Indian Marine had called there to oil, and the officers were not allowed to go on shore to attend a dance at the Anglo-Persian Oil Company's club without permission from Tehran. I first thanked his Highness for the promptitude with which he had granted the necessary permission, which I hoped had reached Abadan in time for the officers to attend the dance, but added that the whole attitude of the Persian Government towards His Majesty's ships appeared to me at present to be almost deliberately unfriendly. I could not imagine that in any other country in the world would such difficulties have been put in the way of British officers landing at the port of a friendly country to attend a social gathering. What did he imagine the impression left on the officers would be? Would they not be likely to say on returning to India that the Persians

seemed to be a disagreeable and unfriendly people? His Highness did not deny this, but added that as soon as the question of principle was settled these little difficulties would at once disappear, and British warships would be welcomed. No man, he said, liked his friends, however intimate they might be, walking into his house without first knocking at the door. The feeling prevailed that British warships had always, so to speak, failed to knock at the door before entering Persian ports, and treated Persian territory as a place where they could do as they liked.

5. I see little hope at present of getting his Highness to yield on the question of asking and obtaining permission in advance, and I do not propose again to raise the matter until I have received instructions to speak to him about his navy proposals, the transfer of the Bushire Residency, and other questions which specially interest him.

6. Please see, with reference to this despatch, your telegram No. 254 of the 21st October, and my telegram No. 352 of the 7th November.

7. Copies of this despatch are being sent to India, Bushire and the Senior Naval Officer.

I have, &c.

R. H. CLIVE.

[E 6247/1/34]

No. 127.

Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received December 2.)

(No. 570.)

Sir,

Tehran, November 16, 1929.

I HAVE the honour to enclose a memorandum embodying my impressions of the reserved area at Henjam, which I visited on the 27th October.

2. I also enclose a counter-draft to the Minister of Court's last proposals, in which are incorporated the various observations contained in the enclosure to your despatch No. 478 of the 10th October.

3. You will observe that I have omitted from the counter-draft article 6 of the Minister's draft. I have little hope that he will agree to this omission, but, as reported in my telegram No. 354 of the 10th November, I will do my utmost to induce his Highness to meet us on the very important matter of the Persian military and police.

4. You will also observe that in paragraph 6 of my draft I have proposed a radical alteration in the quarantine regulations, based on what I understand to be the practice in Indian ports. I am happy to say that the Minister of Court, to whom I mentioned verbally this proposal, was disposed to agree. I pointed out that men-of-war did not make false declarations. There was really no difference between giving the quarantine officer a bit of paper to say that there was no infection and hoisting a signal to the same effect. His Highness, who can be extremely reasonable in practical matters, at once admitted this.

5. I propose to tell his Highness that if, as proposed in article 11 of his draft (also article 11 of the counter-draft), all the buildings in the area are to revert to the Persian Government on the expiration of the lease, it is inequitable to ask for a large rent, although, if he would agree to omit article 6 of his draft, I submit that it would be worth while for His Majesty's Government to consent to paying even a substantial rent.

6. I prefer to wait until I have something palatable for his Highness to digest before handing him the counter-draft.

7. Copies of this despatch have been sent to India, Bushire and the Senior Naval Officer.

I have, &c.

R. H. CLIVE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 127.

Memorandum: Henjam.

THERE are at present three Persian officials in the reserved area who matter:—

1. The postmaster, who holds rank of Deputy Governor.
2. The Customs Mudir.
3. The quarantine medical officer.

The two latter are inoffensive and have given no trouble lately. The postmaster is anti-British, writes misleading reports to Tehran and is generally considered a public nuisance. There are no police as yet, but a force of from ten to twenty-five is threatened in the near future.

There are about six soldiers.

There is another Customs Mudir at "Old Henjam" and a warrant officer in charge of the "garrison" of the whole island, which includes a further ten men.

The quarantine medical officer came off with extreme promptitude on our arrival, and there was no ground for complaint.

To anyone visiting Henjam for the first time the most salient features are:—

1. The two flagstuffs flying one the White Ensign, the other the White Ensign of the Royal Indian Marine.
2. The series of solid (reinforced concrete) buildings which house (a) the boatswain, (b) the dispensary, (c) the storekeeper, (d) the Telegraph Department staff, and the perhaps less solid but equally conspicuous white buildings which house (e) the naval canteen, (f) the Indian P.W.D. representative.
3. The miserable little native building which houses the port officer and the Deputy Governor. The customs house near the pier, although a newly built and fairly large Persian bungalow, looks insignificant in comparison with the very conspicuous British buildings higher up the hill.
4. The iron pier constructed by the Indian Marine Department during the war.
5. The long valley lying to the south-east of the residential quarter where football and other games are played.
6. The native village lying behind and to the south-west of the coal depot at the near end of the pier. Immediately behind the coal depot and east of the village are the buildings containing naval stores. These are wired off from the native village, sufficiently to prevent a right of way, although not enough to keep out thieves and loiterers.
7. The oil fuelling barge lying off shore near the pier.
8. The excellent anchorage in the narrowest part of the straits between Kishim Island and Henjam providing adequate shelter in all weather.

Now before and during my visit, when I walked round the reserved area, my attention was drawn to the following:—

(A.) *Quarantine.*

In accordance with the regulations in force for vessels arriving at ports in British India, "When any vessel with a clean bill of health and not suspected of infection is within sight of port, the master shall intimate the fact by signal; such an intimation shall ordinarily be accepted by the port officer, and if so accepted the health officer need not visit the vessel which may be considered to have pratique."

I consider that Taimourtache should be asked to accept this at least for Henjam, but preferably for all Persian ports.

(B.) *Petrol Storage Shed.*

It is desired to erect a suitable isolated building for this purpose. The Persians have so far refused. I found that petrol was at present being stored in a building adjoining the house occupied by the storekeeper. I propose to bring this to the notice of the Minister of Court.

(C.) *Persian Building Schemes adjoining Coal Dumps.*

This appeared to be unnecessary and provocative. I gather the postmaster was responsible for this. There was plenty of room and a more suitable site higher up the hill. It was not clear whether the projected buildings were for the new police force, the military, or for whom.

(D.) *Complaints by Persian Authorities against Telles, the Storekeeper.*

These appeared to be unfounded and due to a private feud with the postmaster, who was possibly instigated by the former coal coolie contractor (Gelladary), who had lost the contract and wished to revenge himself on Telles. This contractor had made a mint of money out of the Government of India, first during the war, when he fed the Turkish prisoners at 1½ rupees per head per day (the actual cost being reckoned at one-sixth of this, viz., 4 annas per day), and secondly, as coolie contractor for handling the coal, when he is believed to have made in one year 32,000 rupees profit.

(E.) *The Dispensary.*

Free to all inhabitants of the area and paid for by the Government of India. The coaling contractor has the right of free medical treatment for his coolies, and the number of persons treated averaged ten per day or 300 a month. The Persian doctor who acted as quarantine medical officer had no dispensary, and had never shown any desire to start anything in the nature of a practice.

(F.) *Persian Armed Guard for Coal Store and Dump.*

These five individuals cost something like £200 a year and were among the chief pilferers of coal. Besides the pay, they received food and clothing and were housed. With their arms they were also a potential danger. Two watchmen could, I was told, do all that is required, provided adequate barbed-wire fencing was erected, and would be much cheaper and more satisfactory.

(G.) *Prospective Police Forces.*

I was told that several coolies who had been discharged for pilfering coal were now being drilled at Bandar Abbas for the Henjam police force. Evidently the arrival of the police may be a source of much future trouble, and it would be a good thing if means could be found to keep them outside the area. This might be possible if the native village could be excluded by a wall from the area.

I propose in any case to speak to Taimourtache about the police, and beg him not to allow a lot of gaol-birds and riff-raff to masquerade in the area as a police force.

Enclosure 2 in No. 127.

Protocole relatif à Hengam.

ARTICLE 1^{er}.

SA Majesté impériale le Chah de Perse consent à donner à bail à Sa Majesté britannique une enceinte (dont les limites sont déterminées par la carte annexée*) dans son île de Hengam.

ARTICLE 2.

La durée du bail sera de _____ ans et il peut être renouvelé pour une autre période à déterminer si les deux Souverains se mettent d'accord.

ARTICLE 3.

Le but dans lequel Sa Majesté britannique désire avoir un bail sur l'enceinte spécifiée dans l'île de Hengam étant de pourvoir aux approvisionnements de ses vaisseaux de guerre et de la Marine royale des Indes et de la flotte auxiliaire (c'est-à-

* Not reproduced.

dire vaisseaux de la marine militaire qui ne sont pas armés). Sa Majesté impériale le Chah de Perse est d'accord à ce que dans ladite enceinte Sa Majesté britannique ait le droit de maintenir un dépôt de charbon, les réservoirs de pétrole, *magasins (store-houses)*, une station de T.S.F., *des terrains de sport* pour la récréation des marins et une *cantine navale*.

Sa Majesté impériale le Chah de Perse consent à ce que les autorités de Sa Majesté britannique aient le droit de construire les bâtiments nécessaires relatifs aux buts susmentionnés.

La sanitation dans l'enceinte susmentionnée est à la charge des autorités de Sa Majesté britannique, qui auront le droit de prendre les dispositions nécessaires à cet effet.

ARTICLE 4.

Sa Majesté impériale le Chah de Perse consent que pendant la durée du présent bail les importations dans l'enceinte et les exportations de l'enceinte des articles destinés à l'usage des bateaux de guerre de Sa Majesté britannique et de la Marine royale des Indes et de la flotte auxiliaire pour leurs propres besoins, soit la partie consommée dans l'enceinte, soit la partie mise en dépôt sous la surveillance des autorités douanières de Sa Majesté impériale le Chah, ainsi que le matériel nécessaire pour le fonctionnement des stations télégraphiques et radiotélégraphiques et pour la cantine navale soient exempts des droits de douane et de taxe de route et d'autres taxes analogues. Pour chaque importation de ce caractère un certificat sera délivré au préalable par l'officier responsable et dûment autorisé. Toutes autres importations ou exportations à l'effet des besoins de l'enceinte resteront assujetties aux droits et taxes en vigueur.

Il est entendu que le droit de la libre importation des articles prévus à l'article 3 est limité exclusivement à cette partie de l'île de Hengam marquée sur la carte annexée à l'article 1^{er}.

Il est également entendu que les autorités de Sa Majesté britannique n'exporteront de l'enceinte qu'à destination des vaisseaux de guerre de Sa Majesté britannique et de la Marine royale des Indes ou de la flotte auxiliaire.

Les importations et les exportations en général de l'enceinte resteront soumises aux règlements qui seront en vigueur dans toute la Perse quant aux prohibitions et restrictions.

ARTICLE 5.

Conformément à l'usage international, il sera permis aux équipes des navires de Sa Majesté britannique et de la Marine royale des Indes de se débarquer, rester dans l'enceinte précitée et de s'embarquer sans être soumis aux formalités de passeport, aux taxes de débarquement et de séjour ou à d'autres formalités ou charges analogues qu'ils portent ou non l'uniforme.

ARTICLE 6.

L'Empire de Perse étant signataire de la Convention sanitaire internationale du 17 janvier 1912, l'Empire britannique étant signataire de ladite convention et de la Convention sanitaire internationale du 21 juin 1926, Sa Majesté impériale le Chah de Perse et Sa Majesté britannique se mettent d'accord que, dans les limites de leurs engagements respectifs en vertu desdites conventions, leurs prescriptions seront appliquées aux bateaux de guerre définis en article 3 et par les autorités persanes.

Toutefois, pour faciliter l'arrivée desdits bateaux à l'enceinte de Hengam, les deux hautes parties contractantes conviennent que les vaisseaux de guerre arrivant à Hengam le jour signaleront dès qu'ils sont en vue de Henjam si les conditions sanitaires à bord sont bonnes en hissant le jour le drapeau "L."

Cette intimation sera généralement acceptée par le médecin quarantenaire, et dans ce cas il n'aura pas besoin de visiter le vaisseau, qui sera considéré d'avoir reçu pratique.

ARTICLE 7.

Sa Majesté impériale le Chah de Perse consent à louer à Sa Majesté britannique la station de T.S.F. de Hengam, qui servira strictement pour les besoins des bateaux de guerre de Sa Majesté britannique et de la Marine royale des Indes. Les autorités de Sa Majesté impériale le Chah de Perse peuvent également se servir de cette station, payant la taxe de transmission en usage en Perse.

Les frais de maintien de ladite station sont à la charge de Sa Majesté britannique.

A l'expiration du présent bail ou de son extension selon les prévisions de l'article 2 une station de T.S.F. en bon état de fonctionnement sera livrée aux autorités de Sa Majesté impériale le Chah.

ARTICLE 8.

Sa Majesté impériale le Chah de Perse donne son assentiment à l'usage libre de la rade au large de l'enceinte de Hengam pour le mouillage des bateaux de guerre de Sa Majesté britannique et de la Marine royale des Indes et de la flotte auxiliaire. Il reste entendu toutefois qu'aucun vaisseau de guerre ne restera en station permanente dans cette rade.

ARTICLE 9.

En échange du bail de l'enceinte de Hengam, de l'usage de la station de T.S.F., du droit de mouillage dans la rade de l'enceinte et des facilités accordées, Sa Majesté britannique consent à payer aux autorités de Sa Majesté impériale le Chah un loyer annuel de

ARTICLE 10.

Sa Majesté impériale le Chah de Perse convient que Sa Majesté britannique aura le droit de s'assurer à perpétuité du maintien en bon état du cimetière britannique à Hengam.

ARTICLE 11.

A l'expiration du présent bail ou de son extension selon les conditions de l'article 2, tous les bâtiments et installations se trouvant dans l'enceinte de Hengam reviendront gratuitement aux autorités de Sa Majesté impériale le Chah.

[E 6248/104/34]

No. 128.

Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received December 2.)

(No. 571.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of Intelligence Summary No. 23 for the period ending the 16th November, 1929, compiled by the military attaché to this Legation.

Tehran, November 16, 1929.

Enclosure in No. 128.

Intelligence Summary No. 23 for the Period ending November 16, 1929.

(Secret.)

Tehran.

1. *The Shah's Tour.*—His Majesty the Shah returned to Tehran on the 6th November on completion of one month's tour in the northern provinces. The chief places visited were Kazvin, Hamadan, Kermanshah, Senneh, Saujbulagh, Urumia, Tabriz, Ardebil, Astara, Pahlavi, Lahijan, Barfarush, Sari, Bander Shah.

2. His Majesty is said to have been very pleased with conditions in Azerbaijan. In Mazandaran the coastal road must have been greatly improved to allow of the considerable motor traffic entailed. The Shah was accompanied by a comparatively small retinue, including the Master of Ceremonies, the Amir Nizam, and Amir Nasir, eldest son of Soulet-ed-Dowleh. Teymourache joined the Royal party only towards the end of the tour. The Shah travelled on the new railway from Sari to Bander Shah, and appears to have been very well pleased with all he saw of the line. His Majesty is expected to leave Tehran for a tour in the south in about ten days' time, when he will inspect the railway between Dizful and Bander Shahpur, possibly also visiting Abadan.

3. *The Majlis.*—There has been considerable discussion on the question of imports; the restriction of which, especially of luxuries, is urged on the grounds of the maintenance of the exchange. The question of Persian oil has been mentioned, one Deputy suggesting that steps should be taken to increase the oil output from Persia, thereby increasing the wealth of the country.

4. The depreciation in the value of the kran continues to be the subject of a good deal of comment in the Majlis. Committees have been appointed to study the question, but, in the meantime, the Minister of Finance has not attended to give an explanation, and the subject is not clearly understood by the majority of the members.

5. The value of the kran is to-day 61.50 krans per £ sterling. Par is generally considered to be 55, but fluctuates according to the price of silver.

6. The provisional agreement between Persia and Austria has been extended for six months from November 1929.

7. The Perso-Italian Agreement has also been extended for one year from November 1929.

8. The short-wave wireless station at Najefabad is under course of construction. The cable connexions between the wireless stations are being laid.

Persian Baluchistan.

9. All troops of the Kerman Brigade, who have lately been attached to the Seistan Brigade, have returned to Kerman. The following is an analysis of the troops reported in the Sarhad and Baluchistan areas on the 31st August:—

Khwash	...	...	...	607
Bakshun and Shashtun	...	...	...	314
Gusht	...	...	...	28
Iranshahr	...	...	...	175
Mirjawa	...	...	...	50
Duzdap	...	...	...	150

10. Conscription in this area is proceeding apace. There is no active resistance, but bribery is freely resorted to, with frequent success.

Kerman.

11. The first lorries of the postal service from Kerman to Bandar Abbas commenced running on the 23rd September. The contractor states that the service will be twice weekly, and the time of transit forty-six hours. Dodge lorries are being used. The road, however, is not yet safe, and the service is liable to interruption.

12. Duzdap mails are now carried by motor between Bam and Kerman. Another postal lorry with mails from Bandar Abbas was attacked and looted near Tangi Zagh on the Kerman road on the 14th October. Since the first incident on the 27th September, the amnieh have provided four guards to accompany each postal van. These guards succeeded in escaping, but two passengers were wounded. A military detachment from Sirjan has been posted at Tangi Zagh, since when no further robberies have been reported on this section.

13. A commission appointed from Tehran arrived in Kerman on the 3rd October, with the object of enquiring into the local administration. The commission is investigating a large number of complaints received against all departments. Yawar Mustafa Khan, Alburz, the Rais-i-Amnieh, has been relieved of his appointment and sent to Tehran.

14. The number of conscripts liable to be called up this year from Kerman and environs is 900. The present conscription committee are taking every Parsee that they can lay their hands on. In former years the Parsees were accustomed to obtain exemption by bribery.

15. A mobile column recently left Kerman for Lai Zangan, the residence of Sheikh Abul Hassan. On the approach of the column the rebels and a large number of Baharlus, who had collected at Rastaq with the intention of stopping the progress of the column, fled. Sheikh Abul Hassan, as the result of a defeat at Khushnabad, fled with a few followers, and has not yet been captured.

16. During October the Russians sent four car-loads of petrol to Bam, where it was sold at the same price as the Anglo-Persian Oil Company's product.

17. Reference Intelligence Summary No. 21, paragraph 12. The country in which the roads have been made consists largely of wide open plains, with long glacis slopes, up to the hills, the formation of which lends itself to cheap road construction. The cost of construction is reported to be only £3 per mile. Three-ton lorries traverse the roads with ease, and cars can maintain an average speed of 25 miles per hour.

Isfahan.

18. It may now be said that the Bakhtiari trouble is definitely ended. On the 2nd November the Officer Commanding the Isfahan garrison (Sarhang Mohamed Khan, Maimand) issued a proclamation to the effect that Ali Mardan Khan, Chahar Lang, together with his followers, had surrendered to Government. Sartip Shah Bakhteh is reported to have proceeded direct to Tehran, bringing Ali Mardan Khan with him.

19. On the 2nd November a force of 1,000 infantry, with twenty-four automatic rifles, and an artillery detachment, with two field guns, and two pack howitzers, with baggage train, arrived in Isfahan from Chahar Mahal and left for Tehran on the 5th November.

20. On the 27th October, 7,000 sheep were stolen by Boir Ahmedis, 4 miles west of Yezdikhast. On the following day 400 cavalry, under Sardar Bahadur, left Abadeh and encountered the raiders at Padena, 87 miles west of Abadeh. Fighting took place and some twelve Boir Ahmedis were killed or wounded. The stolen sheep are being returned.

21. A combined operation against the Boir Ahmedi raiders is contemplated by forces from Shiraz and Isfahan, the strength of the proposed mixed force to be 1,000.

22. The present garrison of Isfahan is an independent command, reported to be 600 strong, consisting of infantry only, with detachments at Chahar Mahal, Nejefabad and Ardestan.

23. Conscription in Isfahan is being arranged by a commission, the president of which is the Governor-General. There are upwards of 60 per cent. of absentees.

Fars.

24. The Shiraz-Bushire road continues to be unsafe, especially in the vicinity of Borasjun. Convoys are escorted through at intervals. About 2,000 troops are said to have arrived at Borasjun on the 8th November.

25. Dareshuris were still at Baizah on the 26th October, where Malik Mansur Khan was in conference with the tribes *re* taxation.

26. It is reliably reported that the Baharlus have submitted to the Government and that Soulet-ed-Dowleh had gone security for them.

27. The relations between Soulet-ed-Dowleh and Shaibani continue to be amicable. The former is collecting arrears of taxes from the Kashqai; in this connexion the sum of 42,000 toman is mentioned.

Yezd.

28. Conscription has been applied for the first time to the town and environs of Yezd.

Khorasan.

29. The General Officer Commanding, Eastern Division, has lately given considerable attention to the organisation of athletics and sports in his command. During the latter half of October, races, football matches, and tennis tournaments were arranged by him, in some of which he asked the British and American colonies to take part. The programme was rounded off by a review of the garrison. The proceeds from the receipts are being devoted by the General Officer Commanding to the inauguration of an officers' athletic club.

30. *Afghan Affairs.*—Abdul Rasul ("Who's Who," 140) and Mohd. Ghaus Khan, late General Officer Commanding, Herat, gave an unofficial reception in the Afghan consulate in Meshed on the 23rd October. All present enthusiastically acclaimed Nadir Khan. Abdul Rahim has submitted, by letter, the allegiance of the inhabitants of Herat to Nadir Khan.

31. Mohd. Yakub Jan, ex-Minister of Court, Abdul Ahad, late aide-de-camp to King Amanullah, and other Afghan refugees now in Tehran, are very desirous of returning to Afghanistan without delay. Sultan Ahmed, Afghan Ambassador in Tehran, has wired to Nadir Khan asking to be allowed to proceed to Kabul, and be relieved of his present appointment. It is believed that Sardar Azizullah Khan will be appointed in his place. Ex-King Inayatullah appears to be in no hurry to leave Tehran and to return to his own country. He seems to have given up taking any interest in Afghan affairs.

Gilan.

32. The Conscription Committee, presided over by the Governor-General, began its session on the 7th October. By the 19th 550 names had been examined, of whom only sixty-six were found liable for service. All those attending schools have been exempted.

Mazanderan.

33. Conscription is being enforced for the first time in the Barfarush area.

Azerbaijan.

34. It is reported that material required for the Tabriz-Julfa Railway has been purchased from Sweden.

35. The number of conscripts found liable for military service between the 10th and 28th October was 2,082, exemptions totalling only 110.

PERCY C. R. DODD, Major,
Military Attaché.

Tehran, November 16, 1929.

[E 6303/33/91]

No. 129.

Mr. A. Henderson to Sir R. Clive (Tehran).

(No. 600.)
Sir,

Foreign Office, December 5, 1929.

IN paragraph 26 of the letter of the 20th August from the Minister of Court, a copy of which was enclosed in your despatch No. 439 of the 21st August, his Highness put forward a draft treaty article regarding Bahrein, the terms of which were as follows:—

"Sa Majesté impériale le Schah de Perse et Sa Majesté britannique se mettent d'accord pour reconnaître l'indépendance de Bahrein et les droits souverains du Cheikh régnant. Sa Majesté impériale le Schah de Perse aura le droit d'y nommer son représentant pour protéger les intérêts de ses sujets y résidant. Ces derniers auront la faculté de s'y livrer au commerce et à l'industrie dans les conditions accordées à la nation la plus favorisée."

2. The first sentence of this draft, by which the high contracting parties agree to recognise the independence of Bahrein and the sovereign rights of the ruling sheikh, omits the passage in the British draft by which Persia was to recognise the existing treaty relations which unite the sheikhs of Bahrein with His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and with the Government of India. The recognition by Persia of those treaty relations will, however, be provided for elsewhere in the treaty if agreement is reached on the lines proposed in my despatch No. 556 of the 21st November. Provided, therefore, that this question can be settled in connexion with the non-aggression article of the treaty, as suggested in my despatch above-mentioned, the first sentence of Teymourache's Bahrein draft article can be accepted as it stands.

3. The second sentence, relative to Persia's right to appoint a representative at Bahrein, has already been the subject of some correspondence, and you will be aware from the India Office letters enclosed in my despatch No. 543 of the 7th November that the Government of India and the India Office are anxious that at least, in the first instance, you should press for the maintenance of the existing

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arrangement, leaving the British political agent in Bahrein, who is an impartial guardian of Persian interests, to safeguard those interests. But whatever arrangement may be reached on this point, I consider that it should not be included in the treaty, and that the second sentence of Teymourache's draft article must be omitted altogether.

4. The third sentence, by which Persians resident in Bahrein shall have the right to engage in commerce and industry under the conditions accorded to nationals of the most favoured nation, will clearly have to be expanded to give similar rights to Bahreinis in Persia. This sentence must, therefore, be redrafted as a separate paragraph, to run as follows:—

"His Britannic Majesty agrees, on behalf of the Sheikh of Bahrein, that Persian nationals in Bahrein shall have the right to engage in commerce and industry under the conditions accorded to nationals of the most favoured foreign country, so long as Bahreini nationals in Persia shall have the right to engage in commerce and industry under the conditions accorded to the nationals of the most favoured foreign country."

I am, &c.

ARTHUR HENDERSON.

[E 6140/58/34]

No. 130.

Mr. A. Henderson to Sir R. Clive (Tehran).

(No. 281.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, December 11, 1929.

YOUR telegram No. 316 of 16th September: Suggestion that proposed Shatt-el-Arab Conservancy Board might superintend lighting and buoying of Persian Gulf.

You will see from correspondence in my despatch No. 582 of 3rd December that Admiralty and India Office see strong objection to Colonel Ward's suggestion. In these circumstances, and as Conservancy Board scheme is itself so uncertain, suggestion is not one which should at present be mentioned to Minister of Court.

[E 6542/3384/34]

No. 131.

Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received December 16.)

(No. 572.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of circular despatch No. 57 of the 20th November to His Majesty's consular officers, and of a note to the Persian Government, dated the 21st instant, on the subject of ownership of real property in Persia by foreigners.

Tehran, November 20, 1929.

Enclosure 1 in No. 131.

Sir R. Clive to His Majesty's Consular Officers in Persia.

(Circular No. 57.)

Sir,

Tehran, November 20, 1929.

WITH reference to my circular despatch No. 34 of the 13th July last, concerning the ownership of property in Persia by foreign nationals, I have to inform you that it has come to my knowledge that the Persian Government are subjecting the whole question to a careful re-examination, and have now the definite intention to grant to foreigners the right to acquire, under certain conditions, real property in the central parts of Persia. It remains to be seen whether this intention will bear fruit before the end of the period of one year mentioned in my above-quoted despatch.

2. Representations have also been made to the Persian Government that, in view of the great loss which foreign nationals may suffer owing to a forced sale of their property, it would be less inequitable to extend the period of one year to at least three, and to arrange in addition that a fair price should be paid even then.

3. It is to be noted that the revised attitude of the Persian Government, mentioned in paragraph 1, applies only to land situated in the centre of Persia; the fear that from ulterior motives Persia's neighbours are desirous of acquiring all the land near their own frontiers or along her seaboard is still strong in the Persian official mind, and I do not consider that there is any likelihood that the Persian Government will allow land near to their frontiers or to her seaboard to be freely owned by foreigners.

4. The foregoing information has been obtained from confidential sources, and therefore must not be communicated in full to British subjects. There is, however, no reason why you should not inform interested British subjects that the Persian Government are considering the question of permitting foreigners to own property in Central Persia, and that the period of one year may possibly be extended.

Copies of this despatch have been sent to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

I am, &c.

R. H. CLIVE.

Enclosure 2 in No. 131.

Sir R. Clive to Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Tehran.

M. le Directeur général,

Tehran, November 21, 1929.

IN a circular memorandum of the 19th Tir Mah, 1308 (10th July, 1929), the Ministry for Foreign Affairs informed this Legation that foreign subjects had no right to own real property in Persia except within the limits required for their residence, trade or craft; that a period of one year, expiring on the 19th Tir Mah, 1309, would be given to enable any foreign subject who owned property in excess of those limits to sell or transfer it; and that, should any foreign subject not have complied with this arrangement by the above-mentioned date, the property in question would be compulsorily sold by the Persian Government.

2. I am now authorised by my Government to communicate to your Excellency the following observations on that memorandum:—

3. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom do not admit that the ownership of land in Persia by British subjects is, or ever has been, contrary to treaty. It is true that, in certain treaties, many of which are no longer in force, mention is made of the fact that foreign subjects are at liberty to own dwelling-houses and places in which to carry on their business. But it is not stated in those treaties that foreign subjects shall not have the right to own real property in excess of this allowance. The Persian Government has, in point of fact, acquiesced tacitly in the ownership of land by foreign subjects for many years in excess of the allowances specified above.

4. A number of British nationals and firms have thus acquired, by tacit consent, without any objections having ever been made by the Imperial Government, real property in Persia. While the Governments whose interests I represent recognise that, from a strictly legal point of view, the Persian Government has a right to forbid foreign nationals to acquire such real property in future, they cannot accept the principle that such property as has already been acquired should be compulsorily sold without adequate compensation. They are of opinion that, should the Persian Government persist in requiring the eventual sale of these properties, the arrangements made for sale must be such that the present owner should not suffer damage therefrom. It is a well-known fact that the disposal of real property at short notice is often impossible without great loss to the seller; more especially will this be the case if possible purchasers know that simply by waiting a short time they will be able to purchase the land at auction. The Governments whose interests I represent consider that the period of one year, expiring on the 19th Tir, 1309, is much too short, and they suggest that it should be lengthened to at least three years; they also consider that, even then, adequate arrangements ought to be made to ensure that a fair price is received for the land.

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5. I have also to draw your Excellency's attention to the fact that in certain provinces of the Persian Empire no facilities at present exist for the registration of a possessory title to land. British subjects in these areas, therefore, are unable even to establish their proprietary rights on a firm and legal basis through no fault of their own; and, if the time comes for selling their land before the registration department has begun its work in a normal way, the mere fact of lack of registration would create fresh complications and difficulties for the unfortunate proprietor.

I avail, &c.

R. H. CLIVE.

[E 6543/96/34]

No. 132.

Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received December 16.)

(No. 578.)

Sir,

Tehran, November 25, 1929.

IN my telegram No. 361 of the 21st November I had the honour to inform you that Ghaffari, the Director-General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, had been dismissed, that Farzin, who for the past two months had been Minister of Finance, had been appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs, and that his place at the Ministry of Finance had been taken by Mirza Hassan Khan Moshar (Moshar-ul-Mulk), a former Minister for Foreign Affairs.

2. According to information which I have received, the circumstances which gave rise to these changes were as follows:—

For some reason which is not at present clear to me, the Ministry of Justice had at length decided to circulate to provincial Governors and local tribunals the safeguards which had been agreed to by the Persian Government as long ago as the 10th May last year, and which the Minister of Court had assured me at the time would be immediately brought to the knowledge of the competent authorities. These safeguards, which were drawn up in French, had, it appears, in spite of the assurances given, only recently been translated officially into Persian and, though unofficially known to the provincial Governors, had never been communicated to them. Two hundred copies of the British safeguards had now been reneographed and sent to the Ministry of Justice. A press correspondent, happening to call on the "sous-chef de cabinet" of the Minister, enquired what this bundle of papers was, and was told that he might take one. The next day the British safeguards appeared in the Persian press. This gave rise to all manner of surmises, and the story was spread that the British had obtained a number of special advantages which had been accorded to no other foreigners. For this publication Ghaffari was in no way responsible. On the other hand, in order to clear up the misapprehension about special privileges to the British, he at once communicated to the press copies of the safeguards agreed to with certain other foreign representatives. This apparently had the effect of still more bewildering the public. The Shah was furious, enquiries were made as to how these documents had reached the press, a special communiqué was issued by the Ministry of Justice to explain away the safeguards, and Ghaffari and the "sous-chef de cabinet" to the Ministry of Justice were dismissed.

3. It may not be realised that, since the appointment of Ansari (Mushaver-ul-Mamalek) as Persian Ambassador in Moscow in April 1927, *i.e.*, for more than two and a half years, there has been no Minister for Foreign Affairs. Three gentlemen have served as Acting Ministers and, since the appointment of Farzin last June, first as Acting Minister, then as Minister of Finance, there has only been a Director-General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, in the person of Ghaffari. As you are aware, however, the absence of a titular Minister for Foreign Affairs has not, in fact, impeded relations; it has even tended to facilitate them, as all questions of importance have been dealt with directly, and far more expeditiously, by the Minister of Court.

4. The dismissal of Ghaffari has now created a new situation. There was no one in Tehran who was considered capable of being Director-General or suitable as Acting Minister. Farzin, who for the past two months had been Minister of Finance, could hardly be expected to accept the position now of Acting Minister; he has therefore been appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs, no doubt with the concurrence of the Minister of Court, who, I imagine, is satisfied that, with a man

of Farzin's feeble character and lack of initiative, he will still continue to control Persian foreign policy, as he has done for the past two and a half years.

5. The appointment of Moshar-ul-Mulk as Minister of Finance is interesting. I have reason to know that, on the very morning on which he was appointed, he had no inkling of what was in store for him. He had, in fact, arranged to come round to this Legation that day to pay a friendly visit to Mr. Havard, my oriental secretary, who had just returned from leave.

6. Surprise has sometimes been expressed that the Shah, since his accession to the throne, has never made use of Moshar's services, as he is known to have considerable regard for his character and abilities. I am told, however, that Prince Firuz particularly disliked Moshar-ul-Mulk and did all he could to poison the mind of the Minister of Court against him. At the same time, I have no reason to believe that the appointment of Moshar-ul-Mulk was intended as a slap in the face to Teymourache, although it is unlikely that the appointment will be very agreeable to him. It will, moreover, be interesting to see what lines the new Minister of Finance will take with regard to the railway and the enormous financial burdens which will be thrown upon this country if the trunk line across the plateau is really to be built. I am writing on this latter question in a separate despatch.

7. Copies of this despatch have been sent to India and Bagdad.

I have, &c.

R. H. CLIVE.

P.S.—*December 1.*—Since writing the above I have had a long talk with Teymourache. He said that I might be surprised to learn that he had himself suggested the name of Moshar-ul-Mulk to the Shah as Minister of Finance. The circumstances were as follows: The Shah had come to realise that Farzin was quite useless as Minister of Finance. A big scandal had recently been disclosed (the full truth was not yet known) whereby Government grain stored in Tehran had disappeared to the value of some £150,000. This had apparently been going on for some time past, and it was suspected that Prince Firuz was implicated in the matter. The Shah was determined to get to the bottom of it, and told the Minister of Court to find him a new Minister of Finance. Teymourache was not altogether displeased at this order from His Majesty. He realised that, as a former friend of Prince Firuz, he might be accused of trying to shield him by keeping such an ineffectual and feeble individual as Farzin as Minister of Finance. He found, however, that among the younger generation there was not one single man whom he considered competent for the position. The older generation were, he knew, all jealous of his power. Finally, he decided that Moshar-ul-Mulk, in view of the respect in which he was generally held, his upright and honest character and his previous experience as a Minister, was the only man whom he could conscientiously recommend to the Shah. Moreover, in view of the mutual antipathy existing between Moshar-ul-Mulk and Prince Firuz, nobody could now accuse him of attempting to shield the latter. He admitted, when I put it to him, that Prince Firuz had tried to poison his mind against Moshar-ul-Mulk; he begged me to believe, however, that he was not influenced by the personal likes and dislikes of the Prince. Accordingly, he sent for Moshar-ul-Mulk one morning, told him of His Majesty's instructions and, two hours later, he was presented by the Prime Minister to the Majlis as the new Minister of Finance.

R. H. C.

[E 6544/172/34]

No. 133.

Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received December 16.)

(No. 581.)

Sir,

Tehran, November 26, 1929.

IN my despatch No. 337 of the 15th June I had the honour to inform you that the estimated cost of the trans-Persian trunk line had risen from 75 to 120 million tomans (*i.e.*, from £15 million to £24 million, taking the kran at 50 to the pound).

2. Two days ago Mr. M. B. Carrel, vice-president of the Ulan Company, lunched with me. He had just returned from Khuzistan and expected to leave for Europe next week.

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3. I asked Mr. Carrel various questions about the railway, and it may be of interest if I briefly record what he told me.

4. The southern section from the so-called port (no port at present exists) of Bandar Shahpur, on the Khormusa inlet to Dizful, at the foot of the Luristan mountains, a distance of 250 kilom. (156 miles), will be completed in January. The northern section from what again can only be described as the so-called port of Bandar-i-Shah to Aliabad, a distance of 101 kilom. (62 miles), should be completed early next spring. The total cost of the two sections, including the wooden piers at the two ports, would be about 16 million tomans (say £3,200,000). Meanwhile, the syndicate had submitted detailed plans with an estimate of cost for constructing the line from Dizful to Aliabad across the Persian plateau in eight years. The cost of the work was estimated at 173 million tomans (about £35,200,000).

5. I enquired how the Persian Government could ever hope to pay this staggering sum, which, added to the cost already incurred, would bring up the total to not far short of £40 million, and this would not include the cost of constructing the two ports.

6. After fencing with the question a while, Mr. Carrel eventually admitted that Persia could not afford to pay this sum.

7. I then said I had heard that the syndicate could build a railway of the same gauge (standard), but with steeper gradients and sharper curves at a considerably reduced figure. Mr. Carrel said this was so, and he personally thought that such a railway would be amply sufficient for Persia's needs. I asked what would be the cost. He said no definite estimate had been made, but it could, he believed, certainly be built for £25 million and possibly for £20 million. The Persians were, however, at present opposed to the idea, and Russian engineers, of whom there were a number in the country, supported them. Russian railways had sweeping curves and easy gradients, and no one denied that Russians were excellent railway engineers. The Persians, no doubt, had the impression that a cheaper railway would be a second class affair, and that they would not be getting sufficient value for what must still be an enormous outlay.

8. I said that I presumed the cost of running the cheaper railway would, in any case, be greater, and that with increased fuel consumption the haulage cost per mile would be higher with resulting higher freights. He admitted this.

9. I then said that, even taking the very lowest figure of £20 million, if the railway was to be built in eight years the Persian Government would presumably be forced to borrow. He said yes, but not very much. For the first two or three years practically no material would have to be purchased from abroad. Digging and blasting would be the order of the day. There was still about £3 million in hand from the sugar and tea monopoly, while the estimated income from the monopoly was about £1,200,000 a year. I said, leaving aside the amount they might have to borrow, they obviously could not borrow anything at all against the monopoly funds if these were to be used to meet the cost of construction. Therefore, they could only borrow against their customs receipts or the oil royalties. As both these figured as ordinary revenue, taxation would have to be increased to provide a sum equal to the amount required for the service of a loan.

10. At this point, Mr. Carrel remarked: "Anyway, they have a nice railway in Khuzistan."

11. I replied truthfully that I had heard on all sides that the Ulan Company had done their work extraordinarily well in the south, and that it certainly seemed to me possible that in the course of time the southern section might even prove remunerative. He said he felt sure it would. Dizful would become an important point as railhead and roadhead. Goods from the north would be off loaded there and railed direct to Bandar Shahpur and put on board ship.

12. I then enquired about the prospective port of Bandar Shahpur. When recently at Abadan I had flown over the Khormusa inlet, and I enclose a photograph* taken by one of the oil company officials who accompanied me, which shows the wooden pier built by the syndicate, and gives some idea of the surrounding country which, uninhabited and with no fresh water, consists of mud flats which, at the high spring tides, are flooded. Fresh water would have to be brought by pipe line some 25 miles, while embankments would be necessary if buildings are to be constructed. Mr. Carrel thought, however, that the cost of the minimum required to be done need not exceed £1 million. But it is indeed a desolate spot.

13. In view of what Mr. Carrel told me, I doubt the Persian Government, or rather the Shah, coming to any definite decision just yet on the main question.

* Not reproduced.

14. The syndicate's estimate of £35 million appears to have come as a rude shock, and it is just as well that His Majesty should take a little time to think the matter over.

15. Copies of this despatch have been sent to India and Bagdad.

I have, &c.

R. H. CLIVE.

[E 5546/634/34]

No. 134.

Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received December 16.)

(No. 555.)

Sir,

Tehran, November 29, 1929.

I HAVE the honour to report that, on or about the 12th November, Dost Mohammad Khan, against whom the Persian Government conducted somewhat extensive military operations in Persian Baluchistan last winter, succeeded in escaping from detention in Tehran.

2. It will be remembered that, as a result partly of the military operations and partly of false promises as to his future treatment, Dost Mohammad was induced to sue for pardon from His Majesty the Shah, as reported in my despatch to Sir Austen Chamberlain No. 97 of the 20th February.

3. On the 1st April Dost Mohammad arrived in Tehran, where he was well received by the Shah. The latter was gracious and kind to him, gave him a money allowance and had him properly housed and clothed in the approved Pahlavi fashion, but never had any intention of allowing him to return to his native province, however much any of the subordinate military officers who had beguiled Dost Mohammad into surrender may have held out such a possibility to him.

4. There is no doubt that Dost Mohammad considered that such a promise had been made to him, but he appears never to have allowed the Persians to think that he imagined he had been betrayed.

5. Dost Mohammad was more or less free to move about in Tehran as he desired, and was even allowed to go as far afield as Veramin to shoot, accompanied, of course, by an officer of police or roadguards.

6. Veramin lies in a huge plain some 50 miles to the south-east of Tehran, and bordering on its southern side is the salt desert, which stretches right away from north-west to south-east as far as the northern confines of Baluchistan itself. Dost Mohammad went shooting there twice during the summer, and returned with gazelle and wild ass as a mark of his prowess.

7. When he asked for leave to go there again at the beginning of this month it seemed quite natural, and permission for him to go with the usual police officer was willingly accorded. This time, however, Dost Mohammad had no intention of returning to Tehran. He had evidently been struck by the facility which a shooting trip to Veramin offered for escape, and had, it is surmised, made his plans by means of trustworthy messengers to his own people in Baluchistan when once he had verified the possibilities of obtaining his freedom. Going out from Veramin one morning, Dost Mohammad and his guard stumbled into four running camels with their men, who were ready and waiting. What happened can only be conjectured, for the police guard has apparently never since been found, neither has Dost Mohammad since been heard of.

8. It seems almost certain that Dost Mohammad's people had—without anybody's knowledge—come up through the desert, possibly leaving relays of camels at certain water-holes, and had arranged to be at or about a certain date on the edge of the Veramin plain with the means of escape for their chief. Nothing but a camel can travel in this swampy, salty desert, and few Persians can sit a running camel, the use of which is foreign to them in any part of Persia outside Baluchistan. What, therefore, at first sight would appear to be something of a forlorn hope or a mad adventure has turned out really to be a stroke of genius, and Dost Mohammad must by this time have reached whatever destination he had had in view.

9. The Shah is rumoured to have vented his anger by beating the chief of police, but the official body studiously refrains from any mention of the escape; in fact, the affair has been kept as secret as anything can be kept in the East, that is to say,

the press has not reported it, but everybody knows that Dost Mohammad is no longer in honourable captivity in Tehran.

Copies of this despatch have been sent to the Government of India, His Majesty's consul-general at Meshed and His Majesty's consul at Seistan.

I have, &c.
R. H. CLIVE.

[E 6548/104/34]

No. 135.

Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received December 16.)

(No. 590.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of Intelligence Summary No. 24 for the period ending the 30th instant, compiled by the military attaché to this Legation.

Tehran, November 30, 1929.

Enclosure in No. 135.

(Secret.)

Intelligence Summary No. 24 for the Period ending November 30, 1929.

Tehran.

1. *Appointments.*—M. Dekerckheer, Belgian Director of Customs, has been appointed Treasurer-General, in addition to his own duties, *vice* Dr. Walder, who is returning to Switzerland.

Mirza Hassan Ali Khan Ghaffari, officiating Minister for Foreign Affairs, has been dismissed, and Mirza Mohamed Ali Khan, Farzin, Minister of Finance, appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs. The reason for Ghaffari's dismissal was the publication in the newspaper "Ettala-at" of an article dealing with alleged confidential matter regarding the status of foreign subjects in Persia, and for the publication of which Ghaffari was held to be responsible. The "Ettala-at" has been ordered to cease publication.

Mirza Hassan Khan, Moshar-ul-Mulk, who in 1924-25 was Minister for Foreign Affairs, has been appointed Minister of Finance. Since taking office he has devoted his energies particularly to the question of the prevention of opium smuggling and to the arrest and prosecution of the accused in the matter of the large deficit recently discovered in the Government grain store and the embezzlements in Kermanshah.

2. *Dost Mohamed Khan.*—Dost Mohamed Khan, who was captured and brought to Tehran early this year after the Persian Government had carried out successful operations against him, has escaped from Tehran. He obtained permission to go shooting, killed his guard and escaped on camels which he had previously arranged for. He will presumably make for Persian Baluchistan, but, even if he is not captured *en route*, it is not thought that he will be in a position to give much further trouble at the present time. Sarhang Mohamed Khan has been sent from Duzdap to Khwash to watch possible developments.

3. *The Majlis.*—The most important matter dealt with has been the Opium Smuggling Bill and the Bill for the punishment of offenders in this matter. An amendment to the Penal Code has also been before the Majlis to allow for the punishment of Government and municipal employees. In this connexion a temporary Bill has been passed which later on will come up for ratification.

4. The question of local "hakims," or village practitioners, has been mentioned, and they are now allowed to practise, in spite of the regulation by which no unqualified doctor is allowed to practise in Persia.

5. *Railways.*—The Ministry of Public Works has issued instructions to the Railway Syndicate, who control the construction in the north, to expedite the completion of the line up to Aliabad before the beginning of the winter compels them to cease work.

6. *Wireless.*—Budget estimates for the coming year will allow for the establishment of a broadcast receiving station which will relay European broadcasts for the benefit of the Persian public.

7. The Ministry of Posts and Telegraphs have purchased 10,000 tomans' worth of spare parts for wireless plant from the Russian Shark Company.

8. *Afghan Affairs.*—Nadir Khan (or Shah) has been officially recognised as King of Afghanistan by the Persian Government. The present Afghan Ambassador, Sultan Ahmed, is proceeding to Kabul. His successor is Azizulla Khan ("Who's Who," 285).

9. *Persian Air Force.*—Sartip Nakhewan, Commandant of the Air Force, crashed a Junkers monoplane on the Tehran Aerodrome on the 13th November. The machine was reduced to splinters. Nakhewan broke an arm, injured both knees and is now in hospital. Two Frenchmen flying with him, one Lieutenant Du Rief and another, were cut about the face but not seriously. Du Rief was engaged by the Persian Air Force about one month ago as chief technician; he has five French assistants. He states that the Persians in the air force have no mechanical sense and make only fair mechanics. The pilots fly their machines automatically and possess little knowledge of their machines.

10. *Civil Air Lines.*—The civil passenger and postal air service between Baku and Moscow has been closed down. On account of the increase of air mails between Persia and foreign countries, it is considered that the present number of Junkers postal aeroplanes in Persia is insufficient, and consequently this service is being augmented by a certain number of new machines from Germany.

11. *Banks.*—It is announced in the press that, as the business of the National Bank is progressing so favourably, a special credit of 500,000 tomans will be allotted to this bank in next year's budget.

12. *Conscription.*—Over 1,000 students in the more advanced educational establishments of Tehran have been granted certificates of exemption from military service.

In Hamadan, of the first batch of 300 conscripts called up, only 130 presented themselves, of whom nearly 100 were exempted. A second batch of 2,200 are now being dealt with.

The following are the conscription figures from the Birjand area:—

Birjand	...	...	...	...	325
Kainat	...	...	...	...	80
Ghunabad	...	...	...	...	130
Kalikh	...	...	...	...	70
					605

Of these, eighty will remain in Birjand to serve locally in the cavalry detachment and the remainder will be sent to Meshed.

13. *Finance.*—The exchange, which recently fell to over 61 krans to the pound sterling, has hardened, and at present stands at 58.

14. *Sports.*—A Russian football team from Soviet Azerbaijan have recently been playing a series of matches against a Persian team in Tehran. The play has been of an unexpectedly high standard, but the Russians have so far proved superior on all occasions.

Khorassan.

15. *Meshed-Duzdap Road.*—The following is an extract from a note by His Majesty's consul-general, Meshed, regarding the Meshed-Duzdap road:—

"Considering the little work and money spent on it, this road, 600 miles in length, is wonderfully good. There are 60 miles of extremely bad going, 140 miles indifferent and 400 of good going, some of which is extremely good. The speedometer showed 620 miles, which was done in twenty-seven and a half running hours, working out at an average speed of 23 miles per hour. This was taking it easy in a big Buick car."

16. *Perso-Afghan Frontier.*—One hundred and fifty rifles have been issued to frontier villages on the Perso-Afghan border for self-protection against Afghan raiders.

Gilan.

17. It is reported from Resht that several minor points noticed lend colour to the rumour of a food shortage in the U.S.S.R., especially in the Caucasus area. That this is more of a fact than a rumour is confirmed from other sources also.

Ishahan.

18. Ali Mardan Khan, Bakhtiari, who led the recent revolt against the Government, has been brought to Tehran, where he had an interview with His Majesty the Shah, and was pardoned.

Khuzistan.

19. *Telegraphs*.—An extension of the telegraph line from Ahwaz to Bassatin has been sanctioned and a sum of 7,000 tomans allotted for this purpose. Bassatin is 52 miles north-west of Ahwaz on the left bank of the Karkheh River.

20. Several new telegraph lines are now under construction in Southern Persia.

PERCY C. R. DODD, Major,
Military Attaché.

Tehran, November 30, 1929.

[E 6549/637/34]

No. 136.

Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received December 16.)

(No. 593.)

Sir,

Tehran, November 30, 1929.

I HAVE the honour to report that M. Walder, the Swiss Treasurer-General, who arrived here in the summer of 1928, has resigned, and is returning to Switzerland. His case is rather pathetic. I have never before met a Swiss quite like M. Walder outside his own country. He neither speaks correct German nor French. That unintelligible dialect of low German current in the Bernese Oberland is his native language. Except possibly for an occasional brief "ausflug," he had never quitted his native highlands, and came to this country imagining that the Persians were like the Swiss. He combines the slowness of comprehension of a Norseman with the naivety of a child.

2. Having been systematically insulted by Teymourache, who always referred to him to me as "ce crétin de Walder," it at last began to dawn on him that something was wrong. His main duty is to encash the Government receipts and sign the orders for Government payments, but he was given no authority over the financial agents in the provinces. Receipts were falling off and he could do nothing. Finally, the budget for next year was drawn up without his being consulted at all. On the credit side figured a number of receipts which, to his knowledge, were non-existent. He complained, and, so far as I can make out, was told to mind his own business. He at length realised that his position was not merely ridiculous, but an entirely false one. He might even be accused of not having encashed the non-existent receipts which figured in the budget. So he resigned and his resignation was immediately accepted.

3. M. Dekerckheer, the Belgian Administrator-General of Customs, has been temporarily appointed pending the sanction of the Majlis to fill the post of Treasurer-General. M. Dekerckheer hopes to retain his post as head of the Customs concurrently with that of Treasurer-General. Under the existing law the latter post should be filled by a Swiss.

A copy of this despatch has been sent to the Government of India.

I have, &c.
R. H. CLIVE.

[E 6550/19/34]

No. 137.

Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received December 16.)

(No. 595.)

Sir,

Tehran, December 1, 1929.

YOUR despatch No. 556 of the 21st November reached me yesterday afternoon. The same evening the Minister of Court had invited me to dinner in order that we might have a talk about various matters, and I took the opportunity to refer to the point raised in paragraph 7 of your despatch. Reference is therein made to paragraph 10 of my despatch No. 439 of the 21st August, in which I stated that I had told his Highness that the point raised in paragraph 8 of his letter of the 20th August in regard to article 1 of the draft treaty appeared to be unnecessary, as, in my opinion, should either of the high contracting parties cease to be a member of the League of Nations, the engagement to respect the territorial integrity and political independence of the other would none the less remain in force. Last night I informed his Highness that I was now authorised to say that His Majesty's Government had no intention whatever of withdrawing from the League of Nations, and that they presumed that Persia had no such intention either. Moreover, the treaty was being negotiated on the basis that both countries would continue to be members of the League of Nations and parties to the Kellogg Pact. In these circumstances, the point raised in paragraph 8 of his letter to me of the 20th August did not arise.

2. His Highness replied that he entirely accepted what I said. He was sure that His Majesty's Government had no intention of withdrawing from the League of Nations, but circumstances, however unlikely, could conceivably arise which, at some future date, might determine His Majesty's Government to go back on the intention which they had to-day. Again, with reference to the Kellogg Pact, had not His Majesty's Government made certain reservations? He begged me to believe, however, that he was not for a moment questioning the good faith of His Majesty's Government, but to speak quite frankly he was somewhat disappointed with the wording proposed. If, for instance, His Majesty's Government would be prepared to consider some such wording as the following, the effect in Persia would, when the treaty came to be published, be very different to the effect which would be produced by the present draft. He had in mind some such wording as this: "Each of the high contracting parties, in view of the obligations incumbent on them as members of the League of Nations and in view of the Multilateral Treaty for the Renunciation of War, signed in Paris on the 27th August, 1928, and in view of the ancient ties of friendship existing between them, guarantees to respect the territorial integrity and political independence of the other, &c."

3. He went on to explain that he would, of course, have preferred a separate non-aggression treaty such as Persia had with her other neighbours, but he realised that this was impossible. Moreover, conditions had changed since he first made his proposal, the downfall of Amanullah had, at any rate for the moment, removed any danger of aggression on the part of Afghanistan. He hoped I realised, however, that there was all the difference in the world from the Persian point of view between saying "in accordance with the international obligations," and saying "in view of these obligations" with the addition of some such phrase as he suggested. Any Persian reading the article as at present drafted, would simply say this means nothing at all, it merely reaffirms existing obligations, whereas on reading the article drafted on the lines he suggested would at once realise that the relations between Persia and His Majesty's Government were being genuinely and whole-heartedly established on a new basis of mutual friendship and confidence. Persia's other neighbours also would be much more impressed by the wording he suggested.

4. I told his Highness that I would submit to you what he said. I shall take an early opportunity of discussing with him the other points raised in your despatch.

5. A copy of this despatch has been sent to the Government of India.

I have, &c.
R. H. CLIVE.

[E 6729/33/91]

No. 138.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received December 27.)

Sir,

India Office, December 23, 1929.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to transmit to you, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of correspondence respecting Persian communities at Bahrein received from the Government of India.

I am, &c.

A. HIRTZEL.

Enclosure 1 in No. 138.

Consul-General Barrett to Mr. Acheson.

Dear Acheson,

Bushire, November 8, 1929.

WITH reference to my demi-official telegram of the 28th October, 1929, I enclose a copy of Prior's report on the Persian communities of Bahrein, together with a copy of my covering demi-official letter to the Minister.

Yours sincerely,

C. C. J. BARRETT.

Enclosure 2 in No. 138.

Mr. Prior to Consul-General Barrett.

Sir,

Bahrein, November 4, 1929.

I HAVE the honour to refer to your letter and to submit the following note upon the Persian communities at Bahrein:—

2. The Persians at Bahrein fall naturally into two groups, the Sunnis and the Shi'ahs. Of these the Sunnis, though the smaller in number, are the more influential, for they comprise the wealthier merchants and traders and the skilled artisans, boatbuilders, masons, carpenters and the like. The Shi'ahs are mainly petty shopkeepers, coffee- and tea-shop proprietors and motor drivers. They provide almost all the day labourers and dock workers, and most of the bad characters of the Persian community are to be found in their ranks.

3. The Sunnis are naturally on better terms with the sheikh, having the same faith and mode of worship, and their relations with him are, on the whole, good. The Shi'ahs have much less respect and goodwill for the sheikh, who not unnaturally cannot escape the bias that the more or less open hatred between Sunnis and Shi'ahs gives rise to. I cannot call to mind any instance in recent times when his Excellency has shown any active dislike for the Shi'ah Persians, and the agency has, of course, stood as a buffer between them and any active ill-treatment.

4. Their relations with the Arab communities follow in the main the same religious cleavage. The Sunni Persians are on good terms with the Sunni Arabs, and the Shi'ah Persians are on good terms with the Shi'ah Arabs, or at least were, for the recent persecutions of Baharaneh at Mohammerah have effected a notable change in this respect, and there is now something approaching hostility between them, the Baharaneh at Mohammerah being for the most part Shi'ah Arabs. The Sunni Persians occasionally intermarry with Arabs, but it is unusual for Shi'ah Persians to do so.

5. It should be noted that the large Najdi element among the Arabs dislike all classes of Persians, but particularly the Shi'ahs, whom they esteem worse than Europeans or Jews. They are particularly annoyed by the Moharram processions, and if not kept in check would at these times become violent and break up "rozekhanes." It will be recalled that the riots of 1923 were an instance of this ill-feeling of Najdis directed against Persians, an ill-feeling which still smoulders and would readily burst into flames.

6. This summer the ill-feeling between the Sunni Arabs (other than Najdis) and the Persian Shi'ahs was better than it has been for many years past, and the unusual spectacle was seen of their paying visits to Matims ("rozekhanes") together

with Sunni Persians. The ill-treatment of Baharaneh at Mohammerah before alluded to has undoubtedly had a bad effect, and any *entente* has received a severe set-back, and if it continues unabated till next year it will probably give rise to interference with Moharram processions and "rozekhanes."

7. There is an undercurrent of Arab feeling against all Persians which is directed against their privileged position, and support by the agency, a support which the Persians are somewhat apt to throw in their faces. The fact that no foreigners can acquire property in Persia, and that many Persians own extremely valuable property, both in real estate such as gardens, water rights and buildings, in Bahrein is unfavourably commented upon, and there is a feeling that they should be made to return where they came from. There is no doubt that the abler Persian merchants are making considerable headway, and now that customs restrictions have almost killed the trade of Lingah and the smaller Gulf ports they tend to concentrate their business in Bahrein.

8. The two Persian communities have little love for each other, and their animosity is principally based on religious antipathy. This year there were signs of more sympathy between the parties, and Sunni boys are now to be seen reading side by side with Shi'ah boys in the main Persian school. The younger generation show a more liberal attitude towards each other, due partly to laxer religious ideas and partly to the recent growth of national sentiment. There are individual friendships between men of the opposite parties, but little business dealings, and social intercourse is principally confined to solemn occasions such as "ids" and marriages. Relations have, however, steadily improved in recent years, and with a continuance of the *Pax Britannica* which shelters them, a permanent improvement is not too much to hope for.

9. So far as I am aware, their grievances are few. They would naturally prefer to be under the administration of their own Government, but they come to Bahrein of their own accord and mostly prosper and remain here. I have heard complaints that they, more especially the Shi'ahs, have not been given their position at public functions, &c., but, apart from the dislike of Arabs in general for Persians in general which fluctuates from time to time, the Shi'ahs have few members who have sufficient social position to enable them to take a more prominent place.

10. The passport regulations are resented by all Persians, who find it interferes seriously with their trade and liberty of movement, but the Bahrein State had no option but to retaliate in this matter. The trade in sailing-boats from the small ports on the Persian side has undoubtedly been prejudiced by this, for it is difficult for such people to obtain visas without going some distance.

11. I understand some resentment was felt that the boys of the Persian school were stopped from parading the streets in military formations with bugles and national flags, and complaints were made to Bushire and Tehran, and, finally, the Governor of the Gulf ports made a representation to the residency in the matter. This complaint is quite unreasonable, for the idea underlying it was quite clear to the Arabs, who naturally resented this spirit of aggressive nationalism, realising that the Persian Government would not for a minute allow an Arab school, did one exist at, say, Mohammerah, to make similar demonstrations. In fact, the whole situation of the Persian schools appears anomalous, for since they would prevent any attempt to start an Arab school in Khuzistan they have little claim to subsidise in Bahrein without the permission of the Bahrein Government.

12. When the present Shi'ah kadi was appointed some complaints were made that he did not know Persian to listen to the complaints or cases of Persians, but he comes from a Mohammerah family, and since he managed to understand my Persian without difficulty, I have no doubt that he can understand Persians speaking it.

13. There can be no complaint that the agency is unfitted to deal with the many cases of Persians that come before it. I personally speak Persian much better than I do Arabic, and have a ten years' experience of dealing with them. Two of the clerks whose special duty it is to handle cases that go to the kadis speak Persian as their mother tongue, and the principal munshi was for many years a Persian. Such Indians as are employed on the vernacular side almost without exception have studied the language at school. Apart from the standard of justice and uniform law applied, they have the inestimable benefit of having had careful records kept of all their cases ever since the present régime was introduced nearly twenty years ago.

An undoubted grievance was brought to me by a big Persian merchant who complained that the Diving Court (he was a Sunni Persian) were not giving him a

fair hearing in a case, and were attempting to force him to agree to an unjust compromise. I investigated the matter and found that he had cause for complaint, and deputed my assistant, Khan Bahadur Sayyid Saddiq Hassan, to watch the case. He did so, with the result the award of the court was very substantially increased in his favour and an equitable settlement finally arrived at. This has been the sole case of bias that I have met in the courts. The Persian community have four members on the commercial court and are very well represented, and are also well represented by *elected* members on the municipalities. The elections were keenly contested when they were last held two years ago.

They are also, of course, represented in the police force.

14. I personally cannot say I have ever heard of any other serious grievance, nor, indeed, when their present favoured position is contemplated, do I see how they could exist. They have the inestimable privilege of acquiring property which is denied in their own country to foreigners, and have taken full advantage of it. They have their own schools and, unlike Baharaneh at Mohammerah, are free to wear any head-gear they choose. There are no restrictions upon their trade, for Bahrein is free to all merchants and makes no distinction between nationalities. They are enabled, by the protection of the agency, to carry out their religious processions, obnoxious though they are to a majority of the inhabitants, and unpalatable by their very nature to the Sunni Arabs, in an Arab State of which the Government is Sunni.

15. In fact, I may say, in conclusion, that I have been much struck by the freedom from restrictions the Persian community here enjoy, when I contrast it with the innumerable complaints received in Bahrein of the treatment of their compatriots in Mohammerah and elsewhere. So far, the Bahrein Government have taken no reciprocal action except in the matter of passports, but if there is a recrudescence of the complaints of this summer, it is probable that public pressure and Arab opinion will oblige them to take a more active part than they have hitherto done.

My personal opinion is that, if the leaders of the Persian community were privately sounded, their only real complaint would be that the passport restrictions are troublesome and injure their trade, and also possibly that Abdullah Qusaibi, whom they considered responsible for the riots of 1923, was allowed to return to Bahrein.

I have, &c.

C. G. PRIOR,

Political Agent, Bahrein.

Enclosure 3 in No. 138.

Consul-General Barrett to Sir R. Clive.

Dear Sir Robert,

Bushire, November 8, 1929.

I ENCLOSE a copy of Prior's report on the Persian communities of Bahrein.

It is moderate in tone and presents a true picture of the situation. I have nothing to add to it, but I should like to stress the difficulties which Teymourache created by his persecution of the unfortunate Baharaneh in Mohammerah.

The Sunni Arab never likes the Shiah Persian, whom he regards as a particularly unpleasant heretic. Surely even in their own interests it was foolish for the Persians to alienate the slight feeling in their favour on religious grounds of the Shiah Baharaneh.

The passport policy of the Persian Government within the Gulf is frankly absurd. The Bahrein Government naturally retaliated, and it is with difficulty that I have prevented further retaliation due to the narrow views of the gentleman who has recently been appointed Persian consul at Karachi.

The retaliatory measures imposed by Bahrein mainly affect the Persian community, who are the chief traders between Bahrein and Persia. The remedy lies in Persian hands. If Teymourache relaxes the Persian passport regulations, I am sure Bahrein will reciprocate.

I can endorse Prior's opinion of the privileged position of the Persians, whose interests in Bahrein itself are well guarded by the British agency.

Even at the present day this protection is a matter of considerable importance. Before the abdication of Sheikh Isa from active control, it was probably the only thing that kept Persian traders in Bahrein.

The Bahrein Government have not interfered with the free working of the Persian school in Bahrein, though they dislike the subsidy paid by the Persian Government.

Naturally, enough, they resented the marching through the streets of boys in military formation headed by drums, fifes and the Persian flag. As a matter of fact, this provocative display was stopped by the school committee.

It was undoubtedly foolish, as the Persian demonstrations led to demonstrations by Arab schoolboys headed by their flag, and sooner or later a clash must have occurred.

Yours sincerely,

C. C. J. BARRETT.

[E 6756/634/34]

No. 139.

Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received December 20.)

(No. 371.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, December 29, 1929.

MY despatch No. 585.

Dost Mohammed has been caught between here and Meshed and brought to Tehran.

(Repeated to India, No. 222, and Seistan, No. 45.)

[E 6779/4706/34]

No. 140.

Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received December 30.)

(No. 597.)

Sir,

Tehran, December 5, 1929.

I HAVE the honour to refer to my despatch No. 463 of the 7th September, 1929, regarding the relations between His Majesty's consulates and local Persian officials, and to despatch to you herewith a memorandum summarising the various reports received on this subject from His Majesty's consular officers.

2. It will be seen that the position is, on the whole, not unsatisfactory, as I am of the opinion that the anti-British feeling, undoubtedly fostered by the tribal troubles last summer, is essentially a temporary phenomenon. Khuzistan is, perhaps, more complicated, but I have every hope that recent measures proposed by the Minister of Court and accepted by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company may help to clear the air there also. I refer to an arrangement whereby the company will to a large extent dispense with, or at least reduce, their present intelligence services, relying upon a Persian organisation instructed to work closely with them.

3. The recent instructions issued from Tehran limiting to Governors and Governors-General the duty of exchanging calls with foreign consuls is, of course, responsible for a certain deterioration in the relations between consuls and the minor local officials, particularly where a newly-arrived consul is concerned. I am, however, inclined to think that, as is the way in this country, these instructions may tend to become less strictly observed in those posts where the consul shows himself ready to enter upon the relations usually obtaining in such cases.

I have, &c.

R. H. CLIVE.

Enclosure in No. 140.

Memorandum respecting Consular Relations with Persian Officials.

THERE is a very natural tendency for relations to be best where British interests are of least importance and Russian influence predominates. The situation is least satisfactory at posts situated in or near areas affected by the recent tribal revolts and in the proximity of the oil-fields. Distrust of British motives in Persia is no new phenomenon. It lies dormant for a while, but can be worked up at any time. It has recently been reflected in the readiness with which even the higher officials give credence to absurd rumours, generally of Russian origin, accusing

British agents of fomenting trouble among the dissatisfied tribes. The attitude of provincial officials is largely influenced by the atmosphere in Tehran and by what is considered likely to please His Majesty the Shah. Fear of being accused of pro-British sympathies is in many cases the reason for lack of cordial relations, the establishment of which is rendered more difficult by the recent limitation of official intercourse to the higher officials only. Consular officers are sometimes chary of becoming too intimate lest their friendly advances be mistaken for propaganda by the Persians.

2. Generally speaking, the position has been more or less normal in the north, east and west, deteriorating in the centre in proximity of the recent tribal risings, while it was least satisfactory in Arabistan and Fars. The position in Bushire, Ahwaz, Shiraz and Mohammerah has already been reported on fully.

3. In Tabriz and Resht the position is good, in spite of Russian propaganda. Russia is powerful and feared, and the presence of a British representative welcomed as a slight counterbalance. In Meshed, while deliberately planned propaganda hardly exists, the Soviet consul-general undoubtedly encouraged rumours that the tribes in Bakhtiari and Shiraz were being armed and instigated by the British. Local Anglo-Persian relations are friendly, but sincerity is lacking, political expediency being the determining factor. The majority of intelligent Persians mistrust both Russians and British; they no longer consider Russia so dangerous as formerly; on the other hand, they feel that the British could overthrow the present régime if they wished.

4. Relations in Seistan are reported to be as good as they have ever been since the withdrawal of British troops. They are more difficult at Duzdap, with its large Indian colony, but the Persian General Officer Commanding has been friendly. A certain amount of anti-British propaganda is spread by the Soviet consul, who has a small following among junior Persian officials.

5. The position in Kermanshah has been consistently good. There has been a marked tendency to friendliness on the part of unofficial classes lately. Russian instigation is presumed to be at the back of what propaganda there is. Suspicion was recently aroused when a Dr. Lees, in charge of an oil prospecting party in the Kurdistan area, presented a cheap watch to one of the tribal chiefs, by whom it was given out that Dr. Lees had been sent to him on a special political mission by His Majesty's Government.

6. Improvement is also observed in Hamadan, and relations are not to any extent adversely affected by a vague general feeling that Great Britain is not in sympathy with Persian progress. The Russians are always on the look-out for a chance of fostering anti-British propaganda, and have recently opened a club which, however, has as yet no importance.

7. At Isfahan relations with the Governor-General are reported to be most cordial and His Majesty's consul-general's efforts to avoid making unnecessary trouble appreciated. The situation was temporarily affected by the Bakhtiari revolt. In connexion with this, it is worthy of note that the military authorities, having previously reported the tribesmen to be disarmed, were faced with the difficulty of explaining how they happened to be well equipped this summer, and found it convenient to accuse the British. Attacks were also made in the press, probably at Russian instigation, and an incident fabricated out of the C.M.S. Dr. Schafer's visit to Ali Mardan, the Bakhtiari rebel, details of which were forwarded under Tehran despatch No. 398 of the 25th July, 1929.

8. At Yezd, while cordial relations exist with the Governor, there is an under-current of hostility to the British, and the usual suspicion of implication in the tribal rebellion prevails. It is significant that at Kerman the situation improved after the closing of the Russian consulate. A general belief that His Majesty's Government stood at the back of the rebellion does not seem to have prejudiced the attitude towards the British.

9. With the exception of Bandar Abbas, posts in the south have been made the subject of detailed reports. At the former place there has lately been some improvement, but the attitude of the Governor is not certain. Other officials are friendly with the exception of the quarantine officer.

E 6780/6545/34

No. 141.

Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received December 30.)

(No. 600.)

Sir,

Tehran, December 4, 1929.

I HAVE the honour to report that the new prison at Kasr-i-Kajar was inaugurated by His Majesty on the 2nd December in the presence of the Cabinet Ministers, Deputies and a number of other notables. The following day the foreign representatives and members of their staffs were invited to see the new prison.

2. Kasr-i-Kajar is the name of the palace built by Nasr-ed-din Shah on a picturesque eminence lying about half-way between Tehran and the summer resort of Shimran. It is beautifully situated, with an extensive view over the plain to the south. The palace has not been occupied for a number of years, and when the Capitulations were abolished eighteen months ago it was decided to construct a new model prison in the grounds. There can be few prisons in this world built in such beautiful surroundings.

3. On arrival at the prison grounds we were received by the Minister of Court, with whom were the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Justice and Interior, and the new chief of police, General Sadiq Khan Koupal (Salar-Nizam). It transpired that, on the day before, on the occasion of His Majesty's visit, the beds of the sentries had, by an oversight, been left outside. His Majesty summoned General Mahomed Khan Dargahi, the chief of police, abused him vehemently before the assembled company and told him he was dismissed. I had the honour to report this in my telegram No. 365 of the 3rd December.

4. The Minister of Court, who, with the new chief of police did the honours of showing the foreign representatives round the prison, was in his most gay and genial mood, which can no doubt in part be attributed to the sudden dismissal of his old enemy General Mahomed Khan, though the genuine astonishment of the foreign representatives at the new model prison must have been equally pleasing to him. The prison has been built to accommodate 600 male and 200 female prisoners. M. Markoff, the Russian architect who designed it, told me that it was based on the latest plans drawn up by the International Prison Committee (a body of whose existence I am ashamed to say I was till then unaware). The corridors are all light and airy as are the cells, all of which were carpeted. The cells for prisoners convicted of misdemeanours had accommodation for five people, and the prisoners were supplied with a good mattress and blanket. There were a number of cells to hold only one prisoner convicted of more serious crimes, but these were of adequate size, and for some reason which was not clear to me, were supplied with a bedstead instead of with a simple mattress. There were numerous courtyards in which the prisoners could exercise; there was a hospital ward and a pharmacy, an operating room and large well-equipped bathrooms. I asked the Minister of Court if I could be supplied with a plan of the prison, and this he promised to have sent me. It would certainly be impossible to complain, in the event of any British subject being sentenced to serve a term in this prison, that the accommodation as seen yesterday could in any way be complained of.

5. I asked M. Markoff what had been the cost of the building. He said 195,000 tomans (say, £39,000), while the installation of electric heating which was being arranged for would cost an additional 60,000 tomans. The total cost would therefore be about £50,000.

6. Copies of this despatch have been sent to India and Bagdad.

I have, &c.

R. H. CLIVE.

E 6781/3384/34

No. 142.

Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received December 30.)

(No. 603.)

Sir,

Tehran, December 5, 1929.

IN accordance with instructions contained in your despatch No. 416 of the 27th August on the subject of the ownership by foreign nationals of immovable property in Persia, a note, of which a copy was forwarded in my despatch No. 572, was addressed to the Persian Government on the 21st November, in which it was pointed out that a period of one year was quite inadequate for the disposal of real

[20533]

Q 2

property and that, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, this period should be increased to at least three years.

2. In the course of a long conversation which I had with the Minister of Court on the 30th November, he informed me that my note to the Persian Government of the 21st November had been sent to him. He went on to say that he was in sympathy with a great deal of what I said. He frankly admitted that a forced sale at short notice was unfair to the owner of the property; at the same time, however, he was not in agreement with the solution suggested of extending the period from one year to three. He argued that this would merely have the effect of postponing for a couple of years any attempt on the part of the majority of owners to sell their property. In the third year exactly the same difficulty would arise as that of which we complained to-day. He wished, however, to submit to me an alternative solution.

3. He proposed that the owner of the property and the Persian Government should each nominate a representative to assess the value of the land in question and that the mean figure between these two assessments should be taken as the value of the land. If the property was not sold at this valuation at the end of the year's period, it should continue to remain in the ownership of the proprietor until such time as a buyer came forward who was ready to pay the assessed value, the Persian Government having the right at any time to acquire the property at this value. In the opinion of his Highness the rights of the owner of the land would thereby be safeguarded and in all probability a good deal of property would still remain for some time in the possession of these foreign owners, whose position, however, would be legalised.

4. He asked me what I thought of his proposal. I naturally was very guarded in expressing an opinion and said I would submit it to you. *Primâ facie* it appears to me a reasonable way out of the difficulty. The Minister added that he had spoken in the same sense to one or two of my interested colleagues; he mentioned the Turkish Ambassador and the French Minister, and said that, broadly speaking, they had expressed themselves satisfied.

5. Although I have received no reply in writing to my note of the 21st November to the Persian Government, I shall be glad to learn in due course what reply you wish me to give to his Highness's proposals.

6. Copies of this despatch have been sent to India and Bagdad.

I have, &c.

R. H. CLIVE.

E 6782/6317/34

No. 143.

Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received December 30.)

(No. 606.)

Sir,

Tehran, December 15, 1929.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 365 of the 3rd December and in continuation of my despatch No. 600 of the 4th December regarding the dismissal of General Mohammad Khan Dargahi from the command of the police force, I have the honour to state that the day following that on which the chief of police was dismissed the Shah gave instructions that he was to be confined in the lock-up of the military police. At the same time some four of his immediate police subordinates were arrested and confined there too.

2. It appears that on the evening of the day of the dismissal the Shah received news that Dost Mohammad had arrived in the Province of Kerman, and that he and his men had had a brush with some military in which the latter had suffered slight losses. His Majesty at once ordered his car and went down to the central police station, where he arrived about midnight. From there he telephoned to General Dargahi to come immediately, but the latter pleaded illness and said he was unable to obey. The Shah then telephoned to one or two other military officers, who were not at home, and finally found General Salar Nizam, who came hastily to the police station, where he was ordered to take charge of affairs.

3. There would seem to be little doubt that the escape of Dost Mohammad was largely responsible for the arrest of the chief of police, but his subordinates could hardly be blamed for this. For some time past the Tehran public have not been pleased with the present police methods, and Dargahi's dismissal is a cause of joy to many. In the course of the police investigation into the murder of the woman which I reported in my despatch No. 582 of the 28th November, a serious

miscarriage of justice was very nearly committed, as the police, by methods of torture, had succeeded in wringing a confession from a man who was entirely innocent of the deed. When the real murderer was found the public were horrified to discover that such methods were possible. The Shah may therefore have decided that a change in the higher posts of the administration was in any case advisable.

4. Dargahi, after a week's confinement, was liberated on the 11th instant, but was degraded from the rank of general to that of colonel. It is too early yet to speculate on his chances of reinstatement. He has been in charge of the police administration ever since the departure of the Swede, General Westdahl, and, generally speaking, has carried out his task efficiently. He has built up an intelligence service which functions, it would appear, extremely well, and the Shah was in the habit of trusting to the full the information which his chief of police produced. This, in the opinion of many, rendered Dargahi almost indispensable to His Majesty. Personality plays a prominent rôle in all matters Persian, and Dargahi had himself built up and manned this service. It may be surmised therefore that the personnel is faithful to him and may find the control of a new chief irksome, with the consequent result that the Shah's news will not be as efficiently served up as formerly.

5. In the meantime General Salar Nizam has been confirmed in his new post, but it is considered to be only a temporary employment. Were the Shah to reinstate Dargahi, it would be only one more repetition of his well-known methods of reminding powerful subordinates that he is the master of their fate. It may be expected, however, that all Teymourache's influence will be used to keep Dargahi out of favour as long as possible.

6. A copy of this despatch has been sent to the Government of India.

I have, &c.

R. H. CLIVE.

[E 6783/104/34]

No. 144

Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received December 30.)
(No. 608.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of Intelligence Summary No. 25 for the period ending the 14th December compiled by the military attaché to this Legation.

Tehran, December 14, 1929.

Enclosure in No. 144.

Intelligence Summary No. 25 for the Period ending December 14, 1929.

(Secret.)

Tehran.

HIS Majesty the Shah is expected to leave Tehran for a tour in South Persia in the last week of December.

2. The chief of police, Sartip Muhammed Khan Dargahi, has been dismissed and was imprisoned for a week by direct orders of the Shah, of whom he was a close personal friend and adviser. His successor is Sartip Salar Nizam, at one time Persian military attaché in Turkey and lately Governor of the Pusht-i-Kuh. He is an officer with a good military record. At the invitation of the ex-chief of police, members of the Diplomatic Corps and others were shown over the new and very up-to-date prison at Kasr-i-Kajar, on the Gulhek road, on the 2nd December.

3. Amir Lashkar Hussein Khan Khazai has been relieved from the command of the North-Western Division, which has been given to Sartip Hassan Khan Moqaddam (Zaffer-ed-Dowleh), lately officer commanding troops at Saujbulagh. Moqaddam has been promoted Amir Lashkar and leaves for Tabriz on the 14th December.

4. Major Mehmed Ali Khan Sherbani has, it is reported, been sentenced to sixteen years' imprisonment for his illegal practices whilst recruiting officer in Sultanabad. He received his further military training in France. His assistant is said to have also been tried and condemned to death.

5. The Persian members of the Perso-Turkish Frontier Commission have returned to Tehran from the frontier for the winter. Work will recommence in April 1930.

6. A State Board of Inspection has lately been established in Tehran. The board consists of two specially selected members from each Government department, under the presidency of Davar, Minister of Justice. Their duties are to supervise the work of Government and municipal officials throughout Persia. To assist them in these duties, provincial Governors have received orders to submit to the board fortnightly reports on the work of Government officials in their districts and forward for investigation any complaints made against them. It would appear that this board has been established with the object of stopping bribery and corruption amongst State officials, as the necessity for some such form of supervision was found over the recent scandal connected with the Government grain store, when an equivalent of £160,000 of grain was found to be short and for which some eighty individuals have been arrested. The board will, after investigation, in cases where it is thought necessary, send offenders for trial to the new court which has been established for the punishment of Government and municipal employees, the Bill for which has recently been before the Majlis.

7. *Foreigners.*—M. Wilden, French Minister in Tehran, has been transferred, in the same capacity, to Peking.

Mr. Akio Kasama, the newly-appointed Japanese Minister, arrived in Tehran on the 5th December.

Mr. Narusé, who until recently held the post of Japanese Chargé d'Affaires, died in Tehran on the 8th December.

Herr Fry, the newly-appointed Comptroller-General of Accounts, has arrived in Tehran. The following foreigners are now employed in the Ministry of Finance in accordance with the law passed authorising the Government to employ four German or Swiss financial experts:—

Dr. Schniewind (German), Director-General of Finance.
Dr. Scheere (German), Inspector-General of Finance.
Herr Fry (German), Comptroller of Accounts.
M. Dekercckheer (Belgian), Treasurer-General.

The latter is an officiating appointment, *vice* Dr. Walder, Swiss, resigned. M. Dekercckheer has undertaken this duty in addition to his work as Director-in-Chief of Customs.

8. *Education.*—Four French experts are to be engaged as instructors for the Agricultural School at Karej.

9. Three schools are to be opened for the education of tribal children in the areas Persian Baluchistan, Kashgai and Pusht-i-Kuh. A credit of 6,000 tomans has been allotted for this purpose.

10. *Posts.*—An agreement has been made by which mails from Persia can be carried to Europe by the Amsterdam-Dutch Indies Aerial Service, which connects with the Persian air line at Bagdad.

11. *Miscellaneous.*—It is stated in the press that the amount derived from the State tobacco monopoly amounted in October to an equivalent of £48,000, and in November to £46,000.

12. *The Majlis.*—A Bill to allow for an annual credit to be granted for scholarships to fifteen students at the High School for Teachers in Tehran has been before the Majlis. Other matters discussed have been the Attachment Bill, which guarantees payment of damages by appellants in the court, leave for Deputies, import of luxuries, &c.

13. *Railways.*—It appears from further information now available that the Shah was not very pleased with what he saw of the northern section of the railway, and there is a general feeling that the work in the north is not satisfactory.

14. From the south it is reported that the Karun bridge is practically complete, as also is the wooden trestle bridge over the Jerrahi River, about 32 miles from Bandar Shahpur. The eight wooden trestle bridges which it was found necessary to construct to carry the line over the 10 kilom. of marsh land in the vicinity of the port were completed some time ago. These bridges vary in length, the longest being

810 metres. Progress on the line, which was nearing completion from the sea to Dizful, has been retarded on account of the rainy season, which has caused considerable damage to the embankments, abutments, &c.

15. It is confirmed that the train service between Tabriz and Julfa has been increased and now runs three times weekly. This also applies to the service between Tabriz and Sharif Khaneh, on Lake Urumia. In the latter case the steamer service has likewise been increased, and embraces the ports of Golman Khaneh for Rawineh, Hiderabad for Sanjbulagh and Rowanduz and Danalu for Maragha. The railway track between Tabriz and Julfa has recently been somewhat improved.

16. Eleven Persians from the staff of the Tabriz-Julfa Railway have been sent to Moscow for instruction in railway administration.

17. Of the thirty Persians recently sent to Germany to learn technical duties in connexion with railways, twenty are working in schools and factories and ten in locomotive shops.

18. *Civil Air Lines.*—The following statistics have been published by the Junkers Company operating in Persia:—

	1927.	1928.
Kilometres flown	193,039	337,494
Passengers carried	2,812	4,033
Post carried (in kilog.)	757	4,931
Goods carried (in kilog.)	37,602	87,993

In 1927, 10 per cent. of the passengers were Persians.

In 1929, 75 per cent. of the passengers were Persians.

No serious accident has occurred up to date since the establishment of the service in January 1927.

In 1927 there were three Junkers monoplanes (four-seaters) operating, each of 135 h.p.

In 1929 there are eight Junkers monoplanes operating, each of 320 h.p., of which four are seven-seaters.

The Junkers Company are said to have ordered a large twenty-five seater monoplane from Germany for passenger traffic on the Persian air lines.

Khorasan.

19. It is reported that M. Batmanoff, formerly Soviet consul in Shiraz, has been appointed Soviet consul-general, Meshed, in succession to M. Dukhovski, who left Meshed in October.

20. On account of the escape of Dost Mohamed, Amanullah Mirza, General Officer Commanding, Eastern Division, under orders from Tehran, left Meshed for Duzdap on the 3rd December. He has orders to proceed to Persian Baluchistan and take over the direct command there, and make precautionary military dispositions in the event of trouble arising.

21. Sartip Murteza Khan, the chief of the Persian Amnieh, who was touring in East Persia at the time of Dost Mohamed's escape, returned to Tehran on the 2nd December in answer to an urgent summons.

22. A party of some thirty mounted Afghans recently carried out a series of raids in the vicinity of Turbat-i-Sheikh Jam. They were eventually engaged by the Persian Amnieh and lost two men, killed, and were forced to abandon all the property stolen.

Gilan.

23. His Majesty the Shah on his recent tour, when at Pahlavi, decided in favour of a direct bridge with a swing section to connect Pahlavi with Kazian. This bridge it is proposed to construct from the boulevard at Pahlavi, near the Baladiéh, to the old arrival jetty on the Kazian side, close to the port offices. The width here is 190 metres. The opinion of the engineers is still in favour of the two-bridge scheme via Mianpusteh.

24. Whilst at Pahlavi His Majesty instructed M. Saradoff to draw up plans for a new port at Nabibabad (in Kilar Ristag, near the mouth of the Chalus), and expressed his intention of linking that place by a direct road to Tehran. Should this ever be done, the route will probably be that followed by "Routes in Persia," Vol. 2, Route One (N), a distance of 112 miles. Nabibabad consists at present of sixty scattered dwellings and a small bazaar by the sea.

25. It is reported that lately there have been signs of greater participation by the Persians in the Caspian Fisheries and less of their use as a Soviet propaganda base. Much of this is due to the Governor-General, who takes a great interest in Pahlavi and allows no initiative to the local Governor.

PERCY C. R. DODD, Major,
Military Attaché.

Tehran, December 14, 1929

[E 6784/96/34]

No. 145.

Sir R. Clive to Mr. A. Henderson.—(Received December 30.)

(No. 609.)

Sir,

Tehran, December 15, 1929.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that during the last six weeks considerable curiosity has been aroused amongst the public and much anxiety among certain Government officials by the disclosure of extensive peculation in the Government granary.

2. Sometime in August reports reached the Inspectorate of the Ministry of Finance of shortages of grain in the Government granary, and, after a summary investigation, this was found to be true and a thorough investigation was ordered. Towards the end of November it was found that grain to the value of 900,000 tomans was missing. When the report reached Farzin, then Acting Minister of Finance, he sent for the chief Persian member of the committee of inspection and accused him of having instituted the inspection from motives of personal animosity, and three days later this official was placed *en disponibilité*.

3. The shortage was found to have accrued during the last two years, roughly during the period that Prince Firuz was Minister of Finance. The dismissed inspector was not long in receiving a message from Farman Farma, the father of Firuz, to the effect that if the Prince had one or two enemies the inspector in question must now realise that he had many powerful friends. The meaning of Farzin's accusation then became apparent. The dismissed official had recourse to Teymourtache, who made the pretext that this affair was outside his province. He then addressed a petition direct to the Shah, who sent for him and asked for explanations. The Shah himself enquired into the matter and severely censured the Ministers of Finance and Justice for their remissness in not pursuing the affair, and ordered the dismissed inspector to fill the rôle of public prosecutor in the court appointed to investigate the matter.

4. A few days later Farzin was transferred to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and Mirza Hassan Khan Mushar was made Minister of Finance. The enquiries into the peculation made rapid progress, and very shortly some eighty Government employees were under arrest. More than 300,000 tomans have been traced and the properties of the dishonest officials have been confiscated. Nothing has yet been brought home to Prince Firuz except that some 5,000 tomans was paid in excess for a quantity of grain from Kermanshah, believed to have originated from some lands of his father there.

5. The Shah, as a result of this scandal, has ordered the Minister of Justice to constitute a board of Government inspectors, whose duty it will be to meet together and discuss the affairs of the various Ministries. This board is composed of two members from each department, who are recommended by the various Cabinet Ministers as honest and worthy officials. They are to watch over the conduct of their colleagues and report anything suspicious. Such reports will form the basis of a *procès-verbal* of any matter which may afterwards be the subject of investigation by the court appointed to enquire into and judge the conduct of Government officials. The Governors of the provinces have also been instructed to forward fortnightly reports on the working of the various departments in each province and, when necessary, reports on individual officials. The Shah optimistically hopes by this means to purge the Administration and make dishonesty the exception rather than the rule.

A copy of this despatch has been sent to the Government of India.

I have, &c.

R. H. CLIVE.